The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm‐Level Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland

This paper uses a linked employer‐employee dataset to analyze the impact of institutional wage bargaining regimes on average labor costs and within‐firm wage dispersion in private sector companies in Ireland. The results show that while centralized bargaining reduced labor costs within both the indigenous and foreign‐owned sectors, the relative advantage was greater among foreign‐owned firms. The analysis suggests that there are potentially large competitiveness gains to multinational companies that locate in countries implementing a centralized bargaining system. Furthermore, the results provide additional support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within‐firm wage inequality.     

Crosscurrents in Workers Participation

As I contemplate developments in recent years relating to participation in management, I am impressed by the uncertainties, the shifting tides of thought, the atmosphere of experimentation. At the level of participation theory, there is more rather than less doubt. A few years ago in the United States, optimistic theories like those of McGregor and Likert regarding workers needs and desires for self-actualization seemed to be sweeping the field; today they are regarded as psychologically inadequate and faulty. In England the theory of joint consultation is confronted with something of a polarization - either toward apathy or toward codetermination. In Israel the ideology of participation, derived originally from socialist theory, has been subjected to increasing challenge from pragmatic considerations of efficiency and profitability. Profit-sharing plans, after a hundred years of experience and a widening acceptability, do not necessarily entail increased worker participation. At the level of practice, the dominant note once again is uncertainty rather than a clear progression toward either success or failure. Neither the Scanlon Plan in the US nor the Glacier Metals experiment in England have generated many followers. Joint consultation schemes appear generally to have declined in number. In Israel Koor experiments in joint management at the plant level have frittered away. Participation has not even been seriously tried in Australia. Reports from Yugoslavia and Germany, where participation programs have been most fully developed, raise questions about the impact of participation on the productivity and efficiency of the enterprises involved, as well as the degree of involvement of workers. On the other hand, there are some positive currents. The spread of collective bargaining to the local level in England and other European countries, the rising interest in productivity bargaining, the absorption of joint consultation committees by unions - all point in the direction of more worker participation in management, although the model may be one of bargaining rather than integration. Out of these crosscurrents we can distinguish some of the main problems confronting the advocates of greater workers participation in management:

• 1 How to persuade managers that their professional interests are best served by cooperating, if not taking the lead, in different types of participation schemes.
• 2 How to convince workers that “participating” is worth the effort, and how to educate them in various forms of the process.
• 3 How to involve worker representatives in both administration and policy-making on a basis other than bargaining that will not estrange them from their constituents.

Resolution of these problems will depend in part at least on recognition that participation is a multi-dimensional process, that different types of participation may work better with regard to different issues or subjects (depending on requirements of technical knowledge and time), and that participation expectations and arrangements may vary with the different levels of an enterprise.     

When Do Companies Train Low-Skilled Workers? The Role of Institutional Arrangements at the Company and Sectoral Level

The article investigates how institutional arrangements at the organizational and sectoral level affect the likelihood and size of employer investments in continuing training for low-skilled workers in Germany. By building on comparative political economy and organizational theory, hypotheses are derived and tested. Regression analysis based on the IAB Establishment Survey (waves 2011 and 2013) shows evidence that the training participation of low-skilled workers is related to institutional differences between sectors and organizations. At the organizational level, structures of employee representation and formalized HR policies are positively associated with higher rates of training participation among low-skilled workers. Moreover, there is evidence that low-skilled workers benefit in organizational clusters that are characterized by structures of employee representation, formalized HR practices, and bargaining coverage. At the sectoral level, this study finds evidence that low-skilled workers in the health care and manufacturing sector are more likely to receive continuing training.     

The Rise in Orientation at Collective Bargaining Without a Formal Contract

While firm participation in collective bargaining between unions and employers’ associations has been decreasing in Germany over the last two decades, orientation at collectively bargained wages has increased in popularity. Orientation implies that employers claim to set wages according to collective agreements but they are not formally bound by the respective bargaining contract, and in fact, I observe that they pay significantly lower wages than firms that are formally covered. Dynamic nonlinear panel estimation applied to establishment‐level data shows that this orientation is a stepping stone into formal participation. However, the decline in formal participation and the opposing rise in orientation are mostly due to a changing establishment composition rather than to behavioral transitions.     

The Role of Mediation Institutions in Sweden and Denmark after Centralized Bargaining

This article compares coordinated collective bargaining in Sweden and Denmark after centralized bargaining. Existing theories — power resource and cross‐class alliance theory — seem capable of explaining the transition from centralized bargaining to pattern bargaining system. However, they do not explain the internal stability of bargaining coordination once established. This analysis stresses the role of mediation institutions of both countries for solving collective action problems in pattern bargaining by pegging other settlements to the manufacturing labour cost norm. Mediation capabilities, however, differ, which is reflected in more frequent defections in Sweden than in Denmark and thus a more unstable bargaining coordination. These differences have substantive consequences for bargaining outcomes in the two countries.     

The Union Response to International Corporations

The purpose of this paper has been to examine, on a pre-liminary basis, some of the implications of the international corporationunion interface for individual countries. It has been suggested that the impact of this interface will depend on the production strategy of the international corporation, the solidarity of the coalition of the unions in different countries, and the economic and political conditions prevailing in the individual countries. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the bargaining relationship between unions and international corporations, it is suggested that research will have to be conducted on the following topics: the industrial relations decision-making process of international firms, in particular the ways in which these firms react to international collective bargaining; the alternative strategies open to unions in international collective bargaining; the impact of international unionism and international firms on the industrial relations system of individual countries; the problems associated with international collective bargaining involving unions with different political ideologies; and the impact of international unionism on economic and political integration and the perception of national governments.     

Diverging Patterns: Labor in the Pacific Northwest Wood Products Industry

In 1986 workers in the Pacific Northwest United States accepted wage concessions while their Canadian counterparts prevailed after a lengthy strike. This study examines the forces behind the divergence in bargaining trends between American and Canadian wood products workers. It finds that while structural and cyclical economic changes in the industry were similar in both countries, there were crucial institutional and environmental differences. These enhanced the bargaining power of the Canadian membership of the International Woodworkers of America compared to that of IWA Region 3 in Oregon and Washington.     

The Viability of Trade Union Organization: A Bargaining Unit Analysis

The paper develops a model of trade union behaviour based on the concept of the viable bargaining unit. Viability rests on five conditions: membership level, service level, membership participation, employer recognition, and facilities. Unions are seen as portfolios of viable and inviable bargaining units. Six propositions are derived, concerning union scale, growth, the impact of statutory recognition provisions, the emergence of conglomerate unions, governance structures, and relations with employers. Employer dependence is central, and a simple game‐theoretic approach is used to discuss employer co‐operation. Viability at the union level is achieved by portfolio diversification and employer co‐operation.     

管理者薪酬、在职消费与公司绩效——基于合作博弈的分析视角

在我国公司管理者的薪酬激励体系中,年薪、股权激励和在职消费是三个重要组成部分,系统地研究这三个组成部分之间的关系及其对公司绩效影响,对于建立有效的管理者薪酬激励制度和完善公司治理具有重要意义。本文从合作博弈的角度出发,在非对称Nash讨价还价模型的基础上,通过引入内生化的讨价还价力,构建了一个内生化的Nash讨价还价模型,并应用此模型系统地分析了管理者年薪、股权激励与在职消费之间的关系。本文理论模型分析表明:在给定年薪的情况下,管理者持股比例与在职消费之间存在替代关系。本文运用2005—2010年沪深两市A股上市公司面板数据对上述分析结果以及管理者年薪、股权激励、在职消费与公司绩效之间关系进行了实证分析,结果发现:管理者持股比例和在职消费之间存在替代关系,管理者持股比例的增加能够抑制在职消费,从而提高公司绩效。     

Membership Participation and Centralized Control

The union faces severe economic and political problems: it is becoming increasingly expensive to perform important union functions, membership losses are difficult to replace, job mortality is high, firm size is small, membership income is modest, skill level is low, and the union has minority status in almost all of its industries. The policy response to financial pressure is to encourage members to volunteer to perform many union functions which the union can not otherwise afford. Policies supportive of this goal include supply of a broad array of services at union headquarters, insistence that members pay dues in person, insistence on meeting attendance, and emphasis on the steward and crew and the role of the experienced member. The political pressure is weakened union authority. Unusual heterogeneity among employers, occupations, and members, plus an unavoidably decentralized collective bargaining situation, present strong centrifugal tendencies. Major variations in occupation, skills, income level, union background, job security, and ethnic and cultural identification contribute to a diversity of interests and loyalties. A tendency for the membership to be clustered or differentiated by character of their employment also adds a potential threat of balkanization by local. The policy response to political pressure has been the effort to centralize authority and initiative. For example, the 1,000-member General Council has been granted almost unlimited governmental authority. The Council is the channel for downward communication flow; the related structuring, sequencing, and common agendas of all union meetings also keep initiative and authority at the Districtwide level. Additional centralizing aspects include the absence of constitutional restraints on leadership freedom of action; the lack of restraints from the international union; emphasis on crew and steward, rather than on local and local officer; the discouragement of electoral conflicts inherent in the application of the “majority rule”; the preferred ballot position of Districtwide candidates; the Districtwide vote required for the four “regional” leaders; and the offsetting of decentralized collective bargaining with an array of control devices. Meeting attendance, dues payments (without benefit of checkoff), and electoral participation are unusually high. However, volunteer offices are difficult to fill; experienced occupants are difficult to hold. There is little volunteer participation in organizing and collective bargaining and participation is way below the level prescribed by union policy pronouncements. Areas of inconsistency, if not conflict, exist between the two major strands of policy, i.e., encouragement of membership participation, on the one hand, and centralization of authority, on the other. Centralization makes it more difficult to involve members in union affairs. De-emphasis of the role of the local officer and organizer in favor of stewards and vice-presidents has minimized potential divisive influences, but at the cost of inhibiting volunteer leadership activity.     

What Factors Lead Management to Support or Oppose Employee Participation—With and Without Works Councils? Hypotheses and Evidence from Germany

This paper provides the first econometric analysis to distinguish between works councils in establishments where managers have a positive or negative view toward employee involvement in decision making. We similarly distinguish between establishments where no council is present in which management supports or does not support worker participation. We stress the potential role of works councils and participation in motivating employees. Our theoretical analysis and empirical results from German manufacturing establishment data show that the structure of the workforce, principal‐agent problems between owners and managers, collective bargaining, direct employee involvement, human resource management practices, and market strategy and innovativeness all play important roles. Some conflicting conclusions in the works council literature may be due to the failure to distinguish among industrial relations participation regimes characterized by cooperative or uncooperative relationships between works councils and management.     

Worker Participation—Some Under‐Considered Issues

This paper deals with a variety of issues regarding participation that may have received too little attention or that may be viewed from a different perspective. These include the sometimes faddist interest in the topic, participation as a form of bargaining, and alternate research strategies. It also reports on the current status of several once‐publicized participation sites.     

Testing a Behavioral Theory Model of Labor Negotiations

The Behavioral Theory we have developed stands up well and helps us gain a better feeling for the behavioral dynamics of collective bargaining. As expected, economic variables such as bargaining power and the estimated cost and probability of a work stoppage are important determinants of bargaining behavior. Nevertheless, the variables have a differential effect on bargaining goals, with strong bargaining power and low probability of a strike contributing to both distributive and integrative bargaining, whereas high expected costs of a strike help to persuade constituents to support their negotiators (intraorganizational bargaining). Thus we see the roie of intraorganizational bargaining as an alternative to being able to obtain a better settlement from the opponents. Attitudinal structuring seems to be more closely tied to integrative bargaining than was indicated by Walton and McKersie. Furthermore, there seems to be less direct conflict between the tactics used in integrative bargaining and those used in distributive bargaining than predicted by theory. Perhaps the mixed nature of most bargaining keeps the majority of negotiators from applying all-out distributive tactics. At any rate, strong bargaining power, constructive relationships, clear and specific statements of issues, as well as exploring them in a noncommital fashion, seem to aid both distributive and integrative bargaining. We uncovered a number of relationships which varied significantly according to the side (labor or management) and/or team role (chief negotiator or other team member) of the respondent. Although we feel they should be included in the theory of bargaining as moderator variables, and have thus included them in our model, we have only hinted at their impact in this paper. Overall, bargaining behavior and conditions seem to have as much effect on bargaining success as do the economic variables. Of course, we did not measure every possible economic variable, but neither did we examine all possible tactics. Our study confirms that collective bargaining is an interpersonal, attitudinal process as well as an economic one and that there are several distinct goals for the process. We have also demonstrated that, despite problems of locating current negotiations and obtaining an adequate rate of response, field study of the behavioral aspects of collective bargaining is feasible. We hope that investigations along this line will continue.     

Bargaining (De)centralization, Macroeconomic Performance and Control over the Employment Relationship

Based on data for 20 OECD countries, this paper analyses the effect of bargaining centralization on performance and control over the employment relationship. Rejecting both the corporatist thesis and the hump–shape thesis, the paper finds that performance either increases or decreases with centralization, depending on the ability of the higher level to bind lower levels. There is a clear effect on control in that bargaining coverage significantly declines with decentralization. Employers can therefore expect to extend management prerogatives, rather than improve performance, when enforcing decentralization. Hence the literature on bargaining structures when focusing on performance has lost sight of their contested nature.     

Minimum Wages and Collective Bargaining: What Types of Pay Bargaining Can Foster Positive Pay Equity Outcomes?

Using data from interviews and collective agreements in five European countries, this article analyses the relationship between collective bargaining and the minimum wage. In a context of changing minimum wage policy and competing government objectives, the findings illuminate how pay bargaining strategies of trade unions and employers shape the pay equity effects of minimum wage policy. Two general forms are identified: direct responses to a changing national minimum wage, and responses to the absence or weakness of a national minimum wage. The article explains how particular intersections of minimum wage policy and collective bargaining, together with country and sector contingencies, shape the form of pay bargaining and pay equity outcomes.     

Trade Unions and Work‐life Balance: Changing Times in France and the UK?

The mixed empirical findings to date have indicated that some, but not all, unions in industrialized countries are actively involved in campaigning and bargaining around work–life balance (WLB) issues, as part of a modernization agenda linked to feminization and to 'positive flexibility'. This article seeks to identify factors that might encourage or inhibit trade unions from involvement in WLB issues, within a cross-national comparative perspective focusing on two countries (France and the UK) that have contrasting working time regimes and approaches to WLB. It draws on original research carried out in two sectors — insurance and social work — in these two countries. The article links the emergence of union WLB programmes and bargaining agendas to gender-equality concerns within the union and to the gender composition of the sector, as well as to the working time regime, including the mode of action, partnership being a significant corollary of WLB campaigning in the UK. We find support for the modernization thesis in the UK, particularly in the public sector, but within severe constraints defined by employer initiative.     

Patterns of Continuity and Change in Managerial Attitudes and Behaviour in Industrial Relations, 1980-1990

In this paper, data are reported from a longitudinal study of managers' attitudes and behaviour in industrial relations based on a sample of fellows and members of the British Institute of Management. An account of two surveys, carried out in 1980 and 1990, follows an examination of theories of the managerial role in industrial relations and the presentation of a research model. Managerial attitudes and behaviour are then analysed with respect to views on trade unions, personal commitments to collective representation, collective bargaining, employee participation and involvement and views on the role of government. The findings have an added significance because survey dates roughly correspond with the so-called ‘Thatcher years’. The conclusion is that some major changes in industrial relations have occurred during the decade in question, but there are also substantial continuities which cannot be ‘read off’ directly from the dramatic alterations in the political, economic and legal environment.     

Collective Bargaining and Wage Dispersion in Europe

The level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining wage levels and wage inequalities. Two different situations are considered: a first in which bargaining is only ‘multi‐employer’, and a second in which it is ‘multi‐level’, in the sense that workers can be covered by both a ‘multi‐employer’ and a ‘single‐employer’ contract at the same time. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of these different institutional settings on pay dispersion. The study is carried out using the European Structure of Earnings Survey, which is a large dataset containing detailed matched employer–employee information for the year 1995. The countries analysed are Italy, Belgium and Spain. The empirical results generally show that wages of workers covered by only a ‘multi‐employer’ contract are no more compressed than those of workers covered by both ‘multi‐employer’ and ‘single‐employer’ contracts. This implies that where workers are not covered by single‐employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers.     

Economic Integration and State Responses: Change in European Industrial Relations since Maastricht

The article analyses industrial relations change in the six largest EU countries since 1992 in relation to increased internationalization pressures. Based on qualitative and quantitative analysis, it distinguishes between associational and state governance, and detects that despite a predominant, but not universal, trend of weakening trade unions and collective bargaining, no overall liberalization has occurred in the political regulation of employment (employment policies, welfare state, labour law, state support to collective bargaining, public sector). Rather than converging towards neoliberalism, industrial relations emerge as more politically contingent and dependent on multiple forms of power, which are affected by internationalization in different ways.     

Wage councils,product markups and wage markdowns: Evidence from Uruguay

In 2005, after a leftist coalition won the national election for the first time, Uruguay returned to sector-level wage bargaining councils with active government participation. We estimate product markups and wage markdowns using firm-level data for the period 2002–2016, and report decreasing wage markdowns and increasing -to a lesser extent- firm-level product markups. We find statistically significant impacts of minimum mandated wages on product markups and wage markdowns, and additional effects of unions on wage markdowns. The evidence suggests that firms operate in monopsonistic labor markets. Though their bargaining power in the labor market was reduced over time as a result of wage councils, firms were able to pass a sizable part of the increases in labor costs to consumers.