How well does a small structural model with sticky prices and wages fit postwar U.S. data?

In this paper, we ask whether a small structural model with sticky prices and wages, embedding various modelling devices designed to increase the degree of strategic complementarity between price-setters, can fit postwar U.S. data. To answer this question, we resort to a two-step empirical evaluation of our model. In a first step, we estimate the model by minimizing the distance between theoretical autocovariances of key macroeconomic variables and their VAR-based empirical counterparts. In a second step, we resort to Watson's [Watson, M.W., 1993. Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101, 1011–1041.] procedure [Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101 (6), 1011.1041] to quantify the model's goodness-of-fit. Our main result is that the combination of sticky prices and sticky wages is central in order to obtain a good empirical fit. Our analysis also reveals that a model with only sticky wages does not perform well according to Watson's criterion [Watson, M.W., 1993. Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101, 1011–1041.].     

Precautionary saving under liquidity constraints: Evidence from rural Pakistan

This paper investigates precautionary saving under liquidity constraints in Pakistan using household panel data. In particular, while it estimates Kimball's [Kimball, M.S. Precautionary saving in the small and in the large. Econometrica 1990; 58; 53–73.] prudence parameter based on a framework that is similar to Dynan [Dynan, K.E. How prudent are consumers? Journal of Political Economy 1993; 101; 1104–1113.], this study deviates from the framework by explicitly considering liquidity constraints, as in Zeldes [Zeldes, S.P. Consumption and liquidity constraints: an empirical investigation. Journal of Political Economy 1989; 97; 305–346.]. By doing so, this paper attempts to differentiate the standard precautionary saving caused by uncertainty from that caused by liquidity constraints. Furthermore, endogenous liquidity constraints are used in order to resolve issues of selection biases. We find substantial evidence of the presence of precautionary saving in Pakistan. More specifically, the estimated prudence is significantly higher for liquidity-constrained households as compared with unconstrained ones. The finding suggests that the precautionary saving motives appear stronger when households see that their access to credit markets is limited.     

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: A comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

Our comment on Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] addresses the equilibrium concept used in the game with imperfect information, Section 4 of the original paper. The solution represented in the original paper does not constitute a perfect Bayesian Nash-equilibrium. We develop an alternative solution of the game given the assumptions made by Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] and find that the results concerning the optimal amount of over-evaluation of income and the existence of a pooling or separating equilibrium are altered.     

Audited reputation

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854–882].     

Inflation,openness, and exchange-rate regimes: The quest for short-term commitment

This paper further tests Romer's [Romer, D., 1993. Openness and inflation: theory and evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58, 869–903] extension of Kydland and Prescott's [Kydland, F., Prescott, E., 1977. Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy 85, 473–491] predictions for dynamic inconsistency problems in open economies. In a panel data set of developed and developing countries from 1973 to 1998, I find that openness does not play a role in restricting inflation in the short run. On the other hand, a fixed exchange-rate regime plays a significant role. The results are robust to controlling for other variables that determine inflation, performing sensitivity analysis, and using a de facto exchange-rate regime classification.     

Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights

This essay is on the Indian constitution and extends and responds to the work of Singh (Constitutional Political Economy 17:17, 2006) in the analysis of economic rights. The veto player framework is used to analyze the development of economic rights which was diminished and civil rights (through Public Interest Litigation) which was expanded since Indian independence. The Congleton Model (Constitutional Political Economy 12:193–215, 2001) and Tsebelis Model (British Journal of Political Science 25(3):298–325, 1995) on veto players are used to develop the hypotheses and analyze the evolution of the Indian constitution.     

Revisiting the Relationship between Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution: Reply

Here, we respond to the comments raised by Nekby and Pettersson‐Lidbom on our paper Dahlberg et al. (2012, Journal of Political Economy 120, 41–76). We argue that our estimates are internally valid, but we acknowledge that the external validity could have been discussed more thoroughly.     

Variety of products,public capital,and endogenous growth

This paper develops an extension of the endogenous growth model with variety expansion presented in Romer [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technical change, Journal of Political Economy 98, part 2, S71–S102] by considering public capital accumulation. Characterizing the transitional dynamics, the growth rate of consumption traces (and available number of intermediate goods also might trace) an S-shaped converging path to the equilibrium growth rate, similar to a logistic growth curve, if the intensity of public capital is sufficiently high. We also show that public investment enhances economic growth because it stimulates demand for intermediate goods and raises the market interest rate.     

Uncertainty of voters' preferences and differentiation in a runoff system

Haan and Volkerink (Haan, M., Volkerink, B., 2001. A runoff system restores the principle of minimum differentiation. European Journal of Political Economy 17, 157-162, this journal) show that the principle of minimum differentiation holds in two-round elections for any number of candidates. We show that the principle of minimum differentiation may not hold, when uncertainty of the position of the median voter is introduced.     

The dynamics of the Jones R & D growth model

The dynamics of most prominent endogenous growth models are well understood. One notable exception is the Jones R & D growth model [Jones, C.I., 1995. R & D based models of economic growth. Journal of Political Economy 103, 759–784]. This paper provides an analytical treatment of this model's transitional dynamics. It is shown that, given constant returns to labor in R & D (as conventionally assumed in R & D growth models), a unique trajectory converging to the balanced growth path exists. The equilibrium growth path can be monotonic or oscillatory. Moreover, applying a theorem from [Arnold, L.G., 2005. The dynamics of multi-country R & D growth models. University of Regensburg Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 404. February], this result can be used to characterize the dynamic behavior of the multi-country open-economy version of the model.     

Strategic policies and growth: an applied model of R&D-driven endogenous growth

We introduce and explore a general equilibrium model with R&D-driven endogenous growth, whose antecedents are the models of Romer (1990) [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-102] and Grossman and Helpman (1991) [Grossman, G.M., Helpman E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, The MIT Press, Cambridge]. Utilizing evidence from recent econometric studies on sources of growth, the model also accounts explicitly for cross-border technological spillovers. The model is specified and calibrated to data from Japan, and is solved to obtain both the transitional and the steady-state equilibria. We explore the effects of selective trade and R&D promotion policies on long-run growth and social welfare. The model results suggest that while a strategic trade policy has little effect on re-allocating resources into domestic R&D activities, it can significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of technological knowledge, which, in turn, stimulates growth. We find that trade liberalization may cause the growth rate to fall and lead to a loss of social welfare in the long-run, although it improves welfare in the short-run. R&D promotion policies stimulate growth by inducing private agents to allocate more resources to domestic R&D, as well as to take greater advantage of global R&D spillovers. Here, we find significantly high growth effects together with sizable gains in social welfare at low incidence to tax payers.     

Nonlinear adjustment in US bond yields: An empirical model with conditional heteroskedasticity

Starting from the work by Campbell and Shiller (Campbell, J.Y. and Shiller, R.J. (1987). Cointegration and tests of present value models. Journal of Political Economy, 95(5):1062–1088.), empirical analysis of interest rates has been conducted in the framework of cointegration. However, parts of this approach have been questioned recently, as the adjustment mechanism may not follow a simple linear rule; another line of criticism points out that stationarity of the spreads is difficult to maintain empirically.     

The Democratic Efficiency Debate and Definitions of Political Equilibrium

An ongoing debate has been occurring within public choice for over a decade concerning the efficiency of democracy. Virginia Political Economy holds that political markets perform very differently from traditional markets. Chicago Political Economy, exemplified by the work of Becker and Wittman, maintains that political equilibrium, properly defined, is relatively efficient. I argue that the debate can be understood at least partially in methodological terms: Chicago views politics exclusively within the equilibrium framework of traditional economics, while Virginia draws at least implicitly on Austrian economics' view of the economy as a disequilibrium process. I contend that the factors which public choice scholarship has identified as distinguishing politics from markets—rational ignorance, majority rule, collective outcomes—affect the performance of politics as a process even if political equilibrium is relatively efficient.     

A Note on the Theory of Charitable Fund-raising: The Role of Refunds

Andreoni (1998, Journal of Political Economy 106 , 1186–1213) shows that a small amount of seed money from the government can generate substantial additional private donations toward the provision of a public good, when there is a threshold level of provision below which no benefits are achieved. We argue that Andreoni's solution can be extended to a mechanism where refunds are possible. We then argue that a greater "bang per buck" may be achieved if the seed money is targeted to cover the administrative costs of providing refunds.     

Exchange Rate Determination: An Application of a Monetary Model for Brazil

The goal of this paper is to test a variant of the monetary exchange rate determination model, described by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for the Brazilian economy in the recent period. The model starts with the Cagan (The Journal of Political Economy, 66(4):303–328, 1958) money demand, which is complemented by the hypotheses of purchase power parity (PPP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP). We used monthly data of exchange rate, GDP, interest rate for Brazil, and U.S. interest rate and inflation as proxies for international variables. We applied cointegration tests to identify a long run relationship among the variables. The estimated error correction model offers an exchange rate determination model in the short run. Due to potential endogeneity of some variables, GMM was applied to estimate a long-run model of exchange rate determination. The forecasting results of both estimatives were compared with a random walk approach. The results point to the existence of a long and short run equilibrium Real/dollar exchange rate using the structural model, which may be the achievement of this paper.     

Taking,giving, and impure altruism in dictator games

We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.     

Property Taxation, Capitalization, and the Economic Implications of Raising Property Taxes

This study applies a hedonic pricing model to provide further empirical evidence whether, in the spirit of Tiebout (Journal of Political Economy 64(1):416?C424, 1956), Oates (Journal of Political Economy 77(6):957?C971, 1969), and Tullock (Journal of Political Economy 79(5):913?C918, 1971), property taxes in particular have been capitalized into housing prices in the city of Savannah, Georgia housing market. There were sufficient data in this context to study a total of 2,888 single-family houses for the six-year period 2000?C2005; 591 of these houses were located in the Savannah Historic Landmark District. Estimating the model in semi-log form reveals (after allowing for a variety of factors, including 12 spatial variables, four of which are de facto Tiebout type variables) that the natural log of the real sales price of a single-family house in the city of Savannah environment was in fact negatively affected by the city and county property tax level. This study is prompted by the fact that city and county governments are facing serious financial challenges and are searching for viable revenue sources. Increasing property taxes is one of the potential revenue sources being considered by elected officials. In providing current evidence on the effects of property tax in particular and on the Tiebout hypothesis in general, we seek to alert city and state governments of the potential consequences and perils of property tax hikes.     

On the utility premium of Friedman and Savage

We re-examine the utility premium of Friedman–Savage [Friedman, Milton and Savage, Leonard J., “The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk.” Journal of Political Economy 56, 1948, pp. 279–304.]. This measure is useful in understanding risky choices. For instance its reaction to an increased wealth equates to a precautionary demand for saving. We also analyze its two components.     

Asset pricing with idiosyncratic risk and overlapping generations

What is the effect of non-tradeable idiosyncratic risk on asset-market risk premiums? Constantinides and Duffie [Constantinides, G.M., Duffie, D., 1996. Asset pricing with heterogeneous consumers. Journal of Political Economy 104, 219–240] and Mankiw [Mankiw, N.G., 1986. The equity premium and the concentration of aggregate shocks. Journal of Financial Economics 17, 211–219] have shown that risk premiums will increase if the idiosyncratic shocks become more volatile during economic contractions. We add two important ingredients to this relationship: (i) the life cycle, and (ii) capital accumulation. We show that in a realistically-calibrated life-cycle economy with production these ingredients mitigate the ability of idiosyncratic risk to account for the observed Sharpe ratio on US equity. While the Constantinides–Duffie model can account for the US value of 41% with a risk-aversion coefficient of 8, our model generates a Sharpe ratio of 33%, which is roughly half-way to the complete-markets value of 25%. Almost all of this reduction is due to capital accumulation. Life-cycle effects are important in our model—we demonstrate that idiosyncratic risk matters for asset pricing because it inhibits the intergenerational sharing of aggregate risk—but their net effect on the Sharpe ratio is small.     

Book reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
Aganbegyan, Abel; Bogomolov, Oleg; Kaser, Michael
Herr, Hansjoerg; Tober, Silke; West-phal, Andreas
Sachs, Jeffrey, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy
Earle, John S.; Frydman, Roman; Rapaczynski, Andrzej; Turkewitz, Joel (with contributions from Carla Kruga, Jan Mladek, Tatiana Nemeth and Anthony Sinclair)
Laszlo Somogyi, ed., The Political Economy of the Transition Process in Eastern Europe