The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal monetary delegation arrangement of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertainty about the central bank’s output objective. We show that full independence is no longer optimal with uncertain central bank preferences, and that optimal delegation involves the choice of both independence and conservatism. Further, we find that the usual trade-off between independence and conservatism no longer necessarily holds. Consequently, high central bank independence may also require a high level of conservatism.     

Inflation before and after central bank independence: The case of Colombia

In this paper we model the Colombian inflation rate in terms of excess demand effects from asset, goods and factor markets. In contrast to previous results for a group of industrial economies, we find that domestic factors are a far more powerful influence on inflation than are external factors. The paper pays particular attention to the potential effects of the Constitutional Reform of 1991, which created a Central Bank independent from other parts of government. We find that the creation of an independent Central Bank did change some of the parameters of the model, as the disequilibria in goods and monetary markets were found to have a smaller effect on inflation after Central Bank independence was granted.     

Managing financial market expectations: The role of central bank transparency and central bank communication

In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias in money market expectations and dampens their variation. Second, informal communications help manage financial market expectations by reducing the variation of expectations. Third, various subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index lead to a smaller bias in expectations (in particular, evaluation of policy outcome and explanation of interest rate decisions) and to a reduction in the variation of expectations (in particular, explicit prioritization of objectives and provision of information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances).     

The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence

International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.     

Formal targets, central bank independence and inflation dynamics in the UK: A Markov-Switching approach

We examine inflation and uncertainty in the UK with a version of the Markov Switching model, which allows for changes in the variance as well as in the mean and persistence of a series. We find that the UK’s attempts at exchange rate pegs in the form of shadowing the deutschmark and entering the ERM were ineffective, and in the latter case counterproductive in lowering inflation uncertainty. The 1981 budget, however, greatly lowered uncertainty, and the adoption of a formal inflation target also had a palpable, negative impact on inflation uncertainty. As a suggestive exercise, we examine inflation uncertainty in the US, and find that, over 2005–2008, in the absence of an inflation target, uncertainty rose in the US, while uncertainty remained low in the UK over this period of rising commodity prices and financial turmoil.     

Political influence,central bank independence and inflation in Africa: A comparative analysis

This paper develops a new de facto measure of central bank independence (CBI) based on two recent measures of the turnover rates of central bank governors introduced by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), complemented with measures of alliance with the government in power, captured by prior executive appointment, tribe proximity, and political party affiliation. Using 1980–2009 data from 13 countries from the CFA zone (a currency union) and 18 non-CFA countries, the new index is used to 1) examine whether CBI can help achieve price stability in Africa and 2) show how CBI affects African countries that are part of a monetary union. We find that higher turnover rates lead to higher inflation. Our results are robust to the decomposition of the turnover rates into premature removals and ally replacements. Furthermore, we find that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy has no effect on inflation and instead inflation is driven by other variables such as the fixed exchange rate regime or commodity price shocks.     

Fiscal leadership and central bank design

Abstract.  This article investigates the impact, on economic performance, of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously. Further, it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies.     

Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank

This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.     

The effects of government spending shocks on consumption under optimal stabilization

Economic theory has yet to come up with a general guidance regarding the dynamic effects and welfare implications of shocks to public spending. With the aim to provide a theoretical benchmark, we analyse if a rise in private consumption following an exogenous rise in government spending is a feature of the economy under optimal stabilization in a standard New Keynesian setting augmented for the presence of liquidity-constrained agents and non-separable preferences. Our results provide little evidence in support of a crowding-in effect under ‘timelessly optimal’ policy.     

Trade credit, bank lending and monetary policy transmission

This paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy. Most models of the transmission mechanism allow firms to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion. In our model we consider external finance from trade credit as an additional source of funding for firms that cannot obtain credit from banks. We predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in bank lending relative to trade credit. This is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16,000 UK manufacturing firms.     

Inflation, unemployment, and the time consistency of the US monetary policy

This paper verifies the performance of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model to explain the US inflation since the early 1950s. We divide the period from 1951:2 to 2010:2 according to each chairman of the Federal Reserve (FED). In addition, we consider aggregated periods, represented by pre-Volcker, Volcker-Greenspan, Greenspan-Bernanke, and whole sample. A genetic algorithm of stochastic search is applied to reduce the sensitivity of the maximum likelihood estimator to the initial parameter values. Surprisingly, our results show that the time consistency problem explains the US inflation during the Greenspan chairmanship at the FED.     

Debt,inflation and central bank independence

Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Over time, inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt. By contrast, imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions.     

Does it matter (for equilibrium determinacy) what price index the central bank targets?

What inflation rate should the central bank target? We address determinacy issues related to this question in a two-sector model in which prices can differ in equilibrium. We assume that the degree of nominal price stickiness can vary across the sectors and that labor is immobile. The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a modified Taylor Principle holds in this environment. If the central bank elects to target sector one, and if it responds with a coefficient greater than unity to price movements in this sector, then this policy rule will ensure determinacy across all sectors. The results of this paper have at least two implications. First, the equilibrium-determinacy criterion does not imply a preference to any particular measure of inflation. Second, since the Taylor Principle applies at the sectoral level, there is no need for a Taylor Principle at the aggregate level.     

Inequality, inflation, and central bank independence

What can account for the different contemporaneous inflation experiences of various countries, and of the same country over time? We present an analysis of the determination of inflation from a political economy perspective. We document a positive correlation between income inequality and inflation and then present a theory of the determination of inflation outcomes in democratic societies that illustrates how greater inequality leads to greater inflation, owing to a desire by voters for wealth redistribution. We conclude by showing that democracies with more independent central banks tend to have better inflation outcomes for a given degree of inequality. JEL Classification E5, H0 Inégalité, inflation et l'indépendance de la banque centrale. Quels sont les facteurs qui pourraient expliquer les expériences inflationnistes tellement différentes des divers pays dans le passé récent, et l'expérience tellement différente d'un pays donné dans le temps? Les auteurs analysent ce problème de la détermination du taux d'inflation dans une perspective d'économie politique. Ils déterminent qu'il y a une corrélation positive entre l'inégalité et l'inflation, et présentent une théorie de la détermination de l'inflation dans les sociétés démocratiques qui montre comment une inégalité plus grande entraîne une inflation plus grande à cause du désir des électeurs de demander une redistribution de la richesse. Le mémoire montre en terminant que les démocraties e´quipées de banques centrales plus indépendantes tendent à avoir de meilleurs résultats en terme d'inflation pour un degré d'inégalité donné.     

Reconsidering central bank independence

In this paper, we survey the case for central bank independence (CBI). We conclude that CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for monetary stability. CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several, and CBI should not be treated as an exogenous variable. Instead, the question that should be addressed is why societies decide to make their central banks independent? The reasons why CBI is chosen are related to legal, political, and economic systems. A number of empirical studies find correlations between CBI and low inflation rates. Endogeneity of CBI suggests, however, that the correlation has no implications for causality.     

Inflation targeting regimes

This paper divides the monetary frameworks of countries that use an inflation target to define their monetary framework into three different regimes: (i) full-fledged inflation targeting, (ii) implicit price stability anchor, and (iii) inflation targeting lite. The regimes are differentiated by the clarity and credibility of the commitment to the inflation target. The revealed preference for different regimes is related empirically to cross-country structural differences in economic and financial development. Policy implications of moving from one regime to another are drawn, especially for emerging market countries aiming at full-fledged inflation targeting.     

Inflation targeting in emerging economies: Panel evidence

This paper shows there is no evidence that the inflation targeting regime (IT) improves economic performance as measured by the behavior of inflation and output growth in developing countries. The control of common time effects results in less negative and less significant IT impacts on inflation, inflation volatility and output growth volatility than previously found in the literature. Additionally, our analysis shows robust evidence of lower output growth during IT adoption. On balance, although lower long-run mean inflation signals that the central banks of emerging economies with inflation targeting are more inflation-averse, the costs of disinflation have not been lower than under other monetary regimes.     

Inflation contract,central bank transparency and model uncertainty

Using a New-Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine how the robust monetary policy could be modified by a linear inflation contract when a central bank is opaque about its preference for model robustness. It is shown that a central bank must limit this preference and opacity about it to ensure the dynamic stability of the economy. An optimal inflation contract with a zero penalty rate provides no incentive for a central bank to be opaque. The latter must rebalance the benefit of avoiding very bad outcomes in worst case scenarios and the economic costs due to higher macroeconomic volatility.     

产权、金融稳定政策与中央银行独立性

This paper builds a micro-behavior model of central bank and financial institutions from the perspective of property-rights. By analyzing the theoretical model and the practice, we conclude that, in the framework of the present financial stabilization policies in China, the central bank’s functions of monetary policy and financial stabilization are enslaved to financial institutions. Thus, central bank independence has been damaged because of the actual property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions. The policy implication is to cut off the property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions. __________ Translated from Caijing wenti yanjiu 财经问题研究 (Research on Finanical and Economic Issues), 2007, (6): 3–9     

Inflation dynamics and the cost channel of monetary transmission

Evidence from vector autoregressions indicates that the impact of interest rate shocks on macroeconomic aggregates can substantially be affected by the so-called cost channel of monetary transmission. In this paper, we apply a structural approach to examine the relevance of the cost channel for inflation dynamics in G7 countries. Since firms’ costs of working capital increase with interest rates, we augment a (hybrid) New Keynesian Phillips curve by including the short-run nominal interest rate. We find significant and varying direct interest rate effects for the majority of countries, including member countries of the EMU. Simulations further demonstrate that the estimated interest rate coefficients can substantially affect inflation responses to monetary policy shocks, and can even lead to inverse inflation responses, when the cost channel is - relative to the demand channel - sufficiently strong.