Does eco-certification boost regulatory compliance in developing countries? ISO 14001 in Mexico

Private sector initiatives certifying that producers of goods and services adhere to defined environmental process standards are increasingly popular worldwide. According to proponents, they can circumvent chronic barriers to effective public sector environmental regulation in developing countries. But eco-certification programs will have limited effects on producers?? environmental performance if, as one would expect, they select for those already meeting certification standards. Rigorous evaluations of the environmental effects of eco-certification in developing countries that control for selection bias are rare. We use plant-level data on more than 80,000 Mexican facilities to determine whether ISO 14001 series certification of environmental management systems boosts regulatory compliance. We use propensity score matching to control for nonrandom selection into the program. We find that plants recently fined by environmental regulators were more likely to be certified, all other things equal, but that certified plants were subsequently fined just as often as similar uncertified plants. These results suggest that in Mexico, the ISO 14001 program attracts dirty plants under pressure from regulators??not just relatively clean ones??but does not have a large, lasting impact on their regulatory compliance.     

Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance

Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have often employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing compliance with these agreements once they are in place. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent monitor who audits the compliance performance of the members of an agreement. These audits reveal instances of noncompliance so they can be sanctioned. We find that costly monitoring of compliance limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will often involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly monitoring. Consequently, costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly monitoring.      

Lessons from Environmental Regulation for the Nonprofit Sector

As the third sector's economic and social impact grows worldwide, efforts by governments to regulate the sector have focused on increasing compliance in tax–exempt organizations. This article turns to the environmental sector for guidance, summarizing key characteristics of environmental regulation and noting what strategies are likely to prove useful for application to regulation of nonprofit organizations. The article finds some value in promotion of market–based enforcement schemes, but little value in promulgation of laws specifying governance structures and performance standards by a central authority. The most promising opportunity for improvement of the nonprofit regulatory process involves incorporation of financial incentives into monitoring schemes.     

THE PRIVATE RATIONALITY OF BOTTLED WATER DRINKING

This article examines evidence for the private rationality of decisions to choose bottled water using a large, nationally representative sample. Consumers are more likely to believe that bottled water is safer or tastes better if they have had adverse experiences with tap water or live in states with more prevalent violations of EPA water quality standards. Perceptions of superior safety, taste, and convenience of bottled water boost consumption of bottled water. Blacks and Hispanics are more likely to drink bottled water due to their relatively greater exposure to unsafe water and greater risk beliefs. The coherent network of experiences, beliefs, and actions is consistent with rational consumer choice. (JEL D12, D80, Q50)     

Can consumers enforce environmental regulations? The role of the market in hazardous waste compliance

We examine the U.S. hazardous waste management industry to assess the role that consumers play in encouraging environmental compliance. We first examine whether environmental performance affects consumer demand and find that noncompliance does decrease demand, at least in the short term. Next we consider whether market characteristics affect compliance behavior. While we do not find evidence that market size affects behavior, local competition does appear to increase compliance. However, as competition becomes less localized, it has a smaller effect. Finally, regardless of the pressures exerted by consumers to comply, commercial managers are less likely to be in compliance than on-site managers. For example, President Bush’s 2006 budget request for EPA significantly cut funding to the states who are responsible for over 95% of environmental inspections (ECOS, 2005). At the federal level, the number of positions for compliance monitoring decreased by over 17% from FY 2001 to FY 2003 (U.S. GAO, 2002).     

Industrial Ownership and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China

This study explores the differences in pollution control performance of industries with different types of ownership – State owned (SOE), collectively or community owned (COE), and privately owned (POE). A theoretic analysis is conducted and followed by an empirical assessment with Chinese data. The empirical results show that the COEs in China have better environmental performances in water pollution discharges than the SOEs and the POEs, suggesting that COEs may internalize environmental externalities.      

The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions

Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that all preference aggregation rules (PARs) must violate a specific set of normative conditions (transitivity, Pareto, IIA, nondictatorship) over an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. However, the theorem does not address which PARs are more likely to violate those conditions across preference profiles. We compare the probabilities that thirteen PARs (anti-plurality, Hare, Nanson, plurality, plurality runoff, Simpson–Kramer, Baldwin, Borda, Coombs, Copeland, Dowdall, pairwise majority, and ranked pairs) violate Arrow’s conditions. We prove that Baldwin, Borda, Coombs, Copeland, Dowdall, and ranked pairs are less likely to violate IIA than the first six PARs, and they are less likely to violate Arrow’s conditions jointly. In contrast, pairwise majority never violates IIA but can violate transitivity. Simulations with three alternatives reveal that among the PARs studied, pairwise majority is the most likely to satisfy Arrow’s conditions jointly. Our results suggest pairwise majority violates transitivity with a small probability, while the other PARs violate IIA with much larger probabilities.     

Do environmental audits improve long-term compliance? Evidence from manufacturing facilities in Michigan

Using a unique facility-level dataset from Michigan, we examine the effect of environmental auditing on manufacturing facilities’ long-term compliance with U.S. hazardous waste regulations. We also investigate the factors that affect facilities’ decisions to conduct environmental audits and whether auditing in turn affects the probability of regulatory inspections. We account for the potential endogeneity of our audit measure and the censoring of our compliance measure using a censored trivariate probit, which we estimate using simulated maximum likelihood. We find that larger facilities and those subject to more stringent regulations are more likely to audit; facilities with poor compliance records are less likely to audit. However, we find no significant long-run impact of auditing on the probability of a regulatory inspection or compliance among these Michigan manufacturing facilities.     

On Efficiency of Decentralized Environmental Regulation

Contrary to conventional wisdom about an environmental race to the bottom, the theoretical literature as exemplified by Oates and Schwab [1988, Journal of Public Economics, 35:333–354] maintains that homogeneous jurisdictions’ decentralized choices are likely to be socially optimal because each locale sets capital tax rates to zero and sets optimal environmental standards. This paper shows the well-received Oates–Schwab-style efficiency result is not likely if allowed aggregate-emissions act as a firm-augmenting public input that benefits mobile firms.Thanks to participants at the University of Alberta and the reviewers and editors for their helpful comments     

Market Size and the Survival of Foreign‐owned Firms*

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and foreign direct investment cost uncertainty and investigate the survival of foreign‐owned firms. The survival probabilities of foreign‐owned firms depend on firm‐level characteristics, such as productivity, and host country characteristics, such as market size. We show that a foreign‐owned firm will be less likely to be shut down when its parent firm's productivity is higher and its indigenous competitors are less productive. Although a larger market size will always reduce the survival probability of indigenous firms, it can lead to a higher survival probability for foreign‐owned firms if their parent firms are sufficiently productive.     

Effective Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement

We propose an enforcement strategy to achieve complete compliance in a transferable emissions permit system when firms are required to provide reports of their own emissions. Like the literature on self-reporting in the enforcement of standards, we find that self-reporting can conserve monitoring costs, but for a different reason. In addition, we show that targeted monitoring—the practice of monitoring some firms more closely than others—is not necessary in a competitive permit system. Furthermore, tying penalties to the equilibrium permit price can stabilize the monitoring effort necessary to maintain full compliance in the face of permit price fluctuations.     

STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: A CASE OF TRUCKING INDUSTRY

We used trucking industry’s response to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s acceleration of 2004 diesel emissions standards as a case study to examine the importance of accounting for regulatees’ strategic behaviors in drafting of environmental regulations. Our analysis of the time series data of aggregate U.S. and Canada heavy‐duty truck production data from 1992 through 2003 found that heavy‐duty trucks production increased by 20%–23% in the 6 mo prior to the date of compliance. The increases might be due to truck operators pre‐buying trucks with less expensive but noncompliant engines and behaving strategically in anticipation of other uncertainties. (JEL L51, Q25)     

Wage-related labour standards and FDI in China: some survey findings from Guangdong province

Abstract. The paper presents findings from a survey of foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) in Guangdong, China, on the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and wage‐related labour standards (regular wages, and compliance with official overtime and minimum wages), which show that wage‐related standards are statistically higher in FIEs whose home countries’ standards are higher, after controlling for other influences. However, a cost‐reduction FIE is more likely to be associated with inferior standards. The results call for a finer examination of the relationship between FDI and labour standards beyond the simple ‘race to the bottom’ thesis.     

National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities

Abstract. We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare‐maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare‐maximizing policy to violate National Treatment.     

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. We discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm’s decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments, and we analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution. This paper originated from the AEE/REE presidential address for the XXX Simposio de Análisis Económico (Murcia 2005). It builds on the research project on optimal enforcement in environmental problems done in collaboration with David Pérez-Castrillo. I would like to thank David Pérez-Castrillo and Pau Olivella for their useful comments. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (BEC2003-01132) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Barcelona Economics - CREA and 2005SGR-00836).     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments Within an Incomplete Contract Framework

This paper compares three different legal means—no environmental policy (the pollutee pays), full liability (the polluter pays), and pollution standards—to reduce and regulate neighborhood externalities within an incomplete contract framework. It turns out that the relative efficiency of these instruments depends, in general, on details. However, moderate standards are preferable to no environmental policy and tight (but not too tight) standards dominate liability. This provides under the given assumptions (neighborhood externalities, incomplete contracts) a justification for “sensible” standards for three reasons. First, unilateral allocations of property rights are biased that distort allocations even if ex post bargaining takes place. Second, a standard is superior in the following sense: if it is set equal to the outcome under any allocation of rights, it will be improved in the process of ex post bargaining. Third, unilateral property rights encourage strategic ex ante investments up to the point that committing to no bargaining would be beneficial (if possible).     

THE EFFECTS OF ENDOGENOUS MARKET ENTRY OF PHYSICIAN‐OWNED HOSPITALS ON MEDICARE EXPENDITURES: AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES APPROACH

This study examines the effect of physician‐owned hospitals (POHs) on Medicare per enrollee expenditures at the metropolitan area (MSA) level nationwide, spanning the 8‐year time period from 1998 to 2005. The study uses fixed effects panel data estimation with instrumental variables to account for the bias introduced by endogenous POH market entry (i.e., POHs may be more likely to open in high‐growth/high‐demand markets with high levels of Medicare per enrollee expenditures). After controlling for other variables that are likely to affect expenditures (especially the age and sex distribution of the MSA), we find no association between POH presence and Medicare expenditures per enrollee at the MSA level. The results are robust to changes in model specification, estimation technique, and definition of geographic market. These findings suggest that the “demand inducement” aspects of physician ownership of acute care hospitals (if any) have no meaningful impact on market‐level Medicare expenditures per enrollee. Current policies based on an assumption that POHs are associated with significant increases in total expenditures may need to be reassessed. (JEL I11, L10, C33)     

The environmental Porter hypothesis: theory,evidence, and a model of timing of adoption

The Porter hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We will show that times of adoption will be earlier if the non-adoption tax is higher. The environmental tax will turn the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment generating higher profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax will lead to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis will hold even for profit-maximizing firms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competition, X-inefficiency, and agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many case studies that we have evaluated, though, we detected an element of explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies.     

MINIMUM WAGE IMPACTS IN CHINA: ESTIMATES FROM A PRESPECIFIED RESEARCH DESIGN, 2000–2007

We use a prespecified research design to estimate the employment effect of minimum wages in China over the period 2000 to 2007. Our results are consistent with theoretical expectations and institutional realities of Chinese labor markets. These include: negative employment effects in slower growing regions; larger negative effects in non‐state‐owned organizations that tend to be more responsive to market pressures; much larger lagged effects reflecting the time needed for adjustments to occur; no adverse employment effects in the prosperous and growing Eastern region; and a positive employment effect in state‐owned enterprises in the East—consistent with monopsonistic behavior. (JEL J38)