The dynamics of distributive politics

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period, a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t + 1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game and conduct an experiment to test hypotheses generated by the theory for pure distributional (divide-the-dollar) environments. In particular, we investigate the effects of concavity in the utility functions, the existence of a Condorcet winning alternative, and the discount factor (committee “impatience”). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic. Status quo outcomes have great inertia. There are strong treatment effects that are in the direction predicted by the Markov equilibrium. We find significant evidence of concave utility functions.     

Provided and perceived status quo in choice experiments: Implications for valuing the outputs of multifunctional rural areas

This article presents a choice experiment analyzing multifunctional rural development policies targeting conservation and recovery of environmental, social and cultural assets. In choice experiments a base alternative is usually included in order to estimate the welfare change associated to policy proposals. This study is concerned with the much neglected issue of the impact on policy analysis of the definition of a ‘status quo’ alternative either as an objective assessment by experts, or as a self-reported perception by respondents. Convergent validity analysis and prospective policy scenarios show a significant impact of different status quo specifications on individuals' preferences and related welfare measures when complex and unfamiliar biophysical systems are involved in policy analysis and evaluation.     

A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy

This paper presents a dynamic model of elections, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the likely governments that parties would form based on their representation and the policies they would choose as a function of the status quo. The status quo thus affects both the election outcomes and the bargaining power of the parties during government formation. A formateur party therefore has incentives to strategically position the current policy to gain an advantage in both the next election and the subsequent bargaining over government formation and policy choice. These incentives can give rise to centrifugal forces that result in policies that are outside the Pareto set of the parties.     

Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy-interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a proto-coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policy within that coalition. The equilibrium policy in the legislative bargaining stage maximizes the aggregate policy utility of the coalition members and the lobbies, but lobbying can also lead to the preservation of the status quo and lobby-induced gridlock. When the status quo does not persist, the policy outcome is largely determined by the selection of a coalition, since legislative bargaining under unanimity within the coalition leads to a coalition-efficient policy regardless of the identity of the proposer. An example is presented to identify the types of equilibria and provide a full characterization of an equilibrium.     

Voting by veto

This paper describes a voting procedure for revealing preferences for public goods. The procedure consists of two steps: a proposal by each committee member to be added along with the status quo to form the issue set, and then, subsequent to a random determination of voting order, the elimination of one proposal from the issue set by each committee member. For any set of proposals and a given order of voting the procedure determines a unique, winning proposal. Under the procedure's incentives, the winning proposal tends to contain an equal sharing of the potential gains from collective action among the committee members.     

Dynamic legislative policy making

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume preferences and the status quo are subject to arbitrarily small shocks. We prove that equilibrium continuation values are differentiable and that proposal strategies are continuous almost everywhere. We establish upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence, and we provide weak conditions under which each equilibrium of our model determines an aperiodic transition probability over policies. We establish a convergence theorem giving conditions under which the invariant distributions generated by stationary equilibria must be close to the core in a canonical spatial model. Finally, we extend the analysis to sequential move stochastic games and to a version of the model in which the proposer and voting rule are determined by play of a finite, perfect information game.     

An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes

This paper describes an efficiency approach to the evaluation of policy changes. Rather than comparing the utility allocations that arise before and after a policy change is introduced, this approach evaluates a policy change by comparing it with other possible changes which might be made from the status quo. The main merit of the approach is that it is founded on the Pareto criterion rather than on a distributional value judgement. The paper provides a precise statement of the approach and applies it to a number of examples. Some objections to the approach are also anticipated and discussed.     

Income Provision in Old Age

Few areas of public policy impinge more directly on individual lifetime welfare than those directed at retirement income. While policy initiatives implemented since the start of the 1970s fall short of major reform, there have nevertheless been substantial changes in the real value of pensions, the coverage of pensions, and the tax treatment of various forms of retirement income. The objective of this article is to catalogue these changes in policy, and to identify the combination of political philosophy and socio-economic pressures underlying them. It also analyses some of the economic consequences of these policies and examines the question of national superannuation. The article concludes that, for the present at least, any reforms in the area of retirement income provision seem likely to be limited to the refinement of the status quo.     

信用视角下的货币政策有效性研究

信用是市场经济的基石,信用制度的完善与否关系到国家各项宏观调控政策能否真正得到贯彻落实。本文以我国的信用现状为出发点,分析了信用制度的缺失对中央银行在通过实施货币政策进行宏观调控时货币政策工具、货币政策中介目标、货币政策传导机制等方面的影响,认为信用缺失是造成我国货币政策效果不明显的关键因素。     

Optimal unemployment insurance with heterogeneous agents

The framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance (UI) scheme and preferences for unemployment policy reforms. In a first step, the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio UI systems are obtained in simulations. Then, the question whether switching to such an optimal system from the status quo would be approved by a majority of the population is explored. Finally, the transitional dynamics following a policy change are analysed. Accounting for this transition has an important influence on the support for a policy change.     

What's in a second opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England

One way of evaluating how well monetary authorities perform is to provide the public with a regular and independent second opinion. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) are shadowed by professional and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank announcement. In this paper, we systematically evaluate this second opinion and find that, first, the shadow committee of the ECB tends to be relatively less inflation averse than the ECB. In contrast, the shadow committee of the BoE proposes a more hawkish monetary policy stance than the BoE. Second, consensus within a shadow committee is far easier to reach when there is no pressure to change the policy rate. Third, the ECB's shadow committee is more activist than the ECB's Governing Council and a larger degree of consensus within the former brings about a greater likelihood that the two committees will agree.     

The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto

Voting by Veto [VBV], developed by Dennis C. Mueller, is a two-stage voting mechanism for committee decision making. In the first stage, every member of the committee makes a proposal. The proposals are joined with the current status quo (or another fallback option). For the second stage, a random mechanism determines the order of voting and the committee members sequentially eliminate one alternative each. After every committee member has exercised her veto, a single winning alternative remains. Game theory predicts that the equality of the resulting distribution under VBV varies with group size. Hence, decisions in two-member groups should result in highly unequal distributions of benefits. With increasing group size, however, VBV should generate more equally distributed outcomes. We examine the effect of group size under VBV in a series of laboratory experiments where groups with a varying number of members play a ‘divide the dollar game’. Our results confirm that larger groups choose more equal distributions than smaller groups. However, we also find deviations from the model's predictions. Some committees in our experiment do not select Pareto-optimal alternatives. An exploratory analysis of possible explanations suggests that individual behavior is most likely motivated by a combination of material self-interest and social preferences such as reciprocity and fairness.     

A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game

We analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member—if a majority prefer so—or according to previous period's allocation otherwise. Although current existence theorems for Markovian equilibria do not apply for this dynamic game, we fully characterize a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium is such that irrespective of the discount factor or the initial division of the dollar, the proposer eventually extracts the whole dollar in all periods. We also show that proposal strategies are weakly continuous in the status quo that equilibrium expected utility is not quasi-concave, and the correspondence of voters’ acceptance set (the set of allocations weakly preferred over the status quo) fails lower hemicontinuity.     

Investment under Uncertainty in Dynamic Conflicts

This paper analyses a model in which two groups repeatedly compete with each other for a prize in every time period. We assume that there is a status quo bias: if there is a fight today, yesterday's winner is in a stronger position than the other group. Hence, a change of the status quo has long-term consequences that groups need to take into account. Important applications of this model include lobbying for legislation and political transitions through revolutions. We analyse the strategic timing of attacks on the status quo, which is similar to investment decisions under uncertainty. We find that the attack threshold is considerably lower than in a comparable one-period game, and that the expenditure level necessary to change the status quo is low in comparison to the prize; this provides a possible solution to Tullock's "rent-seeking paradox" in lobbying.     

A grey dynamic model for the evaluation of regional sustainable development and its empirical study

Currently, traditional development issues, such as economic stagnation, as well as new challenges like environmental degradation and globalization, need attention. Sustainable development, including economic, environmental, and social elements, is a main goal of decision-makers. The key to sustainable decision-making is to evaluate and forecast the status quo of sustainable development. Policy makers need a tool based on scientific information to forecast the effects of future actions on sustainability and make policies for sustainable development. This paper analyzes the relation of the economy, environment and social welfare by the grey dynamic model. The proposed method uses time series and basic indicators of ecological system, including economic, environmental and social sub-systems. It is applied to Heilongjiang Province and Jiangsu Province. The results have proved different status quo of sustainable development in these two regions, and suggestions are proposed, such as optimization of industrial structure and eco-industrial development. The conclusion is that there is no unique sustainable path, and accordingly, policy makers should choose different criteria and strategies to make efficient sustainable decisions for each region.     

A grey dynamic model for the evaluation of regional sustainable development and its emoirical study

Currently,traditional development issues,such as economic stagnation,as well as new challenges like environmental degradation and globalization,need attention.Sustainable development,including economic,environmental,and social elements,is a main goal of decision-makers.The key to sustainable decision-making is to evaluate and forecast the status quo of sustainable development.Policy makers need a tool based on scientific information to forecast the effects of future actions on sustainability and make policies for sustainable development.This paper analyzes the relation of the economy,environment and social welfare by the grey dynamic model.The proposed method use time series and basic indicators of ecological system,including economic,environmental and social sub-systems.It is applied to Heilongfiang Province and Jiangsu Province.The results have proved different status quo of sustainable development in these two regions,and suggestions are proposed,such as optimization of industrial structure and eco-industrial development.The conclusion is that there is no unique sustainable path,and accordingly,policy makers shouM choose different criteria and strategies to make efficient sustainable decisions for each region.     

SCREENING FOR A CHRONIC DISEASE: A MULTIPLE STAGE DURATION MODEL WITH PARTIAL OBSERVABILITY

We estimate a dynamic multistage duration model to investigate how early detection of diabetes can delay the onset of lower extremity complications and death. We allow for partial observability of the disease stage, unmeasured heterogeneity, and endogenous timing of diabetes screening. Timely diagnosis appears important. We evaluate the effectiveness of two potential policies to reduce the monetary costs of frequent screening in terms of lost longevity. Compared to the status quo, the more restrictive policy yields an implicit value for an additional year of life of about $50,000, whereas the less restrictive policy implies a value of about $120,000.     

Central bankers in government appointed committees

I study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee, who are appointed by the government. Central bankers balance their desire to protect the Central Bank's reputation against their interest to be reappointed. Committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reducing inflation and insulating policy from government pressures. These gains are only achieved if the turnover rate of committee members is low and the committee is small. The former is associated with a low risk of being replaced for not supporting the government's preferred policy. The latter, meanwhile, implies high probability that a single vote affects policy, making any individual member more weary of potentially affecting the Central Bank's reputation through his vote.     

关于我国城市社区卫生服务发展的思考

就目前我国城市社区卫生服务发展举步不前的原因,进行了深入的分析,指出了建立双向转诊制度是破解其发展的关键所在.并为全面推进我国城市双向转诊制度,在政策和制度上提出了创新性建议.     

Individual Characteristics,Behavioral Biases,and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey in Japan

Import liberalization is one of the most actively debated issues in trade policy. This paper examines how trade policy preferences are related to individual characteristics based on a survey in Japan. Among 10,000 surveyed individuals, people working in non‐agricultural sectors, those working in managerial occupations, or those above retirement age tend to favor freer imports. This paper also finds that people who are influenced by the status quo bias are likely to oppose import liberalization even after controlling for each individual's various characteristics, suggesting that neither income compensation nor insurance schemes are sufficient for expanding support for free trade.