Das Medienbild in der islamistischen Online-Propaganda

Islamic terror attacks can be regarded as an endpoint of radicalization defined as a process that takes place on a cognitive and a behavioral level (Neumann 2013b). The analysis of Islamic online propaganda seems to be important when it comes to explaining radicalization processes, as it can be defined as the “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). The arguably most prominent Salafi propagandist in Germany is Pierre Vogel who has about 300,000 Facebook likes and who is said to be an extremely sucessfull missionary on the Internet (Wiedl and Becker 2014). Given Wiktorowicz’s (2006) differentiation of Salafi factions, Vogel belongs to the politicos who emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, but who do not call for violence. While previous research has analyzed several aspects of propaganda made by politicos and the violent jihadis (e.?g., Payne 2009), the media image Islamic propagandists hold has remained unexplored so far. This is an important deficit, as from the perspective of journalism ethics of responsibility, one can argue that journalists should know how their media coverage is perceived and instrumentalized by Islamists.Against this background, the present paper explores Vogel’s media image by analyzing Facebook posts that explicitly contain references to media. At first, the basic question of the Salafi’s understanding of the media arises, as a more technical view on the media can be distinguished from the perception of media as political actors bound by directives by the state (Neumann and Baugut 2017). Moreover, we were interested in the type of media and distinct media outlets Vogel refers to. Secondly, we wanted to find out in how far hostile media perceptions (Vallone et al. 1985), well-explored in other contexts, also occur among Islamists like Vogel that can be characterized by a considerable degree of cognitive and affective involvement that triggers hostile media perceptions (cf. Hansen and Kim 2011, S. 173–174; Matthes 2013, S. 375–376). Third, we were interested in the Salafi’s assumptions on media impact on third persons (Davison 1983), as previous research has pointed to cultural distance as one among several factors enforcing third person perceptions (Tsfati 2014). Fourth, as the perceptions mentioned above possibly foster radicalization, we were interested in whether Vogel consequently shows extremist tendencies in his statements on the media’s role. Methodologically, we conducted a qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2015) of all of Vogel’s media-related Facebook posts in the years 2014–2016 (N?=?137). In those years, Islamic terrorism became a major issue in consequence of terrorist attacks in Germany and other European countries.At first, our analysis shows that Vogel mostly refers indiscriminately to the media in general, not at least because he perceives journalistic cooorientation. In cases in which distinct media outlets are named, all types of journalistic media ranging from local newspapers to public and private broadcasting stations are concerned. The broad media repertoire suggests that the Salafist scene comes into contact with content of established journalistic media—albeit not always directly, but rather through the Salafist opinion leader Pierre Vogel in the sense of a “two-step flow” (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944).Second, we found strong hostile media perceptions indicating that the media are perceived as political actors “spending millions to fight Islam”. Vogel especially complains about media coverage portraying him in the context of terrorism. He traces this kind of media coverage back to both economic editorial imperatives and the media’s alleged political goal to divide the Muslim community. The public complaints about hostile media on Facebook can be interpreted as a contribution to the victim-narrative that is characteristic of Islamic propaganda (Payne 2009).Third, while Vogel criticizes media coverage in many respects, not at least in terms of credibility, he assumes that the media influence on third parties is relatively strong. For example, discrimination against Muslims in everyday life is ascribed to the media. Journalists are even made responsible for supporting terrorism by portraying non-radicalized individuals in the context of terrorism.Fourth, the occurrence of both hostile media and third person perceptions did not result in extremist statements on the role of the media. For example, we found no crimes such as an explicit verbal threat to journalists. Being aware that his critics might encourage supporters to attack the media which in turn could have legal consequences, Vogel emphasizes that complaints about ostensible lies should be raised in a reasonable way.All in all, this study shows journalists that their media coverage is intensively monitored by Germany’s most prominent Salafi and that hostile media and third person perceptions may at the same time also occur among extremists who use exemplars of media coverage for propaganda purposes. Especially an undifferentiated portrayal of Salafists as terrorists appears as grist to the mills of those who want to mobilize and recruit scene members by means of the victim-narrative. Clearly, this study has limitations. Given the heterogeneity of the Salafi scene (Wiktorowicz 2006), findings from a leading German Salafi cannot be simply transferred to the whole scene. Besides the problem of generalizability, an interview with Vogel is needed to understand the motives behind his analyzed postings and to find out whether his media image explored by a scholarly interview is congruent with his media image presented on Facebook.     

Eggo Müller: Paarungsspiele. Beziehungsshows in der Wirklichkeit des deutschen Fernsehens

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Demokratische Internet-Öffentlichkeit? Ein Vergleich der öffentlichen Kommunikation im Internet und in den Printmedien am Beispiel der Humangenomforschung

The importance of the internet has increased significantly in recent years. The easy access of this »new« medium sparked many hopes for a democratization of the public sphere and of public debate: Many authors argued that the internet will make actors and interpretations of topics visible to those parts of the broader public who are usually marginalized in »old« mass media. In an empirical analysis, we compared print media coverage and internet communication to assess these claims. For the case of human genome research — i.e. a bioscientific topic that reseived extensive media attention in Germany —, we analyzed which actors were given public standing and which frames came to the fore. In contrast to the claims mentioned above, our findings indicate that the debate in the internet does not differ to a significant extent from the offline debate in print media. We could not find a more egalitarian, democratic communication in the internet.     

Das Zusammenspiel von gesellschaftlicher Umwelt- und Selbstbeobachtung in der Medienberichterstattung

Mass media communication makes societal changes visible and opens the platform for discussion and public debate. Observation of societal changes and public debate are intrinsically linked. Using the example of media coverage on war and questions of defense and security policies, we researched the relationship between societal changes and public debate in a longitudinal study. We performed a content analysis of the daily newspapers FAZ and Süddeutsche Zeitung for the time period of 1989?C2000. The results showed interesting frame relationships between the coverage of single wars and the coverage of defense policies. Specific aspects of war coverage lead to more coverage of security and defense policy issues, and the framing of the one is interrelated to the framing of the other in complex ways.     

Das Risiko ökologischer und individualistischer Fehlschlüsse in der Inhaltsanalyse

In both survey studies and participant observation, individuals are the most natural unit of observation and usually constitute the unit of analysis. In content analysis, by contrast, the unit of observation is less predetermined. As a result, the choice of particular units of observation and analysis requires both a theoretical and methodological rationale. However, published content analyses hardly distinguish between units of observation and units of analysis. More importantly, units of observations and units of analyses often differ without further reasoning. This study demonstrates that consequences may potentially be severe when units of analysis are arbitrarily chosen. The results suggest that the validity of a number of published content analyses may be dubious and that these analyses may have suffered from individual and ecological fallacies.     

Das »Office for Strategic Influence« als Informationsmanager in der US-Kampagne in Afghanistan

The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, formed the starting point for the United States’ «war against terror,» which began on October 7, 2001, with the first bombardment of Afghanistan. The broad support around the world faded quickly after a few weeks without any significant success in the battle against Al Quaeda. To counter rising annoyance, the US Government created the «Office for Strategic Influence» (OSI) in November 2001. The declared purpose: to produce sympathy and support for the war. Though source material is scarce, it is possible to trace the activities of the OSI. In Afghanistan, the office coordinated «Information Operations» already under way. The OSI also tried to influence domestic and international public opinion by participating in the foundation of the «Coalition Information Center» and by consulting public affairs expert Charlotte Beers and the advertising agency «Rendom Group». After an intensive denunciation by several newspapers, especially the 〉New York Times〈, the OSI was abandoned in February 2002. The discussion about the office defined more concretely the formerly vague border between publicly7 accepted and necessary agitation on the one hand and reprehensible propaganda on the other.