建设施工合同起草及审核在内容和程序上须把握的几个要点

根据多年来积累的各种建设施工合同起草或审核方面的一些经验和心得,就建设施工合同起草及审核时须把握的要点问题做简单概述。     

谨防合同陷阱

签合同时就要作好可能打官司的准备合同的作用主要是明确双方权利、义务。起草、审查合同应注意合同条款完备,含义明确。可以使用或参考国家工商局制定的各种合同的示范文本,防范对方在合同中故意设置陷阱。需要经过登记才能生效的合同,按规定程序进行登记。     

重视合同条款实质内容避免工程造价纠纷

由于工程的特殊性和复杂性，每个工程的承包合同都需要起草合同文件。在实际中，很多发、承包方对建筑工程合同不够重视，对合同条款实质内容的确定随意性较大，以致合同履行过程中才发现，因为合同过于简单、约定不明等原因，引起工程造价纠纷，这要引起我们的足够重视。     

论工程项目管理中的合同与法律

合同管理从一定意义上来说决定了整个工程管理是否能够有效开展,而法律是工程合同在起草、签订以及履行过程中的重要依据,本文以此为基础详细论述了工程项目管理中的合同与法律。     

小议合同英语翻译

合同英语是律师起草法律文件(合同、章程、协议、契约等)惯常使用的语言。合同文件须用词准确、结构严谨,以充分体现其严肃性和严密性,因而,合同英语通常艰涩难懂,语句冗长复杂。现从词汇和句法两个方面入手,对合同英语作一些探讨,提出了从事合同翻译的标准和基本要求。     

项目施工管理中的反索赔

合同是连接业主和各承包商及分包商之间的枢纽,实施中涉及各种大量复杂的合同关系,合同执行过程中索赔和反索赔频繁发生,本文通过相关案例着重论述业主如何做好施工管理中的反索赔工作。     

企业合同管理信息化建设

合同是企业经营管理基础工作的重要内容，通过提高合同管理水平，规范企业合同的签订和履行，能够有效地防范风险、优化管理、降低成本、提高效益。合同管理信息化建设的目标是实现合同在网上的起草申报、审查审批、签订管理、履行管理、数据统计、分析汇报等功能，以信息化技术提高企业合同管理水平，是现代企业合同管理的必然趋势，尤其对大、中型企业具有重要意义。合同管理信息化的意义具体体现在以下几方面。[第一段]     

供用电合同管理中存在的问题及对策分析

供用电合同是供电企业与用户具有供用关系的唯一有效法律凭证,及时、规范地和用户签订供用电合同是供电企业维护自身合法利益的重要方法。本文主要分析了在供用电合同管理过程中存在的各种问题,在此基础上,根据实际情况,提出了针对性的对策。     

加强合同管理规避经营风险

企业在合同管理的各个阶段都会面临着对方违约、合同未成立、被撤消或者无效等合同风险.因此,企业必须加强合同管理工作,在合同谈判、起草、审查、签订、履行及归档等各个阶段采取手段,提高对方履行合同能力、合同条款的规范性和严密性,加强合同履行过程控制,进一步加强合同管理,规避经营风险,积极维护企业利益.     

对合同附随义务的探索及其完善

附随义务是随着诚实信用原则的兴起而产生的一种合同义务,对于保护和平衡合同当事人双方的利益,实现契约正义,发挥着重要的作用。附随义务分为缔约过程中、履约过程中和合同履行完毕后的附随义务。我国对附随义务的规定过于简略,应从立法上进一步明确附随义务的各种形态,提高附随义务的法律效力,明确违反附随义务的责任形式及归责原则。     

Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts

Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public‐to‐private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private‐to‐private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties.     

供应链契约研究综述

文章介绍了供应链契约的概念及分类,然后详细介绍了数量折扣契约、退货策略、数量柔性契约以及收入共享契约,最后指出供应链契约未来的研究方向。     

关于货物运输合同法律特征的探讨

货物运输合同是十分复杂的合同现象,货物运输合同的特征不同于一般民事合同。在分析传统的理论对货物运输合同研究的不足时,揭示了货物运输合同具体而又独特的法律特征,即货物运输合同对承运人一方进行全面的限制,承运人资格许可化;货物运输合同缔约的法律强制化;货物运输合同条款格式化;货物运输合同的主要内容法律化。由于货物运输合同仍然是合同,而合同的本质仍然是自由,自由的程度则取决于立法者对货物运输合同关系的认识和运输关系对法的要求。这种要求表现为社会公共利益的需要。     

Property Rights Protection of Biotechnology Innovations

Protection of intellectual property embedded in self-replicating biological innovations, such as genetically modified seed, presents two problems for the innovator: the need for copy protection of intellectual property and price competition between new seed and reproduced seed. We consider three regimes in two periods with asymmetric information: short-term contracts, biotechnological protection, and long-term contracts. We find that piracy imposes more intense competition for seed sales than does durability alone. Technology protection systems yield highest firm profit and long-term contracts outperform short-term contracts. Farmers prefer, in order, long-term, short-term, and biotechnical protection. Depending on monitoring cost, long-term contracts may be socially preferred to short-term contracts, with both preferred to biotechnical protection.     

Contract employment policy and research productivity of knowledge workers: an analysis of Spanish universities

Abstract

This article investigates how contract employment practices adopted by universities—fixed-term contracts and permanent contracts—impact research productivity measured in terms of publications in scholarly journals. The empirical application considers the Spanish public higher education system for the period 2002–2008. We report an inverse U-shaped relationship between the rate fixed-term contracts and the research productivity of Spanish universities. That is, contract policies based on fixed-term contracts are conducive to research productivity; however, beyond a critical threshold value increases in the proportion of fixed-term contracts are associated with declining research productivity. These findings reveal that contract employment policies shape research productivity, and that flexible and balanced contract practices are critical for enhancing universities’ research productivity. The results suggest that the excessive use of fixed-term contracts might create an unstable working environment that limits the universities’ capacity to capitalize on their knowledge workers. Policy implications and future research avenues are discussed.     

Subjective performance of patent examiners,implicit contracts,and self‐funded patent offices

Self‐funded patent offices should be concerned with patent quality (patents should be granted to only deserving innovations) and quantity (as revenues come from fees paid by applicants). In this context, we investigate what is the impact of the self‐funded constraint on different bonus contracts and how these contracts affect the examiners' incentive to prosecute patent applications. We consider contracts in which a patent office offers bonuses on quantity quotas (explicit contract) and on quality outcome (either an implicit contract or an explicit contract based on a quality proxy). We find that a self‐funded constrained agency should make different organization choices of incentives. For a low quality proxy precision, an agency facing a tight budget operates well with implicit contracts. However, by only relaxing moderately the budget constraint, the agency might be worse off simply because this will preclude implicit contracts. Only very large patenting fees might allow the agency to compensate for the loss of implicit contracts.     

Do salaries improve worker performance?

We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.     

Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly,with and without commitment

In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms' owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare. If products are either sufficiently differentiated or sufficiently close substitutes, owners use Relative Performance contracts. For intermediate levels of product substitutability, they use Market Share contracts. When owners do not commit over the types of contracts, each type is an owner's best response to his rival's choice. Product substitutability has differential effects on output levels and profits, depending on the configuration of contracts in the industry. Finally, managerial incentive contracts are welfare enhancing if they increase consumers' surplus. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

城市合同:法国区域治理的经验与启示

在以多中心、平等治理及和谐关系为特征的城市合同治理方式的推动下,法国构建了世界上较为成熟与成功的善治模式,体现了当今社会对善治的系列要求。法国区域治理所采用的城市合同治理模式,具有以下三点启示意义:即有计划、有步骤的市场分权是实施城市合同的必要条件和有效途径;跨界治理机构的协调参与是城市合同有效进行的保障;城市合同是有效处理区域公共治理主体间利益矛盾冲突关系的基础。     

Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusivity Clauses: Evidence from Shopping Malls

Exclusive contracts are one of the most controversial topics in the economic analysis of antitrust. Yet, very few empirical papers analyze the determinants and the consequences of exclusive contracts. In this paper, I study exclusive contracts between hamburger restaurants and Israeli shopping malls, in which mall owners commit to prohibiting additional hamburger restaurants from entering their malls. I investigate the determinants of these exclusive contracts and examine how such contracts affect the number of hamburger restaurants and their sales. I show that exclusive contracts are less likely to be adopted in larger malls, in malls that face more competition from other malls, and in malls that opened before 1993, when McDonald's and Burger King entered the Israeli market. I then use the mall's opening year—before or after 1993—as an instrumental variable to estimate a negative effect of exclusive contracts on the number of restaurants and on total mall hamburger sales. My findings are generally consistent with anti‐competitive vertical foreclosure models.