ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR AN URBAN BIAS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES*

This paper presents a labor turnover model in which urban employers have an economic incentive to support an urban bias in development policies because of the indirect effect of rural incomes on urban training expenditures through the rate of labor turnover. A comparative static analysis of the model shows that an income transfer from rural workers to urban workers increases the profits of urban employers, even if urban employers are not directly involved in the transfer. Unlike previous versions of the labor turnover model, worker behavior is explicitly grounded in utility maximization.     

CASH INCENTIVES AND UNHEALTHY FOOD CONSUMPTION

This paper studies the effectiveness of taxes, subsidies and cash incentives in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Using an inter‐temporal rational choice model with habit, we calibrate and simulate the effect of those policies to US and UK data. Our findings suggest that cash incentives may be the most effective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption. However, when comparing the reduction in costs for the social security system with the implementation costs, cash incentives can lead to significant monetary losses. Taxes are relatively ineffective in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Finally, subsidies have the best balance between effectiveness and monetary benefits to society.     

ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS: THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS

The advent of novel psychotropic medications has revolutionized treatments for mental illnesses over the past few decades. Concurrently, changes in mental health coverage, particularly for Medicaid patients, created economic incentives for insurance carriers to shift costs and to encourage the use of psychotropic drugs. To quantify these effects, based on the framework in Griliches' seminal study on hybrid corn, we estimate logistic diffusion models using a longitudinal data set on Medicaid drug utilization. We find that financial incentives played a significant role in encouraging use of new medications that have lower physician specialty skill requirements. ( JEL O30, O33, I18, L14)     

MAKING WORK PAY FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS

This paper describes five new welfare reform programs being tested in six areas of the United States and Canada. These programs all use financial incentives to encourage selfsufficiency among welfare recipients. Some programs also provide employment and training services. A microsimulation model is used to predict the impacts of the two most generous programs: the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) and the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP). The simulation results suggest that SSP and MFIP will modestly increase the number of welfare recipients who work. However, because SSP has a fulltime work requirement and MFIP does not, only SSP is predicted to generate an increase in fulltime employment     

INSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION

We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: a horizon effect , whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during his short window of opportunity, and a demand effect , by which the private sector is more willing to bribe stable incumbents. The horizon effect dominates at low levels of stability, because firms are unwilling to pay high bribes and unstable incumbents have strong incentives to embezzle, whereas the demand effect gains salience in more stable regimes. Together, these two effects generate a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between total corruption and stability. On the empirical side, we find a robust U-shaped pattern between country indices of corruption perception and various measures of incumbent stability, including historically observed average tenures of chief executives and governing parties: regimes that are very stable or very unstable display higher levels of corruption when compared with those in an intermediate range of stability. These results suggest that minimizing corruption may require an electoral system that features some re-election incentives, but with an eventual term limit.     

COMPARING ECONOMIC WELL-BEING AMONG ELDERLY AMERICANS

Income-only and income-net worth measures of elderly economic well-being are derived from a single public welfare function-optimizing model of household production and intertemporal resource allocation. These measures are estimated with data on United States elderly in 1984 from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. The income-net worth measure also incorporates independently estimated work-life expectancies and earnings replacement rates. Under both measures, minority, moderately disabled, and unmarried female elderly are the poorest sub-populations. Increasing poverty with age is found under the income-only measure, but not the income-net worth measure.     

PUBLIC EDUCATION, FERTILITY INCENTIVES, NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AND WELFARE

Using a simple overlapping generations model of neoclassical growth, we analyse the effects of both child allowances and the system of public education on the rate of fertility, the per capita income and the individual lifetime welfare. The essential message of the present paper is that developed countries plagued by below-replacement fertility and income stagnation may raise per capita income and the rate of fertility at the same time by increasing the public education expenditure rather than by resorting to child allowances. The latter, in fact, are found to be harmful for long-run neoclassical economic growth and, in contrast with the common belief, for the rate of population growth as well. Moreover, welfare analysis has shown the existence of a Pareto-efficient welfare-maximizing educational contribution rate.     

REVENUE-NEUTRAL INCENTIVES FOR EFFICIENCY AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Recently, interest has grown in using monetary incentives as an efficient way to promote energy efficiency and environmental quality. This paper describes issues raised in designing revenue-neutral incentive policies to achieve these goals. Such policies involve charging fees in proportion to undesirable characteristics and giving rebates in proportion to desirable characteristics. The fees pay for the rebates and for any administrative costs of the program.
This paper analyzes the conceptual issues raised in designing such incentive policies to correct for externalities and to promote the efficiency of buildings and automobiles. The paper examines the nature and importance of externalities, presents the rationale for revenue-neutral incentive policies, and describes six revenue-neutral incentive programs for achieving these goals. In addition, it analyzes the criteria that one should use in determining the size of fees and rebates, in light of the large uncertainties. Finally, the paper addresses key implementation issues.     

INCENTIVES FOR COMPETITIVE RESPONSES IN REPLICATED ECONOMIES: A GENERALIZATION

A simple proof is presented of a theorem of Roberts and Postlewaite on truthful revelation of preferences for replicated economies. The proof provides some generalizations of the earlier result using the strict definition of feasibility. First, to economies with an infinity of agents but with a finite number of types; secondly, to economies with a countable number of commodities.     

ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper has three parts. The first part attempts to analyse the prevailing situation in developing countries. The second part presents a feasible accounting system for such countries, by and large within the framework of the SNA. The third part goes beyond this and tries to obtain a more concise matrix (covering, in concept, those given in the accounting system) furnishing minimal sets of variables and classifications which one has, in any case, to play within the context of policy issues of developing countries. All three authors are jointly responsible for the first part. Uma Datta Roy Choudhury has drafted the second part. The third part has been drafted by the other two authors.     

农用地分等中土地利用系数与经济系数计算方法改进探讨--以江苏省无锡市为例

土地利用系数和经济系数是农用地分等研究中的两个重要系数。章在分析两系数作用和国家“规程”计算方法的基础上,从计算公式和计算步骤两方面对系数的计算方法提出了改进,并以无锡市为例进行了实证研究。结果表明,改进后的方法能使两系数等值区划分和数值计算结果更为科学、合理。     

注重发展规划 促进经济发展

１９９６年 ,圣菲市制定了第一个《经济发展规划》。这一规划的目的在于为圣菲市的经济发展提出战略性规划 ,指明促进经济多元化的途径 ,激发现有存量产业的潜能 ,确定发展目标以及实现目标的有效措施 ,为经济发展创造更多的机遇。为了探讨市政府如何为市民提供更多的经济发展机会 ,我们举行了２０余次公众会议。《经济发展规划》文件的基本导向就是创造更多的机会 ,提高市民的生活质量。由于发展规划中吸收了许多合同文本的内容 ,所以经济发展规划也被认为是我市经济发展合同的重要基础。１９９７年 ,我市的《经济发展规划》荣获美国规划协…     

传统经济管理思想对当代经济管理实践的启示

传统经济管理思想对当代经济管理实践的启示表现在以下几个方面:(1)农地首先是自然资源,其次才是资本资源。土地公有为合理模式。(2)盐铁专营可作为生产管理、流通管理的典型形式,重农抑商的实质需要重新认识。(3)分配管理集中在土地政策和赋税地租上。消费管理以节俭为指导思想。(4)国政经济管理涉及财政管理、军费管理和户籍管理。货币金融管理直接影响到财政和经济贸易。     

试论经济区划的现实意义及其发展

通过分析经济区划工作在以往的局限性,针对我国今天的经济发展形势,认为经济区划是政府必须坚持的工作,而且对于解决当前国民经济发展的障碍,经济区划有其特别的重要性。文章提出了认识经济区划工作的新观点和大致的工作思路。     

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

This article explains how economic analysis can be applied to understand environmental problems and to suggest appropriate policies to deal with these problems. Economic analysis is performed using static and dynamic models, and one‐person and several‐person game theoretical models. Policy recommendations include the control of industrial pollution in China and the regulation of world CO₂ emission through the application of a resolution by the United Nations.     

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUES FOR DEFICIT POLICY

Much of the controversy about reducing the federal deficit has arisen because policymakers lack a deficit policy that is a consistent part of broader macroeconomic policy. This is not surprising since economists have not reached a consensus about such a policy.
This paper sketches the analytical controversy about monetary and fiscal policies and traces it to issues about how the economy works. Although aspects of the deficit question are controversial, there is general concern about the buildup of federal debt implicit in the projection of persistently large deficits. A growing body of research suggests that the increase in the federal debt-to-income ratio may impinge dangerously on the credit available to finance private capital formation. Also, the rising federal debt may indirectly generate inflation through monetization.
Several criteria and approaches to a deficit policy are identified. The paper suggests that changing the "policy mix" by tightening fiscal policy and loosening monetary policy to reduce interest rates is unlikely to succeed to the extent that expansive monetary policy increases real interest rates by raising inflationary expectations and uncertainty.
Since the potential ill effects of the federal debt buildup, are essentially long-run and bear on capital accumulation, any tax increases should avoid disincentives to saving, investment, and to growth generally. Depending on revenue requirements, fundamental changes in the tax system may be necessary. Further reductions in spending appear to be inevitable if the projected rise in the debt-to-GNP ratio is to be halted. Defense, retirement, and medical care programs are most likely candidates for reduction.