Tax Progression and Human Capital in Imperfect Labour Markets

Recent contributions to the theory of taxation argue that tax progression raises welfare and employment in the presence of labour market imperfections. This literature takes the endowment of workers with human capital as given. The present paper analyses the effects of tax progression in a model with endogenous human capital formation. We show that the effect of tax progression on human capital investment depends on the deductibility of the cost of human capital formation. With full deductibility, tax progression raises employment and welfare. With incomplete deductibility, in contrast, the effect of tax progression on employment and welfare may be negative.     

Tax Reform with Useful Public Expenditures

We examine the effects of tax reform in an endogenous growth with two types of useful public expenditures. The optimal fiscal policy shifts the tax base to private consumption and generally requires a change in the size of government. If a tax reform holds the size of government fixed to satisfy a revenue‐neutrality constraint, then the reform will be suboptimal; theory alone cannot tell us if welfare will be improved. For some model calibrations, we find that a revenue‐neutral consumption tax reform can result in large welfare gains. For other quite plausible calibrations, the exact same reform can result in tiny or even negative welfare gains as the revenue‐neutrality constraint becomes more severely binding. Overall, our results highlight the uncertainty surrounding the potential welfare benefits of fundamental tax reform.     

Growth,revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform: Win–win–win strategies

We examine growth, revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform with a two-good, two-factor endogenous growth model. Learning-by-doing and intersectoral knowledge spillovers contribute to endogenous growth consistent with incomplete specialization. We obtain two main results. First, trade liberalization raises (or lowers) the growth rate if and only if the import sector is more effective-labor-intensive (or capital-intensive). Second, we can attain growth, revenue, and welfare gains by combining consumer–price–neutral tariff and tax reform for growth enhancement with an additional rise in the consumption tax on the less distorted good.     

LONG‐RUN GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM

This paper introduces an endogenously‐determined fertility rate into a Romer‐type endogenous growth model and, accordingly, investigates the effects on fertility, economic growth and social welfare of a revenue‐neutral tax reform that involves switching from an income tax to a consumption tax. We show that, in a departure from the existing literature, tax reform could be harmful, rather than favourable, to both growth and welfare, due to an endogenous fertility rate. We also conduct a simple numerical analysis to investigate under what conditions the negative effect on growth and welfare occurs.     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

PUBLIC INVESTMENT,TAX EVASION,AND THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF A TARIFF REFORM

Contrary to the case considered in literature, the experience of developing countries indicates that the tariff reforms have not been revenue neutral due to the heavy dependence of developing countries on trade taxes and pervasive tax evasion. In contrast to the plausibility of a welfare loss shown by the current literature, when the adverse effect of the loss of tariff revenue on public investment is factored in, the welfare outcome of the tariff reforms of past few decades turns out to be much more pessimistic. The constraints imposed by tariff dependence and tax evasion imply that future tariff reforms in these countries should be undertaken after strengthening their domestic tax system and augmenting the ability of their governments to fight tax evasion. For countries of sub‐Saharan Africa, where such reforms are likely to be concentrated, this would need planning and capacity building over a longer time horizon. (JEL D61, D62, F13, H26)     

Capital and Consumption Tax Reforms in a Small Open Economy

The effects of a reform in capital and consumption taxes on private welfare and government tax revenue are examined for a small open, capital‐importing economy. A trade‐off between private welfare and tax revenue is encountered in maximizing social welfare. Nonetheless, lowering capital taxes and raising consumption taxes can increase both private welfare and tax revenue if the initial tax rates are not optimal. In addition, a tax reform by this fashion is a likely response to a rise in the foreign rate of return on capital.     

Welfare‐ and Revenue‐Enhancing Tariff and Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

We examine welfare and revenue effects of tariff and tax reform in a country importing final and intermediate goods, both of which are produced under imperfect competition. We consider two reform strategies. First, lower the sum of a consumption tax and a tariff on the intermediate good, and leave the sum of the consumption tax and a tariff on the final good unchanged. Second, lower the former and change the latter to leave government revenue unchanged. We specify conditions under which each reform strategy raises welfare without decreasing government revenue.     

A ROBUST ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

In contrast to earlier studies, recent research finds that charitable contributions are tax-price inelastic, suggesting that the itemized deduction for contributions loses more tax revenue than it increases in contributions. The estimates from parametric methods are similar to those in earlier studies that find that charity appears to be elastic with respect to the tax price. Because specification tests raise doubts about the consistency of these methods, the authors use a two-stage semi-parametric method and find that contributions are price inelastic. Contributions to social welfare organizations, however, are price elastic; their deductibility loses less in revenues than is contributed. (JEL C14 , C34 )     

Fiscal efficiency,redistribution and welfare

The expanding literature on fiscal decentralization (FD) emphasizes the role of institutional mechanisms for FD's welfare effects. We analyze the welfare effects of FD in case of a fiscal transfer mechanism that punishes inefficiency in tax collection and compensates for local income deficiency. In addition, a portion of transfers is earmarked for investment. Given a level of FD and these rules, the representative local government chooses its tax collection effort to maximize local utility. The solution of the model reveals that the stricter the redistributive rule, the higher are steady-state fiscal efficiency and welfare. While the effectiveness of the redistributive parameters increases with centralization of the revenue pool, it decreases with the tax rate. Both welfare and income distribution, on the other hand, improve with the degree of revenue centralization and the tax rate. Besides, fiscal efficiency and redistribution decrease with investment-earmarked transfers.     

Income Tax Deductions for Work-related Expenses: The Rationale Examined

The Australian income tax permits taxpayers receiving wages to claim work-related expenses (WREs) as deductions against taxable income. The rationale for the provision has never been stated. This paper examines the rationale in terms of equity and efficiency considerations. The analy sis suggests that deductibility of WREs is likely, at best, to have a neutral equity impact; at worst it will have a random impact. WRE deductibi lity is also likely to lead to distortions in both production and consumption. Taken together with the high compliance costs associated with the provision, these arguments justify abolition of WRE deductibility     

Schumpeterian Growth with Productive Public Spending and Distortionary Taxation

Schumpeterian growth theory eliminates the scale effect by positing a process of development of new product lines that fragments the aggregate market in submarkets whose size does not increase with population or the size of the workforce. This entails the sterilization of the growth effects of selected fiscal variables. This insight is applied to shed new light on the role of distortionary taxes on consumption, household labor and assets income, corporate income, and of productive public spending. The framework allows the identification of which of these fiscal variables have permanent (steady‐state) growth effects, and which ones have only transitory effects. It also allows the transitional dynamics to be solved analytically and thus the analysis of the welfare effects of revenue‐neutral changes in tax structure. It is found that replacing taxes that distort labor supply with taxes that distort saving/investment choices raises welfare, and the intuition behind this surprising result is discussed.     

Revenue‐enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly

Existing studies suggest that in developing countries, tax reforms that increase consumption taxes can compensate for shortfalls in revenue from a tariff reduction. However, these revenue‐enhancing tariff–tax reforms have a critical shortcoming—they generally reduce welfare under imperfect competition. This paper shows that tax reforms such as consumption tax reforms do not necessarily have to be implemented to make up for revenue shortfalls from tariff reductions under imperfect competition, because trade liberalization through tariff cuts leads to an increase in government revenue when domestic and imported goods have a high substitutability. This revenue‐enhancing effect of a tariff reduction occurs for a wider degree of product substitutability when initial tariff and consumption tax rates are high. More importantly, we show that even if initial tariff and consumption tax rates are sufficiently low, a tariff reduction still increases government revenue for a low degree of product differentiation under Bertrand competition.     

Inflation and capital gains taxes in a small open economy

Inflation distorts an economy through many channels. This paper highlights the interaction between inflation and capital gains tax and their distortions to a small open economy through the financial market. This research captures several observations. First, capital formation or investment is an important channel for consumption smoothing over the life cycles. Second, capital gains are taxed only when the gains are realized. Third, inflation introduces an upward bias in the calculation of tax base. Thus, a capital gains tax in the presence of inflation can have a significant welfare effect even though its contribution to the government revenue is relatively small. The quantitative analysis shows that high inflation alone can lower social welfare. This problem becomes more severe when capital gains tax is introduced in an inflationary economy. The implicit inflation tax can be more hazardous to the economy than the explicit counterpart.     

Revenue-increasing and welfare-enhancing reform of taxes on exports

The loss of revenue from a reduction in export taxes has been a concern for trade policy reform in many developing countries. We discuss a strategy for selective reform of taxes on exports that enhances welfare and increases revenue. The strategy involves a reduction in the export tax on a given commodity with an offsetting increase in production tax to keep the producer price unchanged. This strategy is especially promising for exportables with a net subsidy on domestic consumption due to high export taxes and low consumption taxes.     

MONETARY EXPANSION AND PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN A CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE ECONOMY*

Using a dynamic optimization model that incorporates a cash‐in‐advance constraint on both consumption and investment and productive public capital financed by a lump‐sum tax and seigniorage, this paper analyses the steady‐state effects of an increase in the inflation rate (the money growth rate) on output, private capital and welfare. The effects are negative at high inflation rates. However, at low inflation rates, the effects depend on the amount of lump‐sum tax revenue collected and therefore are either positive or negative.     

Demographic change and income tax revenues – results from a large microsimulation model for Germany

Similarly to many other European countries, Germany has experienced a considerable demographic shift since the 1970s: higher life expectancy and diminishing birth rates, only partly balanced by immigration, have led to an altered population structure with an increasing share of elderly people. In the next decades, population aging in Germany will accelerate and also induce a decline of the total population. These demographic changes can be expected to have a profound impact on the governmental budget. While shifts in public expenditures have been forecasted regularly since 2005, the revenue side has received less attention to date. We study the long-term (2015–2060) shifts in income tax revenues induced by demographic change. Our aim is to quantify possible fiscal effects of demographic change using microsimulation and to identify elements of the income tax code particularly affected. We find the expected demographic changes to have a clear negative impact on income tax revenues. Population aging increases the impact of various deductibility rules on total income tax revenues, in particular the impact of the deductibility of old-age and health insurance provisions. The impact of the deductibility of exceptional expenses such as expenses for caregiving also increases, but remains small overall. Due to expected increases in real incomes, however, demographic change does not imply an absolute drop in income tax revenues in the next decades.     

Tax treatment of owner occupied housing and wealth inequality

We construct a quantitative general equilibrium lifecycle model with housing tenure decisions to investigate the degree to which wealth inequality in the United States is affected by the preferential tax treatment of home-ownership. Favorable tax treatment of owner occupied housing in the form of home mortgage interest and property tax deductibility, and the untaxed nature of imputed rents, provides a financial incentive for home-ownership over renting as well as an incentive to “over-consume” housing since houses are not fungible. Since the favorable tax treatment of housing disproportionately creates tax savings for the upper quantiles of the income distribution, we quantify how it contributes to the heavily right skewed distribution of wealth in the United States using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We consider a revenue-neutral government response to the counter factual experiments of removing the current tax structure on housing. Our quantitative analysis shows that, in terms of distributional effects, removing all of the preferential tax treatments results in an aggregate increase in welfare. However, we do not find any reduction in inequality. We also find that while some re-allocation toward financial assets occurs, households primarily increase their consumption when imputed housing rents are taxed and the property tax deduction is removed. Thus housing tax policy may be effective at encouraging more overall saving through housing assets.     

A Win–Win–Win Tariff–Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

Taking into account non‐constant marginal costs, this paper considers the effects of a tariff cut combined with a consumption tax increase on welfare, government revenue, and market access. We show that welfare, government revenue, and market access can all improve with this policy reform under decreasing marginal costs. This result may provide a theoretical rationale for the above policy reform, which is guided by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.     

The Financing of Foreign Aid and Welfare: Income Versus Consumption Tax

Empirical evidence shows that developed countries use income or consumption taxes to generate tax revenue, of which they transfer a certain fraction as aid to less developed countries. This paper constructs a two-country general equilibrium trade model that takes into account these realities, and examines the terms of trade, employment and welfare effects of international transfers when the donor country increases the fraction of its income or consumption tax revenue transferred as aid. The desirability of each method of aid financing is discussed from the viewpoint of national and world welfare, and conditions are identified under which aid improves world welfare with the one method of financing, and may worsen it with the other.