Explaining banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

The study examined banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal that banking spread (Net Interest Margin – NIM) is the main determinant of stability and the major means to achieve stability during crises periods. We however find the existence of a threshold effect in NIM.Crises in the banking sector consistently showed to reduce stability. While the results show that high percentage of foreign banks reduce stability, we find foreign banks help stabilize the banking sector in periods of crises. The results show that diversification could also have a positive impact on stability (Z-score) even though this relationship was not robust enough. The results also largely support the competition-fragility view. Particularly, we find that less competition during crises periods can help improve stability. Again, we find evidence for both concentration-stability and concentration-fragility hypotheses depending on the stability measure used. We however find that when large banks in concentrated markets are well regulated, stability could be improved. Weak regulatory environment reduces stability (Z-score) directly and matters during crises periods. Our results are robust to the use of different indicators of stability and estimation methods.     

English commercial bank liquidity, 1860-1913

This article presents new half-yearly time series for the asset ratios of commercial banks in England and Wales, 1860-1913. The series reveal new evidence on the nature of the banks' business and are, therefore, relevant to the debate on the role of banks in British economic development. The new estimates are used to examine trends and short-term changes in bank liquidity. Analysis is concerned with the changing stability of bank asset structure and with substitutability across different asset ratios. The main finding is of a sharp, long-term increase in liquidity and a concomitant decline in bank credit to the non-bank, private sector. The article also highlights the significance of short-term shocks to the trend increase in bank liquidity. The new findings are supportive of the argument that, over time, English banks became less involved with the non-bank private sector. In general, the results confirm that the English and Welsh bank asset structure became more liquid over time. However, no detailed breakdown of bank loans to the non-bank, private sector (for example, between business loans and personal loans), is available for this period. Moreover, the current study offers no evidence as to the trend in financial provision to the business sector from institutions other than the commercial banks. Nevertheless, the results are clear in showing a strong upward trend in commercial bank liquidity and a relative decline in private sector credit provision by the commercial banks.     

Banking fragility and liquidity creation: options as a substitute for deposits

Diamond and Rajan (J Finance 55:2431–2465, 2000; Am Econ Rev Papers Proc 91:422–425, 2001a; Carnegie–Rochester Conf Series Public Policy 54:37–71, 2001b; J Pol Econ 109:287–327, 2001c) have shown in a series of papers that it is precisely the fragility of their capital structure which allows banks to create liquidity. This is because the threat of runs by depositors forces bankers to extract full repayment on otherwise illiquid assets. This result has important implications for financial regulation, such as for capital requirements and deposit insurance. This note shows that put options held by bank owners dominate deposit financing in that they also discipline bankers but do not give rise to inefficient runs. Fragility is thus not necessary for liquidity creation in the Diamond–Rajan framework. This paper has substantially benefitted from the comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee.     

Evergreening in banking

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.     

Larger crises cost more: Impact of banking sector instability on output growth

We propose a method for calculating the macroeconomic costs of banking crises that controls for the downward impact of recessions on banking activity. This method uses an event-study approach and a multiple-equation identification and estimation technique. In contrast to earlier research, we estimate the cost of crises based on the size of banking crises. The extent of a crisis is measured using banking sector aggregates. The results, based on our method and data from over 100 banking crises, suggest that it is the size of the crisis that matters for economic growth. Lower credit and money growth during crises cause GDP growth to decline.     

Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort

Banks can make suboptimal liquidity choices and gamble for lender of last resort (LOLR) support. Endogenous bailout rents are driven by the need to preserve bankers' incentives under uncertain net worth. In equilibrium, banks can herd in risk management, choosing suboptimal liquidity when they expect others to do so. Optimal liquidity can be restored by quantitative requirements, but such regulation is costly. An LOLR policy incorporating bank capital information can reduce distorting rents and allow for a more efficient solution, but may only be possible in transparent economies.     

Market liquidity, asset prices, and welfare

This paper represents an equilibrium model for the demand and supply of liquidity and its impact on asset prices and welfare. We show that, when constant market presence is costly, purely idiosyncratic shocks lead to endogenous demand of liquidity and large price deviations from fundamentals. Moreover, market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, which calls for potential policy interventions. However, we demonstrate that different policy tools can yield different efficiency consequences. For example, lowering the cost of supplying liquidity on the spot (e.g., through direct injection of liquidity or relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can decrease welfare while forcing more liquidity supply (e.g., through coordination of market participants) can improve welfare.     

Bank regulation and supervision in the context of the global crisis

We provide novel evidence on regulatory and supervisory practices around the world in the context of the global financial crisis, using data from a new World Bank survey covering 143 countries. Analyzing differences between crisis and non-crisis countries, we find that crisis countries had less stringent and more complex definitions of capital but exhibited lower actual capital ratios, faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans, were less able to demand banks to adjust their equity, provisions or compensation schemes, and had greater disclosure requirements but weaker incentives for private agents to monitor banks. Comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, there is evidence of few changes. While capital ratios increased, bank governance and resolution regimes were strengthened, private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.     

Strategic trading and learning about liquidity

Many practitioners point out that the speculative profits of institutional traders are eroded by the difficulty in gauging the price impact of their trades. In this paper, we develop a model of strategic trading where speculators face such a dilemma because of incomplete information about time-varying market liquidity. Unlike the competitive market makers that they trade against, informed traders do not know the distribution of liquidity (“noise”) trades. Instead, they have to learn about liquidity from past prices and trading volume. This learning implies that strategic trades and market statistics such as informational efficiency are path-dependent on past market outcomes. Our paper also has normative implications for practitioners.     

Closing call auctions and liquidity

The present paper examines the impact of closing call auctions on liquidity. It exploits the natural experiment offered by the introduction of a closing call auction on the Australian Stock Exchange on 10 February 1997. The introduction of the closing call auction is associated with a reduction in trading volume at the close of continuous trading. However, bid‐ask spreads during continuous trading are largely unaffected by the introduction of the closing call auction. Therefore, closing call auctions consolidate liquidity at a single point in time without having any adverse effect on the cost of trading.     

Aggregate uncertainty, money and banking

This paper addresses the problem of monitoring the monitor in a model of money and banking with private information and aggregate uncertainty. There is no need to monitor a bank if it requires loans to be repaid partly with money. A market arises at the repayment stage and generates information-revealing prices that perfectly discipline the bank. This mechanism also applies when there exist multiple banks. With multiple banks, competition of private monies improves welfare. A prohibition on private money issue not only eliminates money competition but also triggers free-rider problems among banks, which is detrimental to welfare.     

Liquidity,liquidity risk,and information flow: Lessons from an emerging market

This paper examines the role of public and private information flows in intraday liquidity and intraday liquidity risk in the Tunisian stock market. Our empirical results are based on ARMA and GARCH-type models and show that, for major Tunisian stocks, gradually elapsed public information together with gradually elapsed private information in the market is the dominant factor in liquidity improvements in the Tunisian stock market. Liquidity improvements are generated by a decrease in the bid-ask spread accompanied by an increase in the depth at best limit. Our results clearly indicate that the arrival of public information in a sequential manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the bid-ask spread, while the advent of private information in a contemporaneous manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the depth at best limit. Additionally, our results show that liquidity risk persistence disappears when trading volume and order imbalance are included as explanatory variables in the conditional variance equation.     

Banking merchants and banking houses: the hidden key to the workings of the Spanish banking system in the nineteenth century

The historical study of the Spanish nineteenth-century banking system has been almost exclusively carried out through a consideration of the experiences of the joint-stock banks. But the very scarce number of these, and their territorial distribution, makes it necessary for us to look for other financial intermediaries who were able to satisfy the demand for banking services in that time and place. We demonstrate that this role was fulfilled by the banking merchants and banking houses operating through individual firms and partnerships. The object of this work is to make their activities better known and vindicate their importance. The sources used for the study are mainly the accounting documents of several banking houses.     

Cross-border interbank networks,banking risk and contagion

Recent events have highlighted the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of the main advanced countries for the period 1994–2012. Methodologically, I use a spatial modeling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channeling banking risk: I find that countries that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that in stable times, linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil affecting the whole system.     

Corporate bond liquidity before and after the onset of the subprime crisis

We analyze liquidity components of corporate bond spreads during 2005-2009 using a new robust illiquidity measure. The spread contribution from illiquidity increases dramatically with the onset of the subprime crisis. The increase is slow and persistent for investment grade bonds while the effect is stronger but more short-lived for speculative grade bonds. Bonds become less liquid when financial distress hits a lead underwriter and the liquidity of bonds issued by financial firms dries up under crises. During the subprime crisis, flight-to-quality is confined to AAA-rated bonds.     

全球流动性过剩、对冲基金发展与中国金融稳定

全球流动性过剩导致全球金融资产激增,推动对冲基金业规模迅速膨胀,也使得对冲基金业在结构和投资动向上也出现了新的变化。对冲基金在全球寻找套利和投机机会,对全球的金融稳定产生一定的影响,在此背景下,中国需要审慎资本项目开放和加强对冲基金的监管。     

制度安排、金融创新与银行监管有效性

金融制度安排、金融创新与银行监管存在着辩证关系。监管体制差异、监管内容的不同以及监管执行力的差别等,都会导致金融创新与金融监管绩效之间的不同组合。在中国经济转轨和市场全面开放的双重背景下,只有完善现有的银行监管制度,才能既保持金融稳定运行,又能推动金融创新健康发展。     

流动性过剩条件下的县域微观金融困境及应对

本文着重从微观层面对在流动性过剩条件下,县域微观金融运行中显现出来的金融资源配置失衡和金融市场结构性缺陷等问题进行了分析和探讨,并提出了相应的对策建议。     

流动性过剩的新特点与治理创新

流动性过剩新特点表现在被动增量不断且数额大、增量新增渠道多、存量活跃。控制的难点是流量过强。本文针对外汇占款渠道新增流动性、银行体系流动性过剩、存量转化型流动性过剩、国际套利热钱渠道流动性过剩提出了创新治理建议。