PRIVATE POLICING AND PRIVATE ROADS: A COASIAN APPROACH TO DRUNK-DRIVING POLICY

Alcohol-related traffic accidents are externalities, not because of drinking, but because of relatively free access to public roads. Access limits are Coasian (property-rights) policies, but more effective limits will arise if road owners are liable for failing to provide safe roads. This can be achieved by privatising roads, thereby creating strong incentives to employ innovative private traffic policing.     

Delivery of private toll roads: Incentive strategies for improving service quality and social welfare

Managing the service quality of toll roads delivered by using Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to ensure value for money to taxpayers is challenging for governments worldwide. An absence of critical research in this area has exacerbated this challenge. The upshot, in this instance, has been an inability for governments to engender and enact effective incentive strategies to operate and maintain private toll roads. To fill this gap, this paper aims to identify and examine incentive strategies for improving the operational quality of toll roads delivered by private entities. We develop a game model with four scenarios and then compare relevant decision behaviour and social welfare. The analysis reveals that only when the shadow cost of public funds is below a specific threshold there can be a feasible incentive strategy for ensuring quality improvement and higher social welfare. Furthermore, an incentive contract with a predetermined quality can enable a higher operational quality while requiring a higher incentive intensity. The contributions of this research are twofold: (1) we propose an enhanced model that is useful for governments to examine the impacts that different incentive strategies will have on the performance of transport projects; (2) we give an enhanced insight to support decision-making for incentives towards transport asset operations. This research will also be beneficial for governments in enhancing toll roads’ operational quality and social welfare for taxpayers.     

浅析城市道路绿化设计

道路是城市中具有重要地位的空间环境,人们对城市最直接最经常的感受来自于街道,因此道路的景观构成对城市形象具有很大的影响力,本文试图从我国城市道路的现状,城市道路绿化的功能、作用和原则,以及道路绿化存在的问题和未来的发展趋势等几方面来展开,强调了园林式小游园的道路绿化是衡量现代化城市精神文明水平的重要的标志。     

Cost-benefit analysis and the use of urban land for transportation

This paper investigates the allocation of resources, particularly land, within a suburban city where transportation is subject to congestion. In the competitive case, the allocation of land is decided (erroneously) by cost-benefit analysis. This is, perhaps, the best model of the real world process, at this level of abstraction. It is found that the road then built is wider everywhere than the road in the fully optimum case. Hence, if taxes and regulations will eventually be imposed to reduce the gap between the social and private cost of commuting, possibly too much land is now used for roads in American cities.     

Private security and the public safety

The demand for private protection and the effect of such protective measures on the level of crime are examined. Private protection may reduce a household's expected victimization rate either by deterring some crime or by diverting crime to other households. The greater the relative importance of the latter effect, the more likely a community is to “tip” in the direction of deserting the streets at night and taking other precautions. Data on crime and protection are analyzed, but they are inadequate for a full estimation of the model. The paper concludes with a normative analysis of protection and implications for social policy.     

非收费公路养护资金筹集渠道探析

非收费公路是服务社会、服务大众的重要载体,其养护资金不足是公路建养领域亟待解决的问题。要有效解决养护资金不足问题,必须立足于对非收费公路基本发展情况和养护资金筹集存在问题的准确把握,可通过有效利用财政专项资金、鼓励民营企业和个人投资、充分利用现代养护技术降低养护成本、加强养护资金使用监管等等来解决。在新的形势下,应积极探索新思路、新办法,努力解决养护资金不足的问题。     

Toponymy as Commodity: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Urban Place Names

In recent years the study of urban toponymy (place names) has been revitalized by the emergence of a ‘critical toponymies' approach. This focuses on the cultural politics of place naming and the decisions involved in attributing names to the urban landscape. However, in contemporary cities place names have an economic role in addition to their political role. In particular, there have been recent calls for more attention to the commodification of place‐naming rights and practices. This article seeks to respond to these calls by addressing the issue of urban place names as commodities. It begins by examining the naming of sports stadia by corporate sponsors. It then considers a range of ways in which private‐sector interests are increasingly influencing the naming of the urban landscape, from buildings and neighbourhoods to individual streets. Even the material signage that identifies street names can be appropriated within branding and promotional strategies. Moreover, urban place names are increasingly incorporated into a range of commercially produced spatial datasets collated by private companies. The article ends by proposing a number of directions for future research into the economic role of urban place names and the commodification of toponymy more broadly.     

Henry George and The Reconstruction of Capitalism

A bstract . The moral basis for the recommendation of Henry George that land , not labor and capital, be taxed is explained. The justification is that the value of land is socially created by density of population and as a result of private and public improvements , such as roads and utilities. This policy is advocated on the basis of its very successful, if limited, use in many places. It is contended that the need for many forms of social intervention in the economic process, which have many side consequences, would be dramatically lessened.     

Regulation of road accident externalities when insurance companies have market power

Accident externalities that individual drivers impose on one another via their presence on the road are among the most important external costs of road transport. We study the regulation of these externalities when insurance companies have market power. Some of the results we derive have close resemblance to the earlier literature on externality regulation with market power in aviation and private roads, but there are important differences, too. Using analytical models, we compare the first-best public welfare-maximizing outcome with a private profit-maximizing monopoly, and oligopoly. We find that insurance companies will internalize some of the externalities, depending on their degree of market power. We derive optimal insurance premiums, and regular parametric taxes as well as “manipulable” ones that make the companies set socially optimal premiums. The latter take into account that the firm tries to exploit knowledge of the tax rule applied by the government. Finally, we also study the taxation of road users rather than that of firms.     

Municipal costs and urban area

There are plausible reasons for believing that municipal service system costs will increase with urban “sprawl.” The costs of several municipal systems were thus analyzed, namely: water; sewage; roads and highways (capital outlays only); police, fire, and park systems; electricity distribution; gas distribution; and telephone service. The statistical relation between urban area and urban costs was weaker than a priori beliefs might suggest. Capital outlays for public municipal systems increase only about 1.6% for every 10% increment in land area. Public municipal operating costs, and the capital and operating costs of private utility systems are practically unaffected by urban area.     

How Governments Promote Monopolies: Public Procurement in India

Government officials exert tremendous power when they buy goods and services from private companies. By setting the terms and conditions under which public procurement takes place, public officials help determine which companies will thrive and which ones will fail. This is one of the important ways governments help create and sustain monopolies in the private sector. But since the bidding process to sell products or services to the government is supposed to be an open and fair competition, how does it become skewed toward businesses that already dominate markets? We examine a particular source of bias: the eligibility criteria for bidding in public procurement tenders. These criteria often allow a few large, private companies to bid on government contracts, but they exclude a large number of small and medium‐sized enterprises. We study the terms by which offers are solicited in India through tenders floated for transportation projects: roads, highways, bridges, and civil construction. We find that the eligibility criteria impose an unnecessarily heavy burden on small firms, potentially knocking them out of the competition and discouraging them from participating in other procurement processes. In this way, the process reinforces monopolies instead of breaking them up. While this study focuses on India, the results also apply to similar economies.     

BUILDING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: Assessing and managing risks in port development

In recent years increasing dependencies between public and private organizations lead to a growing need for public-private partnerships. However, cultural and institutional differences between the public and private domain and, in addition, the difficulties of bringing the two together, constitute a serious threat to successful public-private partnership. The formation of these partnerships is further hindered by confusion of the concept of public-private partnership. The predominant model of contracting out restricts rather than enhances public-private interaction. This article deals with the difficulties and risks involved in building public-private partnerships and tries to answer the question of how to overcome them. The issue is illustrated by an analysis of the attempts made to realize a huge port expansion in the port of Rotterdam by means of establishing public-private partnership.     

The generation gap and optimal economic growth

Among the problems confronting those who aspire to the development of a realistic and practicable optimal growth theory is that the human population is not homogeneous with respect to age. Those who are relatively young are apt to prefer a different pattern of capital accumulation from that preferred by those who are relatively old. This paper proposes a tentative solution to this particular problem. Essentially the proposal is that society should remain with what is an optimal private plan of an individual who is at the median age of the population at the beginning of the planning period, for one planning period, after which it revises the plan to switch to the optimal private plan of another individual (one planning period younger than the first) who is at the median age at the commencement of the new planning period. Thus the optimal social plan consists of a succession of one planning period implementations of the first periods of the optimal private plans of individuals who are at the median age at that time period. An example of the application of the method is given. An important sidelight of the paper is a critique of standard constant-rate exponential discounting in social planning of optimal capital accumulation, and the proposal that it be replaced by “mortality discounting.”     

Mode choice,transport structure and urban land use

A theoretical model of the urban land market is solved to examine the impact of bimodal passenger transportation on equilibrium residential land use. In this model travel to the central business district occurs on a dense system of radial roads or bus routes and a competing system or radial expressways or mass transit lines fed by a subsidiary system of densely spread access streets. Under rational behavior assumptions for households, it is shown that various basic urban forms can result depending on the relative generalized cost characteristics of the competing dense and sparse radial networks. The basic urban forms yield fundamental shapes, differing as to the relative geometry and position of the market areas for the two modes. The standard Alonso-Muth model of unimodal travel and circular urban form is found to result as a special case in several of these cases. American urbanized areas of various sizes and modal mix provide plausible examples for each of the basic forms. The paper concludes with a discussion of the model's implications as a framework for examining optimum urban transport structure and the proliferation of transport routes as a function of urban size.     

After, before and during: returns to education in Hungary (1986–1998)

How valuable are the skills acquired under socialism in a market economy? This paper throws light on this question using unique data covering the years before and during transition (1986–1998) for about 3 million Hungarian wage earners. We find that returns to a year of schooling increased by 75% from 6.4% in 1986 to 11.2% in 1998. We also find that the private sector rewards formal education more than the public and, in terms of gender, although in 1986 women had greater returns to schooling than men, by 1998 this difference had been eliminated.     

The effect of ownership on sustainable development and environmental policy in urban waste management: An explicatory empirical analysis of Italian municipal corporations

This paper investigates the effect of ownership on sustainable development and environmental policy in Italian municipally owned corporations (MOCs) dealing with urban waste management, trying to understand if multiple ownership can generate better performance compared to single ownership and if the presence of private partners could be crucial in this. The research question is answered by analyzing 41 MOCs of the largest Italian cities operating in urban waste management. In this specific sector, public administrations have tried to improve their offer in terms of sustainable development, environmental policy, and efficiency. The paper covers the Italian case study, where urban waste production per capita is higher than the European average figure. The waste cycle management service is operated in Italy at local level through totally publicly owned companies (monoadministration or multiadministration), mixed (public–private) companies, or via a full externalization achieved by means of public tenders. Through a multinomial ordered probit panel, we show that MOCs with multiple owners perform better than those having a single owner and perform much better with the presence of a private partner, confirming those academic findings according to which collaborative arrangements can increase efficiency, do better than public sector bureaucracy, and lower the costs of service provision. The results of this paper can be used by academics, practitioners, and policy makers alike. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only study that applies this perspective to the analysis of the current international waste management scenario with relation to MOCs having multiple ownerships.     

Seeing Like a City‐State: Behavioural Planning and Governance in Egypt's First Affordable Gated Community

Haram City is Egypt's first ‘affordable’ gated community, hosting both aspirational middle‐class homeowners and resettled poor urban residents. Amidst legal ambiguity during Egypt's 2011–2013 revolutionary period, the management team of this public–private partnership was tasked with creating a ‘fully self‐sufficient’ city. While Haram City is the product of top‐down ‘seeing like a state’ master planning (Scott, 1998 ), the day‐to‐day resolution of class vulnerabilities and disputes over ‘reasonableness’ in city life requires forms of interpersonal adjudication otherwise addressed through local urban law—‘seeing like a city’ (Valverde, 2011 ). This article uses ethnography of management techniques aiming to ‘upgrade behaviour’ to theorize that a private entity, in a strategically indeterminate relationship with the state, reconciles future‐oriented planning and storied prejudices by merging two visions of governance. Imitating the repertoire of urban law, managers plan the very realm of bottom‐up decision making. They then adapt top‐down urban planning to bottom‐up dispute resolution to spatially consolidate the ‘consensual’ outcomes of a rigged game. Evoking both colonial Egyptian vagrancy laws and neoliberal paternalist welfare, ‘seeing like a city‐state’ governance amounts to authoritarianism that conceals itself within custom, appearing neutral so as to plan streets, codes and inner lives at once.     

城市中心区的街道设计策略

城市郊区化和街道荒漠化是当前城市建设所面临的重要问题.为了避免城市中心区的衰退,建设富有活力的街道空间,提高城市公共空间品质,需要调整现行的技术主义的街道交通设计策略,实施城市主义的街道设计策略,使得街道空间真正成为能够结构社区的市民生活空间.     

THE POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF PRIVATE ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS*

Governments are able to manipulate economic transactions in order to achieve foreign policy goals. This article addresses the question: can managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) structure economic transactions in ways that will limit the costs resulting from government intervention? Using a transaction cost framework, the efficiency of alternative structures (exporting, joint ventures, licensing, or wholly owned subsidiaries) for protecting a firm's interests are assessed. We argue that the traditional focus on the dyadic relationship between supplier and buyer misses sources of transaction costs; by conceptualizing economic transactions as embedded in a political context, additional sources of transaction costs are revealed. We examine three cases of home government intervention in US MNE transactions with the Soviet Union. We find that the full range of structural alternatives is affected by government sanctions, although sanctions are imposed on exporting relationships first and removed last. We find that MNEs are, therefore, beginning to insulate international transactions by making their overseas subsidiaries more independent of US technology and supplies with the hope that the US government will be less likely to impose its will extraterritorially by intervening in foreign subsidiaries’private economic transactions.     

On endogenous economic regulation

This paper presents a model in which in each of a succession of time periods the State and the private economy interact to determine rules under which the private agents will operate in the next period, and rules and resources that constrain interventions of the State in the next period. The set of State institutions, called regulators, that are the instruments of State intervention is endogenously determined in each period. The model is a multiperiod game consisting of two phases. The first is a (noncooperative) game played by private economic agents in each period, the rules for which are given by the regulators in the preceding period. The second phase is political. In each period the private agents acting politically determine the legal and budgetary constraints under which the regulators will operate in the next period, and thereby determine the noncooperative game to be played in the next period. Formal entities in the model allow a wide variety of regulatory instruments and transfer payments to be represented.