Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992–2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.     

THE SECOND‐PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMON'S DILEMMA*

The planner wants to give k identical, indivisible objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+ 1)st‐price sealed‐bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This simple mechanism implements the desired outcome in iteratively undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other.     

Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome

It is well known that in a duopoly model of product choice with quadratic transportation cost, the firms locate at the extreme endpoints of the market. Jehiel (1992, Int. J. Ind. Organ, 10, 633–641) has examined this model in an infinite horizon setting where in the initial period the firms choose location and in subsequent periods charge the Nash bargaining solution prices. Then, in the unique equilibrium both firms locate at the center of the market. This paper examines the case when the firms instead charge the prices determined by either the egalitarian bargaining solution or the Kalai–Smorodinski bargaining solution. It is shown that central agglomeration is an equilibrium. Furthermore, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria in addition where the firms locate apart from each other. So the products are not necessarily minimally differentiated. Thus different bargaining solutions provide quite different outcomes.     

Comment on “Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents” [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210–217]

We amend an error in [S. Parreiras, Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents, J. Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 210–217]. Consequently, it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of Crémer and McLean [J. Crémer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian, dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247–1258] as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of their signals about other agents? types. Instead, such an interpretation is warranted only when the weights used to span an agent?s set of beliefs stand in a singular relation with the prior type distribution that is known as an alternative characterization of Blackwell dominance.     

Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game

The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence,each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody?s hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying Kübler and Weizsäcker?s (2004) cognitive frame of limited depth of reasoning.     

Rationing and rationality

This paper investigates a simple three-good two-sector macromodel with fixed prices. In order to omit any ad hoc assumptions about the market outcomes we analyse the model as a game played by (fully) rational players. Whereas the notion of rationality underlying the concept of Nash equilibria implies a multiplicity of solutions (with different trades and different excess demands) the refined notion of uniformly perfect equilibria yields uniqueness. Interestingly, the unique solution implies excess demands differing from previously discussed suggestions. Accordingly, the amount of involuntary unemployment may here be different from those in former models even though transactions are the same. In principle, the model provides a reasonable basis to interpret the magnitude of excess demands, what seems important since excess demands serve as signals not only for markets but also for policy makers.     

SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND THE DEMAND FOR SPORT: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper explores the decision to participate in sports activities in the United Kingdom and the subsequent frequency of participation. The paper draws links between economic and other theories of social interaction to motivate the discussion and links these theories to assessing policy initiatives in the United Kingdom. Cluster analysis is combined with a Heckman analysis to examine the empirical evidence provided by the General Household Survey in 2002. The results suggest that social and personal capital are of paramount importance in determining sports participation, and consequently, it is these features that policy should focus upon. However, the legitimacy of policy activism requires philosophical justification. ( JEL B41, C2, D11, D12)     

Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms

There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem. The classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a family of mechanisms, called Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms, which generalize the Top Trading Cycles to the general case in which individuals are allowed to report indifferences, while preserving a maximal possible set of its desirable properties.     

Aggregate information cascades

We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of cascade arises in equilibrium, the aggregate cascade on the observable action. A cascade on the unobservable action never arises.     

Strategic network formation through peering and service agreements

We introduce a game theoretic model of network formation in an effort to understand the complex system of business relationships between various Internet entities (e.g., Autonomous Systems, enterprise networks, residential customers). In our model we are given a network topology of nodes and links where the nodes act as the players of the game, and links represent potential contracts. Nodes wish to satisfy their demands, which earn potential revenues, but may have to pay their neighbors for links incident to them. We incorporate some of the qualities of Internet business relationships, including customer–provider and peering contracts. We show that every Nash equilibrium can be represented by a circulation flow of utility with certain constraints. This allows us to prove bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability. We also focus on the quality of equilibria achievable through centralized incentives.     

Factors affecting women's participation in forestry in Turkey

This study analyses women's participation in forestry. The study was carried out with 270 women in the Bartın province, located in the West Black Sea Region of Turkey. By employing a Principal Component Analysis it was found that the most important factors affecting women's participation are women's perception related to (1) forest dependence, (2) quality of cooperatives, (3) quality of Forest Organisation, and (4) forest quality. These four factors explained 58% of women's participation. These factors need to be taken into consideration to enhance women's participation in forestry and to achieve sustainable forestry in Turkey.Regression analyses indicate that age, marital status, the rate of population increase and wealth are important variables for explaining variation in levels of participation. The estimated game theoretic model on women's participation indicates that the sharing of forest benefits among women in Turkey is considerably harmonious, while there is scope for improving the Forest Organisation, namely by stimulating participation towards a more effective management of the Turkish forests.     

Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models

Electoral equilibria depend upon candidates' motivations. Maximization of expected vote share may not lead to the same behavior as maximization of the probability of winning the election. Accordingly, it is desirable to understand when electoral equilibria are insensitive to the choice of candidate motivations. This paper examines sufficient conditions for local equilibrium equivalence between expected vote share maximization and maximization of probability of victory in the spatial model of elections with probabilistic voters.     

Non-existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals

Participation in economic games such as auctions is typically costly, which means that players (potential bidders) must consider whether to participate. Such decisions may be no less crucial than how to bid, and yet the literature has been mostly concerned with bidding, assuming an exogenously given number of bidders; see Krishna [Auction Theory, Academic Press, New York, 2002]. Landsberger and Tsirelson [Correlated signals against monotone equilibria, preprint SSRN 222308, Social Science Research Network Electronic Library, May 2000. Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=222308] have shown that fundamental results established in symmetric auction theory with correlated signals, such as the existence of a monotone equilibrium, may not hold if participation decisions are part of equilibrium. The major goal of this paper is to illustrate and explain this result that may be considered counter intuitive given the emphasis placed on monotone equilibria in the auction literature.     

TITLE IX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS

The passage of Title IX, the 1972 Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, expanded high school athletic opportunities to include girls, revolutionizing mass sports participation in the United States. This paper analyzes high school athletic participation in the United States and how sports offerings for boys and girls changed subsequent to the passage of this legislation. Girls' sports participation rose dramatically both following the enactment of Title IX and subsequent to enhancements to its enforcement. Approximately half of all girls currently participate in sports during high school; however, there remains a substantial gap between girls and boys participation in many states. States' average education level and social attitudes regarding Title IX and women's rights are correlated with this remaining gender gap. Examining individual high school students, sports participation is seen more frequently among those with a privileged background: white students with married, wealthy, educated parents are more likely to play sports. This finding points to an overlooked fact—while Title IX benefited girls by increasing the opportunity to play sports, these benefits were disproportionately reaped by those at the top of the income distribution. ( JEL J16, J18, J24, I2)     

A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.     

On the median regression for SURE models with applications to 3-generation immigrants data in Sweden

In this paper we generalize the median regression method to be applicable to system of regression equations, in particular SURE models. Giving the existence of proper system wise medians of the residuals from different equations, we apply the weighted median regression with the weights obtained from the covariance matrix of the equations obtained from ordinary SURE method. The benefit of this model in our case is that the SURE estimators utilise the information present in the cross regression (or equations) error correlation and hence more efficient than other estimation methods like the OLS method. The Seemingly Unrelated Median Regression Equations (SUMRE) models produce results that are more robust than the usual SURE or single equations OLS estimation when the distributions of the dependent variables are not normally distributed or the data are associated with outliers. Moreover, the results are also more efficient than is the cases of single equations median regressions when the residuals from the different equations are correlated. A theorem is derived and indicates that even if there is no statistically significant correlation between the equations, using SUMRE model instead of SURE models will not damage the estimation of parameters.     

Modelling the participation decision and duration of sporting activity in Scotland

Motivating individuals to actively engage in physical activity due to its beneficial health effects has been an integral part of Scotland's health policy agenda. The current Scottish guidelines recommend individuals participate in physical activity of moderate vigour for 30 min at least five times per week. For an individual contemplating the recommendation, decisions have to be made in regard of participation, intensity, duration and multiplicity. For the policy maker, understanding the determinants of each decision will assist in designing an intervention to effect the recommended policy. With secondary data sourced from the 2003 Scottish Health Survey (SHeS) we statistically model the combined decisions process, employing a copula approach to model specification. In taking this approach the model flexibly accounts for any statistical associations that may exist between the component decisions. Thus, we model the endogenous relationship between the decision of individuals to participate in sporting activities and, amongst those who participate, the duration of time spent undertaking their chosen activities. The main focus is to establish whether dependence exists between the two random variables assuming the vigour with which sporting activity is performed to be independent of the participation and duration decision. We allow for a variety of controls including demographic factors such as age and gender, economic factors such as income and educational attainment, lifestyle factors such as smoking, alcohol consumption, healthy eating and medical history. We use the model to compare the effect of interventions designed to increase the vigour with which individuals undertake their sport, relating it to obesity as a health outcome.     

English auctions with resale: An experimental study

I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in English auctions. Subjects tend to overbid, when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market. I employ different models like QRE and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants, that is, as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors. When the outcome of the resale market is not certain, there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the Nash prediction.     

Network architecture, salience and coordination

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of dynamic games in networks. In each period, the subjects simultaneously choose whether or not to make an irreversible contribution to the provision of an indivisible public good. Subjects observe the past actions of other subjects if and only if they are connected by the network. Networks may be incomplete so subjects are asymmetrically informed about the actions of other subjects in the same network, which is typically an obstacle to the attainment of an efficient outcome. For all networks, the game has a large set of (possibly inefficient) equilibrium outcomes. Nonetheless, the network architecture makes certain strategies salient and this in turn facilitates coordination on efficient outcomes. In particular, asymmetries in the network architecture encourage two salient behaviors, strategic delay and strategic commitment. By contrast, we find that symmetries in the network architecture can lead to mis-coordination and inefficient outcomes.     

Relationship between management ownership and firm value among the business group affiliated firms in Korea

In this paper, we revisit an old issue on the relation between management ownership and firm’s value. The Korean panel data on the business group firms, allows us to compute ownership right and control right separately for each business group affiliated firm. Our measures are different from the similar measures on the Korean firms as in Baek et al. (2004) or Joh (2003). Rather than confounding the two offsetting effects, this paper tests convergence of interest hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis separately. Empirical findings show that, given control right, there is no clear-cut relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for most firms with the inside management ownership less than 42%, that there is a positive relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for those firms with the inside management ownership higher than 42%, and that, given ownership right, profitability decreases as control right increases.