Does financial liberalization improve the allocation of investment?: Micro-evidence from developing countries

Using firm level panel data from 12 developing countries we explore whether financial liberalization improves the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. A summary index of the efficiency of investment allocation that measures whether investment funds are going to firms with a higher marginal return to capital is developed. We examine the relationship between this and various measures of financial liberalization and find that liberalization increases the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. This holds after various robustness checks and is consistent with firm level evidence of a stronger association between investment and fundamentals after financial liberalization.     

A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization*

We develop a model of a small open economy with credit market frictions to analyze the consequences of capital account liberalization. We show that financial opening facilitates the inflows of cheap foreign funds and improves production efficiency. However, capital account liberalization has important distributional consequences. Specifically, it may be impossible to use public transfers to fully compensate the loss of those who are negatively affected by capital account liberalization. This explains why financial opening often meets fierce opposition even though it leads to efficiency gains for the economy as a whole. From a practical perspective, capital controls should be lifted gradually for a smooth transition.     

Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

Libéralisation des Services publics de réseau et jeux croisés de la régulation: le cas de l'électricité

This article analyses the liberalization of public services with a special focus on the (re)regulation process that is induced. Firstly, a conceptual framework is developed in order to identify the constitutive elements of the public regulation related to market competition, public service obligations, operators and public property, as well as the tension between them. Secondly, a comparative study describes the liberalization and the regulatory design of the electricity sector in England, France, Germany, Norway and Switzerland. As a conclusion, we note the necessity to further analyse the introduction of market mechanisms into formerly monopolistic network industries and its effects.     

Financial Liberalization and Allocation of Capital: Dark Side of the Moon

Although it is well established that financial liberalization leads to a positive ‘quantity effect’ with higher levels of investment, it remains uncertain whether it also improves the efficacy with which such investment funds are allocated. This paper contributes to this sparely researched aspect of liberalization (‘quality effect’) by carefully examining if the financial reforms in India have led to an improvement in the allocation of resources. Since one of the premises of better allocation is that funds are channelled to firms with higher marginal returns to capital (measured by Tobin’s Q), we propose three unique measures to track the efficiency of resource allocation: (a) dispersion-based measures; (b) the allocative efficiency index; and (c) the relative value of allocation. Contrary to the prevalent assumption that financial liberalization leads to higher capital allocation efficiency, this study’s findings could not establish a direct correlation between the opening up of markets and higher allocation efficiency, except for the latter part of the reform period. Further, this paper draws attention to the greater misallocation of funds in the post-reform period, as the increase in funds availability leads to excess capacity creation in some industries without consideration of the need for concurrent return or demand. The authors of this paper recommend that any financial liberalization needs to be accompanied by the setting up of institutions for corporate control, particularly in an emerging market like India.

     

Public service and competition in the European Union

In recent years, the Treaty of the European Union and the European institutions have had a rapidly increasing impact on the reorganization of commercial public services within the Member States. The trend has been dual—toward liberalization and toward harmonization of standards and national legislations. Progress is reported and analyzed in telecommunications, rail services, and electricity. A general concern is to reconcile legitimate public service obligations with the rules of competition that are prominent in the Treaty. New forms of regulation are tested in various countries preparing for the emergence of a European regulation framework.     

Regulatory reform in telecommunications in Central and Eastern Europe

In this paper we discuss public policy towards the telecommunications sector in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), focusing primarily on the need to ensure adequate capital investment. The analysis falls into two main parts: the regulation of monopoly, and policy on liberalization. Concerning regulation, we discuss how policy credibility is likely to be a problem in the region, and how reputational considerations, the design of regulatory institutions, and methods of price control can help to ameliorate this problem. Concerning liberalization, we consider the effects of potential competition on investment incentives, and construct a simple model to analyse the different effects of liberalization and regulatory risk on investment. Some preliminary policy conclusions are drawn, and we argue that in the CEE region – in contrast to more well developed countries – a reasonable case can be made for allowing a temporary period of monopoly for basic services.     

The effect of financial liberalization on banking sector stability

Several studies indicate that financial liberalization increases likelihood of a financial crisis without distinguishing between a normal period, unstable period preceding the onset of banking panics and crisis/post period. We explain in this paper the relationship between financial liberalization and banking sector vulnerability. Then, we argue that banking sector turmoil is most likely to occur after an intermediate degree of liberalization. Using a recently updated dataset for financial reforms, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and the likelihood of banking crisis for a sample of 49 countries between 1980 and 2010. We used a multinomial logit model in order to take into account what is called the ‘post crisis bias’. We ask whether the relationship remains when institutional characteristics of countries and dynamic effects of liberalization are considered. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking sector stability depends strongly on the strength of capital regulation and supervision. With very weak regulation and supervision, the probability of banking crises is increasing with liberalization but this relationship is reversed as regulation and supervision become significant. The most important type of liberalization in relation to banking crises seems to be operational. A policy implication is that positive growth effects of liberalization can be achieved without increasing the risk of a banking fragility if appropriate institutions are developed.     

Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons

Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.     

Conduct effects of gradual entry liberalization in insurance

The effects of rate regulation on insurance have been profusely investigated in the empirical literature but less is known about the effects of entry liberalization.We investigate the effects of an entry liberalization process on conduct of insurance firms under a rate regulation system. An explicit model of oligopolistic interaction is proposed and an application to the Portuguese auto-insurance market is reported.The results show that coordination between insurance firms was only temporarily upset by a gradual liberalization on entry conditions, with firms resuming almost immediately a coordinated equilibrium.I am thankful to Luís Cabrai, António Leite, José Mata, Vasco Santos, and the referees for useful suggestions. Financial support from an EC Human Capital Mobility Fellowship, grant ERBCHBGCT920147, and the hospitality of Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Public policy towards cross subsidy

Although elusive of measurement, cross subsidies are widely believed to have existed on a significant scale in network industries, particularly when these developed under public ownership. After providing careful definitions of when cross subsidy occurs, this article distinguishes eight distinct cases, drawing examples primarily from network sectors. Debates about the desirability of cross subsidy in the context of public enterprise are then reviewed; issues such as the geographical averaging of tariffs and the extent to which non-commercial obligations should be reimbursed by government on the recoup principle are addressed. The policy package of denationalization, liberalization and new forms of regulation have far-reaching implications for cross subsidy policy. For example, liberalization reduces the ability of incumbent enterprises to cross subsidize uneconomic links in a network, particularly if entrants are not subjected to comparable social obligations. Moreover, denationalized enterprises will more vigorously pursue financial profitability, discontinuing cross subsidy related to the traditional equity and political goals, but exploiting cross subsidy as an entry-repelling tool. Both at the member state and European Union levels, there is evidence of confused thinking about the desirability and continued feasibility of cross subsidy; for example, not recognizing the inconsistency involved in imposing non-economic obligations on incumbents while removing barriers to competitive entry. These developments not only erode the viability of the missions of public enterprises in their traditional sectors but also raise issues for public policy if and when technological developments make possible new forms of price discrimination in social sectors.     

Trade, regulations, and income

We examine the relationship between openness and per-capita income using cross-country data from 126 countries. We find that trade leads to a higher standard of living in flexible economies, but not in rigid economies. Business regulation, especially on firm entry, is more important than financial development, higher education, or rule of law as a complementary policy to trade liberalization. Specifically, after controlling for the standard determinants of per-capita income, our results imply that a 1% increase in trade is associated with more than a one-half percent rise in per-capita income in economies that facilitate firm entry, but has no positive income effects in more rigid economies. The findings are consistent with Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, which highlights the importance of new business entry in economic performance, and with previous firm-level studies showing that the beneficial effects of trade liberalization come largely from an intra-sectoral reallocation of resources.     

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand: Costly Public Funds and the Value of Private Information

In this paper, we analyze the optimal regulation policy when the regulated firm has better information concerning the market demand than the regulator. We show that introducing a cost on public funds into the Planner's objective function does not lead to qualitative results similar to those obtained by introducing distributional considerations. In particular we show that under constant marginal cost the full information policy is not implementable and that the optimal regulatory policy results in informational rents. The social value of private information and the firm's informational rents are both increasing functions of the cost of the public funds.     

Environmental Funds,Public Abatement,and Welfare

This paper addresses some features of environmental funds that the government uses to finance public abatement with pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue. I find that when the pollution tax rate and the tariff rate are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate under public abatement financed by tariff revenue, and lower when public abatement is financed by pollution tax revenue. Furthermore, I show that the optimal tariff rate is positive regardless of which tax revenue is used to finance public abatement. These results are relevant for countries where the government seeks revenues earmarked for the financing of environmental funds.     

The Reform of Local Public Utilities in Italy

The Italian system of local public utilities has recently undergone an important reform process. The first round of reforms, introduced in the 1990s, represented a remarkable change in the social welfare function with regard to the management of local public utilities. The legislation was specifically designed to cut costs and reduce deficits. A second round of reforms, required by European directives, started around the mid-1990s. Several laws were passed introducing important innovations and regulating specific sectors: public transport; electricity; and gas. Article 35 of the 2002 Financial Law was the final step in a comprehensive reform of the whole local public utility sector. The main innovations of the Financial Law concerns liberalization. Article 35 states that the general rule for awarding service provision contracts is competitive tendering; the rationale is obviously that of competition for the market. The general rule as expressed by Article 35 is nevertheless limited during the transition period. In the long run, competitive tendering will become the normal way of awarding contracts for local public utility provision. Even if there are doubts that full competition will be introduced into the sector, liberalization does appear to be having an effect, forcing many local public utilities to become more efficient. The changes introduced have brought about a better and a more efficient system with a greater number of large size enterprises and on the average a more active management.
In the future, the liberalization process may come to a standstill due to an insufficient number of competitors. Strong public administrations are therefore needed to prevent opportunistic behaviour by private firms.     

Financial liberalization,financial regulation and bank efficiency: a multi-country analysis

This article investigates the impact of financial reforms on bank efficiency. More specifically, we distinguish between two different types of financial reforms, i.e. financial liberalization measures and measures of the quality of bank regulation and supervision (i.e. financial regulation), and study their relationship to bank efficiency separately. Moreover, we analyse whether the impact of financial liberalization on bank efficiency is conditional on the quality of regulation and supervision of the banking system. We apply stochastic frontier analysis to calculate bank efficiency at the individual bank level and use a new and detailed database that measures different aspects of financial reforms. The data-set consists of 87 312 bank-year observations covering 61 countries for the period 1996–2005. Overall, we show that the impact of financial liberalization policies on bank efficiency is conditional on the extent to which bank regulation and supervision has been adopted and developed.     

PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION: COSTS AND BENEFITS IN THE PRESENCE OF WAGE-BARGAINING

ABSTRACT ** :  The most important economic motive for privatization and liberalization is to reduce costs, which are believed to be higher in a public monopoly for several reasons, including internal rent capture. We assume that there is wage-bargaining both before and after privatization and liberalization. Wages are then in most cases reduced by liberalization but not by privatization as such. Social welfare may increase after liberalization with decentralized wage-bargaining if many firms enter, if the employees' bargaining strength is high and if there is no need of vertical separation. However, the social costs of privatization and liberalization are more likely to dominate despite free entry if sunk costs are high, and will always dominate under central wage-bargaining or vertical separation.     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

Trade liberalization,the exchange rate and job flows in Brazil

Brazil underwent a large trade liberalization process in the 1990s. Over the period, manufacturing employment decreased significantly, generating public debate on the need to revert liberalization. This paper aims to identify the actual effect of trade liberalization on employment, separating it from exchange rate movements using a gross job flow approach. Our novel dataset covers all sectors and formally registered enterprises, and we use new sector specific exchange rate data. Our estimates suggest that greater openness reduce jobs through increased job destruction, with no effect on job creation, but the exchange rate matters also. Depreciations expand the number of jobs in manufacturing by increasing creation, with no effect on destruction.     

Efficiency‐adjusted public capital,capital grants,and growth

A debate on whether capital grants, and especially European Union (EU) funds, actually contribute to growth has gained prominence lately. This article empirically assesses the relationship between the quality of public investment, capital grants, and growth in a sample of 43 emerging and peripheral economies over 1991–2015. To this end, the contribution of public capital to growth is estimated using efficiency‐adjusted public capital stock series, which reflects the quality of public investment management institutions. In addition, the determinants of effective public investment are analyzed. The results suggest that capital grants contribute positively to effective public investment, and the latter is significant in explaining variations in economic growth. Finally, the article illustrates the impact of raising EU funds absorption on potential growth in emerging and peripheral EU countries.