The Layoff Rat Race*

We investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs. After investments are made, firms may have to lay off workers, and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates. Greater skill investments, especially in specific human capital, contribute more to a firm's bottom line, so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last. We show that as long as workers' bargaining positions are not too weak, workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities. Indeed, workers over‐invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough, even though they only receive a share of any investment. More generally, we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms, the probability that a firm will downsize, and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy.     

Citibank; Citibank,Nader and The Facts

This paper aims to understand how Internet users may improve their social capital by investing in online social activities. We argue that the Internet can be a convenient and efficient means of maintaining existing social ties and/or of creating new ties. We seek to identify the determinants of online investments in social capital and the nature of the interaction with traditional forms of investment in social capital. Using a Luxembourg household survey, the econometric results reveal a significant positive impact of volunteer activities and trust (two measures of social capital) on online investments to maintain social capital, but more ambiguous results are found between online investments and face-to-face contacts with friends. By contrast, online investments to create new ties are poorly related to the Internet users' existing social capital, but depend on the opportunity cost of time.     

Is firm-sponsored education viable?

This paper challenges the commonly-held human capital assumption that profit-maximizing firms cannot invest in their employees' general training. We argue that general training is provided to equilibrate a hostage-type relationship that exists when firms and workers share investments in specific training, and that the firm's investment in general training is not necessarily subject to poaching hazards. We then test the viability hypothesis empirically, using data from a longitudinal survey of natural and social scientists and engineers. Our results suggest that (1) firm investments in general training programs are not necessarily paid for by foregone earnings, and (2) turnover rates do not rise as a function of firm-sponsored general training. These results are discussed in terms of the current policy debate over corporate education expenditures.     

Do mispricing and financial constraints matter for investment decisions?

This study investigates how mispricing and financing constraints affect ?rms’ future capital investments. We find that when the financing constraints are high, overpriced (underpriced) firms invest more (less) subsequently under previous non-optimal investments. The overpriced (underpriced) firms with precautionary motives invest significantly less subsequently when they are financially constrained. The overall evidence suggests that share mispricing, financial constraints and precautionary motives play a critical role that enables investors to less effectively monitor managers’ real decisions, thus limiting firms’ capital investments.     

“创新”抑或“关系”？ 儒家文化视角下社会资本与企业战略研究

在经济社会转型期复杂的外部环境下,中国民营企业如何在激烈的市场竞争中调整战略、获取竞争优势并谋求长期发展？基于儒家文化视角考察了社会资本对民营企业战略导向的影响。以中国私营企业为研究样本,发现社会资本降低了企业的资源约束,但也“绑架”企业持续进行关系投入,促进了民营企业的创新战略和关系战略。儒家文化则规制了这种作用,在一定程度增强了企业的创新战略并削弱了关系战略。进一步研究发现,竞争激烈的环境更容易激发企业的战略变革,但外来文化冲击导致的文化冲突削弱了儒家文化的影响。机制检验发现,社会资本通过缓解融资约束,从而支持了民营企业的战略投入。以上结果经过工具变量回归及一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。上述发现拓展了非正式制度下企业行为的研究,为解释中国情境下民营企业的战略行为提供了经验证据。     

Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence

Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction.      

Technology adoption and accumulation in a vintage-capital model

We present a model of capital accumulation and technology adoption in a vintage-capital framework. The model is an infinite-horizon/infinite-dimensional optimal control model: the firm employs a continuum of technologies (a continuum of heterogeneous capital goods). Capital goods are technology specific, their technology is related to vintage and technology progress. The entrepreneur maximizes the profits obtained by employing a continuum of technologies under the assumption of constant returns to scale and bearing adjustment costs for gross investments. The diffusion of a new technology is established by allowing the entrepreneur to invest in vintage capital goods.     

Revisiting the process of aggregate growth recovery after a capital destruction

We study the implications of a growth model including social capital and habit formation concerning the recovery of economies that suffer from an exogenous destruction in their capital stock. Habits exhibit very low persistence and depend only on last period’s consumption as suggested by empirical evidence. In addition to physical capital, agents invest in social capital which generates both market (production) and non-market (utility) returns. We study an infinite horizon model and compare its implications to a model with habit formation but without social capital. Our framework is more efficient in generating dynamic patterns that replicate the behavior of the main economic variables during the reconstruction period. High investment in social capital at the beginning of the transition is a key element of our results.     

FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO INVEST IN NEW COOPERATIVE INSTRUMENTS: A CHOICE EXPERIMENT

Globalization of agricultural markets put pressures on producer cooperatives to invest in expansion and growth to safeguard their competitiveness. Availability of capital is limited if farmers do not have incentives to increase their capital contribution. Cooperative literature recognizes the residual rights, transferability, and the appreciation potential of the investment as the potential solutions for the problems that may impede cooperative investments. The objective of this study is to understand farmer preferences regarding investment attributes and the potential for attracting investment capital from members and non‐members. We employ a choice experiment method to test new cooperative investment instruments. The data consist of a questionnaire conducted with 406 Finnish dairy farmers. Random parameter latent class logit model is used in the estimation of the data. The results indicate that most of the respondents regard the new investment instruments positively. However, farmers prefer restricting ownership rights to members. Incentives for members to participate in financing cooperative growth could be designed with capital‐based residual rights, mechanisms for transferability and for the appreciation of firm value. Estimation that considered choice difficulty improved model fit, which highlights the need to address respondent burden also in future studies of hypothetical investments in order to produce unbiased estimates.     

How Do Neighbors Influence Investment in Social Capital? Homeownership and Length of Residence

This paper uses individual data from Japan to explore how the circumstances of where a person resides is related to the degree of their investment in social capital. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects and various individual characteristics, I found (1) not only that homeownership and length of residence are positively related to investment in social capital, but also that rates of homeownership and long-time residency in a locality increase an individual’s investments in social capital. Also, (2) the effects of local neighborhood homeownership and local length of residence are distinctly larger than those of an individual’s homeownership or length of residence.     

高校社会资本、协同行为和协同创新绩效的关系研究

高校可利用的社会资本对于高校协同创新活动以及协同创新绩效的重要作用已引起广泛关注,但对于高校社会资本如何影响协同创新绩效的机理仍缺乏深入探索。基于此,从结构、关系、认知3个维度入手,考察了高校社会资本借由高校与其它主体协同行为路径作用于高校协同创新绩效的影响模式,以及协同行为在此过程中的中介作用。结果显示：高校社会资本对协同创新绩效发挥正向促进作用;同时,高校协同行为在这一过程中发挥了部分中介作用,即高校社会资本越丰富,越能促进与其它主体间的协同行为,进而提高高校的协同创新绩效。     

Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability

We study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal. We observe that in the absence of accountability, agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account. Accountability mitigates the observed decrease in risk aversion. Differences are observed between situations where agents are accountable for their decision (“ex-ante”) and where they are accountable for the outcome (“ex-post”).     

A Real Options Approach to Abatement Investments and Green Goodwill

In this paper we adopt the green goodwill argument as to why firms voluntarily invest in abatement capital. We investigate the effects on the abatement investment decision of changes in uncertainty about future green goodwill, competitor abatement investments, regulations, etc., using a real options framework. Our results indicate that increased uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for green products in the future discourage voluntary abatement investments. The model also suggests that voluntary abatement investments are promoted by an increased threat of regulation and competitor abatement investments. Furthermore, the benefit-cost ratio of the abatement investment project, at the point where it is optimal to invest, is independent of what regulatory regime (stringent or lenient) the firm operates in. We also conclude that despite the fact that voluntary abatement investment exists, there may still be room for environmental policy.     

Gender differences in social capital investment: Theory and evidence

This paper analyses individual social capital investment by extending the investment model of Glaeser et al. (2002) to allow for differing types of social capital. A dynamic solution to the individual's maximisation problem illustrates differences in social capital investment dependent on the conversion factor of investment. An empirical section finds that females invest more and derive greater wellbeing from this type of social capital investment; consistent with a higher conversion factor. The findings have implications for the work–life balance policies within firms and provide another explanation for gender differences in earnings.     

Bubbles and capital flows

This paper presents a stylized model of international trade and asset price bubbles. Its central insight is that bubbles tend to appear and expand in countries where productivity is low relative to the rest of the world. These bubbles absorb local savings, eliminating inefficient investments and liberating resources that are in part used to invest in high-productivity countries. Through this channel, bubbles act as a substitute for international capital flows, improving the international allocation of investment and reducing rate-of-return differentials across countries. This view of asset price bubbles could eventually provide a simple account of some real world phenomena that have been difficult to model before, such as the recurrence and depth of financial crises or their puzzling tendency to propagate across countries.     

Joint ventures in Eastern European countries: A survey of legislation

Conclusions The legal framework for joint ventures recently established in Eastern European countries is somewhat contradictory and vague; yet it corresponds to the difficulties these countries are meeting in their transition to the market system. In any case, the lack of a market-based economy and general economic, political and social crises hinder those foreign agents who may wish to invest in former CMEA economies.One of the major problems is represented by the lack of previous experience of private investments in Eastern European countries which initially led to considerable bureaucratic hindrances to foreign free enterprise. Secondly, there is the question of currency convertibility that some countries have yet to completely resolve. As a consequence, real capital participation by all partners is difficult to evaluate, relations with local firms and banks are unduly complex and the full repatriation of profits often problematic.Thirdly, investors may be concerned by a set of questions such as supply, investment safety, scarce and obsolete equipment, outdated technology or low-quality products. For these reasons it is almost impossible to purchase goods in the local market and cooperate with local concerns. Lastly, other drawbacks such as inefficient transport and telecommunications make the life of a joint enterprise extremely difficult.Without doubt, the question that most concerns foreign investors is that of the safety of investments made in areas of great economic and political instability. Several inter-governmental agreements, now being drafted, aim to address just such issues by securing adequate protection for foreign investments.     

Limited liability effect on product safety

This paper analyses how limited liability and capital size affect a firm's investment for product safety. Firms become bankrupt when their products cause accidents and they cannot compensate for the damages incurred. Relatively small firms obtain greater expected profit because they do not need to pay full damage when their products cause accidents and they become bankrupt. Thus, smaller firms may have greater incentives than larger firms to participate in risky projects. But relatively small firms may invest more for product safety because increasing their investments is not costly in case of bankruptcy.     

Distributional Effects of Public Education in an Economy with Public Pensions*

We study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays—education and pay‐as‐you‐go social security—affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents. We consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs, and allocates tax revenues to finance them. In our model, human capital is one of the factors of production. It is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs. Parents' decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism, heterogeneous in its strength across the population, which leads to heterogeneity of incomes. We investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution. We show that in this framework, contrary to some earlier results, increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality. Our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology.     

From the lab to the field: envelopes,dictators and manners

This paper reports results of a natural field experiment on the dictator game where subjects are unaware that they are participating in an experiment. Three other experiments explore, step by step, how laboratory behavior of students relates to field behavior of a general population. In all experiments, subjects display an equally high amount of pro-social behavior, whether they are students or not, participate in a laboratory or not, or are aware of their participating in an experiment or not. This paper shows that there are settings where laboratory behavior of students is predictive for field behavior of a general population.     

中国创业投资区域网络结构与区域合作研究

为揭示创业投资空间行为，促进创业投资对区域经济发展的推动作用，运用社会网络方法，从宏观、中观、微观3个角度剖析我国创业投资区域网络结构，并分析区域间投资合作行为及区域网络的形成。结果表明：我国创业投资区域网络节点间具有互惠性；区域网络可划分为核心区、半边缘区和边缘区，其中核心区成员稳定，各区域节点整体上呈现从半边缘区向边缘区移动的趋势；核心区发展主要依靠核心区内的相互投资，表现为地域上的投资集聚；半边缘区表现出较强的吸引力，主要依靠区域资源及禀赋吸引核心区创投机构投资；核心区节点主要是因为其属于核心区所以更倾向于投资合作关系的形成，而不仅仅是因为关系形成的另一端与自身属于同一区域。