Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition

We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations or partial privatization of the public firm.      

Liberalisation, competition and innovation in the postal sector

This paper empirically assesses the effect of liberalisation and competition on innovation in the postal sector. The analysis is restricted to end-to-end competition. The effect on the incentives to innovate of letter volume, public ownership and other control variables is also tested. Data on liberalisation, competition and innovation in the postal sector is collected for seventeen European countries over eleven years. Three measures are used as proxies for innovation: (1) an innovation index based on a survey conducted for this purpose; (2) the accumulated number of innovations (based on the same survey); and (3) labour productivity. We also develop a liberalisation index to measure the percentage of market liberalised (in terms of letter volume). Several models are estimated by GLS. In general, the models estimated have a high explanatory power. We find evidence that market liberalisation has a positive effect on innovation and that an increase in the market share of the competitors stimulates the investment in innovation, at least until the market share of the competitors reaches a certain threshold. Letter volume is also significant and has a positive impact on innovation. GDP per capita turns out to be significant and has a positive relationship with innovation in all the models estimated.     

Market competition, social welfare in an entry-constrained differentiated-good oligopoly

This paper studies a differentiated-good oligopoly where the socially optimal number of firms (varieties) may be smaller or greater than under the free-entry equilibrium. We show that, under certain conditions, social welfare may be higher when entry is restricted into the industry.     

Strategic incentives under vertical integration: the case of wireline-affiliated wireless carriers and intermodal competition in the US

In its review of the Cingular/AT&T Wireless merger, the FCC noted the potentially conflicting incentives of wireline-affiliated (vertically integrated) versus independent (non-integrated) wireless carriers to act as intermodal competitors in the wireline exchange access market. Specifically, because Cingular and Verizon Wireless are owned by wireline carriers, they may have an incentive to compete “less aggressively” within their parents’ wireline territories while AT&T Wireless, an independent wireless carrier, would not. This paper examines these and other hypotheses by examining pre-merger data on the wireless plans offered by the three carriers. The empirical analysis suggests that AT&T Wireless did not design its plans based upon a regional strategy, whereas Cingular offered substantially smaller-minute wireless plans within its parents’ wireline territories. However, the results also suggest that Verizon Wireless did not design its plans in a markedly different fashion within and outside of its parent’s wireline region. It is posited that these findings might reflect the differing ownership and control structures of Cingular and Verizon Wireless.      

国有银行控股比例与管理授权——基于混合寡占模型的研究

本文结合中国银行业竞争日趋激烈的现实背景,从国有银行股份制改革和管理授权入手构建了银行业混合寡占、国有银行混合持股的两阶段古诺竞争模型,分析国有银行为达到既定目标如何选择国有控股比例及适当的管理激励合同。研究表明,国有银行会选择利润收益合同作为占优管理授权,而放弃相对表现激励合同;当国有银行将最大化社会福利作为目标时,国有银行成为市场垄断者,私有银行被挤出市场;仅在利润收益激励合同下,国有银行将最大化利润和消费者剩余之和作为目标。     

Intra-industry differences in vertical integration, heterogeneous costs and pricing: the case of web hosting

In many differentiated product industries, both traditional and “new economy” activities, vertically integrated firms also supply inputs to apparent rivals in the downstream business. This generates heterogeneity between low- and high-sunk cost suppliers with implications for entry and competitive conduct. The web hosting market is typical with primary suppliers operating alongside resellers who rent server space from them. We explore the impact of competition in US hosting using a unique dataset covering 15,000 packages offered by 3,500 firms. The results suggest price is sensitive to competitor clustering in quality space; an outcome consistent with easy entry for resellers with ultra-low fixed costs.

Foreign direct investment and vertical integration of production by Japanese multinationals in Thailand

We test the vertical model of foreign direct investment (FDI) empirically using firm level information on Japanese multinational activity in Thailand. These data allow us to investigate the effects of both home country (Japan) and host country (Thailand) characteristics on the inter-industry pattern of FDI. For 85 manufacturing industries over the period from 1985 to 1995, we find a positive influence of industry variation in skill intensity and market size in the host country and a negative effect of transport costs on the amount of FDI. These results provide strong direct econometric evidence of vertical integration of production across the countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 32 (4) (2004) 805–821.     

Ownership relations in the presence of cross-shareholding

The direct ownership structure in a sector can be readily obtained from data on shareholding. Due to cross-shareholding, however, the true ownership structure may be hidden by a complex network of indirect relations. In studying the property structure, two important aspects are the size of the relations between primary owners (e.g. individuals) and secondary owners (e.g. companies), and the distance between them. The distance is obtained from the average number of secondary owners via whom the relation runs. As an empirical application, we study the banking sector in the Czech Republic, where also the relation between distance and separation of dividend and control rights is discussed.      

Competition and bargaining in vertical relationships with market uncertainty

We go through the decision to vertically integrate or its opposite, outsource, in an uncertain environment. We consider two different market strategies, price setting and quantity setting and two different vertical relationships: an (imperfectly) competitive one following Stackelberg mode and a more cooperative one with bargaining. In the first scenario, with certainty, price and quantity settings are alike, while with uncertainty the ranking changes. If a bargaining framework is adopted instead, quantity setting under uncertainty leads to an asymmetric distribution of realized gains along the vertical chain. Price setting turns out to be more equitable for firms and preferable even by consumers.

Finance and politics: the wealth effects of special interest group influence during the nationalisation and privatisation of Conrail

Conrail, nationalised in 1976 and privatised in 1987, was themost significant nationalisation and privatisation by the USgovernment in recent years. It was created from six bankruptrailroads under the pressure of interest groups, formed by customers,existing claimants, employees and related companies. We documentthe gains and losses to these special interest groups at keypoints in the nationalised and privatised time periods. Overthis period, the US government had outlays of $6.59 billion,and cash inflow of $6.15 billion, and internal return of –6.4%.The paper provides evidence that a state-owned firm with goodgovernance could deliver superior performance.     

Privatization and optimal share release in the Chinese banking industry

This paper establishes a mixed oligopoly model to explore how the government determines the percentage of shares of the state-owned banks to be released to foreign investors under the goal of seeking to maximize social welfare. The theoretical model finds that the release of shares of state-owned banks to foreign investors will reduce the outputs of the state-owned banks. The direction of the change in the profitability of the state-owned banks depends on the percentage of the shares released. The direction of the changes in the levels of social welfare also varies. If the gap in production efficiency between the state-owned banks and private banks is not large enough, we can be certain that a partial release of shares is the government's best policy.     

欧盟竞争法对汽车领域纵向限制行为的规制

汽车与其他产品相比具有很大的特殊性。一方面，汽车生产市场上竞争者数目相对较少、市场准入门槛较高，使得企业极易限制彼此的竞争，形成垄断；另一方面，汽车的高安全性的要求又需要汽车生产商对汽车的销售和维修服务做出的某些合理的竞争限制。汽车领域的特殊性使得竞争法在防范纵向限制可能导致的垄断性倾向的同时，还必须考虑其安全性的价值取向。欧盟竞争法有效地解决了这一矛盾，对我国汽车领域的立法有很大的借鉴意义。     

Market equilibrium in the presence of green consumers and responsible firms: A comparative statics analysis

This paper analyzes how the interaction between green consumers and responsible firms affects the market equilibrium. The main result is that a higher degree of responsibility of consumers and/or firms may both increase and decrease the total abatement and the social welfare. In general an increment in the degree of CSR of a firm entails an increase of its total clean-up and a reduction of the aggregate abatement of its rival. When the rival firm has a high degree of CSR this second effect is stronger than the first and total abatement falls down. At the same time, when the degree of consciousness of consumers and/or firms is very high, responsible firms overprovide environmental quality: in such case a further increment in the level of social responsibility of a market actor may trigger an increase of firms’ total clean-up but a reduction in social welfare.     

Commercial policy and international factor mobility in the presence of monopolistic competition

This paper utilizes a well-known specification of returns to specialization (a variation of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model) to explore the implications of local agglomeration effects for commercial policy and restricted factor mobility. The paper initially considers a small open economy where it is shown that a tariff reduces the degree of specialization and hence the size of the external economies to the producers. An inflow of labor increases the degree of specialization while a capital inflow decreases it. The paper then considers a two-country world where both countries are large and deals with the pattern of trade and factor mobility.     

Nonexclusionary input prices under quantity competition: vertical integration,foreclosure and sabotage

A vertically integrated provider is a monopoly supplier of an input essential for its rival to produce downstream output. Market exclusion in the form of inefficient foreclosure or sabotage can arise when input prices are, respectively, ‘too high’ or ‘too low’ relative to the downstream price. The range of nonexclusionary input prices within which neither form of market exclusion arises is determined by displacement ratios. The safe harbour range of downstream-to-upstream ‘price-cost’ margin ratios is decreasing in the degree of product homogeneity and approaches a single ratio in the limit as the products become perfectly homogeneous. The bounds of nonexclusionary input prices are markedly wider under Bertrand–Nash competition than they are under Stackelberg competition.     

X-inefficiency and regulatory regime shift in the UK

Concern over economic efficiency has increased in recent years in the UK and has been one of the major driving forces behind the regulatory reforms and privatisation measures which have been initiated since 1979. The amount of detailed work on economic efficiency, and especially on X-efficiency, in the UK is, however, relatively limited. The first part of the paper surveys the previous UK work in this field and explores the implications of the findings in terms of industry wide studies and industry specific studies. The second part of the study looks specifically at the issue of privatisation and the impact that this has had on X-efficiency in the context of the electricity supply industry.     

Choice and design of regulatory instruments in the presence of green consumers

Using a vertically differentiated product model, this paper examines welfare implications of various government policies in a situation where consumers are environmentally discerning. It studies ad valorem taxes/subsidies and emission taxes. The optimal policy depends on the magnitude of damage parameter associated with environmental externality. For a given distribution of tastes and preferences, as the damage parameter increases from a low to a high value, the optimal policy shifts from an ad valorem tax to an ad valorem subsidy. It also shows that for a sufficiently low damage parameter, an ad valorem tax dominates an emission tax.     

Profitability of price and quantity strategies in a duopoly with vertical product differentiation

Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry, there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables, price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition (their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game, a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms. Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000