Increasing wage dispersion and the changes in relative employment and wages in Mexico's urban informal sector: 1987-1993

This study analyses the role of changes in informal/formal relative employment, wage levels and wage inequality in explaining increasing wage dispersion in Mexico during the 1987–1993 period. From 1987 to 1993, the variance of the log of hourly wages for Mexican workers increased by more than 50 per cent. Using data from the Encuesta nacional de empleo urbano we find that this increase in the overall wage dispersion was mainly driven by increasing wage dispersion in the formal sector coupled with a faster growth in formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment. However, compression in the distribution of wages within the informal sector contributed to substantially slowdown the increasing overall wage inequality. About 60 per cent of the 1987–1993 4.65 percentage point reduction in the informal sector share of total employment is explained by changes in the structure that determines sectoral employment; the rest is explained by changes in the composition of the labour force, particularly increases in the sectoral education gap and a change in the regional relative share of sectoral employment. Also, from 1987 to 1993 the sectoral wage ratio increased from 0.59 to 0.63. It seems that a relative improvement in unobserved skills in the informal sector helped to close the wage differential but this effect was partially offset by an increase in the relative prices of both observed and unobserved skills, as well as increases in relative observed skills in the formal sector, particularly education.     

Labor Informality: Choice or Sign of Segmentation? A Quantile Regression Approach at the Regional Level for Colombia

The labor market in developing countries is remarkably heterogeneous, with a small productive formal sector characterized by high wages and attractive employment conditions, and a large informal sector characterized by low productivity and volatile wages. The informal sector is particularly diverse. In this paper, we examine the heterogeneity of the informal sector at the regional level in Colombia. In general, our findings suggest that both voluntary and involuntary informal employment co‐exist by choice and as a consequence of labor market segmentation. We also find that there are striking differences in labor market characteristics across cities, particularly with respect to informal employment.     

Job search and mobility in developing countries. Theory and policy implications

A labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive. We show that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium in this dual economy. We then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms' profits. We find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms' entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment, reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages. We also find that an employment/wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications. In particular, the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it.     

Are labor markets segmented in developing countries? A semiparametric approach

We test the hypothesis that observably similar workers earn higher wages in the formal sector than in the informal sector in developing nations. Using data from Argentina's household survey and various definitions of informal employment, we find that on average, formal wages are higher than informal wages. Parametric tests suggest that a formal premium remains after controlling for individual and establishment characteristics. However, this approach suffers from several econometric problems, which we address with semiparametric methods. The resulting formal premium estimates prove either small and insignificant, or negative. Neither do we find significant differences in measures of job satisfaction between the two sectors. We invoke these results to question the mainstream view that labor markets are segmented along formal/informal lines in developing nations such as Argentina.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Fiscal adjustment and labor market dynamics in an open economy

This paper studies the labor market effects of fiscal adjustment in a two-sector, three-good intertemporal framework. Key features of the model are an informal sector, minimum wages, unionized labor in the formal economy, imperfect labor mobility, and public production of intermediate inputs. “Luxury” and wait unemployment prevail in equilibrium. It is shown that if unions care sufficiently about employment, and if the degree of openness is high, an increase in the price of government services may reduce unemployment in the steady state. A similar result would hold in an efficiency-wage setting if the “disciplinary effect” of unemployment is sufficiently strong.     

Determinants of wage stickiness in a developing economy

We explore wage flexibility in a developing country and compare our results to what has been found in similar studies using European data. In particular, we conduct a survey of 1189 firms in Pakistan to analyze the determinants of wage rigidity. We find that the existence of competitive wages and an interaction with the informal economy are statistically significant determinants of wage stickiness. While the role of competitive wages is similar to what has been found in studies of European firms, the latter find a much larger role for turnover, collective bargaining and employment protection. In contrast, in Pakistan we find that firms hiring from the informal sector are significantly more flexible in changing their wages. This suggests that the informal sector adds to the wage flexibility of the formal sector.     

Sectoral Selection and Informality: a Nicaraguan Case Study

Using microdata from the 1998 and 1993 Nicaraguan Living Standards Measurement Survey, this paper analyzes the relative size and attractiveness of formal and informal sector employment. Switching regression models of the formal/informal sector employment choice indicate that education across years and gender are the primary determinants of formal sector participation. Furthermore, the formal sector is characterized by positive selection. The results for the informal sector are less definitive, but are also suggestive of positive selection. These findings imply that the informal and formal sectors in Nicaragua contribute positively to the overall economy by attracting those individuals best suited for (in)formal sector employment.     

Oil price shock and informal workers in dual labor markets

This paper examines the impact of a rise in oil prices on the wages of workers in the unorganized sector of a developing economy. The model economy is comprised of two non-traded transport sectors, formal and informal, along with other sectors. The main results that we obtain are as follows. The informal transport sector contracts when fuel price rises and lowers the real income of the informal workers. The per-unit return to land rises, and the factor readjustments even raise the output of other sectors in the economy. We also show why inclusion of non-passenger transport services does not alter the main outcomes of the model.     

Economic reform and informal wage—a general equilibrium analysis

We attempt to trace the consequences of liberal economic policies on informal wage in a general equilibrium model with formal informal labor markets, wage-differential, vertical linkage and restricted capital movement. In particular, we show that the informal wage, representing income for a vast segment of unskilled labor may actually increase even if more people are employed in the informal segment. This also confirms that a contraction in the formal sector employment and the consequent expansion in the informal segment do not necessarily imply impoverishment of the existing set of informal workers.     

Tanzanian formal sector workers' participation in informal production

A theoretical model is developed explaining formal sector workers participation in the informal sector. A reduced-form informal sector participation function is derived from a specific utility function, a specific informal sector production function, and a specific informal sector earnings function. The participation function can be estimated consistently, and provides a solution to the problem that informal sector ‘wages’ in developing countries are hard to observe. A sample of Tanzanian formal sector workers is used to estimate the participation function. A majority of Tanzanian formal sector workers participate in informal production. Participation in informal production is inversely related to household income, to living in Dar es Salaam, and to being a mother with small children. Participation is positively related to age, and multiple-job-holding seems to play a very different role in the transition from work to retirement in Tanzania compared to industrialized countries.     

Are Minimum Wages to Blame for Informality in the Labour Market?

The paper estimates the impact of the minimum wage on formal and informal employment in a developing country combining the use of aggregate time series data with modern time-series methods. The analysis is carried out for the case of Brazil over the period 1982–2002. The hypothesis under investigation is that minimum wage rises price workers out of the formal labour market and into the informal sector. The modelling strategy involves the estimation of the long-run structure as well as the short-term dynamics of employment equations in which the minimum wage enters as an explanatory variable.JEL codes: J23 J51 C32     

Informal employment in developing countries : Opportunity or last resort?

There is an ongoing debate among researchers and policy makers, whether informal sector employment is a result of competitive market forces or labor market segmentation. More recently it has been argued that none of the two theories sufficiently explains informal employment, but that the informal sector shows a heterogenous structure. For some workers the informal sector is an attractive employment opportunity, whereas for others - rationed out of the formal sector - the informal sector is a strategy of last resort. To test the empirical relevance of this hypothesis we formulate an econometric model which allows for several unobserved segments within the informal sector and apply it to the urban labor market in Côte d'Ivoire.     

Quantitative Trade Restrictions in Unionized Economies

This paper models the interactions of a labor union and a monopoly firm under an import quota in a small open economy. The distorted equilibrium is depicted in a diagram, in which wages and employment in both sectors, and the monopoly rent, can be identified. The imposition of an import quota in the unionized sector reduces monopoly rent, union employment, and wages in both sectors, compared with the case of autarky. In addition, the paper presents several surprising comparative statics results. For instance, an increase in the world price causes the protected (i.e., "wrong") sector to shrink, wages to decrease, and national income to rise if the initial world price is low.     

The impact of minimum wages on employment of low‐wage workers

This study provides empirical evidence on the impact of a minimum wage increase on employment of workers in the formal sector who have wages below the minimum level in Vietnam. Using the difference‐in‐differences with propensity score matching and the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys of 2004 and 2006, the article finds that the minimum wage increase in 2005 reduced the proportion of workers having a formal sector job among low‐wage workers. Most workers who lost formal sector jobs became self‐employed.     

The formal sector wage premium and firm size

We show theoretically that when larger firms pay higher wages and are more likely to be caught defaulting on labor taxes, then large-high wage firms will be in the formal and small-low wage firms will be in the informal sector. The formal sector wage premium is thus just a firm size wage differential. Using data from Ecuador we illustrate that firm size is indeed the key variable determining whether a formal sector premium exists.     

International Trade,Migration and Unemployment – The Role of Informal Sector

This paper provides an elaborate general equilibrium framework by including informal economic activities in a model of trade, migration and unemployment. Existence of informal activities is critical in generating positive employment effects of liberal trade policies. Following a tariff cut informal wage increases and rate of unemployment goes down under reasonable conditions. Next we generalize the benchmark model to capture the phenomenon of sequential migration: from agriculture to urban informal sector, and then to urban formal sector. Positive employment effect of reformatory trade policy partly owes to the fact that the presence of informal sector directly reduces the cost of migration and, hence, further induces the process of outmigration from agricultural sector. The paper also extends the benchmark model to include both informal intermediate and final good.     

Can minimum wages cause a big push? Evidence from Indonesia

Big Push models suggest that local product demand can create multiple labor market equilibria: one featuring high wages, formalization, and high demand and one with low wages, informality, and low demand. I demonstrate that minimum wages may coordinate development at the high wage equilibrium. Using data from 1990s Indonesia, where minimum wages increased in a varied way, I develop a difference in spatial differences estimator which weakens the common trend assumption of difference in differences. Estimation reveals strong trends in support of a big push: formal employment increases and informal employment decreases in response to the minimum wage. Local product demand also increases, and this formalization occurs only in the non-tradable, industrializable industries suggested by the model (while employment in tradable and non-industrializable industries also conforms to model predictions).     

Regulation of entry, labor market institutions and the informal sector

This paper develops a two-sector matching model that incorporates the main features of Latin American labor markets. It has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries. The model is numerically solved using Brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed. Reducing formal sector's entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance. Increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare. Thus, the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal, as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal.     

A note on the shadow wage in LCDs with migration and formal and informal urban sectors

Given induced rural-to-urban migration, the social cost of (unskilled) labour for urban public sector projects is shown to be lower than the formal-sector, exogenously-determined wage. This result is valid not only when the urban alternative to formal employment is unemployment but also (and more realistically) when the relevant alternatives are formal employment, informal employment and unemployment.