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1.
This paper analyses how the quality of governance, the size of public spending, and economic development affect the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and economic growth. The analysis shows that the interaction between corruption and governance shapes the efficiency of public spending, which in turn, determines the growth effects of corruption. Specifically, corruption improves economic efficiency only when the actual government size is above the optimal level. It implies that a growth-maximising level of corruption is possible. This paper also finds that the incidence of corruption declines with economic development. This is because with economic development the wage rate rises and makes private rent seeking costs higher, thereby, discouraging corruption. The main policy implication is that targeting tax evaders instead of bureaucrats is more effective in terms of both reducing corruption and improving the growth potential of an economy. 相似文献
2.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(6-7):1053-1072
We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a smaller degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government. There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions. 相似文献
3.
This paper develops a game-theoretic model of “petty corruption” by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic “tracks,” and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a “track” of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their projects. Our first result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats. 相似文献
4.
Matheus Wemerson Gomes Pereira Wilson da Cruz Vieira 《International Review of Economics》2010,57(3):335-346
In this article, we analyze the bureaucrats’ corruption problem in a simple neoclassical growth model with a non-convex production
function. In this model, we consider direct relations between product (income) taxation and corruption, and between corruption
and public goods provision. As the main result, we show that the optimal consumption growth path in this economy is higher
in a non-corrupt environment than in a corrupt environment and the higher the proportion of corrupt bureaucrats, the higher
the cost of corruption to society. 相似文献
5.
We study the impact of environmental regulation on the transfer of a clean technology where bureaucrats are needed for government intervention. In the absence of corruption, when environmental taxes are low, a technology transfer always takes place and it increases total outputs, but may lead to higher pollution levels. However, when corruption is possible, a firm with a dirty technology may choose to bribe a corruptible bureaucrat who will underreport the actual level of emissions, thereby hindering the transfer of clean technology. We show that a less strict anticorruption policy may lead to more bribing, but encourage technology transfers. Moreover, an environment-oriented government would set a deterrent environmental tax to reduce pollution, while an output-oriented government would set a minimum tax rate to eliminate corruption and induce technology transfers. However, a balanced government would tolerate corruption when the cost of bribing is low and the clean technology is sufficiently efficient. 相似文献
6.
We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and “lemons.” Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes. Bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, private agents might bribe bureaucrats, whereas they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist. We discuss some welfare implications of the model. 相似文献
7.
Daniel Gibbs 《Economics & Politics》2020,32(2):279-304
I use a formal model to analyze the effect of civil service protections on bureaucratic performance. In a two‐period model, a public manager observes a bureaucrat's actions for a period and decides whether to retain or attempt to remove the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats vary in terms of their intrinsic motivation and choose between careers in government or the private sector. I show that bureaucratic performance is greater in any separating equilibrium in which motivated bureaucrats choose government than in all equilibria in which they do not. Stronger civil service protections reduce the amount of effort that motivated bureaucrats must exert to distinguish themselves from their unmotivated peers in order to ensure retention. This strengthens incentives for motivated bureaucrats to choose careers in government. Stronger civil service protections, however, also reduce the ability of public managers to remove unmotivated bureaucrats. These competing effects yield a non‐monotonic and discontinuous relationship between civil service protections and bureaucratic performance. I use the model to analyze recent reforms to U.S. state and federal personnel management that have significantly rolled back traditional job protections. 相似文献
8.
Theo Eicher Cecilia García-Peñalosa Tanguy van Ypersele 《Journal of Economic Growth》2009,14(3):205-231
We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While
corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents,
but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate
levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough
monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in
determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education. 相似文献
9.
Ayşe Y. Evrensel 《International Review of Economics & Finance》2010,19(3):501-514
While the existing studies focus on the corruption–growth relationship, this paper introduces a new focus involving corruption and growth volatility. The Ehrlich–Lui (1999) framework provides the theoretical background of the paper, which produces testable hypotheses regarding the corruption–growth and the corruption–growth volatility relationship. The cross-section dataset that is used in the empirical analysis contains 121 developed and developing countries. In terms of the relationship between the governance-related variables and growth rates, only corruption control and government effectiveness significantly and adversely affect the average growth rate. Regarding the relationship between growth volatility and governance-related variables, the results suggest that higher corruption control, expropriation risk control, government effectiveness, and government consumption decrease growth volatility. 相似文献
10.
This research sheds light on the analysis of the impact of corruption and political orientation on income distribution in Latin America. Although it has been theoretically demonstrated that corruption worsens the income distribution, the empirical evidence has yielded ambiguous results based on biased estimates not considering a measurement error in the estimation of inequality. This article fills this gap by correcting the previous measurement error bias in the fixed-effects estimation. Additionally, political orientation and its relationship with income inequality are also investigated. The sample covers 18 Latin American countries between 1996 and 2012. Results reveal that corruption increases income inequality. 相似文献
11.
《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2010,73(3):797-810
Empirical evidence shows that not all countries with high levels of corruption have suffered poor growth performance. Bad quality governance has clearly been much less damaging (if at all) in some economies than in others. Why this is so is a question that has largely been ignored, and the intention of this paper is to provide an answer. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth occurs endogenously through the invention of new goods based on research and development activity. For such activity to be undertaken, firms must acquire complementary licenses from public officials who are able to exploit their monopoly power by demanding bribes in exchange for these (otherwise free) permits. We show that the effects of corruption depend on the extent to which bureaucrats coordinate their rent-seeking behaviour. Specifically, our analysis predicts that countries with organised corruption networks are likely to display lower levels of bribes, higher levels of research activity and higher rates of growth than countries with disorganised corruption arrangements. 相似文献
12.
Using an R&D-based growth model with dual regulation, we analyse how environmental policies influence pollution, corruption, a growth rate, and welfare. Considering that polluting firms bribe bureaucrats to evade paying environmental tax, we find that a stricter environmental tax leads to a decrease in growth rate via a decrease in the permit rent as well as an increase in pollution and corruption per firm and results in worsening households’ welfare and in improving the bureaucrats’ welfare. Thus, tax evasion with corruption improves households’ welfare and worsens the bureaucrats’ welfare. Our findings imply that tax evasion under dual regulation improves social welfare. 相似文献
13.
ABSTRACTBased on the data of CGSS2013, we analyse the relationship between income inequality, corruption and subjective well being using an Ordered Probit model. Our results indicate that income inequality and corruption significantly reduces the subjective well-being of our country’s residents. Furthermore, corruption is an important channel for the negative effect of income inequality on subjective well-being, the impact of income inequality on subjective well-being is mainly achieved by the role of corruption. Specifically, the impacts vary according to hukou. Higher degree of income inequality indeed reduces the subjective well-being of urban residents, while it has a positive effect on subjective well-being of rural residents. Corruption has a significant negative impact on the subjective well-being of urban and rural residents. There is heterogeneity in the influence of different income levels in rural areas. The study in this paper shows that anti-corruption and narrowing the income gap are the two major grippers to improve the well-being of the residents. 相似文献
14.
We construct a model of “embedded autonomy,” the idea that the closeness of bureaucrats and business people may lead to growth-promoting policies by the government, though at the risk of leading to crony capitalism. We analyze how the level of monitoring to control corruption and the weight given to the future affect the nature of the possible outcomes. We explore possible tradeoffs between growth and inclusiveness and discuss how our model relates to more general concepts of inclusiveness of institutions, as framed by Acemoglu and Robinson, or the nature of “access orders,” as introduced by North, Wallis, and Weingast. 相似文献
15.
This paper compares corruption in China over the past 15 years with corruption in the US between 1870 and 1930, periods that are roughly comparable in terms of real income per capita. Corruption indicators for both countries and both periods are constructed by tracking corruption news in prominent US newspapers. Several robustness checks confirm the reliability of the constructed corruption indices for both countries. The comparison indicates that corruption in the US in the early 1870s, when its real income per capita was about $2800 (in 2005 dollars), was 7–9 times higher than China’s corruption level in 1996, the corresponding year in terms of income per capita. By the time the US reached $7500 in 1928, approximately equivalent to China’s real income per capita in 2009, corruption was similar in both countries. The findings imply that, while corruption in China is an issue that merits attention, it is not at alarmingly high levels, compared to the US historical experience. In addition, the paper articulates a theoretical framework within which the relationship between corruption and economic development can be understood. The model is used to explain the “life-cycle” of corruption in the development process–rising at the early stages of development, and declining after modernization has taken place. Hence, as China continues its development process, corruption will likely decline. 相似文献
16.
Gerhard Glomm 《European Economic Review》2008,52(6):1009-1034
We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships. 相似文献
17.
This paper presents a model of the interaction between corrupt government officials and industrial firms to show that corruption is antithetical to competition. It is hypothesized that a government agent that controls access to a formal market has a self-interest in demanding a bribe payment that serves to limit the number of firms. This corrupt official will also be subject to a detection technology that is a function of the amount of the bribe payment and the number of firms that pay it. Under quite normal assumptions about the shape of the graph of the detection function, multiple equilibria can arise where one equilibrium is characterized by high corruption and low competition, and another is characterized by low corruption and high competition. Some suggestive empirical evidence is presented that supports the main hypothesis that competition and corruption are negatively related. 相似文献
18.
George R. G. Clarke 《Review of Development Economics》2019,23(4):1604-1623
If corrupt bureaucrats target registered firms, then corruption may discourage registration. Using data from a survey of 4,801 micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in Zambia, this paper looks at whether corruption is a more or less serious problem for registered MSEs. Consistent with earlier studies, the results suggest registered MSEs are more concerned about corruption than unregistered firms are. The paper also proposes two reasons why corruption might affect registered MSEs differently than it affects unregistered firms. We first suggest that registered firms might meet with government officials more often than unregistered firms, giving corrupt officials more opportunities to demand bribes from them, but we also suggest that registered firms might be less vulnerable when officials demand bribes because they are more able to complain about bribe demands. This could offset registered firms' disadvantage because of more frequent meetings. The evidence supports the first, but not the second, hypothesis. Registered firms were more likely to meet with government officials but were not consistently less likely to pay bribes when they did meet with them. 相似文献
19.
Josef C. Brada Zdenek Drabek Jose A. Mendez M. Fabricio Perez 《Journal of Comparative Economics》2019,47(1):31-49
We model the relationship between bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) and the level of corruption in multinational firms’ (MCNs’) home and host countries. We construct and test a model of bilateral FDI between countries that differ in their levels of corruption. FDI is affected negatively both by the level of corruption in the host country and by differences in home- and host-country corruption. Our model emphasizes that MNCs develop skills for dealing with home-country corruption, and these skills become a competitive advantage in similarly corrupt host countries. We test the model using data on bilateral FDI stocks among a large number of home and host countries, using a variety of specifications and estimation strategies to provide robustness. Our results show that the effects of host-country corruption and of differences in corruption levels between home and host countries are statistically and economically significant. 相似文献
20.
Samuel Adams Edem Kwame Mensah Klobodu 《International Review of Applied Economics》2016,30(6):790-808
This paper examines the effect of financial development and control of corruption on income inequality in 21 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 1985–2011 using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. The empirical results show that financial development measures have positive impact on income inequality, which suggest that financial development increases income inequality. On the other hand, the coefficients of control of corruption are negative and significantly related to income inequality which implies that corruption control reduces income inequality. Further, the interaction of the financial development and the control of corruption is found to be negatively and significantly related to income inequality. Equally the interaction of the financial development and transparency index (an alternate measure of corruptibility) is found to be negatively and significantly related to income inequality. These findings suggest that the control of corruption and transparency in governance are crucial in reducing income inequality in SSA. 相似文献