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1.
Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule,trade openness,and labor market condition
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Ram C. Acharya 《Economics & Politics》2018,30(3):423-443
Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market. 相似文献
2.
We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies. 相似文献
3.
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay Sajal Lahiri Howard J. Wall 《Review of International Economics》2012,20(5):1034-1045
This paper examines the effect of cross‐border lobbying on domestic lobbying and on external tariffs in both Customs Union (CU) and Free Trade Area (FTA). We do so by developing a two‐stage game which endogenizes the tariff formation function in a political economic model of the directly unproductive rent‐seeking activities type. We find that cross‐border lobbying un‐ambiguously increases both domestic lobbying and the equilibrium common external tariffs in a CU. The same result also holds for FTA provided tariffs for the member governments are strategic complements. We also develop a specific oligopolistic model of FTA and show that tariffs are indeed strategic complements in such a model. 相似文献
4.
Governments, especially in developing countries, routinely practice binding overhang (i.e. setting applied tariffs below binding WTO commitments) and frequently move applied tariffs for given products up and down over the business cycle. Moreover, applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical in developing countries. We explain this phenomenon using a dynamic theory of lobbying between domestic interest groups. Applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical when high‐tariff interests (e.g. import‐competing industries) capture the government: these groups concede lower tariffs to low‐tariff interest groups (e.g. exporting firms or firms using imported intermediate inputs) during recessions because recessions lower the opportunity cost of lobbying and thereby generate a stronger lobbying threat. 相似文献
5.
Wolfgang Mayer 《Review of International Economics》2002,10(4):657-670
The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income. 相似文献
6.
When trade policy is determined endogenously by lobbying, it matters whether countries are arranged into a customs union or a free trade area. This paper compares the two regimes when the member governments are asymmetric in their susceptibilities to lobbying and in their bargaining power within a customs union. In the model, a customs union never leads to lower tariffs for both countries, whereas it can lead to higher tariffs for both. 相似文献
7.
Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck Gerald Willmann 《The Canadian journal of economics》2006,39(3):845-873
Abstract . Grossman and Helpman (1994) explain tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying process. In most empirical implementations of this framework protection is instead measured using non-tariff barriers. Since tariffs allow the government to fully capture the rents from protection, while non-tariff barriers do not, the existing parameter estimates of the protection for sale model are likely to be biased. To address this problem, we augment the framework by considering instruments that allow partial capturing. Our specification is supported by the data, where we find that only 72–75% of the rent from protection is appropriated by the government. 相似文献
8.
Carolyn Fischer 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2017,66(3):553-575
Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies. 相似文献
9.
John Douglas Wilson 《Economics & Politics》1990,2(3):241-258
This paper studies an election game between two politicians, in which each provides income transfers to special-interest groups in return for political contributions. It is shown that a move to a more inefficient form of transfers may lower the total excess burden created by these transfers, because the politicians are induced to reduce their provision of transfers. For the case in which the income transfers are indirectly provided as trade protection to import-competing industries, a switch from production subsidies to tariffs as the form of protection reduces the equilibrium level of excess burden and makes both politicians better off. 相似文献
10.
Carsten Kowalczyk 《Pacific Economic Review》2002,7(2):305-318
This paper analyzes unilateral and multilateral reform of ad valorem tariffs and subsidies. The paper shows that under substitutability, extensive subsidization of exports is required for an increase in the lowest tariff rate to raise economic welfare. The paper derives also conditions for when a radial reduction of ad valorem tariffs and subsidies may fail to raise economic welfare. 相似文献
11.
Switching the lights off: The impact of energy tariff increases on households in the Kyrgyz Republic
This paper describes an analysis of the impact that higher energy tariffs would have on households in the Kyrgyz Republic using micro-data from the 2009 Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey. This analysis was conducted to determine which households would be most affected by higher energy tariffs and to what extent mitigation measures, such as lifeline tariffs or direct cash transfers, might lessen the impact for poor and vulnerable households. The analysis focused on first-order effects and used benefit incidence analysis and static micro-simulation to estimate the expected costs and benefits of higher energy prices and the corresponding mitigation measures. The results suggest that both the type of energy and the level of connectedness matter. Increasing tariffs for thermal power used for central heating and hot water mainly affects richer households in urban areas. Reducing implicit electricity subsidies affects the entire population due to nearly complete country coverage with electricity connections. Both lifeline tariffs and direct cash transfers could mitigate the effect of higher electricity tariffs at lower costs than universal subsidies. 相似文献
12.
Pradeep K. Mitra 《Economics & Politics》1989,1(3):207-224
This paper explores the extent to which insights available from existing writings on directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities in international trade modify rules of tax and tariff reform in normative public economics and examines in what way these should affect advice on tax policy usually given to developing countries. The analysis proceeds by developing two models. The first incorporates revenue seeking directly into a standard open economy public finance model and examines whether analysis of policy reform and economic costs of distortionary tariffs must be modified. The second includes a political component in the form of lobbying for subsidies – the expenditure side of the budget – as well as a normative economic component that raises taxes – the revenue side – to finance the social costs of such lobbying. The model can be used to determine the effects of politically determined expenditures on tax setting. The analysis shows that the grammar of welfare-theoretic arguments that underlies the reform and design of tax and tariff structures is robust to the inclusion of DUP activities of the type considered here. In particular, the latter lend no presumption in favor of uniformity in tax and tariff structures. It is argued that existing policy advice on tax and tariff reform derived from models where DUP activities have traditionally played no role continues to be appropriate when account is taken of formal treatments of DUP-type phenomena extant in the current literature. 相似文献
13.
Bruce Elmslie 《Review of International Economics》2004,12(4):689-692
This note looks at Smith's critiques of bounties (read “subsidies”) on exports. Smith's analysis of bounties foreshadowed the basic trade policy framework of distortions and noneconomic objectives. While Smith did not develop the theory of distortions, he captured the logic of the theory of noneconomic objectives and actually ranked policy alternatives based upon their relative social costs. Corden (1957 ) first ranked tariffs versus production subsidies within a noneconomic objectives framework, and Johnson (1960 ) first used the term in its modern sense, but the formulation of the general framework lies with Smith. 相似文献
14.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(1-2):119-141
This paper compares the Congressional budget process (instituted in 1974) and the piecemeal appropriations process that preceded it. Previous theoretical analysis using spatial models of legislator preferences finds no systematic difference in relative spending levels under the two regimes. This paper instead uses a model of interest group lobbying. A legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies to sector-specific interest groups. In the “appropriations process,” the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget that, because of interest group influence, involves overspending on subsidies. In the “budget process,” the Budget Committee proposes an aggregate level of spending (the budget resolution); then, the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget. A free rider problem among the interest groups inhibits the lobbying of the Budget Committee to increase the aggregate budget. If each group is sufficiently small, it takes the budget resolution as given, and lobbies the Appropriations Committee. Aggregate spending is lower and social welfare is higher under the budget process; however, provision of the national public good is suboptimal. The paper also analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels, but can be revised by a simple majority vote. Here, the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes to budget rules. 相似文献
15.
Foreign multinationals often not only export but also control local firms through FDI. This paper examines the various effects of trade and industrial policies when exports and FDI coexist. We focus on the case in which a foreign firm has full control of a local firm through partial ownership. Cross‐border ownership on the basis of both financial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market linkages through which tariffs and production subsidies may harm locally owned firms but benefit the foreign firm. Foreign ownership regulation benefits locally owned firms. These results could have strong policy implications for developing countries that attract an increasing share of world FDI. 相似文献
16.
Yu-Ter Wang 《The Japanese Economic Review》2004,55(2):153-161
Given that countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, I re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs under imperfect competition. I find that (i) the optimal countervailing duty depends on the existing import tariff level; (ii) the optimal import tariff is so high that the optimal countervailing duty is zero and hence foreign export subsidization occurs; and (iii) it is more likely for countervailing duties to be imposed on a foreign firm whose government takes no action when other foreign countries reduce or eliminate their subsidies on exports. 相似文献
17.
MARTIN RICHARDSON 《Economics & Politics》1994,6(1):79-96
This paper considers the choice between a customs union (wherein partners share a common external tariff) and a free trade area (wherein each partner chooses its own tariff against non-members). Following the result that a customs union dominates a free trade area, with coordination of domestic tax policies, we show that a free trade area may nevertheless be chosen if tariffs are determined endogenously through industry lobbying. This is so even when the free trade area equates producer prices within its borders and induces tariff revenue competition and whether or not there is domestic free-riding in lobbying. 相似文献
18.
The effect of the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian multilateral trade liberalization
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In this paper show that the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) tariff preferences have triggered a decline in Canadian external tariffs, explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998. Next, we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the US firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in Canada; this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the US and Canada. Finally, we estimate the effect of the CUSFTA on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in Canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity. 相似文献
19.
This paper examines the effect of political and economic asymmetries in the formation of common external tariffs (CETs) in a customs union (CU). We do so by introducing possible cross‐border lobbying and by endogenizing tariff formation in a political economic model for the determination of CETs. The latter allows us to consider asymmetries among the member nations in their susceptibilities to lobbying. We also consider asymmetries in the influence of the member nations in CU‐wide decision‐making. A central finding of this paper is that, in the absence of economic asymmetry, the CET rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in country influences if the two countries are equally susceptible to lobbying. If influences are the same, the CET also rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in susceptibilities. These results hold irrespective of whether the lobby groups in the two member countries cooperate or work non‐cooperatively. 相似文献
20.
The paper analyses the evolution of the Israeli exchange rate regime from the application of large discrete devaluations interspersed with gradual adjustments of export subsidies and import tariffs, through the adoption of a crawling peg (1975), and culminating in exchange decontrol and a float (1977). The main issues analysed in greater detail are the problem of maintaining an export-biased trade strategy, the role of devaluations in the inflationary process and the effect of alternative exchange rate regimes on expectations and capital-account transactions. 相似文献