Understanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential Trade Agreements

This paper examines various implications of preferential trade agreements, namely customs unions and free trade areas, in the context of a multicountry general equilibrium model. The model is calibrated to represent countries with symmetric endowments, and aggregate and disaggregate welfare change measures are used to quantify the welfare effects of preferential trade agreements. It is found that free trade areas are better than customs unions on welfare grounds for the world as a whole. Welfare decompositions suggest that a significant fraction of the welfare changes is explained by the volume-of-trade effect for both types of preferential trade agreements.     

Gains From Trade in a Cournot–Nash General Equilibrium

It is shown that, in a context of Cournot–Nash general equilibrium, free trade is potentially gainful for each trading country. No restrictions are placed on the numbers of products, factors of production or countries, or on the nature of returns to scale. Moreover, preferences, techniques and factor endowments can differ from agent to agent.
JEL Classification Numbers: F10, F12, F13, F15.     

Alliances and negotiations

Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of ‘alliance’ and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to ‘more aggressive’ negotiating tactics than majority procedures.     

International trade between consumer and conservationist countries

We consider trade between a ‘consumer’ country with an open access renewable resource and a ‘conservationist’ country that regulates resource harvesting to maximize domestic steady-state utility. In what we call the mild overuse case, the consumer country exports the resource good and suffers steady-state losses from trade, as suggested by the conventional wisdom that weak resource management standards confer a competitive advantage on domestic firms in the resource sector but cause welfare losses. Strikingly, however, when the resource stock is most in jeopardy, the conservationist country exports the resource good in steady state and both countries experience gains from trade.     

The impact of trade costs on exports: An empirical modeling

Studies, which have discussed some of the important issues concerning the measurement of trade costs, have conceded that the literature is still in the early stages of understanding and measuring what the real costs are. It is in this context, decomposing trade costs into ‘natural’ costs, ‘behind the border’ costs, ‘explicit beyond the border’ costs, and ‘implicit beyond the border’ costs, this paper suggests a method to measure the impacts of these components on changes in exports between countries in the absence of complete information on all the components of trade costs in home and partner countries. Empirical measurement has been demonstrated using 1999 and 2004 trade data from Pakistan. The results show that Pakistan's export growth between 1999 and 2004 came mainly from the reduction in both ‘explicit and implicit beyond the border’ trade costs in partner countries.     

How close is Asia already to being a trade bloc?

FTA bilateral and regional negotiations in Asia have developed quickly in the past decade moving Asia ever closer to an economic union. This paper uses a fifteen-country global general equilibrium model with trade costs to numerically calculate Debreu distance measures between the present situation and potential full Asia integration in the form of a trade bloc. Our results reveal that these large Asia economies can be close to full integration if they act timely in agreements through negotiation. All Asia countries will gain from Asia trade bloc arrangements except when the Asia FTA can only eliminate tariffs. These countries’ gain will increase as bilateral non-tariff elimination deepens. Larger countries will gain more than small countries. Asia FTA, Asia Union and RCEP will benefit member countries more than ASEAN+3. Global free trade will benefit all countries the most.     

Why are Trade Agreements Regional?

This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries a familiar problem of coordination failure occurs, giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, regional trade agreements generate larger rent‐shifting effects than nonregional agreements. Countries use these effects to coordinate on a unique equilibrium.     

Optimal trade policy in tariff games with inside money

We construct a bilateral trade model incorporating two physical goods and a financial asset (inside money) to discuss the optimal trade policy that countries would choose to maximize their respective utilities. In this Nash tariff game, the trade of physical commodities only occurs geographically across countries, and the trade of inside money allows for intertemporal allocation of consumptions. When the preferences, present and future endowments for each country are given, according to our numerical analysis, trade surplus or deficit (inside money) and optimal tariff rates are endogenously determined when general equilibrium conditions hold. One country may purchase inside money to shift current consumption to the future, and the other may be willing to issue inside money for smoothing its consumptions in two periods. This imbalance trade contradicts traditional trade models which imply a balanced trade policy. We further find that the price of inside money as an implied interest rate also is determined by the trade intervention policies.     

Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade

We study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects. Such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes. We show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because of scientific uncertainty. A free-riding effect is identified, implying more conservative behavior by countries. We also study the role of producers (lobbies) in providing valuable information, finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the ‘traditional’ good. Moreover, lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting.     

Does Growth Encourage Factor Price Equalization?

This paper first notes the importance of "one-cone" versus "multi-cone" equilibria in the Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade, then asks whether economic growth in neoclassical growth models leads toward one or the other. The one-cone equilibrium arises with internationally similar factor endowments. It has a single set (cone) of relative factor endowments, within which countries diversify and have global factor price equalization (FPE) under free trade. The multi-cone equilibrium arises with larger factor endowment differences. It has FPE within cones, but not between them. The two configurations differ in important ways. The paper examines several neoclassical trade-and-growth models, distinguished by their assumptions about saving, asking whether factor endowments converge into a single cone. None of the models suggests convergence, while some strongly imply that countries will end up in different cones. This suggests a preference for the multi-cone version of the model.     

Barriers to Global Free Trade through Bilateral Agreements

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a dynamic noncooperative bargaining game with a random proposer. We show that global free trade (a grand coalition) does not necessarily occur unless transfer payments among countries are allowed. When transfer payments are possible, bilateral FTAs always achieve global free trade, but the ex‐ante and ex‐post inequalities of social welfare among countries are larger than those when all countries are independent because of the strategic bargaining behavior.     

Free trade: what are the terms-of-trade effects?

Changes in trade policy affect a nation’s economic welfare through terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade effects. A move to global free trade would imply higher world economic welfare equal to the sum of all nations’ volume-of-trade, or efficiency, effects. Since the sum of the terms-of-trade effects across all nations is zero, terms-of-trade effects are contentious. Konishi, Kowalczyk and Sjöström (2003) have shown that if customs unions do not affect trade with non-member countries, immediate global free could be achieved if free trade were proposed together with international sidepayments equal to the terms of trade effects. How large would these terms of trade effects, and hence transfers, be? This paper presents estimates from a simple computable general equilibrium model of a world economy of perfect competition. We show that, in some cases, terms-of-trade effects are small compared to efficiency gains, and transfers are not necessary for free trade. In other cases, terms-of-trade gains may account for more than 50% of a country’s gains from free trade and transfers could be large.     

Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity

This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner’s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient Nash equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached.     

What Determines Sectoral Trade in the Enlarged EU?

In this paper, we estimate a sectoral gravity model for trade within a heterogeneous trade bloc, the enlarged EU, comprised of a high‐income group (wealthiest EU), a middle‐income group (Greece, Portugal and Spain), and a low‐income group (new Central and Eastern European member countries). The estimation was conducted on sectors with different degrees of scale economies and skill‐intensities in the presence of transport costs. The results offer support for the call to incorporate trade theories based on both endowments and scale economies. In addition, whilst integrating poorer countries is beneficial for all of the participants in the bloc, there is still a role for a redistribution policy, such as the EU's Regional Policy, which should comprise a mix of policies, focusing on both income and education/skills, together with infrastructure development.     

Endogenous City Formation with Production Externalities: Existence of Equilibrium

I show that equilibria exist in closed city‐system models with production externalities if firms' production possibilities vary continuously with the source of the externality, are constant returns to scale in own inputs, include inaction, and satisfy free disposal; if firms have to employ their own inputs to produce output; if there is a finite number of firm types; and if some standard conditions on preferences and endowments are satisfied. This is the first model to include production externalities in the fully general equilibrium framework required for endogenous city formation. Thus, this result provides formal support for the conjecture that production externalities lead to urban agglomeration.     

Labour Demand, Wage Mark-ups and Product Market Integration

Globalization makes it easier to relocate production and thus employment across countries. Therefore, it is often asserted that labour demand becomes more elastic, causing wage mark-ups to fall and thus erode the effective market power of trade unions. We explore this issue in a general equilibrium model where the elasticity of labour demand is endogenized and related to the facility by which production can be relocated across countries. Wages and employment increase unambiguously as a result of product market integration, but it is ambiguous whether wage mark-ups decrease or increase. A numerical illustration suggests that the elasticity effect – even when the wage mark-up falls – is of second order relative to the gains from trade.      

Endogenous Comparative Advantage*

We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously acquire skills that are imperfectly observed by firms; therefore, firms use aggregate country investment as the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational externality interacting with general equilibrium effects on each country's skill premium. Asymmetric equilibria with comparative advantages exist even when there is a unique equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric, no‐trade equilibria can be unstable under free trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade can be Pareto‐improving even if it leads to an equilibrium between rich and poor countries, with no special advantage regarding country size.     

Environmental impact, quality, and price: Consumer trade-offs and the development of environmentally friendly technologies

The paper examines the effect of heterogeneous consumer trade-offs - between environmental performance, quality of service characteristics, and price - on the generation and diffusion of environmentally benign technology paradigms. We find that the direction, timing, and environmental impact of new paradigms is shaped by the distribution of consumer trade-offs. Of key importance are the initial distributions of consumer preferences, and how those distributions evolve over time. This has serious implications on environmental pollution, and for policy makers seeking to influence the ‘greening’ of consumer demand.     

Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers

We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the ‘poaching’ of their ‘brains’ by larger, wealthier markets.     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.