Patents and quality growth in OLG economy

This paper shows how heterogeneity in patent ownership across generations and lifecycle saving considerations qualitatively change the conventional implications of patent policy for quality growth. We study a close Overlapping Generations economy that grows through sequential quality improvements (“quality-ladder”), to show that for plausible values of the Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution (a) shorter patent length enhances growth (b) under exogenous innovation size loosening patent breadth protection spurs R&D investment and quality growth and (c) the effect of loosening lagging breadth protection on R&D investment and quality growth under endogenous innovation size depends on patents length. Our findings explore a new channel through which strong patents may hinder innovation and emphasize the importance of coordination in patent-policy across the different dimensions of the patents system.     

Carbon sequestration and permit trading on the competitive fringe

This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration policy literature. First and foremost, we develop a theoretical framework in which sequestration and permit-trading markets are analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. Our framework formalizes the linkage between regulatory policy changes (as they manifest themselves in the permit market) and subsequent equilibrium allocations in the sequestration market. Second, we perform a numerical analysis demonstrating the role market structure, or market power, might play in the determination of the equilibrium sequestration allocation and carbon price. Both our analytical and numerical results demonstrate the importance of incorporating into empirical supply-side models demand-side information that is reflective of an underlying market structure.     

Some thoughts on the Sutton approach

I analyze the relation between market size and number of firms when an endogenous number of firms chooses the market strategy and (simultaneously or sequentially) an R&D investment. I generalize the linear Cournot model with an endogenous cost-reducing activity and show that, as long as exogenous fixed costs are positive, the market structure is naturally characterized by an inverted-U relation between market size and number of firms, in line with the celebrated hypothesis of Sutton. However, the increase of the market size reduces the prices and expands individual investment and production exactly as in endogenous market structure only with exogenous fixed costs.     

Network effects, market structure and industry performance

This paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities. Exploiting a minimal complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods, we prove existence of non-trivial fulfilled-expectations equilibrium. We formalize the concept of industry viability, investigate its determinants, and show that it improves with more firms in the market and/or by technological progress. These results enlighten some well-known conclusions from case studies in the management strategy literature. We also characterize the effects of market structure on industry performance, which depart substantially from ordinary markets. The approach relies on lattice-theoretic methods, supplemented with basic insights from nonsmooth analysis.     

What are good R&D investment strategies for leaders and followers?

Research and development (R&D) investment affects the growth of firms in the same industry differently according to their technological positions. This study empirically investigates differences in how R&D investment influences firm growth between technological leaders and followers. Additionally, this study investigates the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition on the relationship between R&D investment and firm growth. Using a sample of 2322 observations from 492 firms in the U.S. chemical and allied products industry for the period 2000–2009, we show that an increase in R&D investment leads to greater firm growth for technological followers than for technological leaders. We also find that the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition vary depending on whether a firm is a technological leader or follower.     

Explaining foreign bank entrance in emerging markets

This paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the empirical observation that foreign banks from industrialized countries tend to increase their involvement in emerging markets in periods of market instability. In this model, domestic banks have (through past lending operations) more soft information on their borrowers available compared to foreign banks. Foreign banks, however, have a superior screening technology that allows them to obtain more hard information about their borrowers’ investment projects. The model has an important implication: Foreign banks increase their market share when credit market conditions deteriorate. The rationale for this finding is that the comparative advantage of the domestic bank loses value in unstable credit market conditions. Thus, the advantage of having a screening technology becomes more important and allows the foreign bank to increase market share. In times of crisis hard information on projects is relatively more important than soft information on the borrower’s history.     

Endogenous asset ownership structures in deregulated markets

This paper determines the equilibrium ownership structure in an emerging market deregulated by a joint privatization and investment liberalization. It is shown that bidding competition in the privatization stage is not sufficient for reaching an efficient equilibrium market structure. Competition in the ensuing entry stage is also required. Otherwise, one firm can induce another to take the role of the weak firm in the subsequent product market competition, by making concessions in the bidding in the privatization auction. It is also shown that Employment Guarantees may “help” the buyer of the privatized firm “abstain” from investing and thus create a less competitive market structure.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

Improving ICANN’s governance and accountability: A policy proposal

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has control over extremely important aspects of the Internet. Yet, its non-profit corporation status, combined with the way that it is funded and governed, make accountability a serious problem. This paper draws on the accountability framework that has been developed by Mueller (2009) to evaluate the structure and governance of ICANN and then compares it to the structure and governance of a number of other organizations that perform a roughly comparable range of coordination and standard-setting functions, to explore what might be applicable to ICANN. Virtually all of these other organizations are governed by their direct users, thereby building accountability into their structures. We suggest that this would be a good model for ICANN as well.     

Free Trade Agreement with Endogenous Market Structure

We examine the incentives of free trade agreement (FTA) formation between two countries under endogenous market structure with leaders and followers. We demonstrate that establishing a FTA is neither an equilibrium outcome nor socially optimal when consumer demand and fixed cost are intermediate, products are close substitutes and countries are asymmetrical. This is because the FTA induces exit of followers, which makes the market less competitive and shrinks the leader’s production both in the domestic and foreign markets. We also show that large developing countries are less likely to establish a FTA than small developed countries.     

R&D, risks and overreaction in a market with the absence of the book-to-market effect

Prior studies document that the book-to-market (BM) effect is absent in the Taiwan stock market. Using Taiwanese data covering from 1991 to 2006, we show that, after controlling for the size effect and the Fama and French's (1993) risk factors, the BM effect only exists for those firms with low R&D intensity essentially because these stocks suffer less from investors’ underreaction to R&D investment. The BM effect arises primarily from fundamental reversals acting as a proxy for investors’ overreaction.     

Knowledge appropriability, firm size, and growth

Empirical evidence shows that the number of patents per R&D dollar declines with firm size. In this paper, we propose a Schumpeterian growth model that accounts for this evidence. We analyze an economy with firms that engage in cost-reducing innovation resulting from the accumulation of both codified and tacit knowledge: the former occurs through the purchase of patents, while the latter is the result of R&D conducted in-house by firms. We study the relation between knowledge appropriability and market structure, and we show that a shift from patents to in-house research occurs as firm size gets larger. Since innovation statistics concentrate mainly on patents, this process of research reallocation results into an under-estimation of innovative activity and is responsible for the declining ratio of patents to R&D expenditure. Survey data on UK-based firms provide support to our results.     

Leadership and Privatisation in a Mixed Multi‐product Oligopoly: An Endogenous Timing Model

This paper examines both leadership choice and welfare consequences of privatisation in an endogenous timing mixed multi‐product oligopoly. It shows that a multi‐product firm undermines the welfare‐maximising efforts of a public firm by cross‐subsidising. The paper demonstrates that a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium emerges in a multi‐product market, in contrast to the multiple equilibria of a single‐product market. This unique equilibrium indicates that profit‐maximising private firms retain leadership while a welfare‐maximising public firm acts as a follower. Even on the off‐equilibrium path where the public firm acts as a leader, it rarely generates maximum social welfare. However, privatising the public firm usually harms social welfare and results in a different timing structure in equilibrium.     

Optimal nonlinear income taxation with productive government expenditure

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with a production externality and nonlinear income taxation, and uses it to examine how the fiscal authority devises its nonlinear tax structure from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. It is found that, in the Barro (1990) model, Pareto optimality can be achieved if both policy instruments for the tax scalar and the extent of the tax progressivity/regressivity are set optimally.     

Endogenous fluctuations in a cournotian monopolistic competition model with free entry and market power variability

The purpose of this article is to show that there is a link between imperfections of competition and occurrence of endogenous fluctuations. We consider a two-sector model in which a perfectly competitive final good sector uses inputs that are produced in a Cournot monopolistic competition market. We show that when inputs are not perfect substitutes, and the depreciation rate of capital is sufficiently small, Neimark bifurcations are susceptible to emerge. This is a consequence of additional variability in the dynamical system generated by the dependence of the markup on the number of firms. This number changes over time because firms can enter and exit the market without costs. Moreover, a fixed cost in the technology ensures that the number of active firms at a given date is finite provided that the elasticity of substitution between inputs is bounded from above.     

Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers

We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of private-value auctions for differentiated goods. New buyers and new objects may arrive at random times. Since objects are imperfect substitutes, buyers? values are not persistent. Instead, each buyer?s private value for a new object is a new independent draw from the same distribution.We consider the use of second-price auctions for selling these objects, and show that there exists a unique symmetric Markov equilibrium in this market. In equilibrium, buyers shade their bids down by their continuation value, which is the (endogenous) option value of participating in future auctions. We characterize this option value and show that it depends not only on the number of buyers currently present on the market and the distribution of their values, but also on anticipated market dynamics.     

Investment choices: Indivisible non-marketable assets and suboptimal solutions

Several investment decisions deal with non-marketable assets. Non-marketable assets are available only to one investor and are often indivisible. This has relevant consequences on investor investment opportunities. Adhering to a mean–variance representation of the investment space and considering a non-marketable asset (divisible or not), we derive some possible investment scenarios an investor may face. Furthermore, we show how a limited ability to gather and process information affects investor portfolio choices. Our results define a set of conditions under which the non-marketable asset represents a good investment and show that, under certain assumptions, the efficient frontier exhibits non-linearities and intervals of discontinuity.     

The recent boom–bust cycle: The relative contribution of capital flows, credit supply and asset bubbles

We use an estimated open economy DSGE model with financial frictions for the US and the rest of the world to evaluate various competing explanations about the recent boom–bust cycle. We find that the savings glut hypothesis is insufficient for explaining all aspects of the boom in the US. Relatively strong TFP growth and expansionary monetary policy are also not able to explain fully the volatility of corporate and in particular residential investment. We identify bubbles in the stock and housing market as crucial. Concerning the downturn in 2008/2009, the fall in house prices and residential investment only plays a minor role. Mortgage defaults have more explanatory power, especially in a specification of the model with a segregated equity market. Finally, the bursting of the stock market bubble was at least as important in this recession as in 2001. Because of various negative shocks hitting the economy at the same time in 2008/2009 and continued positive technology growth, not only the real interest rate declined but inflation fell rapidly and left insufficient room for monetary policy to play a similar stabilising role as in previous recessions.     

Host country's strategic policies and multinational firm's choice of entry mode

This paper examines the effects of contract enforceability and market structure on a firm's choice between licensing and foreign direct investment. Clearly, the firm's choice impacts upon social welfare in the host country. Therefore, the government of the host country is likely to set contract enforceability for inducing the multinational firm (MNF) to choose a desirable mode of entry. The paper takes into account two different cases. In the first case, the host country does not have an incumbent that can compete with the MNF, and in the second case, it has one incumbent that can compete. The paper shows that the government's choice of contract enforceability is crucially dependent upon the domestic market structure and the domestic capacity to absorb the advanced technology of the MNF.