Bayesian consistent belief selection

A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule, conditions her prior only on the available information (by selecting a belief in the announced set), and who updates the information prior-by-prior using Bayes' rule.     

Estimation of consistent multi-country FEERs

Most studies on equilibrium exchange rates focus on a limited number of G7 countries. But in a situation of world imbalances, emerging countries can no longer be excluded. The study of all equilibrium exchange rates is delicate. First, the trade model has to be balanced at the aggregate level. This paper suggests a method to achieve world balance both in volume and in value. Second, the N − 1 bilateral exchange rates cannot ensure that the N areas will reach their macroeconomic equilibrium simultaneously. This paper examines the existing solutions to solve the N − 1 problem and proposes an alternative which minimizes the distance to the current-account targets. Finally, in order to compare the relevance of the different methodologies, FEERs are calculated for 19 industrialized and developing countries. The results, which are taking into account the modification on output gap assessment induced by the 2008–2009 crisis, lead for the year 2010 to a USD closed to its equilibrium, a RMB undervalued by around 35% in real effective terms and to a EUR/USD parity equals to 1.47.     

A consistent route to randomness

Fully rational agents are allowed to optimize over expectations formation technologies in an environment where it is costly to collect and process information. It is shown in a general equilibrium framework that optimization over expectations by rational and forward-oriented agents can lead to endogenous instability. Specifically, we illustrate that resulting equilibria can be both chaotic and self-consistent with the distribution of agents' expected forecasting errors coinciding with the actual errors implied by the endogenous dynamic process. Moreover, we show that the equilibrium dynamics, while being purely deterministic, need not be distinguishable from stochastic dynamics to an outside rational observer.     

Evaluation designs for technology assessments and forecasts

The worth of technology assessments and technological forecasts need not remain a matter of faith; indeed, it cannot. Evaluation of technology assessments and forecasts is indicated both to assess their effectiveness and to provide feedback useful for improving the state of the art. Drawing upon evaluation research, we present a range of alternative evaluation designs that fit into four general categories; pre-planned or post-hoc evaluations of single studies; pre-planned or post-hoc comparisons among multiple studies. We distinguish among three classes of performance objectives meriting evaluative attention: validity, utility, and advancement of the methodological art. For each objective we in turn consider pros and cons of several specific evaluation designs. We conclude with recommendations for two coordinated, but selective, evaluation programs, one focused on comparison among extrapolative forecasting techniques and one devoted to certain aspects of technology assessment methods and utilization.     

人力资本积累与经济持续增长

本文从阐述传统经济增长理论的局限性出发，介绍了人力资本概念及其对经济增长的影响，尤其是专业化的人力资本积累对经济长期增长的决定性作用。作者认为，我国作为一个发展中的大国，要实现经济增长方式由粗放型向集约型转变，提高经济增长的质量与效益，必须吸收和借鉴经济增长理论研究的最新成果，进一步加大教育（包括专业教育、职业教育、在职培训等）投入，扩大对外开放，使我国丰富的人力资源转化为专业化的人力资本积累，从而促进经济的长期稳定增长     

A representation of consistent binary relations

We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a numerical representation which is equivalent to consistency as defined by Suzumura (Economica 43:381–390).      

A consistent multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle

The unidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle demands that a regressive transfer in income—a transfer from worse-off (poor) to better-off (rich)—decreases social welfare. In a multidimensional setting the direct link between income (or any other attribute) and individual well-being is absent. We interpret the social welfare level of a distribution in which each individual has the same bundle as the individual well-being level. We define regressivity on the basis of this individual well-being ranking. In a setting with both transferable and non-transferable attributes, the imposition of the ensuing “consistent” Pigou-Dalton principle forces individual well-being to have a quasi-linear structure in the transferable attributes. Since we allow for transferable and non-transferable attributes, our result provides a normative underpinning for criteria in the distinct literatures of multidimensional inequality measurement (only transferable attributes) and of needs (one transferable and one non-transferable attribute).     

Macroeconomic Modelling and Bayesian Methods

This paper discusses the evolution of macroeconomic modelling. In particular, it focuses on Bayesian methods and provides some applications of the Bayesian Vector Autoregression methods to the Indian economy.

     

A characterization of consistent collective choice rules

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference, which excludes the possibility of a “money pump.” The properties of collective choice rules used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.     

The evolutionary stability of constant consistent conjectures

In the general context of smooth two-player games, this paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant) consistent conjectures in a given game and the evolutionary stability of these conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent and consistent conjectures are the only interior candidates to be evolutionarily stable. Examples are provided to illustrate the result.     

Balanced Bayesian mechanisms

In the transferable utility case, a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers. We present a new, easy to interpret, condition and we show that it is (strictly) more general than all the other conditions found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.     

Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing

This paper considers the problem of testing an expert who makes probabilistic forecasts about the outcomes of a stochastic process. I show that, as long as uninformed experts do not learn the correct forecasts too quickly, a likelihood test can distinguish informed from uninformed experts with high prior probability. The test rejects informed experts on some data-generating processes; however, the set of such processes is topologically small. These results contrast sharply with many negative results in the literature.     

Bayesian coalitional rationalizability

In this paper we extend Ambrus's [A. Ambrus, Coalitional rationalizability, Quart. J. Econ. 121 (2006) 903-929] concept of “coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability)” to situations where, in seeking mutually beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes' rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations, i.e., the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, and not just only against restricted subsets of strategies. We offer an alternative notion of Bayesian c-rationalizability suitable for such complex social interactions. We show that Bayesian c-rationalizability possesses nice properties similar to those of conventional rationalizability.     

马克思可持续发展经济思想与人的全面发展

马克思经典著作及其理论中,包含着丰富的可持续发展经济思想及其与人的全面发展的关系.马克思不仅仅或主要是从阶级剥削角度揭露资本主义的暂时性,而更重要的是从人类社会可持续发展的角度,从人的发展的角度揭露和论证资本主义的危害性和暂时性,以及被新的合理社会形态(人与自然和谐发展,人得到全面发展的社会形态)所代替的必然性、合理性,使人类社会持续发展、使人和自然和谐发展共存,从而使人得到全面自由的发展,这才是马克思毕生所追求的.马克思理论占主导的应该是他的合理开发、利用保护自然资源,人和自然和谐共存、发展,人得到充分自由全面发展的可持续发展思想.     

A dimensionally consistent aggregation framework for biophysical metrics

We develop a formal representation of the economy-ecosystem interaction problem by distinguishing between stock-flow, and fund-flux spaces (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). We then define dimensionless quantities in both the cardinal stock-flow space and the ordinal fund-flux space. This leads to analytic definitions of natural capital and natural income in the fund-flux space. We show that a stock-fund representation of the economy-ecosystem interaction problem helps investigate aggregation properties of biophysical metrics. In particular, we show how a metric that is dimensionally consistent in the stock-flow space can have dimensional problems in the fund-flux space. Ecological footprint is used as an illustrative example. Finally, we argue that dimensionally consistent metrics are keys to further the development of biophysical assessments as a tool for practical environmental policy.     

Time‐consistent optimal fiscal policy*

This article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period's capital income tax rate. We find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment. First, capital income tax rates are very high (65% on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment). Second, labor income taxes are rather low on average (about 12% versus a value of around 31% under full commitment). Finally, labor income taxes are quite volatile, whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero.     

Time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity

I characterize time consistent equilibrium in an economy with price rigidity and an optimizing monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency of price change, at a cost, in response to higher inflation. Previous studies, which assume a constant degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes, find two time consistent equilibria—one with low inflation, the other with high inflation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high inflation equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, time consistent equilibrium is unique. This result depends on two features of the analysis: (1) a plausible quantitative specification of the fixed cost of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inflation that is independent of price rigidity.