浅谈如何保护我国公司独立董事的独立性

近些年来国内关于独立董事制度的研讨相当激烈,许多公司已经引进了独立董事。"独立性"是独立董事的灵魂,独立董事能否真正在公司中起作用,关键在于他是否具有独立性。文章从独立董事制度的产生及独立董事的独立性涵义入手,分析我国现行的独立董事独立性所存在的问题,并给出几点建议。最后基于个人思考提出了对于"保护独立董事独立性"的一点质疑。     

论独立董事“独立性”的建立

对独立董事制度而言,独立性是独立董事和独立董事制度的灵魂。独立董事必须以独立于公司管理层的独立的身份、独立的人格、独立的行为参与公司董事会的经营决策过程和履行监督公司管理层的职责,如果没有了独立性,整个独立董事制度赖以建立和存在的基础就不复存在,独立董事就毫无存在的价值和意义。我认为,应该准确理解和把握独立董事＂独立性＂的三方面内容。     

从独立董事的薪酬制度设计透析其独立性

独立董事制度作为改善公司内部治理结构的有力措施 ,已被正式引入到我国上市公司中。独立性作为独立董事制度的灵魂 ,直接关系着独立董事能否在公司治理机制中真正起到制衡的作用。在对国内外独立董事的薪酬制度现状进行比较分析的基础上 ,进一步探讨了薪酬制度与独立性之间的关系 ,并对如何合理地设置我国上市公司独立董事的薪酬制度提出一些建议     

独立董事托管制可让独立董事“独立”

我国的独立董事制度建立不久,还存在诸多问题。独立董事区别于其他董事最根本的特征是“独立”,其独立与否、独立性高低对独立董事制度能否发挥作用至关重要。目前我国上市公司在独立董事的管理、提名聘任、薪酬发放等诸多方面都存在不独立的情况,     

完善我国上市公司独立董事制度的思考

独立董事制度是指在董事会中设立独立董事,以形成权力制衡与监督的一种制度。而公司独立董事是指不在公司担任除董事以外的其他职务,并与所受聘公司及其主要股东不存在可能妨碍其进行独立客观判断关系的董事。独立董事制度是已被以美国为代表的西方国家证明是一种行之有效并被广泛采用的制度。目前世界上许多国家都建立了比较完善的独立董事制度。2001年,中国证监会发布了《关于在上市公司中建立独立董事制度的指导意见》,标志着我国正式引入独立董事制度。     

独立董事与公司治理:理论、经验与实践

独立董事在董事会成员中所占的比例数在很大程度上反映了公司董事会的独立性特征。有观点认为 ,独立董事制度为公司的权益资本和管理雇佣契约提供了更为安全的治理措施。经验分析表明 ,目前实行的独立董事制度并没有发挥真正的效用。政策制订部门的当务之急就是协调监事与独立董事之间的功能冲突 ;同时 ,注意治理机制的互补作用 ,打造独立董事市场 ,发挥声誉机制的作用 ,并强化立法的质量与增大执法的力度。     

首个上市公司独董履职制度出台

正中国上市公司协会日前发布《上市公司独立董事履职指引》,这是我国自2001年推行这项制度以来首个针对独立董事履职的制度性文件。根据要求,独立董事应当保持身份和履职的独立性,无法符合独立性条件的,应当提出辞职。独立董事的连任时间不能超过6年,原则上最多在5家上市公司兼任独立董事。值得注意的是,指引明确,独立董事不仅有权从公司领取适当津贴,还享有要求上市公司为其履行独立董事职责购买责任保险的权利。如果由半数以上独立董事提出但未被上市公司采纳的提案,     

我国基金管理公司的独立董事制度

近年来,国际组织和成熟市场经济国家纷纷开始以完善公司治理结构为主要内容的制度创新.一些国家和地区在完善公司治理结构的过程中,都将提高公司治理的独立性--即在公司的董事会里增加一定比例的独立董事来增强监督的独立性、公平性和有效性作为一项重要内容,独立董事制度日渐盛行.借鉴国际经验,中国证监会要求基金管理公司必须完善治理结构,实行独立董事制度.独立董事人数不少于公司全部董事的三分之一,并多于第一股东提名的股东人数.     

地方法人金融机构独立董事制度有效性提升路径

独立董事制度对改善地方法人金融机构公司治理水平、提升金融机构管理风险、控制风险的能力有积极作用。经过多年的发展,地方法人金融机构独立董事制度已略有成效。基于对唐山中支辖区7家地方法人金融机构独立董事制度运行情况的调查分析,发现地方法人金融机构独立董事制度存在配备不完善、独立性和专业性不足、履职积极性不高、激励机制不健全等问题,提升地方法人金融机构独立董事制度有效性,需完善相关法律法规、引入多样化专业背景独立董事、提升独立董事履职效能、加强激励等。     

浅析独立董事的独立性

独立董事制度首创于美国，是指在上市公司董事会中设立独立董事的制度。由于独立董事特有的独立性，使得独立董事一方面可以有效制约控股股东和经理层，遏制内部人控制问题；另一方面还可以凭借专业知识及独立判断提高董事会决策的科学化、透明化程度，促进上市公司规范运作。因此，独立董事制度是完善公司治理结构、保护中小股东利益的有效途径。     

独立董事返聘与公司违规:“学习效应”抑或“关系效应”？

本文关注独立董事任期届满后离任、但经过一段“冷却期”后再次被原上市公司返聘的现象(“独立董事返聘”)。本文以2003—2016年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,研究了独立董事返聘对公司违规的影响究竟是基于“学习效应”的抑制效果还是基于“关系效应”的助长效果。研究发现:(1)对独立董事返聘的公司而言,相对于冷却期,返聘期的公司违规显著更少(纵向对比);(2)返聘的独立董事首任期间,公司违规要显著低于冷却期(纵向对比);(3)相较无独立董事返聘、返聘人数更少的公司,返聘人数更多的公司违规显著更少(横向对比)。研究发现支持了“学习效应”假说,即独立董事返聘抑制了公司违规,并非是规避任期规定的手段。     

Is there an association between director option compensation and the likelihood of misstatement?

Oversight bodies in the United States (US) have addressed the issue of director independence in recent years. Bebchuk et al. [Bebchuk, L., Grinstein, Y., Peyers, U. (2006). Lucky directors. (Working paper Harvard University Law School) SSRN # 952239.] found that director oversight may be impaired if directors receive option grants under favorable terms because these grants may create a mutuality of interest between directors and managers. We assess whether option grants to independent directors reduce oversight of financial reporting. Using a sample of 105 US firms that misstated their revenue matched with a sample of non-misstatement firms, we find that companies whose independent directors do not receive stock options are less likely to misstate revenues than companies who meet the Sarbanes-Oxley definition of independence. Our results show that compensating outside directors with stock options may weaken their independent oversight.     

中国上市公司独立董事制度研究

独立董事制度在中国上市公司中实施只有四年左右的时间.本文通过独立董事制度实施以来存在问题的研究,从公司治理结构与独立董事制度、独立董事制度产生的基础、股权结构与独立董事制度以及独立董事本身等方面进行了深层次探索,认为完善独立董事制度应从体制和政策调整两方面共同进行.体制方面,完善在国内外公司治理结构模式的比较分析基础上,将独立董事制度与公司治理结构结合起来.从政策调整方面,应从独立董事职责、独立董事产生机制、独立董事监管体系的形成、独立董事工作制度等诸方面加以调整和完善,以使独立董事制度发挥其真正的效用.     

A股民营公司独立董事制度的控股方效应研究

上市公司治理机制的核心在董事会,而董事会结构及其治理效果又受到控股方影响。本文利用A股民营公司的数据实证考察了控股方的控制结构对独立董事比例这～治理机制的影响。结果显示,A股民营公司独立董事比例仅处于满足监管数量要求的“达标”边界,控股方的控股比例越高,越不愿强化董事会独立性;若控股方直接担任董事长或总经理、抑或两职兼任,则愿引进更多独立董事。总的说来,A股民营公司的独立董事机制难以越出控股方的意图。     

Independent directors and the propensity to pay dividends

Using data from 944 public companies in 2006, I examine how a firm's propensity to pay dividends is related to (i) board independence and (ii) independent directors' tenure, number of board seats (busy) and equity incentive compensation. After controlling for the effects of traditional economic, CEO entrenchment and ownership determinants of the propensity to pay dividends, I find evidence of a positive association between the propensity to pay and (i) board independence and (ii) director tenure, and a negative association between the propensity to pay and (i) busy directors and (ii) greater equity incentive compensation in the director pay structure. I find consistent results when the decision is to pay cash dividends or repurchase shares. In further tests, I find that equity incentive compensation in the independent director pay structure is the most pervasive determinant across other dividend measures such as dividend payout, total payout and repurchases. Overall, the findings suggest that the characteristics of independent directors are important determinants of the payout policy. The results also suggest that future corporate governance research could benefit from incorporating characteristics of independent directors rather than limiting governance measures to board independence especially when recent empirical evidence (Linck et al., 2008, 2009) shows convergence, and therefore, narrowing variation in the proportion of outsiders and insiders on a board.     

独立董事制度的有效性:基于盈余管理视角

本文从盈余管理的视角研究我国独立董事制度的有效性,为我国独立董事制度的完善提供实证支持.结果发现,具有会计专业能力的上市公司独立董事人数越多,盈余管理程度越低;独立董事薪酬越高,上市公司盈余管理程度越高.但没有发现独立董事比例、履职环境与其盈余管理程度具有显著的相关关系.     

The influence of director stock ownership and board discussion transparency on financial reporting quality

Seventy-two active corporate directors participate in an experiment where management insists on aggressive recognition of revenue, but the chief audit executive proposes a more conservative approach. Results indicate interactive effects of director stock ownership and the transparency of director decisions. Stock-owning directors are more likely to oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings when transparency increases. For non-stock owning directors, however, increasing transparency does not affect the likelihood that directors oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings. The current study challenges suppositions that equate director stock ownership with improved financial reporting and higher corporate governance quality, and it provides evidence that increased transparency is beneficial when director compensation plans threaten director independence.     

The determinants of director remuneration,executive tenure and individual executive disclosure in North African IPO firms

This paper examines the impact of board governance mechanisms, namely board size, independence ratio, opacity of earnings disclosure, and ratio of genuinely independent nonexecutive directors to total board size on director remuneration, executive tenure and likelihood of individual executive salary disclosure in a unique and comprehensive sample of 69 North African IPO firms. I find evidence of the enhanced governance role of true independent nonexecutives in family as opposed to non-family firms in improving disclosure of individual salaries and moderating lengths of executive tenure. However while their role is only significant in the context of family firms the evidence suggests that their presence is associated with higher levels of remuneration. The evidence also ascribes a greater role for business angel as opposed to more formal private equity financing which is more applicable within the highly social networked economy of the Maghreb region.     

The value of independent directors: Evidence from sudden deaths

We investigate contributions of independent directors to shareholder value by examining stock price reactions to sudden deaths in the US from 1994 to 2007. We find, first, that following director death stock prices drop by 0.85% on average. Second, the degree of independence and board structure determine the marginal value of independent directors. Third, independence is more valuable in crucial board functions. Finally, controlling for director-invariant heterogeneity using a fixed effect approach, we identify the value of independence over and above the value of individual skills and competences. Overall, our results suggest that independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders.     

Independent director cash compensation and earnings management

This study examines the impact of independent directors’ cash compensation on firms’ financial reporting quality using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2008. Unlike in the U.S. where most listed firms provide stock-related compensations to outside directors, Chinese listed companies compensate independent directors with cash only. This context offers a cleaner setting for examining the effects of independent director cash pay on earnings management. Our study documents a positive association between independent director cash compensation and the magnitude of earnings management. This suggests that compensating independent directors with higher cash pay compromises their independence and reduces their effectiveness in financial reporting oversight. Our results are robust to an array of sensitivity checks. These findings have important implications for both investors and policy makers by showing that independent directors’ cash compensation is also a significant determinant of financial reporting quality.