新古典模型中收入和财富分配持续不平等的动态演化

本文讨论了当个人劳动能力和偏好存在差异的情况下,资本收入和劳动收入分配的差异如何通过遗产机制影响收入和财富分配的持续性不平等程度。论文分析表明:在偏好、个人劳动能力和个人收入的随机冲击的影响下,如果市场是完善的,整个经济系统存在收入和财富分配的稳定不平等状态,而且,这种稳定的不平等状态与初始的财富分配的不平等和一次性的产权配置都是无关的。最后,本文分析了资本收入税和劳动收入税对持续不平等程度的影响,通过分析指出:从长期来看,在劳动能力和初始财富存在差异而偏好没有差异的情况下,征收劳动收入税比征收资本收入税更有利于改善由于能力差异所造成的持续不平等。     

Income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary provision of linear public goods

This paper examines the effect of income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary provision of a linear public good. We use models of inequality aversion and altruism to predict behavior in our setting. Our results are not consistent with these models, however; our experimental results suggest that less wealthy subjects give the same absolute amount (and more as a percentage of their income) as the more wealthy.     

新古典模型中收入和财富分配持续不平等的动态演化

本文讨论了当个人劳动能力和偏好存在差异的情况下，资本收入和劳动收入分配的差异如何通过遗产机制影响收入和财富分配的持续性不平等程度。论文分析表明：在偏好、个人劳动能力和个人收入的随机冲击的影响下，如果市场是完善的，整个经济系统存在收入和财富分配的稳定不平等状态，而且，这种稳定的不平等状态与初始的财富分配的不平等和一次性的产权配置都是无关的。最后，本文分析了资本收入税和劳动收入税对持续不平等程度的影响，通过分析指出：从长期来看，在劳动能力和初始财富存在差异而偏好没有差异的情况下，征收劳动收入税比征收资本收入税更有利于改善由于能力差异所造成的持续不平等。     

Capital Income Taxation,Economic Growth and Heterogeneity in the Motivation to Give

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between capital income taxation and economic growth within an overlapping generations model when individuals may bequeath wealth. The altruistic concern is modeled as a synthesis of joy‐of‐giving and family altruism so that individuals may derive utility from the amount of bequest itself and by providing children with a disposable income later on in life. Using this framework, it is shown that, in contrast to the existing literature, increasing the capital income tax rate may well enhance growth under operative bequests.     

Envy and Altruism: Contrasting Bivariate and Univariate Prospect Preferences

We compare prospect ordering with and without envy and altruism. We find that envy can induce a violation of the univariate first‐degree stochastic dominance (FSD), and thus a violation of the classic expected utility monotonicity axiom. Surprisingly, altruism can also violate FSD preferences. The intuitive explanation of the result in the case of altruism hinges on the sign of the mixed derivative of the bivariate preference: the individual might prefer a certain correlation between her wealth and her peer group's wealth, and is therefore willing to violate FSD as long as the outcomes of the two parties are ordered according to her preferences. When investments are considered, envy and altruism can distort not only preferences but also actual choices.     

On the long-run wealth distribution in a simple Ramsey model with heterogeneous households

This paper analyzes the long-run wealth distribution in a Ramsey model where individuals have a common rate of time preference but different intertemporal elasticities of substitution. As a result, it is shown that heterogeneity among households in intertemporal substitution is sufficient for the existence of a non-degenerate long-run wealth distribution. We also investigate the properties of the long-run wealth distribution and the transition of capital and consumption using the phase diagram.     

Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Dynasties and Uncertain Lifetimes

This paper studies how the lack of an annuities market affects savings behavior and intergenerational transfers in a dynastic overlapping generations economy. I find that the answer to this question depends crucially on altruism. On the one hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is operative, then the lack of annuity markets enhances capital accumulation. On the other hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is not operative, the absence of annuity markets can either increase or decrease aggregate savings. I characterize under which conditions capital accumulation is enhanced. I also prove that an overlapping generations economy with altruism and uninsurable lifetime risk faces capital overaccumulation relative to the modified Golden Rule. The efficient allocation corresponding to the modified Golden Rule can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium by a pay-as-you-go social security system, and this can only be done if individuals are altruistic.     

Stochastic dominance and thick-tailed wealth distributions

Right-skewed and thick-tailed wealth distributions have been documented as an empirical regularity across space and time. A key mechanism for explaining these distributional features is proportional random growth. We investigate the comparative statics of a well-defined class of random growth models when allowing for stochastically ordered shifts in the wealth return process. An order-contingent monotone comparative statics property is identified, according to which pure increases in risk (e.g. higher volatility of capital returns) foster top wealth concentration whereas first-order stochastically dominated shifts in the return process (induced by e.g. proportional capital income taxation) rather lower inequality at the upper end of the distribution. Our analysis points to the potentially ambiguous effects on top wealth inequality of introducing or modifying capital income tax treatments in the presence of stochastic returns.     

Mineral wealth and human capital accumulation: a nonparametric approach

This article uses a nonparametric approach to investigate the nexus between mineral wealth and human capital accumulation across countries. Higher mineral wealth is associated with elevated levels of human capital in a cross-section of countries. Matching the overall level of economic development and political instability and violence, weakens but does not reverse this conclusion. These results are economically significant. Moving up from the bottom to the top quartile for subsoil wealth per capita decreases illiteracy by ≈ 12% among young and adult females. Conversely, moving down from the top to the bottom quartile for subsoil wealth per capita decreases the average years of primary and total education by ≈ 1.5 years for females. Results are consistent with Hirschman's conjecture that enclave economies have weaker production linkages but stronger government revenue linkages than other activities. Most importantly, this article argues that caution should be exercised when discouraging countries from exploiting their mineral wealth, especially for countries where human capital is scarce.

I know, [there is] no safe depositary of the ultimate powers of society, but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.     

THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN LIBERIA

The economy of Liberia is one in which, in spite of past satisfactory growth performance, a high level of income inequality persists. In 1977, for instance, a mere 2 percent of the people accounted for some 33 percent of nation-wide wage income. These people live disproportionately in Montserrado County in which the capital city is located. While each of the other counties are largely rural and poor, each has far lower intra-county inequality than wealthy Montserrado.
Intersectoral location of the income-earner, average income levels and the extent of access to human capital formation opportunities are some characteristics of the economy that have been found to explain significant portions of intercounty variations in the levels of household income concentration. Income inequality is reduced with increases in the extent of agricultural activity as the share of the top income group falls and that of the bottom group rises. The reverse happens with growing urban-area activity. Higher income concentration occurs with rising per capita incomes as the top group's income share rises and the bottom income group's share falls. While this appears to be an instance of the Kuznet U-shaped hypothesis, here there are no definite signs of a possible reversal any time soon. The levels of access to educational facilities move inversely with the level of inequality, with expanding elementary facilities benefiting the poorer people at the expense of the wealthy while the reverse happens in the case of expanding secondary educational facilities.     

The Distribution of Wealth in Australia — A Survey*

This paper surveys and analyzes the available evidence on the distribution of wealth in Australia. On the basis of this evidence, it is argued that the cross-section distribution of personal wealth reveals considerable concentration in the top tail, with the top 1 per cent of adult individuals holding around 25 per cent of private wealth. The inequality of wealth revealed in the cross-section distribution among the top 10 per cent of wealth holders is not significantly reduced when adjustments are made to correct for life-cycle influences. Although the proportion of wealth held by the top 1 per cent of adult individuals has decreased sharply since World War I, the second to tenth percentiles have almost the same proportion in the 1960s and 1970s as in 1915.     

作为内生偏好的利他行为及其经济学意义

现代经济学与现代生物学对人性的看法相当一致,都把自利看作人类行为的基本前提。但来自桑塔费学派的最新研究证明,在人类进化的早期阶段,利他行为作为社会规范内部化的产物,在维持个人之间的合作劳动、有效提高族群生存竞争能力方面,具有不可替代的重要作用。我们在ESS(即“进化稳定策略”)基础上提出一个演化均衡模型,进一步解释了利他行为的进化优势以及合作剩余导致利他偏好内生的机制。     

Increasing returns to savings and wealth inequality

In this paper I present an explanation to the fact that in the data wealth is substantially more concentrated than income. Starting from the observation that the composition of households' portfolios changes towards a larger share of high-yield assets as the level of net worth increases, I first use data on historical asset returns and portfolio composition by wealth level to construct an empirical return function. I then augment an Overlapping Generation version of the standard neoclassical growth model with idiosyncratic labor income risk and missing insurance markets to allow for returns on savings to be increasing in the level of accumulated assets. The quantitative properties of the model are examined and show that an empirically plausible difference between the return faced by poor and wealthy agents is able to generate a substantial increase in wealth inequality compared to the basic model, enough to match the Gini index and all but the top 1 percentile of the US distribution of wealth.     

HOUSEHOLD SAVING AND PORTFOLIO CHANGE: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1983–89 SCF PANEL

There are few sources of high-quality data on the dynamics of wealth accumulation. This paper uses newly available data from the 1983 89 panel of the Survey of Consumer Finances to examine household saving and portfolio change over the 1980s. Our main findings are as follows. First, median household wealth rose modestly over the period. Second, while overall wealth inequality increased, households in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution in 1983 saw their share of total wealth decline, probably reflecting turnover among the very wealthy. Third, although age, income, and initial wealth had significant effects in regressions on household saving, a large part of the variation in saving was unexplained. Finally, there were clear life-cycle patterns in the portfolios of assets and liabilities held by households, with younger households acquiring homes, businesses and all types of debts, and older households divesting themselves of these assets and debts.     

A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Provision of Public Goods

This paper considers a dynamic model of Tiebout-like migration between communities that utilize distinct allocation procedures for public goods. At issue is whether voluntary or compulsory procedures are more likely to prevail over time. We model infinitely lived individuals who make repeated, sequential location decisions over one of two communities. Each community uses a distinct mechanism for allocating public goods. The first is one in which contributions are given voluntarily by the citizenry of the community. The second is a compulsory scheme by which individuals are taxed proportionately to wealth with the tax determined by a majority vote. Opportunities to accumulate wealth exist via accumulation of public capital.
The Markov Perfect equilibria of the dynamic game are studied. Our main result shows that when accumulated wealth converges to a steady state, individuals' locational choices eventually "select" the involuntary provision mechanism. This holds despite the fact that unanimous location in the voluntary provision community may in many cases remain as a Nash equilibrium of the static game each period. We also describe conditions under which voluntary provision survives. These conditions require that accumulation of capital fails to decrease wealth dispersion over time. The results are shown to be consistent with findings relating inequality to school choice.     

Optimal Taxation of Bequests in a Model with Initial Wealth*

We formulate an optimal‐taxation model where parents leave bequests to their descendants for altruistic reasons. In contrast to the standard model, individuals differ not only in earning abilities, but also in initial (inherited) wealth. In this model, a redistributive motive for an inheritance tax – which is equivalent to a uniform tax on all expenditures – arises, given that initial wealth increases with earning abilities. The introduction of the inheritance tax either increases intertemporal social welfare or has an ambiguous effect, depending on whether the external effect related to altruism is accounted for in the social objective.     

Gender Quotas and Human Capital Formation: A Relative Deprivation Approach

We study a quota's effect on individual human capital investment incentives beyond merely altering individual's overall probability of being promoted. We assume that individuals sense relative deprivation from unfavorable (income) comparisons within their reference group and that comparisons take place within the same gender. The introduction of a female quota increases (decreases) the number of women (men) holding top positions. On one hand, the relative deprivation to which female individuals are subjected to increases. These female individuals respond to an increase in their relative deprivation by acquiring additional human capital which, because it enables them to increase their earnings, reduces their relative deprivation. On the other hand, male individuals invest less in human capital in response to a decrease in relative deprivation. We show that the human capital formed by women who are encouraged to do so by the quotas is larger than the human capital that men who are discouraged by the quotas refrain from forming. However, the positive human capital accumulation effect hinges on a certain level of ability by gender and on how much individuals perceive relative deprivation.     

THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES

In this study, new estimates are presented of the size distribution of household wealth in the U.S. in 1969. Compared to previous studies, its major advance is the inclusion of all marketable or discretionary household assets and liabilities and their alignment with national balance sheet totals. Household disposable wealth (HDW) is defined as the sum of all marketable or fungible assets held by households less liabilities. The Gini coefficient for HDW is 0.72, the share held by the richest one percent of households is 31 percent, and the share held by the top five percent is 49 percent. There is, however, a large variation in the concentration of different household assets. The Gini coefficient is 0.30 for household durables and inventories, 0.69 for equity in owner-occupied housing, 0.94 for bonds and securities, and 0.98 for corporate stock. HDW is then divided into two mutually exclusive components. The first, called "life-cycle wealth," is defined as the sum of equity in owner-occupied housing, durables, household inventory, demand deposits and currency, and the cash value of life insurance and pensions less consumer debt. This form of wealth tends to be accumulated over the life-cycle for either consumption, liquidity, or retirement purposes. The second, called "capital wealth," is the sum of time and savings deposits, bonds and securities, corporate stock, business and investment real estate equity, and trust fund equity. Life-cycle wealth is substantially less concentrated than capital wealth. The Gini coefficient for it is 0.59, while that for capital wealth is 0.88. Moreover, among the lower wealth groups, over 80 percent of household wealth takes the form of life-cycle wealth, whereas among the top wealth groups the proportion is under 20 percent. The results suggest substantially different savings motivations between the two groups.     

The distributional effects of progressive capital taxes

Rising inequality since the 1980s has spurred much research examining the underlying causes and potential policy responses. Among the more controversial, One of the more controversial policy proposals is a progressive capital tax in response to rising top wealth shares around the world proposes a progressive capital tax in response to rising top wealth shares around the world. This paper introduces rank-based econometric methods for dynamic power laws as a tool for estimating the effect of progressive capital taxes on the distribution of wealth under different assumptions about the impact of these taxes on household behavior. In most scenarios, we find that a small tax levied on 1% of households would substantially reshape the US wealth distribution and reduce inequality.     

Credit layering in informal financial markets

Informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers. In this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders, a landlord and a merchant, who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth. We show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor. In this case, the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord. Otherwise, only the trader lends. As a consequence, a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords. Interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering. This pattern is shown to be supported empirically.