Entrepreneurial strategy v. accounting accuracy in ‘calculating’ capital and income

Both entrepreneurs and accountants ??calculate?? capital and income but their procedures diverge. The paper examines this divergence and the respective calculational objectives of entrepreneurs and accountants in the business enterprise. For the entrepreneur, capital and income are ex ante calculational judgments of prospective income gain from strategic use of the enterprise??s capital goods. But the accountant must shun entrepreneurial judgments to ??calculate?? the contemporary net market value of enterprise??s capital goods at a specified date. Hence, the accountant??s calculation of income is the net contemporary increase in the market value of the enterprise??s capital goods. These accounting calculations facilitate assessment of the success of an enterprise strategy. But critics assert that accounting practice ignores the need of external investor??s for accurate information on enterprise prospects. The paper concludes with a critique of accounting regulation and explores the feasibility and means of privatizing the entrepreneurial choice of accounting techniques.     

The Institutional Revolution: A review essay

This review essay discusses and appraises Douglas Allen’s The Institutional Revolution (2011) as a way of reflecting on the uses of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) in economic history. It praises and defends Allen’s method of asking “what economic problem were these institutions solving?” But it insists that such comparative-institutional analysis be imbedded within a deeper account of institutional change, one driven principally by changes – often endogenous changes – in the extent of the market and in relative scarcities. The essay supports its argument with a variety of examples of the NIE applied to economic history.     

Merchant and regulated transmission: theory, evidence and policy

Economists acknowledge the problems of regulated transmission but have different views on the likely efficiency of merchant transmission. This paper first examines the evidence on alleged market failure and regulatory failure as experienced in practice in Australia, where there have been both regulated and merchant interconnectors. Merchant transmission has generally not exhibited the standard examples of market failure but regulated transmission generally has exhibited the standard examples of regulatory failure. Imperfect information??more specifically, in the form of lack of coordination??has often been a challenge whatever the approach. Experience in Argentina suggests that transactions costs are not a barrier to negotiation and efficient investment determined by users. Policy should seek to improve the regulatory framework and to remove barriers to private initiatives. An important role for regulation is to facilitate coordination between potential providers and users of transmission lines.     

The price of the market: pursuit of self-interest as annihilation of self

The paper criticizes the view that the market provides for the well-being of individuals by offering the widest field for the pursuit of self-interest. It argues, first, that this view is disastrously mistaken because it misunderstands what individuals are, but, second, that proponents of this view??notably Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations and the neoclassical economists??actually show the opposite of what they claim: that is, they show that pursuit of self-interest in the market is the annihilation of self. Thus, the proponents of the view show that it is untenable and at least point toward the terms necessary for a more adequate alternative. The paper then asks whether the market must be like this, first, through considering a line of thought on the possibility of a non-predatory market that runs from Aristotle, through the Italian Civil Happiness school, to modern socialist writers. Second, it offers an alternative view of the individual, according to which individuality is in part constituted through substantial relations with other individuals, a version of which can be found in Smith??s Theory of Moral Sentiments and Lectures on Jurisprudence. On the basis of these two discussions, a market order that sustains rather than destroys individuals can be imagined. However, this order would have lost many central characteristics of the capitalist market order.     

产业升级中的本土市场规模效应

在产业升级过程中,本土市场的互动效应、市场规模的诱致效应与本土规模市场的终端需求效应能对其产生重要影响。这种影响集中体现为互动效应能够引导产业升级的需求发现,需求发现通过市场规模的相互催化为产业升级提供运营支持,终端需求效应通过参与式合作有助于发展产业升级所需的技术能力。我国市场规模巨大,产业升级应充分利用本土市场规模效应。这就需要建立正确的市场激励机制、加快本土市场发展,鼓励本土企业根植于国内经济的创新,推动本土企业与外来资本联合研发等。     

International trade and competitiveness

We analyze the role of international market size differences in determining the investment in process R&D (and thus firms?? competitiveness) in a trade model with oligopolistic market structure, non-homothetic production technology and costly trade. We show that the R&D effort is higher (or even disproportionately so) for firms in the larger market, which causes endogenous asymmetries across countries. As a result, firms in the larger market have higher competitiveness, which increases their market shares in international markets. Furthermore, and contrary to what is predicted by Krugman (Am Econ Rev 70:950?C959, 1980) ??home market effect??, in equilibrium the larger country does not need to host a disproportionately higher share of the world??s industry than of the world??s demand. Despite this, the larger country can still continue to run a trade surplus in the oligopolistic sector, since it hosts firms with higher competitiveness than firms in the smaller country.     

Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia

Why do risk premia vary over time? We examine this problem theoretically and empirically by studying the effect of market belief on risk premia. Individual belief is taken as a fundamental primitive state variable. Market belief is observable; it is central to the empirical evaluation and we show how to measure it. Our asset pricing model is familiar from the noisy REE literature but we adapt it to an economy with diverse beliefs. We derive equilibrium asset prices and implied risk premium. Our approach permits a closed form solution of prices; hence we trace the exact effect of market belief on the time variability of asset prices and risk premia. We test empirically the theoretical conclusions. Our main result is that, above the effect of business cycles on risk premia, fluctuations in market belief have significant independent effect on the time variability of risk premia. We study the premia on long positions in Federal Funds Futures, 3- and 6-month Treasury Bills (T-Bills). The annual mean risk premium on holding such assets for 1?C12?months is about 40?C60 basis points and we find that, on average, the component of market belief in the risk premium exceeds 50% of the mean. Since time variability of market belief is large, this component frequently exceeds 50% of the mean premium. This component is larger the shorter is the holding period of an asset and it dominates the premium for very short holding returns of less than 2?months. As to the structure of the premium we show that when the market holds abnormally favorable belief about the future payoff of an asset the market views the long position as less risky hence the risk premium on that asset declines. More generally, periods of market optimism (i.e. ??bull?? markets) are shown to be periods when the market risk premium is low while in periods of pessimism (i.e. ??bear?? markets) the market??s risk premium is high. Fluctuations in risk premia are thus inversely related to the degree of market optimism about future prospects of asset payoffs. This effect is strong and economically very significant.     

Market, civic virtues, and civic bargaining in the medieval and early modern age: some evidence from sixteenth century Italy

In the last decades, historians have shown that the modern market is rooted in the institutional system created in European towns since the middle ages. This approach leads us beyond the usual opposition between market and society or between public and private market. Indeed, in the medieval and early modern age, the market was part of a wider institutional design of civil life, which had a basic conceptual frame of reference in the notion of the common good, a feature typical of such organicistic and hierarchical societies. This paper explores the process of market construction in the medieval and early modern age. I firstly analysed the role of the market in these societies and then focused on the case of foodstuff provision: a key element of the non-written, ancient pact between rulers and people, based on the assurance of subsistence. As a basis for the study, I employed sixteenth century documents regarding Vicenza, a medium-sized town in the Republic of Venice. These show very clearly that, in general, market and price regulation was not the result of arbitrary interventions by public authorities; on the contrary, it was the result of a process of negotiation, which I call civic bargaining. This process involved??to various degrees??public authorities, landowners, merchants and guilds, and the town??s people, the pursuit of the common good being, in practice, a matter of balancing various needs and interests. Present-day economic and social public policies are, in many aspects, an inheritance of the institutional system created in the medieval and early modern age: knowledge of these origins is useful in the present debate regarding economic versus social development, as discussed at the end of the paper.     

Well-being and war

Happiness research has dealt with a great number of determinants of well-being but has neglected the effect of war. Wars drastically reduce people??s happiness. The large psychic costs of soldiers, the suffering of civilians, and the material destruction are well documented. An important issue for happiness research is how to calculate the forgone well-being of the people killed in war. Wars may also increase happiness by providing shared experiences, raising national pride, and ??ennobling?? people. ??Combat flow?? increases an individual soldier??s subjective happiness. Deep issues are elicited regarding what type of happiness is legitimate.     

Employment cycles, low income work and the dynamic impact of wage regulations. A macro perspective

In this paper we investigate, against the background of Goodwin??s (1967) growth cycle model, a dual labor market economy and the consequences of introducing an unemployment benefit system and minimum wages in the second labor market and a maximum wage barrier in the first one. In the framework with free ??hiring?? and firing?? in the both labor markets we show (a) that in fact maximum real wages in the first labor market not only reduce the volatility of this labor market, but also provide global stability to the system dynamics if they are locally explosive, and (b) that larger fluctuations in employment can be made (at least partially) socially acceptable through a (workfare oriented) unemployment benefit system augmented by minimum wage in the low income segment of the labor market.     

Shadow Money in the 19th Century: Is Marx Relevant for Understanding Contemporary Shadow Money?

ABSTRACT

The growth of shadow money, since the 1980s, has implications for both central bank policy and the theorization of money. However, modern shadow money has a historical analogue in the private bill market of 19th century England This article explores the relevance of Marx’s logical and historical analysis of the evolution of the forms and functions of money in capitalist economies, and his concrete analysis of the bill market in order to understand shadow money today.     

Law, legislation, and local minima: Solving a problem in Hayek��s theory of common law judging, with historical examples

Friedrich Hayek??s Law, Legislation, and Liberty noted a problem in the common law system: Sometimes, following judicial precedent would lead to unforeseen bad outcomes over time. No judge can anticipate all possible implications of a precedent-setting decision, and sometimes later judges, bound by precedent, will be forced despite themselves to elaborate the law in ever more inefficient or unjust ways. Hayek proposed that one role of the legislator was to correct such ??dead ends?? in the common law. This paper proposes that judges working within the constraints of the common law and given only the tools Hayek himself allowed them are capable of escaping such binds on their own. It uses historical examples from the era of coverture to support this claim. Not only were judges willing to identify exceptions to coverture, these exceptions helped pave the way for coverture??s eventual abolition. This process is examined and found to be otherwise consonant with Hayek??s larger theory of the common law as a rule-finding process.     

Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions

We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers. Traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market-clearing price. It fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding. The designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values/costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved. This optimality, however, comes at the expense of plausibility: (i) the monetary transfers among the traders are defined in terms of the traders' beliefs about each other's value/cost; (ii) a trader may suffer a loss ex post; (iii) the mechanism may run a surplus/deficit ex post. We compare the virtues of the simple yet mildly inefficient buyer's bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism.     

Voting with the wallet

The vote with the wallet is a new, emerging feature of economic participation and democracy in the globally integrated market economy. This expression identifies the pivotal role that responsible consumption and investment can play in addressing social and environmental emergencies which have been aggravated by the asymmetry of power between domestic institutions and global corporations. In this paper, we examine (both in general and by using examples drawn from the financial and non-financial sectors) how ??voting?? for producers which are at the forefront of a three-sided efficiency which reconciles the creation of economic value with social and environmental responsibility may generate contagion effects by triggering ethical imitation of traditional profit-maximizing actors, thereby enhancing the production of positive social and environmental externalities. Within this new framework, policies that reduce the search and information costs of voting with the wallet may help socioeconomic systems to exploit the bottom-up market forces of other-regarding preferences, thereby enhancing opportunities to achieve well-being with reduced top-down government intervention.     

Stochastic growth with short-run prediction of shocks

We study a variation of the one-sector stochastic optimal growth model with independent and identically distributed shocks where agents acquire information that enables them to accurately predict the next period??s productivity shock (but not shocks in later periods). Optimal policy depends on the forthcoming shock. A ??better?? predicted realization of the shock that increases both marginal and total product always increases next period??s optimal output. We derive conditions on the degree of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of marginal product under which optimal investment increases or decreases with a better shock. Under fairly regular restrictions, optimal outputs converge in distribution to a unique invariant distribution whose support is bounded away from zero. We derive explicit solutions to the optimal policy for three well-known families of production and utility functions and use these to show that volatility of output, sensitivity of output to shocks, and expected total investment may be higher or lower than in the standard model where no new information is acquired over time; the limiting steady state may also differ significantly from that in the standard model.     

The merger of populations, the incidence of marriages, and aggregate unhappiness

Let a society??s unhappiness be measured by the aggregate of the levels of relative deprivation of its members. When two societies of equal size, F and M, merge, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be higher than the sum of the levels of unhappiness in the constituent societies when apart; merger alone increases unhappiness. But when societies F and M merge and marriages are formed such that the number of households in the merged society is equal to the number of individuals in one of the constituent societies, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be lower than the aggregate unhappiness in the two constituent societies when apart. This result obtains regardless of which individuals from one society form households with which individuals from the other, and even when the marriages have not (or not yet) led to income gains to the married couples from increased efficiency, scale economies, and the like. While there are various psychological reasons for people to become happier when they get married as opposed to staying single, the very formation of households reduces social distress even before any other happiness-generating factors kick in.     

Nominal uniqueness and money non-neutrality in the limit-price exchange process

We define continuous-time dynamics for exchange economies with fiat money. Traders have locally rational expectations, face a cash-in-advance constraint, and continuously adjust their short-run dominant strategy in a monetary strategic market game involving a double-auction with limit-price orders. Money has a positive value except on optimal rest-points where it becomes a ??veil?? and trade vanishes. Typically, there is a piecewise globally unique trade-and-price curve both in real and in nominal variables. Money is not neutral, either in the short-run or long-run and a localized version of the quantity theory of money holds in the short-run. An optimal money growth rate is derived, which enables monetary trade curves to converge towards Pareto optimal rest-points. Below this growth rate, the economy enters a (sub- optimal) liquidity trap where monetary policy is ineffective; above this threshold inflation rises. Finally, market liquidity, measured through the speed of real trades, can be linked to gains-to-trade, households?? expectations, and the quantity of circulating money.     

Proto-coalition bargaining and the core

In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise, a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F??s opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F??s opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why ??important?? coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others.     

Holdup and wage dispersion

This paper provides a search-theoretic model of the labor market, in which large firms hire workers sequentially and wages are bargained with full commitment. The firm's optimal vacancy-posting strategy trades off the fact that a larger size decreases marginal benefits from subsequent jobs, but avoids higher future recruiting costs attributable to the holdup effect. The holdup effect is dominant if the production function is not sufficiently concave, resulting in firm-size wage premium. The equilibrium features wage dispersion both within and between firms. When calibrated to the U.S. data, the extended model accounts for 67%–84% of the observed wage dispersion, among which 13%–27% is attributed to the holdup effect.     

The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration

In his 1960 seminal contribution to game theory and its applications, The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling suggested that in international negotiations, strong international opposition may be an asset rather than a liability. Rather than constraining it, the opposition would enlarge the opportunity set thus making it easier to successfully conclude international negotiations. This property, which is also known as the Schelling-conjecture, shares some aspects with constitutional economics, namely the two-level approach suggesting that it might be beneficial for all parties to give up some power by tying one??s hands. In this paper we examine by means of a simulation study how far we can take this notion in the politics of trade integration. In explicitly marrying Schelling??s 1960 idea with the 1988 two-level approach by Putnam and embedding the result into the political economy of trade we find that the threat of a domestic opposition or national institution having a veto power frequently but not always delivers a more favorable outcome for the respective trade representative at the international table. Whether the Schelling-conjecture applies or not actually depends on the subtle interplay of a ??bully effect?? and a ??serenity effect??.