The Small Firm in a Quantity Choosing Game: Some Experimental Evidence

We demonstrate with a grim trigger strategy that the small firm should be more willing to collude tacitly as its market share declines; large firms should be less willing to cooperate. The small firm is not a maverick. The intensity of rivalry between two firms with asymmetric market shares is studied in experimental markets. Treatments give duopolists (1) 50% shares, (2) a 60 or 40% share, and (3) an 80 or 20% share. Choices for the small firm in the latter treatments are not significantly larger than the collusive choice. Irrespective of relative size, firms in all three market environments exhibit collusive behavior.     

Identifying Participants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Output & Market Share Tests Reexamined

If there is a cartel agreement among a subset of firms in an industry, it should be predicted that all firms in that industry will increase prices. Nevertheless, industry prices alone should not indicate that a particular firm is guilty of that conspiracy. According to the output test and its market share variant – proposed by Blair and Romano – if the output or the market share of the firm that claims to be innocent in the collusive activity rises in response to the price increase, that firm's claim should be accepted as true. Using a collusive variant of the dominant firm model, this paper shows that these are not robust tests to reveal either innocence or guilt, and characterizes cases where they may pardon a guilty firm (Type I error) or indict an innocent firm (Type II error). This paper also shows that a market share test can not be used to prove a dominant firm's intent for predatory pricing.     

Towards a typology of collusive industrial networks: Dark and shadow networks

The prevailing understanding of collusive B2B networks is primarily based on the theories of industrial economists and organizational criminologists. ‘Successful’ collusive industrial networks (such as price-fixing cartels) have been seen to endure due to formal managerial structures of coordination and control. In this paper, we seek to transcend and challenge the understanding of these illegal forms of co-opetition by drawing on evidence from an in-depth examination of four price-fixing cartels that were facilitated chiefly by marketers. Our contribution introduces the notion of ‘shadow networks’ (networks where although attempts are made to ensure secrecy, multilateral modes of network structure dominate akin to ‘normal’ managerial endeavours such as joint ventures) and ‘dark networks’ (networks which appear more opaque and secretive through the adoption of bilateral modes of network structure and limited bureaucracy) to illustrate the types of collusive network forms that may exist. In addition, this allows us to build a deeper understanding of collusive network forms and related inter-firm interaction for an industrial marketing audience. We provide implications for marketing practice, theory, and policy. Specifically, we outline how organizations and the marketing function can perform self-administered antitrust audits in order to help avoid breaches of antitrust. Further, we consider the importance of the two forms of collusive inter-firm networks uncovered where marketers have attempted to render these secret from antitrust agencies, introducing a relatively new line of inquiry to the industrial marketing literature.     

On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour

This paper examines an antitrust enforcement policy of using significant price changes in an industry as a sorting mechanism for the allocation of resources devoted to policing collusion. That is, in either responding to complaints or initiating investigations on their own, I examine the issue of whether an antitrust enforcement policy of inferring possible collusion from significant prices changes is effective in deterring collusion given that antitrust officials have no direct knowledge of the costs of individual firms. Using the imperfect information repeated game of Green and Porter (1984), I show that this investigation strategy if coupled with uniform costs being borne by firms, can reduce the expected profits from the collusive agreement: however, unless the punishment is large enough, it will be ineffective in reducing the frequency of collusion. More importantly, it can have the undesirable effect of reducing the output agreed to by firms, if firms choose quantities, or raise collusive prices if firms are choosing price. Moreover, if the enforcement policy is anticipated by firms, the punishment mechanism adopted to support collusion will be altered to offset the policy.     

Detecting Collusion

Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.     

Collective exclusion

This paper studies collusion among vertically integrated incumbents who may either delegate output production to a more efficient downstream entrant (“accommodating regime”) or refuse to supply the entrant and produce the final good themselves (“exclusionary regime”). Accommodating agreements yield higher collusive profits, but suffer from contractual frictions: An incumbent may first offer the entrant a high wholesale price for the input, and then undercut the entrant on the final good market, so that the entrant cannot recover its high input costs downstream. When the efficiency gap between the incumbents and the entrant is small, this hold-up effect dominates over the efficiency effect. Depending on modeling choices, exclusionary collusion is then either more profitable than accommodation, or is the only sustainable collusive regime.     

Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection

This paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel. Buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous. We find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases. During the transitional phase, price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks. During the stationary phase, price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than under non-collusion or simple monopoly; a low price variance may then be a collusive marker. Compared to when firms do not collude, cost shocks take a longer time to pass-through to price.     

Price-Matching Guarantees and Equilibrium Selection in a Homogenous Product Market: An Experimental Study

Price-matching guarantees have been alleged to sustain collusive prices in a homogenous product market. Theories in this literature also suggest that there exist multiple equilibria (i.e., a set of price equilibria between the competitive and the monopoly price) when all sellers adopt these guarantees in such a market. Theoretical prediction in this case fails to pin down the actual behavior of players a priori. This paper illustrates the essential role of controlled experiment in testing the collusive theory of price-matching guarantees and thereby shedding light on the embedded equilibrium selection problem. In particular, this paper studies two highly stylized market models, obtains testable predictions, and lays out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that these guarantees facilitate collusion among sellers and thus solve the equilibrium selection problem considerably. I am grateful to Jim Cox, Martin Dufwenberg, Haimanti Bhattacharya, and the editor of this journal and the two referees for their suggestions. I thank seminar participants at the University of Arizona and North American Economic Science Association meeting at Tucson, 2003 for their helpful comments. A research grant from ESL, University of Arizona, for this project is gratefully acknowledged. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.     

Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion

This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545–564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1–37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal.     

Multimarket contact in Italian retail banking: Competition and welfare

This paper studies banks' competitive behavior on the deposit side of the Italian retail banking industry. We use a structural model to estimate demand for deposit services and test several supply models. We find that both the competitive, differentiated product Bertrand and the perfectly collusive models are rejected against partially collusive models with coalitions based on the participants' market contact. In the best fitting collusive model, the coalition includes 8 banks with at least 19 overlapped regions. Banks with extensive multi-market contacts tend to be less competitive and behave as if they were maximizing their profit jointly, taking into account the competitive fringe of smaller banks.     

An Anticompetitive Effect of Eliminating Transport Barriers in Network Markets

This paper examines the welfare effects of physically interconnecting two (network) markets that were previously separated. In each market a different set of capacity-constrained firms operate. Firms engage in a supergame and collude whenever it is rational for them to do so.We find that, under certain parametric restrictions, interconnection of the two markets reduces total welfare. The collusive horizon may extend from a single market to the overall integrated market. In such case, interconnection can be viewed as “exporting” collusion, rather than competition.      

The Collusive Equilibrium in a Quantity-Setting Supergame: An Application to Taiwan’s Flour Industry

This paper examines the stability of the collusive equilibrium in Friedman’s repeated game through an empirical study of Taiwan’s flour market. We calculate the payoff streams following a deviation or adherence for each firm. The evidence shows that the specified punishment path is credible, and could sustain the collusive allocation.     

Collusion between two-sided platforms

We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.     

Flagging cartel participants with deep learning based on convolutional neural networks

Adding to the literature on the data-driven detection of bid-rigging cartels, we propose a novel approach based on deep learning (a subfield of artificial intelligence) that flags cartel participants based on their pairwise bidding interactions with other firms. More concisely, we combine a so-called convolutional neural network for image recognition with graphs that in a pairwise manner plot the normalized bids of some reference firm against the normalized bids of any other firms participating in the same tenders as the reference firm. Based on Japanese and Swiss procurement data, we construct such graphs for both collusive and competitive episodes (i.e when a bid-rigging cartel is or is not active) and we use a subset of graphs to train the neural network such that it learns distinguishing collusive from competitive bidding patterns. With the remaining graphs, we test the neural network’s out-of-sample performance in correctly classifying collusive and competitive bidding interactions. We obtain a very decent average accuracy of around 95% or slightly higher when either applying the method within Japanese, Swiss, or mixed data (in which Swiss and Japanese graphs are pooled). When using data from one country for training to test the trained model’s performance in the other country (i.e. transnationally), predictive performance decreases (likely due to institutional differences in procurement procedures across countries), but often remains satisfactorily high. All in all, the generally quite high accuracy of the convolutional neural network despite being trained in a rather small sample of a few 100 graphs points to a large potential of deep learning approaches for flagging and fighting bid-rigging cartels.     

Bundling,tying, and collusion

Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in a collusive oligopolistic market.     

Types of synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisitions on merging and rival firms

Acquisitions, in general, have been demonstrated to create economic value. The intuitive reason underlying this value creation stems either from an ability to reduce costs of the combined entity, an ability to charge higher prices, or both. Current research in the area attributes these abilities to an opportunity to utilize a specialized resource. Our focus in this study is to compare three broad classes of resources that contribute to the creation of value. Following the conventional wisdom, these resources are classified as cost of capital related (resulting in financial synergy), cost of production related (resulting in operational synergy), and price related (resulting in collusive synergy). Given the limitations of our sample and research design, we find that collusive synergy is, on average, associated with the highest value. Further, the resources behind financial synergy tend to create more value than the resources behind operational synergy.     

Resale and Collusion in A Dynamic Market for Semidurable Goods

The paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second‐hand markets. It will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity. The main contribution of the paper shows that an active second‐hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude, as do policies that affect the functioning of the second‐hand market (e.g., leasing policy and buy‐back). It will also be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits.     

Joint ventures and competitive strategy

A framework for using joint ventures (and other forms of cooperative strategy) within varying competitive environments is constructed, and hypotheses are developed concerning the impact of particular industry traits upon firms' options in pursuing them. Industry examples illustrate the framework's hypotheses. In this framework, demand traits suggest what types of cooperative strategies are needed. Competitor traits suggest how firms will respond to these needs for cooperation. Since joint ventures can be inherently unstable organizational forms, it is important for managers to (1) select the right cooperative strategy option and (2) modify the autonomy from (and coordination with) sponsoring firms that ventures enjoy as their industry structures evolve. Familiarity with cooperative strategy options is important because (1) as growth slows, (2) as markets shrink or become crowded, (3) as industries become global, or (4) as technological change accelerates to speeds where individual firms cannot recover their initial investments, managers will have less margin for error. If managers do not learn how to use cooperative strategies advantageously their firms may encounter difficulties in delivering adequate value to their customers, replenishing their base of skills, and/or safeguarding their abilities to increase long-term shareholder value.     

OUTPUT‐EXPANDING COLLUSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A COMPETITIVE FRINGE*

Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a few large firms and a competitive fringe of many small suppliers choosing quantities in an infinite‐horizon setting subject to demand shocks. We show that a collusive agreement among the large firms may not only bring an output contraction but also an output expansion (relative to the non‐collusive output level). The latter occurs during booms and is due to the strategic substitutability of quantities. We also find that the time at which maximal collusion is most difficult to sustain can be either at booms or recessions. The international copper cartel of 1935–39 is used to illustrate some of our results.     

Economies of scale,strategic advertising and fully credible entry deterrence

Recent work on entry deterrence has emphasized the distinction between a monopolist’s reversible and irreversible preentry strategic moves (e.g., limit pricing) will not credible deter a rational potential entrant. Dixit (1980) and other have demonstrated, however, that irreversible preentry capacity investments can result in credible deterrence. In this paper, we examine preentry advertising investments which irreversibly alter postentry demand conditions. Using an infinite horizon model, we show that preentry investments in advertising may result in credible deterrence even for the extreme case where an entrant expects a collusive postentry price, and the monopolist ceases all advertising at the moment of entry.