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1.
Recent decision theories represent ambiguity via multiple priors, interpreted as alternative probabilistic models of the relevant uncertainty. This paper provides a robust behavioral foundation for this interpretation. A prior P is “plausible” if preferences over some subset of acts admit an expected utility representation with prior P, but not with any other prior QP. Under suitable axioms, plausible priors can be elicited from preferences, and fully characterize them; also, probabilistic sophistication implies that there exists only one plausible prior; finally, “plausible posteriors” can be derived via Bayesian updating. Several familiar decision models are consistent with the proposed axioms.  相似文献   

2.
This paper shows that common p-belief of rationality implies p-rationalizability for games with compact strategy sets. We also establish the Bayesian foundation for the perfect p-rationalizability for finite games. The p-rationalizability is then used to analyze the robustness of rationalizable sets. For any game with compact strategy sets, we show that the rationalizable set is robust, i.e., the strategies characterized by common p-belief of rationality are close to the rationalizable set when p→1.  相似文献   

3.
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [3] characterize preferences over menus of lotteries that can be represented by the use of a unique subjective state space and a prior. We investigate what would be the appropriate version of Dynamic Consistency in such a setup. The condition we find, which we call Flexibility Consistency, is linked to a comparative theory of preference for flexibility. When the subjective state space is finite, we show that Flexibility Consistency is equivalent to a subjective version of Dynamic Consistency and that it implies that the decision maker is a subjective state space Bayesian updater. Later we characterize when a collection of signals can be interpreted as a partition of the subjective state space of the decision maker.  相似文献   

4.
We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in symmetric separating strategies in the model of English auctions given by P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber (1982, Econometrica50, 1089–1122). There is a continuum of such equilibria. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber is that in which bids are maximal. Only in the case of pure private values does a restriction to weakly undominated strategies select a unique equilibrium. This has important implications for empirical studies of English auctions, particularly outside the pure private values paradigm. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82.  相似文献   

5.
This paper considers a two-agent model of trade with multiple priors. Firstly, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of an agreeable trade, whereas the two conditions are equivalent in the standard Bayesian framework. Secondly, we show that the two conditions are equivalent when the set of priors is the core of a convex capacity. These results are also related to the no trade theorems under asymmetric information.  相似文献   

6.
This paper formalizes two different principles to socially rank allocations under efficiency-equity trade off. The efficiency-first social preference relation ranks an allocation x higher than an allocation y if and only if (i) x is Pareto-superior to y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equity-superior to y. The equity-first social preference relation reverses the order of application of the two criteria. We show that the efficiency-first relation may have a cycle, whereas the equity-first relation is transitive. We also characterize and compare the sets of maximal elements for these social preference relations in the Edgeworth box and examine the nonemptiness of the sets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D63, D61.  相似文献   

7.
We employ a 10-variable dynamic structural general equilibrium model to forecast the US real house price index as well as its downturn in 2006:Q2. We also examine various Bayesian and classical time-series models in our forecasting exercise to compare to the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, estimated using Bayesian methods. In addition to standard vector-autoregressive and Bayesian vector autoregressive models, we also include the information content of either 10 or 120 quarterly series in some models to capture the influence of fundamentals. We consider two approaches for including information from large data sets — extracting common factors (principle components) in factor-augmented vector autoregressive or Bayesian factor-augmented vector autoregressive models as well as Bayesian shrinkage in a large-scale Bayesian vector autoregressive model. We compare the out-of-sample forecast performance of the alternative models, using the average root mean squared error for the forecasts. We find that the small-scale Bayesian-shrinkage model (10 variables) outperforms the other models, including the large-scale Bayesian-shrinkage model (120 variables). In addition, when we use simple average forecast combinations, the combination forecast using the 10 best atheoretical models produces the minimum RMSEs compared to each of the individual models, followed closely by the combination forecast using the 10 atheoretical models and the DSGE model. Finally, we use each model to forecast the downturn point in 2006:Q2, using the estimated model through 2005:Q2. Only the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model actually forecasts a downturn with any accuracy, suggesting that forward-looking microfounded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of the housing market may prove crucial in forecasting turning points.  相似文献   

8.
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.  相似文献   

9.
In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.Two information structures are equivalent from the perspective of a modeler, if they induce the same equilibrium outcomes. We characterize the situations in which two information structures are equivalent in terms of natural transformations, called garblings, from one structure to another. We study the notion of ‘being equivalent to’ in relation with three equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium, agent normal-form correlated equilibrium and the belief invariant Bayesian solution.  相似文献   

10.
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value type parameter. We call these independent linear environments. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. We also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. We illustrate these techniques with applications to auction design and public good provision.  相似文献   

11.
In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities. I study the nontransfer allocation of two ex-ante identical objects under Bayesian incentive compatibility, with symmetric agents and independent private valuations. I find the ex-ante utilitarian-optimal mechanism, in which the probability of receiving a specified object is used as “numeraire” to purchase probability units of the other object. I characterize this mechanism as an appropriate combination of lotteries, auctions and insurance. The latter element ensures that efficient auctions are feasible. If the problem is constrained to guarantee exactly one object per agent, then the optimal mechanism uses no information other than the agents? ordinal preferences.  相似文献   

12.
The paper studies Bayesian games which are extended by adding pre-play communication. Let Γ be a Bayesian game with full support and with three or more players. The main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome, q, that is rational (i.e., involves probabilities that are rational numbers) can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of Γ, provided that the following condition is satisfied: There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s in Γ such that for each type ti of each player i the expected payoff of ti in q is larger than the expected payoff of ti in s.  相似文献   

13.
We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by E. van Damme (1989, J. Econ. Theory48, 476-496) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) capture this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (J. Swinkels, 1992, J. Econ. Theory57, 306-332) is always consistent with forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.  相似文献   

14.
This paper considers feasible Bayesian implementation for an environment with state dependent feasible sets. We assume no externality in individual feasibility constraint sets and no exaggeration on the part of agents, but allow for flexible information structures. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, Closure, and Bayesian Monotonicity are found to be necessary and sufficient for feasible Bayesian implementation. This result is applied to an exchange economy where agents have fixed preferences but uncertain initial endowments and complete information. A condition called the Endowment Condition, which is weaker than Individual Rationality, is identified as necessary and sufficient for feasible Nash implementation.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D70; D71; D74; D82.  相似文献   

15.
This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of multiple-priors utility. A central axiom is dynamic consistency, which leads to a recursive structure for utility, to ‘rectangular’ sets of priors and to prior-by-prior Bayesian updating as the updating rule for such sets of priors. It is argued that dynamic consistency is intuitive in a wide range of situations and that the model is consistent with a rich set of possibilities for dynamic behavior under ambiguity.  相似文献   

16.
ABSTRACT

This essay examines the role of mechanisms and Bayesian inference in process tracing. With respect to mechanisms, I argue that the core of process tracing with causal inference is the identification of mechanisms understood as intervening events. Events are different from standard intervening variables when used with process tracing, because events are treated as sets in which cases can have membership. With respect to Bayesian analysis, I concur with recent writings that suggest Bayesian inference is at the heart of process tracing. The Bayesian nature of process tracing explains why it is inappropriate to view qualitative research as suffering from a small-N problem and certain standard causal identification problems. More generally, the paper shows how the power of process tracing as a qualitative methodology depends on and grows from its set-theoretic underpinnings.  相似文献   

17.
We consider the mechanism design problem when agents’ types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ?>0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ?-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents’ strategies are nearly truthful.  相似文献   

18.
We characterize rationality of certain choice functions C by C(A) ∩ C(B) ? C(AB) ? C(A) ∪ C(B). We also characterize choice functions coming from preference relations which are partial orders and some other types of relations. Furthermore, we also characterize the admissible set of a binary relation by the fact it is invariant under certain changes in the relation.  相似文献   

19.
A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible farsighted pairwise deviations from any network gG to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominant network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.  相似文献   

20.
We provide axiomatic characterizations of two natural families of rules for aggregating equivalence relations: the family of join aggregators and the family of meet aggregators. The central conditions in these characterizations are two separability axioms. Disjunctive separability, neutrality, and unanimity characterize the family of join aggregators. On the other hand, conjunctive separability and unanimity characterize the family of meet aggregators. We show another characterization of the family of meet aggregators using conjunctive separability and two Pareto axioms, Pareto+ and Pareto?. If we drop Pareto?, then conjunctive separability and Pareto+ characterize the family of meet aggregators along with a trivial aggregator.  相似文献   

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