False Discoveries in UK Mutual Fund Performance

We use a multiple hypothesis testing framework to estimate the false discovery rate (FDR) amongst UK equity mutual funds. Using all funds, we find a relatively high FDR for the best funds of 32.8% (at a 5% significance level), which implies that only around 3.7% of all funds truly outperform their benchmarks. For the worst funds the FDR is relatively small at 7.6% which results in 22% of funds which truly underperform their benchmarks. For different investment styles, this pattern of very few genuine winner funds is repeated for all companies, small companies and equity income funds. Forming portfolios of funds recursively for which the FDR is controlled at a ‘acceptable’ value, produces no performance persistence for positive alpha funds and weak evidence of persistence for negative alpha funds.     

UK mutual fund performance: Skill or luck?

Using a comprehensive data set on (surviving and non-surviving) UK equity mutual funds, we use a cross-section bootstrap methodology to distinguish between ‘skill’ and ‘luck’ for individual funds. This methodology allows for non-normality in the idiosyncratic risk of the funds — a major issue when considering those funds which appear to be either very good or very bad performers, since these are the funds which investors are primarily interested in identifying. Our study points to the existence of stock picking ability among a relatively small number of top performing UK equity mutual funds (i.e. performance which is not solely due to good luck). At the negative end of the performance scale, our analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis that most poor performing funds are merely unlucky. Most of these funds demonstrate ‘bad skill’. Recursive estimation and Kalman ‘smoothed’ coefficients indicate temporal stability in the ex-post performance alpha's of winner and loser portfolios. We also find performance persistence amongst loser but not amongst winner funds.     

Active mutual funds: Beware of smart beta ETFs!

Smart beta ETFs have gained tremendous prevalence among investors in recent years. This study provides empirical evidence that a proportion of this fast-paced growth can be attributed to the investor migration from closet factor active mutual funds to smart beta ETFs. Using a sample of US domestic equity active mutual funds and smart beta ETFs from 2000 to 2019, we find that smart beta ETFs offer factor exposures at lower fees and therefore higher risk-adjusted returns than closet factor funds. The investors notice the benefits of smart beta ETFs and replace closet factor funds with these ETFs. Closet factor funds are at higher risks of being replaced when investors are sophisticated, when the market share of smart beta ETFs increases, and after 2012. Our findings illustrate the dynamic changes in investor preference towards investment products that bring similar or greater benefits at a lower price.     

Performance attribution of mutual funds in India: outperformance or mis‐representation?

We conduct a novel holdings‐based performance attribution, particularly suited to emerging markets, for equity‐oriented active mutual funds in India. Although, we find significantly positive alphas for an average fund, the stated benchmarks are grossly mis‐specified. A style‐adjusted benchmark could beat the stated benchmarks by greater margins than the funds themselves. While funds’ trading activity consistently adds value, cash drag and market timing usually diminish value. Although, the best‐performing funds exhibit superior security selection abilities, their outperformance does not persist. However, despite the lack of persistence winner funds continue to generate significantly higher alphas than loser funds for quite some time.     

Use of active peer benchmarks in assessing UK mutual fund performance and performance persistence

The majority of UK style-specific mutual funds either report a broad market index as their prospectus benchmark or give no benchmark at all – a practice that may be (a) strategic, or (b) cultural and attributable to the lack of UK style-specific indices (e.g. mid-cap-growth, small-cap-value). The choice of a broad market index as a benchmark can bias the inferences of a fund’s performance and performance persistence. This study is the first to provide an alternative to style-specific indices in the UK, and suggests the use style-specific peer group benchmarks, following [Hunter, D., E. Kandel, S. Kandel, and R. Wermers. 2014. “Mutual Fund Performance Evaluation with Active Peer Benchmarks.” Journal of Financial Economics 112 (1): 1–29]. Our sample comprises of 817 active UK long-only equity mutual funds allocated to nine Morningstar style categories (peer groups) during the period 1992–2016. We show that the funds with the most significant positive peer-group-adjusted alphas continue to perform well one year ahead, in terms of both parametric and non-parametric measures of persistence in performance. Moreover, persistence in performance is driven by both winner and loser funds. The results within each peer group are by and large consistent with these findings.     

The Relation between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry

Gruber (1996) drew attention to the puzzle that investors buy actively managed equity mutual funds, even though on average such funds underperform index funds. We uncover another puzzling fact about the market for equity mutual funds: Funds with worse before-fee performance charge higher fees. This negative relation between fees and performance is robust and can be explained as the outcome of strategic fee-setting by mutual funds in the presence of investors with different degrees of sensitivity to performance. We also find some evidence that better fund governance may bring fees more in line with performance.     

Cross-sectional learning and short-run persistence in mutual fund performance

Using monthly return data of more than 6400 US equity mutual funds we investigate short-run performance persistence over the period 1984–2003. We sort funds into rank portfolios based on past performance, and evaluate the portfolios’ out-of-sample performance. To cope with short ranking periods, we employ an empirical Bayes approach to measure past performance more efficiently. Our main finding is that when funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on 12-month ranking periods, the top decile of funds earns a statistically significant, abnormal return of 0.26 percent per month. This effect persists beyond load fees, and is mainly concentrated in relatively young, small cap/growth funds.     

THE COST OF MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION FEES

Many individuals purchase shares in mutual funds as investments. With a lack of evidence supporting performance persistence in fund returns, investors should consider expenses as a fund-selection tool since fund expenses have a negative effect on fund returns. One of the largest expenses incurred by fund investors is distribution expenses, which include both load charges and annual fees. Close to two-thirds of all equity funds charge investors for fund distribution. The true cost of these distribution fees to investors is hard to measure because a myriad of distribution arrangements have evolved that vary both the timing and magnitude of distribution charges. We derive a simple methodology that expresses the present value of distribution costs as a percentage of the original investment in fund shares for any expected holding period. This methodology allows direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees for mutual funds with different types of sales arrangements.     

Persistence and the four‐factor model in the Australian funds market: a note

We investigate whether Australian fund managers are able to deliver persistent performance using Carhart’s (1997) four‐factor model. Short‐ and long‐term persistence is examined and the sample is also divided into unit trusts and superannuation funds. We do not find evidence of persistence in any sample of funds. We find that winner (loser) funds tend to hold past winner (loser) stocks. Winner and loser unit trusts both appear to have positive exposure to small stocks.     

What determines fund performance persistence? International evidence

We study performance persistence across a global sample of equity mutual funds from 27 countries. In contrast to the existing U.S.‐based evidence, we find that net performance persistence is present in the majority of fund industries, suggesting that fund manager skill is commonplace rather than a rarity. Consistent with the intuition that more competition in the mutual fund industry makes remaining a winner fund less likely but keeping a loser fund at the bottom of the performance ranks more probable, we show that competitiveness explains the cross‐sectional variation in performance persistence.     

The Mismatch Between Mutual Fund Scale and Skill

I demonstrate that skill and scale are mismatched among actively managed equity mutual funds. Many mutual fund investors confuse the effects of fund exposures to common systematic factors with managerial skill when allocating capital among funds. Active mutual funds with positive factor-related past returns thus accumulate assets to the point that they significantly underperform. I also show that the negative aggregate benchmark-adjusted performance of active equity mutual funds is driven mainly by these oversized funds.     

Performance persistence of international mutual funds

This study applies the “winner–winner, winner–loser” methodology developed by Brown and Goetzmann, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, and Malkiel to test for short-term performance persistence in international equity mutual funds over the 20-year period from 1977 to 1996. Persistence tests are applied to a database consisting of all international equity funds in existence during this period, varying from a low of 11 (1977) to a high of 473 (1996) funds, reflecting the extremely rapid growth of this asset class over the last 20 years. The authors are not aware of any other persistence studies of international equity funds. The results show statistically significant performance persistence for 1-year holding periods, but no persistence for 2-, 3- or 4-year periods. For 1-year periods, overall, performance persistence is statistically significant at the .001 level. This leads to the conclusion that international equity mutual funds exhibit strong performance persistence for short-term (1-year holding periods), but persistence generally fades after the first year. These results are generally consistent with results found by other researchers using this methodology. Survivorship bias is a concern in virtually all time series studies of mutual fund returns. This bias is minimal in this study because each new fund is added to the database, merging funds continue to be included and adjustments are made for funds that cease operations. The only bias is that if any fund closed and did not merge with an existing fund, that fund would not have returns to be included for the future periods. Only 28 funds ceased operations over the 20-year period during which 490 new funds were introduced.     

UK equity mutual fund alphas make a comeback

In this study, we re-visit the performance of 887 active UK equity mutual funds using a new approach proposed by Angelidis, Giamouridis, and Tessaromatis. The authors argue that mutual funds stock selection is driven by the benchmark index, so if the benchmark generates alpha, there will be a bias in interpretation of manager's stock-picking ability. In their model, the alpha of a fund is adjusted by the benchmark's alpha. By applying this method, we eliminate bias inflicted by the persistently negative alphas of FTSE 100 Index in the period 1992–2013. We find that adjusted Fama–French and Carhat alphas of UK equity mutual funds are higher than those implied by the standard three- and four-factor models and are overall positive, contrary to most of the existing literature on UK fund performance. This result is consistent across funds' investment styles and robust to the use of FTSE Small Cap as benchmark for a sub-sample of small cap funds.     

Performance and diversification benefits of IPO-focused mutual funds

We investigate whether mutual funds that invest in initial public offerings (IPOs) outperform the Renaissance IPO Index, IPOX® 100 U.S. Index, and other comparable equity funds that do not invest in IPOs. We also explore whether investors gain diversification benefits by investing in IPO-focused mutual funds. Using a sample of active open-ended US equity mutual funds, we find that IPO-focused funds outperform the Renaissance IPO Index and comparable funds that do not invest in IPOs. Moreover, they provide investors with the benefit of diversification along with better returns. We also find the value added by active management based on IPO strategy.     

Fee Variation in Private Equity

We study how investment fees vary within private equity funds. Net-of-fee return clustering suggests that most funds have two tiers of fees, and we decompose differences across tiers into both management- and performance-based fees. Managers of venture capital funds and those in high demand are less likely to use multiple fee schedules. Some investors consistently pay lower fees relative to others within their funds. Investor size, experience, and past performance explain some but not all of this effect, suggesting that unobserved traits like negotiation skill or bargaining power materially impact the fees that investors pay to access private markets.     

The wisdom of crowds: Mutual fund investors’ aggregate asset allocation decisions

We find that the aggregate asset allocation decisions of US mutual fund investors depend on economic conditions. Both anticipated economic downturns and periods of turmoil lead investors to direct flow away from risky equity funds and towards lower-risk money market funds. These patterns are markedly stronger for investors in low cost and low turnover funds relative to investors in high cost and high turnover funds, consistent with sophisticated investors being more sensitive to changing conditions. Benchmarked against a buy-and-hold strategy, these asset allocation strategies reduce risk without degrading the risk-return trade-off. Our evidence suggests that individual investors, often dismissed as noise traders, collectively react to economic signals in a sensible manner when determining asset allocations.     

The Performance of Local versus Foreign Mutual Fund Managers

In this paper we examine the performance of US equity funds (locals) versus UK equity funds (foreigners) also investing in the US equity market. Based on informational disadvantages one would expect the UK funds to under‐perform the US funds, especially in the research‐intensive small company market. After controlling for tax treatment, fund objectives, investment style and time‐variation in betas, we do not find evidence for this. In the small company segment we even find a slight out‐performance for UK funds compared to US funds. Finally we observe a home bias in the UK portfolios, which is partly attributable to UK funds investing in cross‐listed stocks in the USA.     

Capacity effects and winner fund performance: the relevance and interactions of fund size and family characteristics

This study analyzes the existence of capacity effects and performance persistence for US equity mutual funds for the period from 1992 to 2007. We focus on winner funds and distinguish between capacity effects from both size and inflows and explore their interactions with two measures of family size, i.e. family total net assets under management (family TNA) and the number of funds at the family level (family breadth). The differentiation of family size allows us to analyze competing effects at the family level such as economies of scale as well as organizational complexity costs and conflicts of interest. Our empirical results confirm diseconomies of scale at the winner fund level and indicate that only small winner funds with low inflows significantly outperform the four-factor benchmark on a net return basis. There are no universal benefits from economies of scale at the family level, but our findings suggest the existence of conflicts of interest in families offering a relatively large number of funds. Small winner funds in families offering a small number of funds significantly outperform while economies of scale only materialize among extremely small winner funds. We provide detailed robustness checks for our empirical results. Overall, simply conditioning on fund size is not sufficient for selecting future outperforming funds. The results indicate that fund investors may earn positive abnormal returns when combining information on fund size with information on fund flows or fund family affiliations in their asset allocation decisions.     

The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives

Hedge funds display several interesting characteristics that may influence performance, including: flexible investment strategies, strong managerial incentives, substantial managerial investment, sophisticated investors, and limited government oversight. Using a large sample of hedge fund data from 1988–1995, we find that hedge funds consistently outperform mutual funds, but not standard market indices. Hedge funds, however, are more volatile than both mutual funds and market indices. Incentive fees explain some of the higher performance, but not the increased total risk. The impact of six data-conditioning biases is explored. We find evidence that positive and negative survival-related biases offset each other.     

Do machines beat humans? Evidence from mutual fund performance persistence

We study the performance persistence of quantitative actively managed US equity funds. We show that the persistence of quantitative funds originates from poor performers and that there are reversals at the top of the performance scale, which is no different from the widely accepted evidence in the mutual fund literature. When testing for differences in performance persistence between quantitative and non–quantitative funds, we find no differences for poorly performing funds, but we observe significantly more reversals for quantitative funds at the top of the performance distribution. We also find that the differences in performance persistence are not explained by differences in flow–induced incentives to generate alpha, as there is no heterogeneity in investors preferences when allocating capital to these funds. Overall our results are consistent with machines having less skill than their human counterparts.