Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Regulation and Supervision: A Cross-Country Investigation

Bank regulation and supervision (RS) is a formal institutional mechanism that aims to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard risks in the banking sector. This paper offers an empirical exploration of the relationship between banking-sector performance and RS using data on the legal quality of bank regulation and supervision. The main channels via which RS affects bank performance are considered to be depositor trust, investment mobilization, and borrower discipline. An event study of up to fifty-three countries provides robust evidence that RS has significant positive effects on bank deposits and investment rate and significant negative effects on nonperforming loans.     

国外金融监管协调合作的成功经验及启示

国际经验表明,金融危机的发生在很大程度上是由于金融监管不力,而监管不力往往又与各金融监管部门各自为政、缺乏协调合作紧密相关.基于加拿大、日本、韩国、澳大利亚等国家次贷危机前金融监管协调合作机制改革的考察,笔者分析了这些国家在监管机构设置与职能、监管机构协调与合作、监管信息收集与共享以及国际监管协调与合作方面取得的成功经...     

银行监管和股东属性对银行风险的影响——基于新兴经济体的监管数据分析

银行监管按世界银行的标准划分为总体监管和12类分项监管;银行大股东属性包括政府类、金融企业类、外资类等.总体监管可以有效地降低银行风险;大股东为工业类、金融类企业的银行能够更好地控制风险,而家族类银行的风险程度较高;通过对分项监管进行研究可以发现,加强对所有权、资本要求、经营活动限制、外部审计要求、流动性、存款保险制度、退出及监管效率八个方面的监管可降低银行总体风险,而加强准入、内部管理、资产分类配置、信息披露这四类监管反而会增加银行总体风险.     

银行监管的理论研究

银行体系自身具有内在的脆弱性;自然垄断、外部效应和信息不对称等问题又导致金融市场的失灵;银行业在经营中必然存在一定的道德风险。上述原因使得银行监管成为一种必要,有效的监管有利于防范金融风险的发生。     

关于中央银行金融监管权边界的理论思考

中央银行应在多大程度上行使金融监管职能,长期以来一直是个理论上有争议的问题,在各国金融监管实践中也表现出不同的情况。然而,此次金融危机后,许多国家出台的金融监管体制改革方案都主张扩大中央银行的监管权限。本文拟对中央银行扩权的主要依据进行理论分析,并对我国金融监管框架的改革提一些建议。     

内部监督、监管替代与银行价值

本文以银行内部监督为例,通过建立一个简单模型并进行实证检验,深入研究了监管对内部治理机制的替代关系及其对银行价值的影响。研究结果表明,监管确实改变了银行内部监督机制,产生了监管替代。监管对内部监督进而对银行价值的影响较为复杂,不同监管措施的影响存在差异。事前严格的监管降低了内部监督强度,对银行价值产生负面影响;事中监管监督的影响取决于对内部监督的替代程度,当替代效应大时会降低银行价值,反之,当替代效应小时则会提高银行价值。监管替代的存在表明良好的银行公司治理有赖于恰当的监管政策。为减少监管过度替代带来的问题,我国现行由监管部门主导银行改革的监管政策需要作出调整。     

我国商业银行信贷亲周期性与逆周期监管政策探析

伴随着宏观经济前进的步伐,我国银行业市场化进程也在加速,商业银行取得了巨大发展,同时其顺周期性也逐步凸显。本文用实证分析验证了我国商业银行信贷的亲周期性。在世界各国实施宏观审慎监管政策的背景下,我国商业银行的逆周期监管就显得尤其重要。     

银行监管与企业融资的跨国实证分析

依据世界银行对各国银行监管与微观企业调查的跨国数据,运用实证分析方法,考量巴塞尔协议三大银行监管手段对企业融资的影响。结果发现：资本充足率要求与私营部门监测均会降低融资可得性,且对中小型企业的影响更大;而政府部门监管权力能提高企业融资可得性。鉴于此,监管机制设计应充分考虑不同政策的相互影响,特别是对中小型企业融资的冲击,慎重调整资本充足率与对私人监测程度的监管要求,妥善应用政府监测程度监管权力来实现金融稳定与企业融资的双赢,增强金融服务实体经济能力。     

Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior

This paper utilizes bank Call Report and FDIC receivership data from 1987 to 1991 to examine the impact of a failed bank acquisition on the growth rate of commercial and industrial (C&I) lending at the acquiring institutions. Using a two-stage least squares model with fixed effects, we find that banks acquiring a failed bank's assets experience a significant decline in both the growth rate of C&I lending and their capital asset ratios in the period of the acquisition. The results support anecdotal evidence that failed-bank borrowers may experience difficulties in accessing credit once their bank fails and underscores the importance of bank-borrower relationships in C&I lending. Finally, the paper provides an alternative explanation for banks' stagnant or declining business lending activity during this period of financial turmoil.     

当前我国银行监管职能不宜从中央银行分离

当前 ,银行监管职能是否从中央银行分离成为国内外理论界的热门话题。本文从理论角度和现实国情两个方面 ,阐明了当前我国不宜进行银行监管职能从中央银行分离的改革 ,认为我国的当务之急应是如何在现有框架下有效协调银行监管与货币政策的关系问题。     

对财政监督效应的思考

财政监督效应能够切实提高财政资金使用效率,实现科学理财、民主理财以及依法理财,促进国家财政科学化、精细化管理。文章在明确财政监督效应内涵基础上,确定“科学监督”与“全面监督”为现阶段财政监督目标,深入剖析了我国目前财政监督存在的问题,并提出了相应的政策建议。     

金融控股公司的反垄断法规制——以银行集中控制为视角

金融控股公司已成为当前各国发展金融行业,提升金融竞争力的主要方式。金融控股公司的集中是竞争效率的反应,但过度集中则会导致竞争者减少,竞争机制的失灵。过去,人们强调金融业的监管问题,但金融危机不仅使人们意识到审慎监管的重要性,也引起了人们对金融反垄断的思考。对金融控股公司集中的反垄断规制应以有效竞争原则为基本理念;在规制的具体规则中,则应考虑相关市场的界定和有效抗辩机制这两个因素。     

The Interaction of the IFRS 9 Expected Loss Approach with Supervisory Rules and Implications for Financial Stability

This paper examines the interaction of the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 expected credit loss (ECL) model with supervisory rules and discusses potential implications for financial stability in the European Union. Compared to the incurred loss approach of IAS 39, the IFRS 9 ECL model incorporates earlier and larger impairment allowances and is more closely aligned with regulatory expected loss. The earlier recognition of credit losses will reduce the build-up of loss overhangs and the overstatement of regulatory capital. In addition, extended disclosure requirements are likely to contribute to more effective market discipline. Through these channels IFRS 9 might enhance financial stability. However, due to the reliance on point-in-time estimates of the main input parameters (probability of default and loss given default) IFRS 9 ECLs will increase the volatility of regulatory capital for some banks. Furthermore, the ECL model provides significant room for managerial discretion. Bank supervisors might play an important role in the implementation of IFRS 9, but too much supervisory intervention bears the risk of introducing a prudential bias into loan loss accounting that compromises the integrity of financial reporting. Overall, the potential benefits of the standard will crucially depend on its proper and consistent application across jurisdictions.     

Bank Capital and Risk: Is Voluntary Disclosure Enough?

This paper considers whether banks have an incentive to disclose accurate information concerning their risk and capital adequacy. State-of-the-art capital regulation relies on quantitative capital requirements, bank supervision, and public disclosure of information to the markets. Is voluntary regulatory disclosure of risk information sufficient to achieve policy objectives? The game-theoretic model of this paper suggests that voluntary disclosure can be usefully supplemented with other regulatory tools, in particular with direct supervision and financial market discipline.     

Stock Price Reaction to Evidence of Earnings Management: Implications for Supplementary Financial Disclosure

We condition security price reactions to quarterly earnings announcements on whether firms disclose supplementary balance sheet and/or cashflow information that can be used to estimate the consequences of earnings management. Disclosure of supplementary information is voluntary, and thus, we consider the possibility that firms that disclose balance sheet and/or cashflow information differ systematically from firms that do not disclose. Results indicate that investors discount evidence of earnings management at the disclosure date when supplementary information is disclosed. Such results indicate more informed earnings interpretations of quarterly earnings when firms provide balance sheet and/or cashflow information concurrently.

Foreign Bank Behavior during Financial Crises

This paper studies whether lending by foreign banks is affected by financial crises. We pair a bank‐level data set of foreign ownership with information on banking crises and examine whether the credit supply of majority foreign‐owned banks that underwent home‐country crises differ systematically from those of other foreign banks. In contrast to the literature, our broad global coverage allows us to exploit variations between foreign banks; this enables us to identify an average treatment effect directly attributable to crises. Our baseline results show that banks exposed to home‐country crises between 2007–08 exhibit changes in lending patterns that are lower by between 13% and 42% than their noncrisis counterparts. This finding is robust to potential alternative explanations, and also holds, though less strongly, for the 1997/98 Asian crisis.     

Modernizing Financial Regulation: The Relation Between Interbank Transactions and Supervisory Reform

Modernized financial firms are larger than traditional institutions, and they provide a broader range of services. Although the individual regulatory issues raised by modernization are not new, the pace and scope of these market changes may imply a qualitative change in the ability of governments to guarantee financial system stability. Private market discipline is more flexible, and the value of flexibility seems to have risen. In order to elicit private monitoring, however, governments must credibly eschew too-big-to-fail policies. Toward this end, national regulators should encourage ongoing efforts to implement secure interbank settlement systems.     

论构建财政监督创新机制

针对我国现行财政监督中存在的法律依据欠缺、组织体系不完善、监督方式单一、技术手段落后等弊端,应进行财政监督机制创新--建立健全财政监督法律体系,强化财政监督的法制保障;搭建财政"大监督"框架,加大执法配合力度;采取多重监督方式配合,运用现代信息技术手段,提升财政监督效果.     

营造适应城商行发展监管环境

城市商业银行是中国金融改革与发展的产物,被称作国有商业银行和股份制商业银行之后的中国银行业的第三梯队。从1995年国务院决定在城市信用社基础上组建城市商业银行开始,从无到有、从小到大,经历了从分散的多个法人到一级法人、从松散的作坊式管理到现代商业银行的规范管理、     

影子银行与金融危机

本文认为,此次全球金融危机的根源在于回购市场挤提引起的银行恐慌。机构投资者是回购市场的需求者,他们向影子银行"存款",影子银行则以资产抵押支持证券保证"存款"的安全。当证券化资产的折价率大幅提高时,就出现了回购市场挤提,引起银行恐慌,从而导致了此次全球金融危机。