我国房地产行业竞争形势研究

文章从介绍我国房地产行业市场竞争现状着手,分析了在房地产市场上不同规模、不同背景的企业在竞争中的相互关系,以及不同背景、不同类型竞争者各自的竞争能力。通过研究,指出了我国房地产市场已经显现出即将由数量扩张型竞争向核心竞争力型竞争转化的态势。     

Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections

Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market—the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model—we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of Hall's framework for estimating price‐cost margins. We show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, which can be characterized by a ‘joint market imperfections parameter’. Using an unbalanced panel of 10,646 French firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978–2001, we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market (IC‐EB), followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right‐to‐manage bargaining in the labor market (IC‐PR), and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC‐MO). For each of these three predominant regimes, we assess within‐regime firm differences in the estimated average price‐cost mark‐up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters, following the Swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion. To assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime (IC‐EB), we also relate our industry and firm‐level estimates of price‐cost mark‐up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm‐specific variables respectively. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Three Modes of Competition in the Marketplace

Competition is often thought of a fairly obvious thing, a rivalry. In a market context the meaning of competition is usually taken to be a rivalry among the sellers. The article seeks to broaden this view by considering other competitive relationships in the marketplace. Using the simplifying assumption that there are only two types of market actors, sellers and consumers, there are three possible types of relationships or interdependencies among these actors in a market. In competitive terms this includes the familiar competition among sellers but there is also the possibility of competition between sellers and consumers, as well as competition among consumers. The article outlines essential characteristics of the three modes. Implications of multi‐mode competition for market performance and welfare are discussed.     

企业信息化管理变革的趋势与战略研究

信息化的发展使全球化市场竞争和企业管理模式发生深刻变化,重新认识企业信息化管理变革的趋势及其发展战略,对我国21世纪企业的市场、决策及发展意识的定位,有着不可忽视的意义。     

Financial analyst coverage for U.S. firms facing foreign competition: Evidence from trade liberalization

This study examines financial analyst coverage for U.S. firms following an increase in foreign product market competition. To capture exogenous shocks to domestic firms' competitive environments, we exploit a quasi‐natural experiment from large import tariff reductions over the 1984 to 2005 period in the manufacturing sector. Using data for the years before and after large tariff reductions, our difference‐in‐differences analysis shows evidence of a significant decrease in analyst coverage for incumbent U.S. firms when they face greater entry threat from foreign competitors. We also find that analysts with less firm‐specific experience and less accurate prior‐period forecasts are more likely to stop following the domestic firm when foreign competition intensifies. Overall, the findings suggest that foreign product market competition from global trade liberalization is an important determinant of financial analysts' coverage decisions.     

Competing for Consumers with Self‐Control Problems

I examine strategic implications of competing for consumers with self‐control problems. For investment goods, like health clubs, I find that the equilibrium sign‐up (lump‐sum) fees decrease when competition intensifies, similarly to prices in standard oligopoly models. However, the equilibrium attendance (per‐unit) price increases due to firms' deteriorated ability to take advantage of consumers' self‐control problems. Moreover, firms earn less profit due to consumers' self‐control problems—the firms have a unilateral incentive to charge per‐unit fees lower than the marginal cost; however, they cannot make up the lost margins by increasing the lump‐sum fee, due to competition. I also show that for plausible parameter regions the market adjusts to consumers' self‐control problem in such a way that firms play the standard equilibrium strategies that they would have engaged in with fully rational consumers, with identical market outcomes. Most of the results are qualitatively the same for leisure goods (for example, credit cards); however, some results are reversed: the per‐unit fees are higher than marginal cost and decrease as competition intensifies.     

The Impact of Monopolies on Small Business Development in Russia

The imposition of economic sanctions on Russia by other countries has raised interest rates, diminished the working capital of small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), and led to the restoration of state‐owned companies in many sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation continues to make efforts to develop a market‐oriented economy based on open competition. This article considers the current situation with SMEs in Russia from the standpoint of market competition and the influence of monopolies on this process. It analyzes bottlenecks in the interaction of monopolies with SMEs. For example, the wires and pipelines required to distribute energy, heat, and electricity over large geographic areas are natural monopolies: only one company can provides each service efficiently in a given area. The companies that control those natural monopolies are able to extract payments far in excess of cost from small businesses. In this and other ways, monopolies are able to dominate the Russian economy and restrict competition from SMEs.     

Price Discrimination in Two‐Sided Markets

We examine the profitability and welfare implications of targeted price discrimination (PD) in two‐sided markets. First, we show that equilibrium discriminatory prices exhibit novel features relative to discriminatory prices in one‐sided models and uniform prices in two‐sided models. Second, we compare the profitability of perfect PD, relative to uniform prices in a two‐sided market. The conventional wisdom from one‐sided horizontally differentiated markets is that PD hurts the firms and benefits consumers, prisoners' dilemma. We show that PD, in a two‐sided market, may actually soften the competition. Our results suggest that the conventional advice that PD is good for competition based on one‐sided markets may not carry over to two‐sided markets.     

Market value,market share,and mergers: Evidence from a panel of U.S. firms

Improving shareholder value has often been cited as a merger determinant. Because mergers create larger firms and less competition, they may increase shareholder value through higher market share and stock‐market value. We investigate merger impacts on firms' stock‐market value and market share. We construct panel data from 4 different data sources on public merging and non‐merging U.S. manufacturing firms for 1980–2003. Instrumental variables and factors such as R&D, patents, and citations control for endogeneity. We find that mergers are positively correlated with stock‐market value and market share.     

Competition and innovation: The tango of the market and technology in the competitive landscape

Technology innovation can be a double‐edged sword in helping a firm to address competitive pressures. We explore the relationships among market competition, technology competition, and firms' advancement to a higher generation of production technology. Though market competition drives technology advancement as firms attempt to escape competition and technology competition also drives technology advancement as firms try to stay in the technology race, concurrent high market and technology competition lead a firm to defer advancement. We find supportive evidence with data on global flat panel display makers. Our findings shed light on how competition interacts with a firm's technology advancement decision and, in general, a firm's technology strategy.     

市场营销的创新意识与道德准则

市场营销在企业的发展过程中具有举足轻重的地位。目前不少企业出现不断创新的良好势头,然而市场始终存在“诚信”危机,最终导致市场萎缩。创新和道德准则是一把“双刃剑”,只有构建在“诚信”的基石上,才会有理性的光芒与丰厚的回报。市场上过度的无序竞争必然最终损害消费者、经销商、生产者的共同利益。     

INNOVATION,COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTEL CASE

Microprocessor‐maker Intel has been subjected to the highest fine in the history of EU competition policy. Intel operates in a market with one other main supplier, a fact that seemed to provide grounds to those accusing it of abusing a dominant position. The authors argue that, in spite of the limited number of players, the microprocessor market showed the distinctive marks of dynamic competition: ever‐lower prices and ever‐growing innovation. Political considerations more than sound economic reasoning seem to be behind the EU antitrust decision.     

CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment Under Product Market Competition

How does product market competition influence whether CEOs with greater or lower levels of overconfidence are hired and whether CEOs overinvest in innovation? In a Cournot model in which firms hire a CEO to take charge of research and development (R&D) investment and production decisions, this paper shows that CEO overconfidence and overinvestment can be explained as an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, the intensity of product market competition and the equilibrium CEO overconfidence level (and R&D investment) exhibit an inverted U‐shaped relationship. As the product market tends toward perfect competition, all firms hire a realistic CEO and do not overinvest. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition,Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

This study examines the relevance of non‐executive outside directors with multiple directorships for corporate governance building on a large panel of European listed firms in the period 2003 to 2011. Focusing on executive turnover as an indicator for effective monitoring, the findings reveal that multiple directorships and product market competition are substitutes. Outsiders increase executive turnover in underperforming firms exclusively if competition in the industry is weak. In environments with effective competition, outsiders do not significantly influence the decision to replace underperforming managers. In fiercely competitive industries, the market pressure seems to effectively limit managerial discretion for opportunistic behavior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

政府采购法功能分析

政府采购法是国家调整政府采购过程中产生的各种社会关系的法律规范之总称。在现代经济社会中,政府采购法在行政管理、产业导向和保护市场竞争等方面发挥着日益重要的作用。     

Multiproduct Firms in Hotelling’s Spatial Competition

Oligopoly models are usually analyzed in the context of two firms, anticipating that market outcomes would be qualitatively similar in the case of three or more firms. The literature on Hotelling’s location‐then‐price competition is not an exception. In this paper, we show that the main finding of brand bunching in Hotelling’s duopoly no longer holds once three or more firms are allowed to enter the market. That is, in oligopoly with three or more firms, firms proliferate brands.     

Organizational Structure and Product Market Competition

This paper explores the link between delegation of authority and product market competition. It considers a firm that is contemplating entering a market served by an incumbent. The firm can adopt either a decentralized or a centralized authority structure. In the former, authority is delegated to an agent, while in the latter, it is retained by the principal. We address the questions of how the toughness of future product market competition affects the delegation decision, and how this decision in turn affects product market competition. The delegation decision is determined by a trade‐off between inducing the agent to take greater initiative and accepting lower operating profits from a less efficient decision taken by the agent.     

Exclusionary practices in two‐sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers

We analyze exclusionary conduct of platforms in 2‐sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard 2‐sided market model, we show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for the incumbent and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the 2 shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.     

日本快递业的发展动态研究

物流是连接供与需之间的纽带,是通过载体服务体系完成物在时空上的变化达到物流的目的,快递业作为传统物流的特殊形态,开发了小货物运输市场的潜在需求,并推动着产业经济结构的优化与调整。文中介绍了日本快递业的物流系统、经营战略、市场竞争体系,并对其发展趋势进行了分析,为中国快递业市场的快速发展提供参考。     

新经济下战略联盟合作伙伴选择新机制

在经济全球化和技术经济高速发展的市场经济下,战略联盟发展显现出新的发展趋势。我们必须在联盟合作伙伴选择方面发展一种新的方法以更好地适合联盟的发展。本文在结合传统联盟伙伴选择的基础上,提出更加适合竞争环境下的联盟合作伙伴选择新机制。