House Prices and Government Spending Shocks

We show that dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with housing and collateralized borrowing predict a fall in house prices following positive government spending shocks. By contrast, we show that house prices in the United States rise persistently after identified positive government spending shocks. We clarify that the incorrect house price response is due to a general property of DSGE models—approximately constant shadow value of housing—and that modifying preferences and production structure cannot help in obtaining the correct house price response. Properly accounting for the empirical evidence on government spending shocks and house prices using a DSGE model therefore remains a significant challenge.     

The Heterogeneous Responses of Consumption between Poor and Rich to Government Spending Shocks

Government spending shocks have substantially different effects on consumers across the income distribution: consumption increases for the poor whereas it decreases for the rich in response to a rise in government expenditure. I shed light on this issue by incorporating a progressive tax scheme and productive public expenditure into a heterogeneous agent model economy with indivisible labor. The model economy is able to successfully match aggregate and disaggregate effects of government spending shocks on consumption. When the government increases its spending and accompanies it by a rise in tax progressivity, the poor are employed and increase their consumption since after‐tax wage rates increase while the rich decrease their consumption because of a fall in after‐tax wage rates.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Government Spending: The Great Recession was (Really) Different

We estimate the effect of government spending shocks on the U.S. economy with a time‐varying parameter vector autoregression. The recent Great Recession period appears to be characterized by uniquely large impulse responses of output to fiscal shocks. Moreover, the particularity of this period is underlined by highly unusual responses of several other variables. The pattern of fiscal shock responses neither completely fits the predictions of the New Keynesian model of an economy subject to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, nor does it suggest regular variation of fiscal policy effects depending on the state of the business cycle. Rather, the Great Recession period seems special in that government spending shocks had a strongly negative effect on the spread between corporate and government bond yields and a strongly positive effect on consumer confidence and private consumption spending.     

Deep Habits,Price Rigidities,and the Consumption Response to Government Spending

This paper studies two frictions, good‐specific habit formation and price rigidities, used in theoretical models to generate the crowding‐in of consumption by expansionary government spending observed in the data. Both frictions generate countercyclical price markups, rising wages, and ensuing consumption–leisure substitution to overcome the negative wealth effect of the fiscal expansion. I demonstrate that while they independently support the rise of consumption, when used together the two frictions exert opposing pressures on the markup and the wage, weakening consumption–leisure substitution. Crucially, when price stickiness is high enough in an economy with “deep” habits, consumption is crowded out by the fiscal expansion.     

The Government Spending Multiplier in a (Mis)Managed Liquidity Trap

I study the impact of a government spending shock in a New Keynesian model when monetary policy is set optimally. In this framework, the economy is at the zero lower bound but expectations are well managed by the central bank. As such, the multiplier effect of government spending increases on expected inflation is close to zero while the one on output can be larger than one. This is consistent with recent empirical evidence on the effects of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.     

Propagation Mechanisms for Government Spending Shocks: A Bayesian Comparison

The inability of a simple real business cycle model to predict a rise in consumption in response to increased government expenditures, observed in many empirical studies, has stimulated the development of alternative theories of government spending shocks. Using the Bayesian approach, we evaluate the quantitative performance of five extant models, and find that neither of the considered transmission mechanisms for government spending helps improve the fit of the baseline model. Moreover, we find that consumption decreases in all estimated models in response to a rise in government spending.     

Asymmetric Labor Market Institutions in the EMU and the Volatility of Inflation and Unemployment Differentials

How does the asymmetry of labor market institutions affect the adjustment of a currency union to shocks? To answer this question, this paper sets up a dynamic currency union model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices, hiring frictions, and real wage rigidities. In our analysis, we focus on the differentials in inflation and unemployment between countries, as they directly reflect how the currency union responds to shocks. We highlight the following three results. First, we show that it is important to distinguish between different labor market rigidities as they have opposite effects on inflation and unemployment differentials. Second, we find that asymmetries in labor market structures tend to increase the volatility of both inflation and unemployment differentials. Finally, we show that it is important to take into account the interaction between different types of labor market rigidities. Overall, our results suggest that asymmetries in labor market structures worsen the adjustment of a currency union to shocks.     

Taxation, Public Policy, and Dynamics of Unemployment

This paper provides an overview of the key issues relating to taxation, public policy and the dynamics of unemployment.It takes issue with the widely held view that generous social insurance schemes and the associated highpayroll taxes have been the major cause of the high unemployment rates which have persisted in Europe over thepast 15 years. It puts forward a framework for a theory of adjustment, based on the portfolio theory of the riskaverse firm and the efficiency wage theory of labor markets. This is used to explain why in the onset of a downturn,the hiring rate may lag the layoff rate, thus giving rise to rising unemployment rates. It is also shown to provideguidance as to policies which enhance the ability of firms to bear risks and which reduce costs of hiring and firing.The paper argues that while policies which increase severance or layoff costs may be well intended they mayactually serve to exacerbate the magnitude of employment fluctuations. Similarly, unemployment compensation,which is designed to ease the burden on those who are unemployed, may lead to higher levels of equilibriumunemployment. These programs can be restructured in ways which simultaneously ease the short-run burden ofthose thrown into unemployment, while reducing the adverse impact of these programs on the unemployment rate.     

Government Spending and the Taylor Principle

This paper explores how government size affects the scope for equilibrium indeterminacy in a New Keynesian economy, where part of the population live hand-to-mouth. The main result is that a higher level of public consumption is likely to generate indeterminacy and render the Taylor principle insufficient as criterion for equilibrium uniqueness. This holds even though fiscal policy serves to reduce swings in current income. Only if government consumption is a substitute for private consumption, will it narrow the scope for indeterminacy. Hence monetary policy should be conducted with an eye to the amount and composition of government consumption.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

Unemployment Risk, the Housing Market and the Effects of Decentralised Redistribution

The paper examines the general equilibrium effects of benefits to the unemployed and the taxes to pay for them in a two country model in which people move to maximise expected utility. Wages are set by unions, and unemployment emerges as an equilibrium phenomenon. Wage setting institutions are found to be important for assessing the welfare effects of redistribution from the employed to the unemployed. The analysis finds that, with monopoly unions, more redistribution tends to repel population from the country increasing redistribution and to reduce welfare in both countries, but the opposite is the case in a model in which wage setting does not depend on unemployment benefits and taxes. These effects are dampened by the combination of risk averse consumers and inelastic housing supply.     

What Accounts for the Changes in U.S. Fiscal Policy Transmission?

Using vector autoregressions on U.S. time series for 1957–79 and 1983–2004, we find government spending shocks to have stronger effects on output, consumption, and wages in the earlier period. We try to account for this observation within a DSGE model featuring price rigidities and limited asset market participation. Specifically, we estimate the structural parameters of the model for both periods by matching impulse responses. Model‐based counterfactual experiments suggest that most of the changes in fiscal policy transmission are accounted for by increased asset market participation and the more active monetary policy of the Volcker–Greenspan period.     

Social Security,Unemployment, and Growth

The paper develops an overlapping generations model that highlights interactions between social security, unemployment and growth. The social security system has two components: old age pensions and unemployment insurance. Pensions have a direct effect on economic growth. Both pensions and unemployment benefits influence equilibrium unemployment caused by wage bargaining. Since unemployment deteriorates growth, both types of social security have an indirect negative effect on growth.JEL Code: E24, H55, J51     

Monetary Policy,Trend Inflation,and Unemployment Volatility

The literature has long agreed that the DMP model (after Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982, Pissarides 1985) with search and matching frictions in the labor market can deliver large volatilities in labor market quantities, consistent with empirical data, only if there is at least some wage stickiness. I show, however, that the model can deliver nontrivial volatilities without wage stickiness, as long as it has price dispersion and nonzero long‐run inflation rates. I find that by keeping inflation at a positive rate, monetary policy may be accountable for the large standard deviations observed on labor market variables. In addition, the Shimer (2005) puzzle disappears under monetary policy shocks.     

Environmental policy,pollution, unemployment,and endogenous growth

The paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with pollution externalities and a labor market distorted by union monopoly power and by taxes and transfers. We study the optimal second-best pollution tax and abatement policy and find that a shift toward greener preferences will tend to reduce unemployment, although it will hamper growth. We also find that greater labor-market distortions call for higher pollution tax rates. Finally, we show that a switch from quantity control of pollution combined with grandfathering of pollution rights to regulation via emission charges has the potential to raise employment, growth, and welfere without damaging the environment.     

Fiscal Multipliers at the Zero Lower Bound: The Role of Policy Inertia

The presence of the lagged shadow policy rate in the interest rate feedback rule reduces the government spending multiplier nontrivially when the policy rate is constrained at the zero lower bound (ZLB). In the economy with policy inertia, increased inflation and output due to higher government spending during a recession speed up the return of the policy rate to the steady state after the recession ends, which in turn damps the expansionary effects of the government spending during the recession via expectations. In our baseline experiment intended to capture the effectiveness of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the output multiplier at the ZLB is 1.9 when the weight on the lagged shadow rate is zero, and 0.5 when the weight is 0.85.     

The Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy Over the Business Cycle: A CEE Perspective

In this article we analyze the effectiveness of fiscal policy—for a group of four Central and Eastern European countries. The recent literature shows that fiscal multipliers in the developed economies are higher during recession than expansion. So far, similar empirical analyses have been lacking for CEE countries. The results presented in this article show that fiscal multipliers in CEE countries differ with respect to the phase of the business cycle. Based on the SVAR methodology in which we allow for deterministic regime switching, we show that the government spending multipliers are significantly higher when the output gap is negative.     

Borrowing to Finance Public Investment? The ‘Golden Rule of Public Finance’ Reconsidered in an Endogenous Growth Setting*

In this paper, we look for long‐run and short‐run effects of fiscal deficits on economic growth and welfare in a standard endogenous growth model. We show that, under very general hypotheses, the ‘golden rule of public finance’, which allows a government to run public‐investment‐oriented fiscal deficits, leads to a lower balanced‐growth path in the long run, and eventually in the short run, compared with balanced‐budget rules. Welfare effects are more difficult to assess, and depend on the form of the utility function. Our model shows that debt rules such as the golden rule may improve (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘low’) or weaken (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘high’) intertemporal welfare. Consequently, a balanced‐budget rule does not necessarily dominate debt rules from the point of view of welfare, while it does from the point of view of long‐run economic growth.