Unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing

Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these benefits moderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees’ concerns about unemployment risk. Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits, we find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the link between unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing is stronger when there is higher unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ more low-wage workers, who find unemployment insurance benefits especially useful. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that public policy decisions such as unemployment insurance have significant, albeit probably unintended, externalities on corporate financial reporting.     

Comparing inequality aversion across countries when labor supply responses differ

We analyze to which extent social inequality aversion differs across nations when controlling for actual country differences in labor supply responses. Towards this aim, we estimate labor supply elasticities at both extensive and intensive margins for 17 EU countries and the US. Using the same data, inequality aversion is measured as the degree of redistribution implicit in current tax-benefit systems, when these systems are deemed optimal. We find relatively small differences in labor supply elasticities across countries. However, this changes the cross-country ranking in inequality aversion compared to scenarios following the standard approach of using uniform elasticities. Differences in redistributive views are significant between three groups of nations. Labor supply responses are systematically larger at the extensive margin and often larger for the lowest earnings groups, exacerbating the implicit Rawlsian views for countries with traditional social assistance programs. Given the possibility that labor supply responsiveness was underestimated at the time these programs were implemented, we show that such wrong perceptions would lead to less pronounced and much more similar levels of inequality aversion.     

机关事业单位养老保险制度改革的收入再分配效应

论文采用精算方法,选择终身净转移额和内部收益率两大指标,从全国和地区两个层面,定量分析了机关事业单位养老保险制度改革的代内再分配效应和代际再分配效应。研究结果表明:养老保险制度改革对城镇职工、其他制度模式下的参保群体、不同地区、代与代之间的收入再分配效应,主要取决于工资增长率和利率的动态组合,新制度既可以发挥正向的代内再分配效应和代际再分配效应,也可能会引起代内不公平和代际不公平,而且再分配效应会随缴费年限增加而增强。     

Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island models

To understand European and American unemployment during the last 60 years, we use a search-island model and four matching models with workers who have heterogeneous skills and entitlements to government benefits. When there is higher turbulence, in the sense of worse skill transition probabilities for workers who suffer involuntary layoffs, high government mandated unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection (EP) in Europe increase unemployment rates and durations. But when there is lower turbulence, high European EP suppresses unemployment rates despite high European UI. Four matching models differ in how they assign unemployed workers to matching functions. That affects how strongly unemployment responds to increases in turbulence. Heterogeneity among unemployed workers highlights the central role of adverse labor market externalities in matching models and reveals that the cost of posting vacancies is the lynchpin of a matching model.     

Risk aversion and skewness preference

Empirically, co-skewness of asset returns seems to explain a substantial part of the cross-sectional variation of mean return not explained by beta. This finding is typically interpreted in terms of a risk averse representative investor with a cubic utility function. This paper questions this interpretation. We show that the empirical tests fail to impose risk aversion and the implied utility function takes an inverse S-shape. Unfortunately, the first-order conditions are not sufficient to guarantee that the market portfolio is the global maximum for this utility function, and our results suggest that the market portfolio is more likely to represent the global minimum. In addition, if we do impose risk aversion, then co-skewness has minimal explanatory power.     

Gini Indices and the Redistribution of Income

Just as the Gini inequality index captures people's relative deprivation (Yitzhaki, 1979), so, we show in this paper, Gini-based progressivity and horizontal inequity indices capture individual perceptions of relative fiscal harshness and ill-fortune. In fact, we find that these links between individualistic perceptions and the measurement of the distribution and redistribution of income generalise to the family of indices based on the extended Ginis of Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983). Through 'leaky bucket' experiments, we also suggest how we can parameterise the inequality aversion present in these indices. Analysis of the Canadian gross and net income distributions (conducted using recently developed statistical inference procedures) shows the distribution and the aggregation of these individual indicators of relative deprivation, fiscal harshness and ill-fortune in 1981 and in 1990.     

Household Life Cycle Protection: Life Insurance Holdings, Financial Vulnerability, and Portfolio Implications

Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, we examine the life cycle demand for different types of life insurance. Specifically, we test for the consumer's aversion to income volatility resulting from the death of a household's wage‐earner through the purchase of life insurance. We first develop a financial vulnerability index to control for the risk to the household. We then examine the life cycle demand for life insurance using several definitions of life insurance. We find, in contrast to previous research, that there is a relationship between financial vulnerability and the amount of term life or total life insurance purchased. In addition, we find older consumers use less life insurance to protect a certain level of financial vulnerability than younger consumers. Secondly, our study provides evidence that life insurance demand is jointly determined as part of a household's portfolio. Finally, we consider the impact of family members' nonmonetary contribution on the household's life cycle protection decision. Our results provide some evidence that households take into account the value of nonmonetary contribution in their insurance purchase.     

Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.     

Corporate demand for insurance: Some empirical and theoretical results

While risk aversion explains individual consumer demand for insurance, it does not explain the corporate demand for insurance. Studies have suggested a variety of incentives that motivate corporations to purchase insurance. We find that the primary motivation for corporate insurance purchases can be explained by the bondholder's me-first rule. In return for insurance, bondholders will charge stockholders a lower cost of debt, thereby increasing firm value.     

农民工失业保险问题探究

我国农民工人多而势弱,一方面,他们在经济社会发展过程中的作用越来越举足轻重,另一方面,他们又是权益最得不到保障、最容易大面积遭受失业灾害侵袭的弱势群体。随着改革开放的不断深入,我国农民工失业保险制度建设长期缺失的现状与经济社会的发展越来越不合拍,因而,从我国国情和农民工实际出发,尽快建立健全农民工失业保险制度,切实有效地解决农民工劳动权利和基本生活的保障问题,不仅必要,而且迫切。     

The Trade-Off between Insurance and Incentives in Differentiated Unemployment Policies

In this paper, I revisit the central trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of unemployment insurance policies. The generosity of unemployment insurance benefits differs not only across countries, but also across workers within countries. After illustrating some important dimensions of heterogeneity in a cross-country analysis, I extend the standard Baily–Chetty formula to identify the key empirical moments and elasticities required to evaluate the differentiated unemployment policy within a country. I also review some prior work and aim to provide guidance for future work trying to inform the design of unemployment policies.     

Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from France

We evaluate the effect of downside insurance on self-employment. We exploit a large-scale reform of French unemployment benefits that insured unemployed workers starting businesses. The reform significantly increased firm creation without decreasing the quality of new entrants. Firms started postreform were initially smaller, but their employment growth, productivity, and survival rates are similar to those prereform. New entrepreneurs' characteristics and expectations are also similar. Finally, jobs created by new entrants crowd out employment in incumbent firms almost one-for-one, but have a higher productivity than incumbents. These results highlight the benefits of encouraging experimentation by lowering barriers to entry.     

Entrepreneurial risk aversion,net worth effects and real fluctuations

This paper examines the combined effect of asymmetric information and private entrepreneurial risk aversion on investment decisions. The standard optimal debt contract becomes modified by the introduction of insurance and a risk premium that entrepreneurs demand due to the uncertainty of their investment returns: the private equity premium. In general equilibrium, the private equity premium may become a mechanism that magnifies the effects of shocks. A structural estimation of the model's parameters using Chilean and U.S. data shows that the entrepreneurial risk aversion assumption has more empirical relevance in an economy where smaller privately-held businesses are relatively more prevalent than where the corporate sector predominates, like the U.S.     

Labor Unemployment Concern and Corporate Discretionary Disclosure

We investigate how firms strategically vary their disclosure policies in response to labor unemployment concern. Using changes in state unemployment insurance laws as exogenous variations of labor unemployment concern, we show that firms provide more bad news forecasts when unemployment concern is low. This relation is stronger when firms are financially constrained, when CEOs and CFOs have higher equity incentives, and when workers are likely to be affected more by unemployment. Our findings are not driven by earnings management reversal or underlying performance changes, and are robust to a battery of identification tests. Finally, we find a similar effect of unemployment concern on disclosure using the tone of 10‐K and 10‐Q filings as an alternative proxy for corporate disclosure. Overall, our findings suggest that labor unemployment concern is an important consideration for corporate discretionary disclosure.     

Bank spread with uncertain deposit level and risk aversion

This paper derives a model of the banking firm under uncertainty and risk aversion. The selection of the bank's optimal spread between loan and deposit rates is emphasized. The model's results provide some implications for bank asset quality, capital regulation and deposit insurance. For example, it is shown that increases in the level of equity capital tend to increase the bank's spread under DARA. This implies an improvement in bank asset quality. On the other hand, as the deposit supply function becomes more volatile, the bank's spread narrows, which implies a decline in the quality of the bank's assets.     

How aware are employees of their benefits? Findings from two companies

This study examines benefit awareness of employees in two companies. Contrary to previous research, the results show that employees are generally accurate in their perceptions of the benefits available to them. However, the results also show a lack of awareness of unemployment insurance and disability insurance as benefits. In addition, employees were somewhat uncertain regarding costs of benefits to employers. These findings suggest that employers should monitor employee awareness of benefits and target communications to specific problem areas.     

State Dependent Unemployment Benefits

Optimal design of unemployment insurance is considered in a search setting where the state of nature (business cycle) affects the unemployment risk and thus the return to search. The incentive effects or distortions of individual job search arising due to the unemployment insurance scheme are crucial for optimal policies, so is the scope for risk diversification that depends critically on whether the balanced budget requirement applies to each state of nature or across states of nature. In the former case a basic budget effect tends to cause optimal benefits to be procyclical. If risk diversification across states of nature is possible, the fact that incentives are more distorted in good than bad states of nature tends to make both benefits and contribution rates countercyclical. It is shown that countercyclical benefits exacerbate employment fluctuations but increase average employment by aligning benefits more with states of nature where the incentive costs are small.     

Optimal insurance contract and coverage levels under loss aversion utility preference

This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously and determines the optimal coverage levels with respect to deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance, and, by assuming that the insured has an S-shaped loss aversion utility, the insured would retain the enormous losses entirely. The representative optimal insurance form is the truncated deductible insurance, where the insured retains all losses once losses exceed a critical level and adopts a particular deductible otherwise. Additionally, the effects of the optimal coverage levels are also examined with respect to benchmark wealth and loss aversion coefficient. Moreover, the efficiencies among various insurances are compared via numerical analysis by assuming that the loss obeys a uniform or log-normal distribution. In addition to optimal insurance, deductible insurance is the most efficient if the benchmark wealth is small and upper-limit insurance if large. In the case of a uniform distribution that has an upper bound, deductible insurance and optimal insurance coincide if benchmark wealth is small. Conversely, deductible insurance is never optimal for an unbounded loss such as a log-normal distribution.     

Credibilistic risk aversion

In the probabilistic risk aversion approach, risks are presumed as random variables with known probability distributions. However, in some practical cases, for example, due to the absence of historical data, the inherent uncertain characteristic of risks or different subject judgements from the decision-makers, risks may be hard or not appropriate to be estimated with probability distributions. Therefore, the traditional probabilistic risk aversion theory is ineffective. Thus, in order to deal with these cases, we suggest measuring these kinds of risks as fuzzy variables, and accordingly to present an alternative risk aversion approach by employing credibility theory. In the present paper, first, the definition of credibilistic risk premium proposed by Georgescu and Kinnunen [Fuzzy Inf. Eng., 2013, 5, 399–416] is revised by taking the initial wealth into consideration, and then a general method to compute the credibilistic risk premium is provided. Secondly, regarding the risks represented with the commonly used LR fuzzy intervals, a simple calculation formula of the local credibilistic risk premium is put forward. Finally, in a global sense, several equivalent propositions for comparative risk aversion under the credibility measurement are provided. Illustrated examples are presented to show the applicability of the theoretical findings.     

The Demand for Insurance With an Upper Limit on Coverage

The demand for insurance is examined when the indemnity schedule is subject to an upper limit. The optimal contract is shown to display full insurance above a deductible up to the cap. Some results derived in the standard model with no upper limit on coverage turn out to be invalid; the optimal deductible of an actuarially fair policy is positive and insurance may be a normal good under decreasing absolute risk aversion. An increase in the upper limit would induce the policyholder with constant absolute risk aversion to reduce his or her optimal deductible and therefore this would increase the demand for insurance against small losses.