Fiscal decentralization,equalization, and intra-provincial inequality in China

Using a nationwide county-level panel dataset for the years 1995–2009, this paper conducts the first analysis in the literature to examine the impacts of fiscal decentralization and fiscal equalization, both measured at the sub-provincial level, on intra-provincial inequality in China. While fiscal decentralization offers significant advantages regarding public expenditure efficiency, a potentially large disadvantage is that it may lead to increased regional inequality. In this paper, in line with our theoretical hypotheses, we find that while fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level in China leads to larger intra-provincial inequality, fiscal equalization efforts performed by provincial governments tend to mitigate the detrimental effect of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality. Our results also indicate that the quantitative effects of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality tend to be larger when they are measured from the expenditure side, which is consistent with the fact that expenditure decentralization is a much more meaningful measure of decentralization in China. Overall, we provide evidence on the potential inequality costs of using fiscal decentralization as a development strategy. At the same time, we emphasize the importance of implementing a fiscal equalization program to ensure the overall success of decentralization policy.     

Fiscal Transfers and Fiscal Sustainability

We examine whether the U.S. and German state governments pursue sustainable fiscal policies taking into account fiscal transfers. Using panel data techniques we investigate whether the debt‐to‐GDP ratio had a positive influence on the primary surplus (Bohn model). We show that including/excluding fiscal transfers changes the results. If fiscal transfers are not included in the primary surplus, the test results do not indicate that the U.S. and German state governments pursued sustainable fiscal policies. Our results also suggest that fiscal transfers were positively related to debt. These findings indicate that intergovernmental transfers have implicitly subsidized debts.     

Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act

The literature on distressed firms has focused on these firms’ investment, capital structure, and labor decisions. This paper investigates a novel aspect of firm behavior in distress: how financial health affects a firm?s lobbying and, consequently, its relationship with the government. We exploit the shock to nonfinancial firms during the 2008 financial crisis and the availability of the stimulus package in the first quarter of 2009. We find that firms with weaker financial health, as measured by credit default swap spreads, lobbied more. We also show that the amount spent on lobbying was associated with a greater likelihood of receiving stimulus funds.     

Corporate lobbying,political connections,and the bailout of banks

Political involvement has long been shown to be a profitable investment for firms that seek favorable regulatory conditions or support in times of economic distress. But how important are different types of political involvement for the timing and magnitude of political support? To answer this question, we take a comprehensive look at the lobbying expenditures and political connections of banks that were recipients of government support under the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). We find that politically-engaged firms were not only more likely to receive TARP funds, but they also received a greater amount of TARP support and received the support earlier than firms that were not politically involved.     

Uncertainty and Fiscal Cliffs

Large pending fiscal policy changes, such as in the United States in 2012 or in Japan with consumption taxes, often generate considerable uncertainty. “Fiscal cliff” episodes have several features: an announced possible future change, a skewed set of possible outcomes, the possibility that implementation may not actually occur, and a known resolution date. This paper develops a model capturing these features and studies their impact. Fiscal cliff uncertainty shocks have immediate impact, with a magnitude that depends on the probability of implementation, which generates economic volatility. The possibility of fiscal cliffs lowers economic activity even in periods of relative certainty.     

财政扩张

从1998到2008,十年,中国积极财政政策一次轮回。积极,财政人都知道,意味着财政要把难题自己扛在肩。积极财政政策的实施,意味着经济难题开始转化为财政难题,然后由财政去解决。所以,积极,意味着沉重的责任。     

桑弘羊的财政思想及其对现代理财观的指导意义

桑弘羊，作为我国西汉时期著名的政治家和理财家，曾为封建专制政府的财政建设和当时社会经济的发展做出过重要的贡献，其丰富的经济思想在其所推行的财政改革措施中得到了充分的贯彻。本文主要通过其推行的财政措施来介绍桑弘羊的财政思想，并适当地探讨了其理财思想对现代理财观的指导意义。     

Political Accountability and Fiscal Federalism

In a model with democratic institutions and three jurisdictions, we study the allocation and welfare in a one-level (unitary) and a two-level (federal) government, given that the central government finds it optimal to discriminate in favor of two jurisdictions and against the third. Favored jurisdictions are at least as well off in a unitary structure as compared to a federal one, while this may not be so for the jurisdiction discriminated against. We finally show that jurisdiction-specific electoral uncertainty is consistent with both equitable as well as discriminating allocations.     

Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.     

Fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic management

The purpose of this paper is to address a central question in fiscal federalism - whether or not fiscal decentralization implies serious risks for fiscal discipline and macroeconomic management for the nation as a whole. This paper addresses this important issue by drawing upon the existing evidence regarding macro management and fiscal institutions in federal and unitary countries. This is supplemented by cross country regression analysis plus the analysis of two case studies: the Brazilian federation and the unitary regime in China. The main conclusion of the paper is that decentralized fiscal systems offer a greater potential for improved macroeconomic governance than centralized fiscal regimes. This is because the challenges posed by fiscal decentralization are recognized and they shape the design of countervailing institutions in federal countries to overcome adverse incentives associated with incomplete contracts or the “common property” resource management problems or with rent seeking behaviors. JEL Code E6 · H7 · H1     

政府间财力分配与中国地方财政能力的差异

近些年来,我国地方财政能力的差异呈现不断扩大的趋势。财政分权改革过程中政府间财力分配体制设计的缺陷,是导致我国地方财政能力差异扩大的体制性原因。本文从中国政府间财力分配的两次过程,来分析这一制度对地方财政能力差异的影响,并对如何完善我国政府间财力分配体制、缩小地方财力差异提出对策建议。     

黄奇帆财智

2009年,金融危机成为贯穿经济发展的背景词汇,主流的话语都在讲述危中有机。同样作为主流的代表之一,黄奇帆口中的危中有机来的似乎更平和、更实在。     

潍坊:“发现”政府引领经济的模型

政府先振兴金融业,让现代经济拥有更加强壮的心脏:再创设各类资金支持平台,让现代经济的血液有可健康流动的管道;最后创新多种政府金融手段,让血液流动得更畅通更健康,促使经济真正实现又好又快的发展。     

Heterogeneous Consumers and Fiscal Policy Shocks

This paper studies empirical facts regarding the effects of unexpected changes in aggregate macroeconomic fiscal policies on consumers that differ depending on individual characteristics. We use data from the Consumption Expenditure Survey to estimate individual‐level responses and multipliers for government spending. We find that unexpected fiscal shocks have substantially different effects on consumers depending on their income and age levels: the wealthiest individuals tend to behave according to predictions of standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, whereas the poorest ones behave according to standard IS–LM (non‐Ricardian) models, most likely due to credit constraints. Furthermore, government spending policy shocks tend to decrease consumption inequality.     

Fiscal policy and financial market movements

This paper estimates fiscal policy reaction function in order to investigate the links between financial market movements and fiscal policy outcomes. An increase in asset prices affects in a positive and significant manner primary balances, with the response reflecting both an increase in government revenues and a fall in government spending. The most important impact on fiscal balances is due to changes in residential property prices. Changes in equity and commercial property prices are also important determinants of fiscal balances. Our findings suggest that the steepening of the slope of the yield curve contributes to expenditure based fiscal discipline.     

Tax competition and federal equalization schemes with decentralized leadership

Regional governments compete by setting capital taxes in anticipation of the central government’s fiscal equalization and income redistribution policies. I start by demonstrating that the constrained socially optimal allocation satisfies the Pareto efficient conditions; therefore, it may be first best. It is also shown that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the game played by regional and central governments is socially optimal. The anticipation of equalization of marginal utilities of public consumption and equalization of marginal utilities of private consumption provides regional governments with correct incentives in the setting of capital taxes, preventing the phenomenon known as “race to the bottom.”     

Tax competition and fiscal equalization under corporate income taxation

This paper challenges the view that tax base equalization by the so-called representative tax system (RTS) removes inefficient undertaxation in corporate tax competition. The innovation of the paper is that it focuses on a tax on corporate income, instead of the unit tax on capital considered in previous studies. We employ a tax competition model with fiscal equalization and show that the RTS fails to fully internalize pecuniary and fiscal externalities. As a consequence, the RTS yields inefficiently low tax rates in the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game between governments. Tax revenue equalization performs even worse, but combined with equalization of private income it implements the efficient tax rates on corporate income.