How Large Looms the Ghost of the Past? State Dependence versus Heterogeneity in Coordination Games

In games with multiple, Pareto‐rankable equilibria and repeated play, does a history of playing an inefficient equilibrium make it harder for players to reach the efficient equilibrium? In other words, can people “get stuck” in bad equilibria? Previous studies have found support for this, but they have relied on naturally occurring variation in precedent. I implement randomized control to establish that precedent effects are important, but that naturally occurring variation exaggerates the importance of precedent. I present evidence that some of the endogeneity of naturally occurring precedents is due to variation in risk attitudes. This is because in the coordination games used, the inefficient equilibrium is associated with a safe strategy. Understanding the causal effect of precedent is important since many development problems are viewed as coordination games. Moreover, an appreciation of the way in which potential heterogeneity may interact with the policy is essential when trying to lift groups out of bad precedents.     

Cooperative and predatory advertising: Effects on oligopoly advertising investment

An oligopolist's advertising behavior depends upon the externalities generated. Negative externalities occur when the firm's advertising gains in sales are a result of a loss to the rest of the industry. On the other hand, positive externalities may result because advertising by any single firm may increase that firm's sales while at the same time increasing sales in the rest of the industry.In the literature these types of externalities are referred to as "predatory advertising" and "cooperative advertising," respectively. Market shares are redistributed when advertising is purely predatory, and advertising is a public good when advertising is purely cooperative. The effect of advertising externalities on the firm's incentive to advertise is investigated in this paper.     

跨区域基础设施建设的政府间协调机制研究——以铁路为例

围绕郑渝铁路过境权的争夺是跨区域基础设施建设中政府间协调机制缺失的结果。文章认为,在跨区域重大基础设施的建设中,各地区存在着特殊的偏好,因此,必须有地方政府参与;由于存在地区间外部性,因此,必须有中央政府的参与。此外中央政府还可以起到协调各地方政府的作用。跨区域公共物品的供给除了政府共同出资,还有赖于政府间有效的协调,其实质是由传统的行政管理关系,转向各方平等参与和协商的区域共治。     

VALUE-ADDED TAX IN A BORDERLESS SA-BLNS REGION

Market integration and the abolition of border controls increase the mobility of consumers and cross‐border shopping. This makes it difficult to maintain a destination‐based VAT. Because of differences in the size of countries, governments of different sizes may engage in inefficient tax competition. Such externalities result in a call for tax coordination and a review of VAT regimes most suitable to a globalised world. One of the ultimate objectives of an African Union is a single market. This paper introduces the potential VAT policy implications of further economic integration within Southern Africa as a prelude to an African Economic Community, drawing on the experience of the EU in particular. When the critical factors that may impact on VAT policy are viewed together with SACU's long history of customs cooperation, a form of clearing‐house regime seems appropriate. However, this may not be politically appropriate, thus clearing the way for a more conventional approach, such as the transitional EU‐VAT regime.     

On access pricing with network externalities

It has been argued that access charges may be set optimally by applying the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR). The paper analyzes the optimality properties of the ECPR in the presence of network externalities in the telecommunications sector. It is assumed that network externalities in the fixed telephony, which is operated by an incumbent monopoly, may arise from the increase in the number of subscribers of a mobile carrier that seeks interconnection to the fixed network. It is shown that the optimality properties of the ECPR that may exist under some restrictive assumptions, do not hold in the presence of network externalities. Specifically, the ECPR may take into account the social opportunity cost with the entry of the competitor, but it fails to incorporate the social benefit accrued to consumers of the fixed telephony when network externalities are present. Presented at the Fifty-First International Atlantic Economic Conference March 13–20, 2001, Athens, Greece. The author would like to thank participants of the Conference, in particular, Michael Pickhardt and Neil Rickman and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions.     

Exchange-rate Attack as a Coordination Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper compares theoretical predictions for a coordinationgame, used to explain the onset of a currency crisis, with observationsfrom laboratory experiments. Theories that assume full rationalitysuggest that public information may destabilize an economy bycreating self-fulfilling belief equilibria, while private informationleads to a unique equilibrium. In experiments, differences inbehaviour for these two kinds of information are small. Publicinformation increases efficiency and coordination among players,and there is no evidence for destabilizing effects owing toself-fulfilling beliefs.     

Coordination

Many economic games have multiple equilibria, some of which are better than others for everyone involved. Such coordination games are of special interest to economists because they raise the possibility that a group of individuals or even a whole economy might become mired in an unfavorable situation. This paper explains how to use playing cards in the classroom to implement an economic game with multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. Discussion can focus on policies and institutions that promote coordination on better outcomes. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory economics to teach concepts of team production and coordination and in intermediate microeconomics to teach game-theoretic concepts of Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Time required: Five minutes for reading instructions, 20 minutes for decision making, and about 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one or more decks of playing cards, each deck accommodating 26 people. One copy of the instructions should be made for each person. Payment to a randomly selected individual is optional and will require about a dollar or two.     

Sticky prices as a coordination success

Recent contributions have articulated ways in which price rigidities signal breakdowns of coordination. These contributions are aimed at unifying New Keynesian economics by linking the issue of nominal price flexibility with that of between-firm coordination. By contrast, this paper demonstrates that sticky prices can signal a coordination success rather than a coordination failure. A model is developed in which N firms face a stochastic industry demand and engage in (infinitely) repeated Bertrand competition. In each period, firms are able to learn the realization of the demand shock but at a positive cost. The existence of two equilibria—one featuring sticky prices and the other featuring flexible prices—is proved. These equilibria are then compared. The equilibrium featuring sticky prices Pareto-dominates that featuring the flexible ones.     

Intra- and Inter-industry Externalities from Foreign Direct Investment in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector: New Evidence from Mexican Regions

This paper presents new empirical evidence on externalities from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in several Mexican regions in the early 1990s. The main findings are threefold. First, the presence of FDI creates negative externalities within industries and positive externalities between industries through backward linkages. Second, FDI-externalities are stimulated by large technological differences between FDI and Mexican firms and by geographic concentration of industries. Third, we identify a substantial level of regional heterogeneity of the externality impact of FDI, in line with the notion that FDI may have contributed to processes of changing regional prosperity under trade liberalization. The findings also imply that maquiladora firms in the border states are generating positive externalities.     

Reflected Glory Versus Repulsive Envy: How Do the Smiths Feel About the House of the Joneses?*

A key question raised regarding conspicuous consumption is whether such consumption leads to positive or negative net externalities. The present paper examines how the presence of luxury and expensive properties within a local area affects the house prices in Taipei City. Positive externalities may be associated with improved urban amenities or reflected glory. Negative externalities may be associated with the adverse reference group effect; that is, repulsive envy. The paper discusses the spillover effects due to changes in neighborhood's housing characteristics, and shows significant spatial patterns in house prices and the importance of socioeconomic influences on house prices.     

Intermarket network externalities and competition: An application to the media industry

Intermarket network externalities occur when the utility of a good produced in a given industry varies with the size of the demand for a good produced in another. A particularly significant example of this phenomenon is provided by the interaction between the media and advertising industries. Media consumers vary according to their willingness to pay for a media good, which depends on the advertising volume. In the advertising market, advertisers vary according to their willingness to pay for an advertisement, which also depends positively on the audience reached. We model a situation of competition between two content providers who are rivals in both the media and advertising industries, choosing simultaneously the newspaper prices and the advertising rates. We characterize the equilibria of the game and explore how they depend on audience attitudes towards advertising. Our main finding is that two-sided interactions may induce exit by one of the media companies from either only the advertising market or both markets.     

外部性的类型、庇古解、科斯解和非内部化

文章的目的是对外部性进行一个比较系统的分类,在此基础上,讨论外部性的科斯解与庇古解的根本分歧.我们的观点是,他们的根本分歧是,庇古愿意依靠政府去解决外部性导致的低效率,而科斯不愿意如此,根本的原因是他们具有不同的政府信念.实际上,在正交易成本的世界里,内部化一切外部性的企图是不理性的,而不内部化一些外部性是理性的.外部性的非内部化有两种类型--算计的非内部化和政治的非内部化.     

Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products

We examine free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the Gilbert and Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that for products that are differentiated enough, when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria coexist, the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium may Pareto dominate the entry equilibrium. Hence, “coordination failure” underinvestment in entry prevention can occur. However, as claimed, the overinvestment result of Gilbert and Vives remains robust to moderate amounts of product differentiation. We also show that coordination failure underinvestment arises in a wide variety of entry deterrence models and does not rely on assumptions regarding strategic substitutability or complementarity of precommitments.     

美国排污权交易制度对我国节能降耗的启示

节能降耗行为具有很强的正外部性,导致其供应不足,在环境领域,排污权交易广泛地应用于解决污染的外部性问题,取得巨大成功。本文在分析了美国排污信用交易和排污许可交易的基础上,认为可以探讨用交易机制来推动中国的节能降耗事业,设计适合中国国情的与时俱进的节能降耗交易机制。     

Economic and Social Security: The Role of the EU

This lecture addresses the issue of growing inequality of labour incomes in the EU. In this lecture, it is observed that through higher unemployment at downward rigid wages, the market position of low-skilled workers has deteriorated over the past quarter-century in Western Europe and that European countries have failed to develop an efficient instrument of income insurance on behalf of low-skilled workers. Wage subsidies are such an instrument. Furthermore, it is argued that labour market integration in an economic union like the EU entails externalities, resulting in underprovision of insurance and that coordination or matching grants could overcome this second inefficiency. On these empirical and theoretical grounds, this article proposes the organisation at EU level of a scheme of matching grants for low-skilled labour, whereby a share of national wage subsidies to low-skilled labour would be financed by the EU under suitable funding.     

International spillover effects of sectoral tax differentiation in unionized economies

Sectoral tax differentiation has in recent years appeared onthe agenda in European policy discussions concerning unemployment.The member countries of the European Union are allowed to reducethe value added tax rates on goods and services that are particularlylabour intensive and price elastic. This paper provides a theoreticalanalysis of the international repercussions of such policies.We develop a two-country and two-sector model with monopolisticcompetition in the goods market and wage bargaining in the labourmarket. Policy externalities operate through the endogenouslydetermined terms of trade. We examine how national and supranationalcommodity tax policies affect sectoral and total employmentand characterize optimal commodity taxes with and without internationalpolicy cooperation. Some rough estimates of the welfare gainsfrom policy coordination are also presented, using a calibratedversion of the model.     

Social Justice and open coordination in Europe.

In his Tinbergen lecture Jacques Drèze broaches two interesting themes. He argues, firstly, that we have failed to develop an efficient instrument for income insurance on behalf of potentially low-skilled workers; wage subsidies are such an instrument. Secondly, he argues that labour market integration in an economic union like the EU entails externalities, resulting in underprovision of insurance; coordination or matching grants could overcome that second inefficiency. I largely share Drèze's policy paradigm. Yet, I believe enhancing social justice in the European Union requires, at this stage of European cooperation, a different methodology of policy coordination, which has recently been coined 'open coordination.' I will develop my argument in favour of 'open coordination' with reference to the two themes Drèze discusses.     

A cointegration analysis of dynamic externalities

This paper presents a cointegration analysis on the effects of dynamic externalities upon economic growth using time-series data from 1975 to 2003 on the one-digit industries of the Tokyo metropolitan area in Japan. Some new time-series econometric methods that have been recently developed to conduct unit root and cointegration tests are used in the analysis, allowing for an endogenously determined structural change in the time period studied. It also proposes a new type of dynamic externalities, called Network dynamic externalities, to represent knowledge spillovers resulting from the whole agglomerated area via transportation networks, and shows that they have cointegrated relations with the total factor productivity (TFP) of the manufacturing, finance, wholesale and retail trade, as well as the overall industries. In addition, evidence is also found that Marshall–Arrow–Romer (MAR) dynamic externalities, which are associated with own industrial production concentration, affect the TFP of most industries selected for estimation. However, Jacobs dynamic externalities, which are represented by the diversity of industrial production, only contribute to the TFP of the services industry, and Porter dynamic externalities, which are expressed by the competitiveness within industries, do not influence the selected industrial TFP.     

Determinants of FDI-induced externalities: New empirical evidence for Mexican manufacturing industries

This paper presents new statistical evidence on foreign direct investment (FDI)-induced externalities in Mexican manufacturing industries for 1993. The new empirical results are important in three respects. First, the size of technological differences between FDI and Mexican firms is positively related to positive externalities, indicating the importance of sufficient scope of potential externalities, incentives to make externality-facilitating investments and the absence of negative competition effects. Second, geographical concentration is identified as a structural determinant of positive FDI externalities. Finally, the effect from FDI cleared from the influence of technological differences and agglomeration is the creation of positive externalities, especially when endogeneity of the foreign participation variable is controlled for.     

Externalities of Network Finance and Related Reflections on Price Strategies

Externality is an important trait in economy. This paper discusses the concept of network externalities, and then analyzes the characteristics and cause of externality in network finance. Externalities of network finance have been reflected on ,the cost structure of network finance services. Furthermore, it influences the pricing strategies. This paper analyzes the influence of externalities to network finance and gives some price strategies of network finance.