Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

地方税收竞争中公共品供给的动态博弈及应对思路

地方税收竞争在中国具有普遍性,但与市场经济发达国家的税收竞争又存在着内容上的差异.从博弈分析来看,博弈参与主体在完全信息条件下,其最优结果是进行地方税收竞争且投入于公共品.但从中国的现实情况来看,公共品供给不足是源于制度上提供的潜在利益驱动地方政府偏离其应有责任.因此,减少政府层次、合理配给地方政府相对独立的税权、制定良好的公共支出政策是促使经济进入良性循环、地方税收竞争走向规范、有序的重要制度安排.     

A Note on the Composition of Public Expenditure under Capital Tax Competition

Keen and Marchand ( Journalof Public Economics, 1997, 66, 33–53) argue that undercapital tax competition, the composition of public expenditureis inefficient in that too much is spent on public inputs benefitinglocal business and too little on public goods benefiting residents.Their result depends on labor immobility. This note shows thatthe Keen-Marchand argument may not hold if both labor and capitalare mobile. An interesting case is identified where capital taxationdoes not distort the mix of public goods and public inputs, eventhough the overall level of public expenditure is inefficientlylow.     

Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments

Academic literature in public finance has focused on interjurisdictional tax competition—namely among similar types of local governments—but has leaved vertical externalities arising from interactions between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base aside. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model within which interjurisdictional tax competition and vertical interactions between two overlapping governments that share the same tax base can be analyzed simultaneously. We find that interjurisdictional tax competition reduces the global tax rate set by both overlapping governments (federal and local) but is unable to solve completely the distortion arising from vertical externalities. The model is also extended to allow for government subsidies to industrial capital. We give sufficient conditions for capital subsidies to be more efficient to attract capital when they are granted at a federal level rather than at a local level.     

Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level

Due to the use of distortionary taxation, many believe that real-world economies should attain a lower level of public expenditures than in a situation where lump-sum taxes are available. The present paper examines this hypothesis by means of the two-type self-selection model of income taxation. Based on the findings of Boadway and Keen (1993), I provide sufficient conditions for both a lower and a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best. In particular, it is shown that the separability assumption of Christiansen (1981) leads to under-provision of the public good in the income tax optimum.     

Tax Competition, Income Differentials and Local Public Services

This paper examines strategic tax setting between fiscal authorities in the presence of mobile workers who locate across these jurisdictions in response to differing tax structures and congestable local public amenities. We find that the nature of the tax setting outcomes depend crucially on the proximity between cities. For distant cities with the same size populations, the pressure on tax rates of a more mobile workforce depends on the whether mobile workers are net beneficiaries or net contributors. If mobile workers are either high or low income earners, cities lower tax rates. If mobile workers are middle income earners, cities raise tax rates. For close or neighbouring cities, workers locate in one of the cities and tax rates and local public amenities are dispersed.     

农村税费改革与农村公共产品供给体制的转变

农村税费是农村公共产品的总体补偿价格.作为地方性的公共产品,农村公共产品供求机制的理顺和价格的合理形成与制定,直接关系到农村公共产品的有效提供、农民福利和收入水平的提高以及农村税费改革的深入推进.本文以农村税费改革为切入点,从分析农村税费改革的直接和最终诱因出发,剖析农村公共产品供给体制的弊端,指出农村税费改革的进一步推进需要农村公共产品供给体制的彻底转变.     

A Note on Intertemporal Fiscal Competition and Redistribution

This paper studies fiscal competition among jurisdictions in a dynamic framework, where the degree of mobility of private capital across jurisdictions boundaries is perfect. The optimal tax on mobile capital is a source tax that taxes away factor rents. Further we show that taxation of mobile capital can redistribute income in favor of the immobile factor labor. This is because the factor rents generated by public inputs and appropriated by mobile capital exceed the efficient level of public expenditure for investments. JEL Code: H21, H23, H42, H71     

中韩工业制成品的贸易竞争关系分析

作为当今全球最重要的双边经贸关系之一,中韩贸易发展迅速,两国已互为重要的贸易伙伴。利用贸易竞争力指数、产业内贸易指数、GHM指数对中韩工业制成品的贸易竞争关系进行实证分析,结果显示：中韩双边工业制成品以产业间贸易为主,产业内贸易为辅;劳动密集型制成品、技术和资本密集型制成品以产业间贸易和低质量垂直型产业内贸易为主。两国的制成品贸易互补性强,中国相对处于产业分工的低端。为提升中国制成品的贸易竞争力,应采取加强技术自主研发、完善双边贸易合作机制、加快产业结构调整等措施。     

公共产品视角下的我国税权治理机制研究

当前,我国税权治理机制存在事权、财权和税权不统一,税权高度集中,地方税收立法权缺位等问题,不利于地方税系的健全和地方经济社会的发展。本文主要是通过公共产品的视角来阐述税权治理的理论依据,并借鉴西方国家税权治理的有益经验,进一步完善我国的税权治理机制。     

The Role of Prices for Excludable Public Goods

When a public good is excludable it is possible to charge individuals for using the good. We study the role of prices for publicly provided excludable public goods within an extension of the Stern-Stiglitz version of the Mirrlees optimal income tax model.We show that for a public consumer good there is a range of circumstances in which charging a price for the public good decreases welfare. We find that a necessary condition for a positive price to be desirable is that the marginal valuation of the public good is increasing in leisure. However, even under this condition, welfare is initially decreasing in the price, implying that charging a lower than optimal price may be less efficient than setting a zero price. Thus, even when there is a case for charging a price for the public good, an attempt to implement the optimum in practice may be risky, as even setting a modest price to avoid overshooting the optimum may be Pareto inferior to charging no price at all. The policy case for a price may thus appear rather weak. We also find that producers using an intermediate excludable public good as an input should not be charged a price for using the good.     

农村公共产品供给与农民收入问题研究

阻碍农民增收和农村经济发展的根本原因在于改革开放以来农村公共产品供给不足,表现为农村公共产品供给与需求失衡;同时,政府将有限的财力和公共产品的大部分投向城市,形成了公共产品供给的城市化倾向,这又表现为城乡公共产品供给失衡.农村公共产品的长期短缺严重地影响了农村私人产品的产出效率.因此,作者提出了必须关注农村农民对公共产品的需求;建立起完善的农村公共产品体系等重要观点.     

农村公共品供给差异与均等化研究

由于各地区财政能力和公共品支出的不对称,我国各地区农村公共品的国际水平存在着显著差异。根据2009年我国各省市自治区农村公共品供给状况的分析,发现农村公共品的供给和均等化在东、中、西部地区存在明显的差异,在农村公共品供给方面排在前十名的大多是中部和东部地区,而排在居后位置的大多是西部地区。西部地区的财力与农村公共品的支出需求存在较大的不对称。为改变这种状况,应当建立和完善政府预算管理体制;走农业联社、集体农庄化的道路;有针对性的加大政府对各地区农村公共品的投资;多渠道多方面加大对农村公共品建设的投资。     

国际税收竞争的实质及应对

国际税收竞争实质上是市场竞争规律在政府行政领域的体现形式。良性税收竞争有助于降低总体税负、减少经济扭曲、提升公共产品生产效率,但对此类竞争的国际协调难以取得实质成效。恶性税收竞争则会掠夺性地侵占他国税基,对此类竞争的遏制具备理论的必要性和可行性。政府可通过改革现行税制、精简规范收费、优化公共服务以及加强国际合作来应对国际税收竞争。     

公共产品产权结构多元态势下的供给效率分析

从产权结构多元态势这一视角分析公共产品的供给效率,不同产权安排形式在公共产品供给中存在着效率条件及非效率解,树立产权结构多元态势的经济发展观是实现公共产品有效供给的最佳路径选择.     

财政分权与农村公共产品供给——从政府职责的角度分析

适度的财政分权有助于农村公共产品的供给,财政分权的关键是明确各级政府的职责。为保证农村公共产品供给更有效,应着力从五个方面入手,即明确政府与市场的关系、合理定位各级政府在农村公共产品供给中的职责范围与财力分配、遵循事权与财权相匹配的原则、建立科学的转移支付制度、提高地方政府收入。     

Mixed Tax Systems and the Public Provision of Private Goods

In contrast to what used to be conventional wisdom among economists,several recent contributions have shown that in-kind transfersschemes can be welfare-improving in the presence of distortionarytaxes (usually, linear taxes or a general income tax). In thisnote, we extend previous work by considering the most generaltax system compatible with reasonable information constraints,i.e. a mix of linear indirect and non-linear direct taxes. Threemain results are noted. We find that in the presence of a mixedtax system (as opposed to the non-linear income tax alone): i) not only encouraged but also discouraged goods satisfy a conditionfor the desirability of public provision; ii) there is a tendencyfor the optimal level of in-kind transfers to be lower; iii)there is a basic equivalence between uniform and income-contingentin-kind transfers. We also show how previous results can be derivedas special cases of ours and others have to be modified to accountfor the mixed tax system.     

Shadow-Pricing Interpretation of the Pigovian Rule for the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Note

The Pigovian rule for the optimal public goods provision with distortionary taxation is given a new interpretation. It relates the Pigovian rule to project evaluation rules in terms of shadow prices. Our formula for the Pigovian rule is compared with that given by existing literature for cases in which commodity taxes are set optimally to articulate the implications of their results. This approach also renders a clear insight on the nature of resource allocation and income redistribution effect involved in the public goods provision in a heterogeneous-consumers economy.     

Rules and Levels in the Provision of Public Goods: The Role of Complementarities between the public Good and Taxed Commodities

This paper revisits the question of whether the second-best level of public good provision is lower than the first-best level in a standard model of public good provision with identical consumers. The role played by the complementarities between the public good and the private commodities is clarified. Furthermore, it is shown that the second-best level is indeed below the first-best level if the Hicksian demands for the taxed commodities are independent of the level of public good provision.     

Local Public Funding of Higher Education When Skilled Labor is Imperfectly Mobile

If higher education is publicly funded by local (sub-federal) jurisdictions, while skilled labor is heterogeneous in responding to wage differentials between jurisdictions, the spillovers that result give rise to a disparity between the centralized output-maximizing allocation of resources to higher education and decentralized equilibria. Generally, decentralization leads to under-provision, which can be offset by inter-jurisdictional subsidies based on gross migration flows. But the extent of the discrepancy depends on the local balance of political forces. Indeed, when the welfare of native-born emigrants is highly valued while new immigrants carry little political weight, over-provision in equilibrium is possible.