Regular Distributive Social Systems

I consider abstract social systems where individual owners make gifts according to their preferences on the distribution of wealth in the context of a noncooperative equilibrium. I define a condition of regularity and a condition of strong regularity of these social systems. I prove notably that: regularity is generic, and implies the local uniqueness of equilibrium and the uniqueness of status quo equilibrium; strong regularity is nongeneric, implies that an equilibrium exists for all initial distributions of wealth, whenever an equilibrium exists for one of them, and implies the connectedness of the range of the equilibrium correspondence. These properties have strong implications for distributive theory and policy, summarized in a general hypothesis of perfect substitutability of private and public transfers. The formulation and discussion of this hypothesis lead to a general assessment of the explanatory power of the theory.     

Conflict and the Social Contract*

We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.     

市场经济运行中的效率与公平及分配正义辨正

要建立一个真正意义上的和谐社会,必须以实现分配正义为前提.而仅靠市场经济的分配模式尚不能实现合理、公正的分配,解决社会不公问题.政府介入是经济运行的必要调控手段,政府介入到市场经济的运行中来,必然会面临如何处理公平与效率的关系问题.只有理顺这一关系才能使社会财富的分配走向更加合理化,才能创造一个和谐的制度环境,从而实现和谐社会构建.     

The Evolution of the Social Contract

Two transitions in the evolution of the social contract are considered, the first from the dominance hierarchies of the great apes (used as a proxy for our prehuman ancestors) to the egalitarian political structure of non-sedentary hunter-gatherer bands, and the second, to the reintroduction of hierarchical institutions of governance, primarily a result of living in fixed settlements after the inception of agriculture. The first transition was a product of biological and cultural evolution, which brought about big brains, language, higher consciousness, and a lower rate of time preference that enabled early man to sustain an egalitarian social contract and thereby escape the domination that confronted his prehuman ancestors. The second transition was a product of cultural evolution alone. The high costs of enforcing the hunter-gatherer social contract caused it to break down and be replaced by hierarchy when the domestication of plants and animals gave rise to a sedentary existence and increased populations. However, it is shown that the very biological and cultural adaptations that made hunter-gatherer egalitarianism possible were a necessary foundation for the spontaneous creation of complex culture and the evolution of institutions that would once again eventually make freedom possible and economic prosperity possible.     

合同方式的演进和交易效率与安全

从世界范围看,随着社会经济的发展,合同方式大体上经历了由重形式到重意思再到意思与形式兼顾的由繁到简的演进历程。我国现行合同法关于合同方式兼采要式与不要式原则,具体表现为三重规则,即一般规则、特别规则、特别规则的例外规则。回顾合同方式的历史演进与解析我国合同方式的法律态度,有助于加强人们对合同方式对交易效率与安全的影响的认识,使人们自觉规范交易活动,减少合同纠纷,追求交易效率与安全的最高境界,促进经济健康发展。     

把提高效率与促进社会公平结合起来

党的十七大报告中提出了我国摆脱贫困、加快实现现代化、巩固和发展社会主义的十大“宝贵经验”,其中“把提高效率同促进社会公平结合起来”是宝贵经验之一。正确认识和处理好效率和公平的关系问题,是党中央和全国人民所关注的一个重要的理论和实际问题。它是中国特色社会主义理论体系中有关怎样发展社会主义经济、怎样正确对待和处理人民群众自身利益的原则性问题。     

综合性社会契约视角下的社会责任投资决策

社会责任投资起源于20世纪60年代西方社会,它是企业社会责任的一种实践活动。目前在欧美等发达国家,社会责任投资已逐渐成为一种主流基金投资模式,并为越来越多的投资者所认可,而在我国,对社会责任投资尚处于了解阶段。综合性社会契约理论是美国学者多纳得森和邓菲于1994年提出的一个将企业社会责任和社会伦理相衔接的重要理论。文章介绍和评析这两个理论并尝试建立基于综合性社会契约理论的社会责任投资模型,希望借此对投资者进行社会责任投资决策产生一定的理论指导。     

不完全契约理论下企业间的交易效率

文章基于不完全契约理论分析框架,利用拓展和延伸了的不完全契约理论模型,在分析归纳已有研究的基础上,引入私下执行资本(PEC),并进一步深入到自我执行机制的内在因素和作用机理.模型分析结果表明,正是重复博弈下的未来收益、声誉溢出和诱因底线等因素影响了PEC,进而影响企业间交易效率.分析有利于我们更好地理解上下游企业间交易行为乃至更广泛的企业关系,对于解释和改善我国企业目前管理现状提供了一定的思路.     

Efficiency and Program‐Contract Bargaining in Spanish Public Hospitals

Abstract This paper analyses the evolution of productivity in Spanish public hospitals during the period characterised by the use of program‐contracts. The results demonstrate that a significant improvement has occurred. The decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index shows that efficiency change has been the main contributor to productivity improvement. We also analyse the dynamic implications of program‐contract bargaining. In particular, the data support the hypothesis that the bargaining process has been subject to a ratchet effect, i.e., the more a hospital does today, the more the hospital is asked to do in the future. This result threatens the credibility of the program‐contract as an incentive system .     

The Meaning of Social Efficiency

Abstract

Policy implementation calls for efficiency. But because policy concerns range over broad social and political-economic areas, the efficient pursuit of one particular goal may conflict with the realization of some other, equally important social interest. Hence, efficiency for its own sake cannot be a policy goal. Giving special attention to the development process, the paper discusses the problems and contradictions that arise when policymakers working in a framework of neoclassical economic theory attempt to deal with issues of equity, stabilization, markets and trade. Starting with the limitations of market efficiency when conventional requirements of social welfare as well as social and environmental sustainability are taken into account, it is argued that a more meaningful concept of social efficiency can be obtained with the help of the human development indicators elaborated by the United Nations Development Program, augmented by the sustainability indicators developed by the European Union and others during the last decade.     

平等、效率和社会稳定的整合选择

平等、效率是影响社会稳定的复合变量。我国平等、效率和社会稳定目标的整合选择取向，应当是在推进经济背景平等的过程中凸显教育对能力培养的杠杆作用，以阶层和职业的较充分流动创造更充分的机会平等，以不断深化的法治推动经济规则平等，应着重以经济机会和经济规则的平等，营造社会公正和效率含量更高的社会稳定环境。     

基于劳动合同的公司治理结构及治理效率的分析

现有研究文献对公司治理的讨论主要基于管理者和企业家的角度,很少涉及到普通劳动者层面。随着人力资本重要性的提高,最广泛的普通劳动者也应该进入我们的研究视野当中,而劳动合同是雇员与厂商双边关系最直观的表现形式之一。通过透视普通劳动者的劳动合同,运用比较分析等方法,从而发现企业治理结构的演进历程中,企业治理效率的改进通常都伴随着劳动者地位的提高,因此目前研究如何有效的提高最广泛的劳动者群体的利益应该成为一个重点。     

Health Status Risks and the Efficiency of Social Security Systems

We studied the allocative efficiency of a social security system with earning tests focusing on the leisure–work choices of older men. Given empirical findings that health status and social security benefits are the most important determinants of such choices, we incorporated risks with respect to health status into an overlapping–generations model, and analysed how allocative efficiency was changed by the introduction of social security systems. It was found that the effects of a social security system can be broken down into particular categories and that a social security system improves efficiency when the pension system is small. JEL Classification Numbers: H55, I10, E40.     

环境效率、能源效率与经济社会发展协调度

首先基于数据包络分析(DEA)模型提出了单要素效率和要素联合使用效率的定义,然后应用2003～2007年的省级数据测算了我国30个省市(西藏除外)的环境效率、能源效率和经济社会发展的协调度。测算结果显示,我国各地经济社会发展协调度总体上呈现出区域特征,东部的协调度比西部和中部高些。各地产业结构、能源生产与消费的分工结构、外商直接投资(FDI)、技术进步和环境治理的投入均可解释我国各区域经济社会发展协调度的差异。     

Contract Choice: Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue‐Sharing Contracts

We present a simple principal–agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue‐sharing, a bonus, and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue‐sharing contract. This choice turns out to be not only the most efficient but also, at the same time, fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that, under revenue‐sharing contracts, concerns for fairness can be closely associated with the use of monetary incentives.     

Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region–specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within–region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non–monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of "constitutional rules" (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization.     

On the Efficiency of Job Search with Social Networks

This paper provides a simple matching model in which unemployed workers and employers can be matched together through social networks and through more efficient, and also more costly, methods. In this framework, decentralized decisions to utilize social networks in the job search process can be inefficient and give rise to multiple equilibria. More precisely, in a decentralized equilibrium, social networks can be overutilized, with respect to an efficient allocation, in some circumstances and underutilized in others. Moreover, the existence of different job search methods can give rise to a higher job search intensity than the efficient one. This is in sharp contrast with the standard result, derived in matching models, according to which search intensity is always too low if not efficient. Finally, in the presence of different job search methods, conditional unemployment benefits hikes, which can be used as a coordination device to improve welfare when individuals.     

Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition

Within the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homo- geneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from Downsian, two-party, electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D63, D72.     

Social Contract and Introspection. A Proposal for an Austrian Welfare Economics

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

二轮承包到期后农地调整的理论逻辑与社会影响

土地是财富之母、农业之本、农民之根。土地制度是一个国家最为重要的生产关系安排,是一切制度中最为基础的制度。中国农村承包地在二轮延包时如何处置成为当下亟待解决的重要问题。在当前中国农村人地不匹配矛盾极为严重的情况下,文章指出在受限制的产权制度框架内,二轮到期后进行农地的小调整,具有固有的经济逻辑、制度依据和符合社会道义,且对生产效率、地力保护不太可能会产生太大的影响,反而可以利用二轮到期延包时点的调地改善土地的细碎化问题。