MARKET PERFORMANCE WITH MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS*

We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit‐Stiglitz when firms sell multiple products. Both products and firms are (horizontally) differentiated. We propose a general nested demand framework where consumers first decide upon a firm then which variant to buy and how much (the nested CES is a special case). We use it to determine the market's biases when firms compete in product ranges and prices. The market system attracts too many firms with too few products per firm: firms restrain product ranges to relax price competition, but this exacerbates over‐entry.     

Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.     

The US fashion industry: A supply chain review

The fashion industry has short product life cycles, tremendous product variety, volatile and unpredictable demand, and long and inflexible supply processes. These characteristics, a complex supply chain and wide availability of data make the industry a suitable avenue for efficient supply chain management practices. The industry has also been in a transition over the last 20 years: significant consolidation in retail, majority of apparel manufacturing operations moving overseas and, more recently, increasing use of electronic commerce in retail and wholesale trade. This paper aims to review the current state of operations and recent trends across the fashion supply chain in the US. We use industry-wide data, articles from business journals, industry reviews and extensive interviews with an apparel manufacturer in California, and a major US department store chain to describe the current operational practices and how the industry is restructuring itself during the transition, focusing at the apparel manufacture and retail segments of the supply chain.     

The influence of prior industry affiliation on framing in nascent industries: the evolution of digital cameras

New industries sparked by technological change are characterized by high uncertainty. In this paper, we explore how a firm's conceptualization of products in this context, as reflected by product feature choices, is influenced by prior industry affiliation. We study digital cameras introduced from 1991–2006 by firms from three prior industries. We hypothesize and find that: (1) prior industry experience shapes a set of shared beliefs that results in similar and concurrent firm behavior; (2) firms notice and imitate the behaviors of firms from the same prior industry; and, (3) as firms gain experience with particular features, the influence of prior industry decreases. This study extends previous research on firm entry into new domains by examining heterogeneity in firms' framing and feature‐level entry choices. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Impact of demand uncertainty on supply chain cooperation of single-period products

Cooperation is an approach of improving competitive advantages of a supply chain. A two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer for a single-period product is studied, and retail-market demand uncertainty is described by coefficient of variation. We develop a cooperation mechanism to address the cooperation and its implementation between the manufacturer and the retailer, two market situations are considered: (i) the wholesale price and the order quantity are decision variables, (ii) the wholesale and the retail prices as well as the order quantity are decision variables. In both market situations, our research shows that: (1) the cooperation mechanism can improve the overall channel profits and the supply chain members’ allocated profits, (2) the described cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty: it can be implemented if, and only if, the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small and coefficient of variation of retail-market demand does not exceed an upper bound. Impacts of retail-market demand uncertainty on wholesale price, order quantity and/or retail price have also been investigated through analytical and numerical analyses. Although our research is based on the assumption that the manufacturer dominates the supply chain in the non-cooperative situation, which is not the case for most retailer-driven supply chains, this research is still significant on providing guidelines for practitioners in current China mid-level car market that is similar to situations described in the paper.     

Entry timing,exploration, and firm survival in the early U.S. bicycle industry

We explore the relationship between a firm's entry timing and its probability of surviving the early, uncertain period of its industry, and consider the trade‐off between entering early and potentially establishing a strong position in the industry vs. waiting until technological uncertainty is reduced. We hypothesize that, owing to inertial forces, firms that enter the industry at the earliest point in its history are least likely to make the conversion to the product generation that becomes the dominant design in the industry. Exploration through the introduction of new products appears to reflect a local search process and retards the transition to the dominant design. We also hypothesize that, though firms entering early may exhibit longer life spans, their advantages are limited to the period before the emergence of the dominant design. We test our hypotheses in the early U.S. bicycle industry, and find evidence consistent with the idea that inertia limits firms' abilities to make the transition between generations of product configurations. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

OPTIMAL PRICING AND QUALITY CHOICE WHEN INVESTMENT IN QUALITY IS IRREVERSIBLE

This paper examines the price and quality choice of a single product, risk-neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry. It is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand. In a Stackelberg leader-follower game, the leader and follower pre-commit immediately up to a certain level of uncertainty. In this case the leader produces the higher quality good. When uncertainty is higher than this threshold, the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality good.     

Why Do Firms Enter a New Product Market? A Two‐Dimensional Framework for Market Entry Motivation and Behavior

What are the energetic forces that induce established firms to enter new product markets? While most previous research has explained the economic profits expected from a new product market as firms' distinctive motivation for market entry, some recent studies also emphasize interfirm competition and benchmarking activities as another important factor that motivates firms' new market entry. To explain the established firms' diverse new product market entry behaviors, this study presents a two‐dimensional scheme of entry motivation in terms of the degrees of target market profit focus and competitor focus. The first dimension captures the economic motivation of firms' new market entry that ranges from focusing on the direct expected profits from the target market to considering more strategic/indirect benefit incentives. The second dimension captures the degree of firms' external motivation for entry affected by competitors that ranges from independent entry decisions to fully competitor‐oriented entry decisions. Using multiple‐industry survey data, the current study empirically verifies that these two entry motivation dimensions explain a great portion of actual firms' new product market entry behaviors and that they are independent of each other. Subsequently, this study validates that firms' operational size and their environmental factors like perceived technological uncertainty and competitive intensity upon new market entry affect the degrees of the two dimensions of firms' new product market entry motivation. More specifically, large firms less emphasize target‐market profits than small firms, and when perceived technological uncertainty is high, potential market entrants become less target market profit focused but more competitor focused. Under a highly competitive new market condition, firms focus on both target‐market profits and competitors. Based on the analysis of new market entry motivation dimensions, the current study proposes a new typology of established firms' market entry behaviors. The suggested typology represents the four different types of new product market entrants and examines specific characteristics and entry strategies for each type of potential entrants. This entry‐motivation framework should provide a deeper understanding of the backgrounds of entry behaviors and assist firms in developing appropriate entry strategies and in advantageously responding to rival firms' actions with regard to entry.     

Preemptive investments under uncertainty,credibility and first mover advantages

We present a continuous-time game in which two firms must decide at each instant of time whether to be in or out of a market that expands up to a random maturity date and declines thereafter. Firms are initially inactive, and they differ only in the opportunity costs of using their assets (e.g., owing to different redeployment or resale values). After characterizing the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of the entry and exit game under demand uncertainty, we challenge the result that the threat of preemption can partially or even totally dissipate a first mover advantage. When post-entry profits can be negative, the preemption threat of a firm may become weaker because its rival may force it out of the market after entering. As a result, there may be little or no dissipation of the first mover advantage when post-investment profits are not assumed to be always positive.     

Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains

This paper considers two competing supply chains, each with multiple upstream suppliers producing complementary products and selling to a single buyer (e.g., assembler or retailer), who then sells the finished assembled product to a market that involves both demand uncertainty and competition. Our main research questions focus on what supply chain structure (integration vs. decentralization) and which contracting strategy a business should choose. We find that supply chains that decentralize perform better under strong market competition (i.e., high degree of product substitution between supply chains). However, when a large number of suppliers exist, supply chains that integrate perform better. When decentralized structures are used for both supply chains, a consignment with revenue sharing contract generally outperforms a wholesale price contract from the downstream retailer's point of view. Interestingly, for a supplier, a wholesale price contract, which pushes all demand risks to the downstream retailer, might not be preferred. For the entire supply chain, one contract strategy can outperform another depending on the degree of competition, the cost share of the buyer, and the number of suppliers.     

Passing through the supply chain: Implications for market power

In this paper, we study the connection between pass-through and market power in the Brazilian Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) industry. We use a state tax shock and apply a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate pass-through – at different levels of the supply chain – and an instrumented difference-in-differences strategy to estimate demand, and then feed a theoretical model to make inferences about a conduct parameter – that measures market power. We find an incomplete pass-through at the distribution level and for the supply chain as a whole, and a more-than-complete one at the retail level. Furthermore, we estimate price-elasticity of demand to be greater than one. When we feed a theoretical model of pass-through under imperfect competition with these estimates, we obtain a high conduct parameter at the whole supply chain level and an even higher one at the retail level alone. These results show that considering only the whole supply chain pass-through may lead to hasty conclusions about market power. Besides contributing to the empirical literature that connects pass-through with market power, we contribute to on-going national discussions regarding competitiveness in the LPG industry.     

Letting the market work for you: an evolutionary perspective on product strategy

Managers must choose to allocate scarce resources either to the maintenance of a range of products tailored to heterogeneous consumer preferences or to the efficient production of a small number of products. In addition, managers must choose the degree to which they periodically cull the product line. Vigorous selection removes poor performers from the product line, but this action simultaneously impairs the firm's ability to monitor changes in consumer preferences. Empirical evidence from the computer workstation industry reveals that the ideal choice of product variety depends on the competitive ecology of the industry. Product variety becomes less valuable as the total number of products on the market increases, but it increases in value as uncertainty makes the accurate prediction of demand difficult. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

JOINT VENTURE BUY‐OUTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper provides a theory of joint venture buy‐outs in the presence of demand uncertainty. In an infinite horizon framework with demand uncertainty, we consider a foreign firm's decision on whether to form a joint venture or to open a fully owned subsidiary. Without the possibility of future share adjustment, the foreign firm enters the market through a joint venture if the host‐country firm helps to reduce the uncertainty significantly. Consequently, the firm enters at an earlier point in time compared to the situation in which opening a fully owned subsidiary is the only option to the firm. The possibility of future share adjustment in the joint venture further increases the incentive to speed up foreign investment. Although the possibility of share adjustment results in a joint venture buy‐out and can reduce the future profits of the host‐country firm, it may increase host‐country welfare by attracting foreign investment at an earlier point in time. We show the implications of learning in the joint venture.     

Supply Adjustments to Demand Shocks in the Commercial Real Estate Market

This paper contributes a theoretical investigation of real estate supply adjustments in the commercial real estate market. Simple theoretical linkages between the goods market (the demand side) and the space market (the supply side) are developed and then used to explain the optimal supply decisions of space producers. Propositions relating to how space production decisions are made under conditions of demand certainty, demand uncertainty and free entry are derived from optimization models. Under demand certainty, the adjustment of space supply is shown to be affected by whether an exogenous shock is perceived as mild or disastrous. Under demand uncertainty, construction based on pent-up demand is shown to be suboptimal.     

Speed to Market for Innovative Products: Blessing or Curse?

The relationships among speed to market, quality, and costs are important to managers as they attempt to best establish incentives and set goals for new product development teams, allocate resources for new product development, or create positional advantage in the market. The existing literature suggests that the economic consequences of being late to the market are significant, including higher development and manufacturing costs, lower profit margins, and lessening of the firm's market value. Therefore, traditional logic has held that new product development managers need to manage the trade‐offs among speed to market, quality, and costs. While both scholars and managers have often acquiesced to performance trade‐offs among “faster, better, and cheaper,” this research attempts to improve understanding of the interrelationships between these objectives, and ultimately profit. Based on a survey of 197 managers, faster speed to market is shown to be related to better quality and lower costs; it is not necessary to sacrifice one of these outcomes. Further, the moderating roles of two dimensions of innovativeness (innovativeness to the firm and to the market) are examined on the relationships between speed and quality, as well as speed and profit. Both dimensions of innovativeness positively moderate the relationship between speed to market and quality. For more innovative products (both to the firm and the market), there is a stronger positive relationship between speed and quality than for less innovative products. Further, innovativeness to the firm negatively moderates the relationship between speed and profit. Thus, speed has a less positive impact on profit for highly innovative‐to‐the‐firm products compared with less innovative‐to‐the‐firm products. By being conscious of the projects’ levels of innovativeness (along with prioritizing various performance measures), managers can more rationally decide when to emphasize speed to market based on this study's findings.     

Entry into Nascent Industries: Disentangling a Firm's Capability Portfolio at the Time of Investment Versus Market Entry

Research summary : This article examines the capability antecedents of firm entry into nascent industries. Because a firm's technological investments in nascent industries typically occur before market entry, this study makes a distinction between firm capabilities at the time of market entry and at the time of initial investment. At the time of market entry, core technical capabilities and complementary assets influence the likelihood of entry. However, at the time of investment, a firm's integrative capabilities as well as the initial stocks of related technical capabilities and complementary assets become critical, as they enable endogenous development of core technical capabilities and complementary assets by the time of entry. The empirical sample consists of firms involved in field experiments in agricultural biotechnology during the period 1980–2010. Managerial summary : New product commercialization in a nascent industry typically requires access to not only core technologies of the focal industry, but also supporting commercialization assets. However, firms may not possess these critical capabilities when they first invest in the industry. Instead, empirical evidence from the context of agricultural biotechnology shows that at the time of first investment, a firm's integrative capabilities partly explain their likelihood of entry. Integrative capabilities encompass a set of practices that enable effective coordination and communication, and in turn put firms in an advantageous position to develop the needed capabilities by the time of entry. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Appropriability,preemption, and firm performance

The impact of strategies used to appropriate innovation rents on firm performance is analyzed using a sample of U.S. public manufacturing firms. Stronger appropriability at the firm level, achieved through patent protection or the ownership of specialized complementary assets, leads to superior economic performance, as measured by the stock market valuation of a firm's R& D assets. Among commonly used ‘nonconventional’ patent strategies, preemptive patenting allows incumbents to strengthen their market power. Consistent with theory, such effect is higher for incumbents with higher ex ante market power and facing a higher threat of entry, and lower when R& D competition is characterized by the discovery of drastic innovations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relevance of organizational capabilities and its dynamics: what to learn from entrants' product portfolios about the determinants of entry timing

The resource‐based view of the firm suggests that the timing of market entry by a firm depends on its resources and capabilities, but several important questions remain. First, in a high‐velocity market where capabilities change quickly, how does entry timing depend on the capabilities at varying points in time? Second, how much flexibility does a firm have in altering its capabilities to achieve desirable entry timing? To answer these questions, this study sets out to develop a dynamic, refined version of the resource‐based view that parameterizes a firm by its time‐varying capability relevance with respect to a focal market, and makes predictions on entry timing and future growth of capability relevance. The study develops a novel approach that uses the entrants' product portfolios to infer a potential entrant's capability relevance. The results based on a panel of potential entrants show that the initial and current capability relevance each affect entry timing alone, revealing the persistent effect of the initial condition. However, given the knowledge of the current capability relevance, the initial relevance has no effect on entry timing, suggesting that the initial relevance affects entry timing through its influence on the current relevance. Firms that are in an initially unfavorable position can still achieve early entry, provided that they improve their capability relevance over time. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No‐discrimination Constraint

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no‐discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour‐based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third‐degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.