Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players

We introduce and analyze three definitions of equilibrium for finite extensive games with imperfect information and ambiguity averse players. In a setting where players’ preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility, as characterized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18(2):141–153, 1989), our definitions capture the intuition that players may consider the possibility of slight arbitrary mistakes. This generalizes the idea leading to trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as introduced in Selten (Int J Game Theory 4(1):25–55, 1975), by allowing for ambiguous trembles characterized by sets of distributions. We prove existence for two of our equilibrium notions and relate our definitions to standard equilibrium concepts with expected utility maximizing players. Our analysis shows that ambiguity aversion can lead to behavioral implications that are distinct from those attained under expected utility maximization, even if ambiguous beliefs only arise from the possibility of slight mistakes in the implementation of unambiguous strategies.     

Growth outside the stable path: Lessons from the European reconstruction

This paper exploits a natural experiment, the large destruction of capital in continental Europe during World War II, to characterize the transitional dynamics of an economy that begins with a capital stock below its steady state level. We use these regularities as a benchmark to discriminate among competing growth specifications. A model that combines non-separabilities in preferences with a technology that restricts the degree of substitutability between inputs outperforms the widely used AK and Cobb–Douglas specifications with time-separable preferences. Our results suggest that policy evaluations based in growth models that overlook non-separabilities in preferences or impose strong restrictions on the technological structure might be grossly misleading.     

Alcohol demand among young people in Spain: an addictive QUAIDS

This paper analyzes the demand for alcoholic beverages among young people in Spain. To that end, we develop a theoretical model which combines elements from the Theory of Two-Stage Budgeting and the Theory of Addiction, with this being empirically translated into a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) in which the particular characteristics of young people are introduced by Price Scaling (PS) techniques. We then estimate this specification by using data drawn from the Spanish National Survey on Drug Use in the School Population (2000) and the Spanish National Household Survey (2000). Given that wine, beer and spirits all have normal demands, our results suggest that a tax increase imposed with the intention of reducing alcohol consumption would appear to be efficient. This paper was partially written while Ana Isabel Gil was a Visiting Researcher at the London School of Economics and Political Science, to which she would like to express her gratitude for the hospitality and facilities provided. An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the Spanish Economic Analysis Meeting-2003 (Sevilla, Spain) with all the comments made by the participants being appreciated. Finally, the authors would like to express their thanks for the financial support provided by the Spanish Ministry of Education-CICYT and the European Commission (Project 2FD97-2057). The usual disclaimer applies.     

An implementation of the Owen value

We present an implementation of the Owen value (Owen, 1977, Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, pp. 76–88), inspired by the bidding mechanism introduced by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, J. Econ. Theory 100, 274–294). The idea is the following: first players of each coalition play the bidding mechanism trying to obtain the resources of the coalition. Later, players who obtained the resources play the bidding mechanism in order to share the surplus.     

Dynamic inefficiency in an overlapping generations economy with production

Reichlin [Equilibrium cycles in an overlapping generations economy with production, J. Econ. Theory 40 (1986) 89-102] has shown in an OLG model with productive capital that whenever the steady state is locally indeterminate and undergoes a Hopf bifurcation, it is Pareto-optimal. While these results were established under the assumption of Leontief technology, the author has partially extended them to show that the Hopf bifurcation is robust with respect to the introduction of capital-labor substitution. In this note, we prove that the Pareto-optimality of the steady state does not extend to technologies with capital-labor substitution. When the steady state is a sink or undergoes a Hopf bifurcation, it is characterized by over-accumulation with respect to the Golden Rule—the interest rate is negative—hence not Pareto-optimal. Most importantly, it follows that stabilization policies targeting the steady state leave room for welfare losses associated with productive inefficiency, apart from the very special case of Leontief technology.     

Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation

It has been suggested that players often produce simplified and/or misspecified mental models of strategic decisions [Kreps, D., 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford]. We submit that the relational structure of players' preferences in a game is a source of cognitive complexity, and may be an important driver of such simplifications. We provide a classification of order structures in two-person games based on the properties of monotonicity and projectivity, and present experiments in which subjects construct representations of games of different relational complexity and subsequently play the games according to these representations. Experimental results suggest that relational complexity matters. More complex games are harder to represent, and this difficulty seems correlated with short term memory capacity. In addition, most erroneous representations are simpler than the correct ones. Finally, subjects who misrepresent the games behave consistently with such representations, suggesting that in many strategic settings individuals may act optimally on the ground of simplified and mistaken premises.     

Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution

We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D50, O41.     

Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma

This paper investigates the Harsanyi [Harsanyi, J.C., 1973. Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points. International Journal of Game Theory 2 (1), 1–23]-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and Välimäki [Ely, J.C., Välimäki, J., 2002. A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 102 (1), 84–105] in their study of the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. We find that any such strategy profile is not the limit of one-period memory equilibrium strategy profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distributions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable.     

R&D intensity,economic growth and firm-size growth: theory and practice

This article proposes a theoretical knowledge-driven horizontal research and development (R&D) endogenous-growth model to explain, for 10 innovative countries, the co-movement of the respective R&D intensity, economic growth and firm-size growth, by exploring short-medium-run and long-run growth effects. Bearing in mind some recent literature, we improve the R&D technology, by considering that R&D is more labour intensive through time as complexity increases, that the diffusion of designs is affected by coordination, organizational and transportation costs, and that a potential entrant will come up with the right idea is reduced because of the presence of a larger number of entrants. We show that when the economy is not initially in a steady state, it can take a saddle path towards the unique and locally saddle-path stable interior steady state. Both transitional-dynamics and steady-state behaviours of our theoretical model are then consistent with, respectively, the time-series and the cross-sectional evidence.     

On R&D spillovers, multiple equilibria and indeterminacy

Empirical studies often find significant and positive R&D spillovers across firms. In this note, we incorporate this spillover effect into a scale-invariant quality-ladder model. We find that the modified model features multiple steady states (1) a high-R&D steady state, (2) a low-R&D steady state and (3) a zero-R&D steady state. As for dynamics, when R&D spillovers are small, only the zero-R&D steady state is stable, and it emerges as a no-growth trap. In this case, the economy is subject to sunspot fluctuations around this trap (i.e., local indeterminacy). When R&D spillovers are large, both the zero-R&D and high-R&D steady states are stable and locally indeterminate. In this case, increasing patent breadth may cause the high-R&D steady state to become unstable and the economy to converge to the no-growth trap. Therefore, strengthening patent protection may stifle innovation through the occurrence of a bifurcation.     

协调博弈均衡随机稳定性的研究现状与展望

协调博弈均衡选择不仅依赖于博弈支付，更重要的是依赖于参与人之间复杂的行为预期过程，它是继囚徒困境博弈模型之后又一被广泛研究的博弈类型，本文基于随机稳定性思想，结合已有的研究文献，基于实验经济学的研究结果阐述了除博弈支付之外还有许多其他影响均衡稳定性的因素，在此基础上，进一步论述了相关理论模型的研究结论及其存在的缺陷，因此，要更现实地研究协调博弈均衡的稳定性，就需要加入除博弈支付之外的其他因素，最后，文章结合实验研究及理论模型提出了协调博弈均衡稳定性研究的思路与方向，为学者们进一步研究提供了新的视角。     

Construction industry in Spain,is it guilty of the current crisis?

This article presents an analysis of the construction sector in Spain over the last decade. Several indicators are constructed based on Input–Output tables that demonstrate that the importance attributed to this sector does not correspond to its true role in the overall Spanish economy. Although it is true that the construction industry is important for other sectors of the economy, it is also true that the sector shows indicators that are average for the Spanish economy and lower than those of the industrial sector.     

Wood and industrialization: Evidence and hypotheses from the case of Spain, 1860-1935

The aim of this paper is to study wood consumption during the industrial expansion which took place in the western world in the second half of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century, through the analysis of the case of Spain. For this purpose, we present the series of Spanish wood consumption both as a raw material (WRM) and as firewood (FW) between 1860 and 1935 and we carry out two exercises with these series. The first calculates the intensity of use (IOU), which relates wood consumption in physical terms with the evolution of the GDP. The second, more complex, exercise estimates a standard consumption function that allows us to know the elasticity of WRM with respect to the GDP, the Spanish price of wood and the Spanish price of a substitute material like iron. Based on our results, we discuss the lower dependence of the Spanish industrial economy on wood, the “liberation” of forest areas that may have occurred in Spain as a result of industrialization, and to what extent the trends observed for the Spanish case can be extrapolated internationally. The main conclusion is that industrialization transformed the uses of wood and, though the importance of this resource per unit of GDP decreased, its overall consumption increased, generating greater pressure on forests at an international level.     

饭店绿色营销博弈观

文章运用博弈论对饭店绿色营销中各个博弈主体的相互关系进行了深入分析,指出饭店绿色营销的实施是饭店、宾客、政府三方博弈的结果。     

The productivity paradox and the new economy: The Spanish case

This paper studies the impact of the information and communication technologies (ICT) on economic growth in Spain using a dynamic general equilibrium approach. Contrary to previous works, we use a production function with six different capital inputs, three of them corresponding to ICT assets. Calibration of the model suggests that the contribution of ICT to Spanish productivity growth is very relevant, whereas the contribution of non-ICT capital has been even negative. Additionally, over the sample period 1995–2002, we find a negative TFP growth and productivity growth. These results together aim at the hypothesis that the Spanish economy could be placed within the productivity paradox.     

Economic growth and the evolution of water consumption in Spain: A structural decomposition analysis

The aim of this paper is to examine how technology, processes of input substitution, and changes in final demand, all of which underlie economic growth, influence water consumption. This analysis is undertaken for Spain during a significant socio-economic period, from 1980, the beginning of the democratic era, to 2007, the onset of the current economic crisis.To this end, we construct water consumption series linked to a time series of input–output tables generated for the Spanish economy, and we develop a structural decomposition analysis to study mainly changes in water consumption embodied in final demand.We find that the growth in Spanish demand (all other things being constant) would have implied an increase in water consumption almost three times the growth actually observed. However, this demand effect is largely offset by technology and intensity effects, mainly due to changes in agricultural crops. Given the importance of the demand growth, the final demand effect is also analyzed in detail, broken down by categories as well as level and composition. Household demand and the increase of exports appear as key explicative factors.     

Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View

In this paper, we argue that it is essential to incorporate bounded rationality into game theory. Game theory has been applied to aspects of economics such as industrial organizati on on the basis of the naive interpret ation of game theory, which requires players to be ideally rational in an extremely unrealistic way. We stress the importance of establishing the perceptive interpretation of game theory by taking boundedly rational players' inductive reasoning processes into account. We explain my recent work, Matsushima (1997), which shows that the subjective games perceived by players in the long run are entirely different from the true objective game, and are trivial games in the sense that there exists a strictly dominant and subjectively Pareto-efficient strategy profile among the set of pure strategy profiles.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C90, D43, D80     

Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and also the participants in seminars at GREQE (Marseille), Université de Montréal, UBC, HEC (Paris), in the Location Theory session of the World Congress of the Econometric Society (Barcelona) and in the Game Theory Conference at the University of Western Ontario for their comments. We remain, of course, solely responsible for the content of the paper. Financial support from FCAR (Québec), SSHRCC (Canada) and CNRS (France) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Subsistence consumption and natural resource depletion: Can resource-rich low-income countries realize sustainable consumption paths?

This contribution is concerned with efficient use of a resource if households are characterized by Stone–Geary preferences with a minimum subsistence level of consumption. Subsistence consumption implies particular minimum requirements for initial endowments with reproducible man-made capital and resources. If these are not met, the economy is not able to cover subsistence consumption such as nutrition. Focusing on the steady state, we find that the equilibrium can be governed by zero or positive growth. The latter occurs if the rate of exogenous technical change exceeds the rate of time preference. In the former case, we can show that Hartwick’s investment rule applies in a steady state. Finally, we calibrate the model for developing but resource-rich countries and trace the full dynamic development of the economy. Furthermore, we evaluate this full adjustment process regarding several sustainability indicators.