Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance?

Recently, microfinance has been coming under public and media attacks. The microcredit crisis following from microfinance‐induced suicides in 2010 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh indicates that weak corporate governance and imprudent risk taking have far‐reaching consequences. Yet, analyses of corporate governance mechanisms among microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain underdeveloped. As a response, this study examines the impact of CEO power on MFI risk taking by deriving explicit predictions of this effect from a characterization of the microfinance industry. Based on a sample of 280 microfinance institutions, our results suggest that powerful CEOs of microfinance non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) have more decision‐making freedom than powerful CEOs of other types of MFIs. This induces them to make more extreme decisions that increase risk. Furthermore, the decision‐making freedom powerful CEOs have in NGOs appears to lead to worse decisions, because the presence of powerful CEOs in microfinance NGOs is associated with lower performance.     

The retention of CEOs that make poor acquisitions

Does the failure to replace CEOs following a bad takeover represent a cost-effective strategy or a failure of boards of directors and the market? We study 104 white knight contests to examine why poorly performing firms retain their CEOs. We find the majority are poor performers before they enter the control contest (q?相似文献   

CEO optimism,CEO selection,compensation, and corporate investment decision: The case of CEOs who were rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover

What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment.     

未来CEO的五种基因

历时两年,IBM商业价值研究院调查了中国58位CEO以及全球1130位CEO、企业高管,试图描绘出一个详细的未来图景:未来的企业、未来的CEO应该是什么样。调查发现,未来的CEO必具备这五种基因:渴求变革、     

Overpaid CEOs got FDIC debt guarantees

From 2008 to 2009, the FDIC guaranteed hundreds of billions of dollars of newly issued bank debt through the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). We find that CEOs making more than their peer groups were significantly more likely to steer their companies to obtain federal guarantees for their banks’ debt. The average bank in our sample with a debt guarantee had a CEO who was paid $1.6 million per year more than the average CEO in his or her peer group. In addition, there is evidence that large, systemically important banks were more likely to obtain FDIC debt guarantees.     

The Roles of Chinese CEOs in Managing Individualistic Cultures in Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions

The individualism-collectivism culture represents an important and well-researched distinction across cultures. Yet research is less clear about how the different levels of individualistic cultures in host countries affect the success of an increasingly important firm strategy – cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs). This study addresses this key research question in the context of Chinese firms’ CBMAs, as Chinese firms are increasingly acquiring targets outside of China in the New Normal global business landscape. This study further theorizes and tests how the Chinese acquirer CEOs’ characteristics moderate the wealth creation relationship. In an analysis of 404 Chinese firms’ CBMAs, we found that an individualistic culture in the host country is negatively associated with Chinese acquirers’ CBMA wealth creation. We also demonstrate that Chinese CEOs’ exposure to foreign culture and female gender weaken that negative relationship, while CEO duality strengthens this negative relationship. Our research thus suggests that culture in host countries can negatively affect acquirers’ CBMA performance, but CEOs may be able to manage the effects of the culture to increase their CBMA performance.     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

不做昙花一现的英雄，很难很难

只有精心培育一批CEO候选人,企业才能在变革来临时从容不迫1994年,美国费尔菲尔德市,58岁的杰克·韦尔奇在整整一年的时间里痛苦不堪,晚上失眠,清晨早醒。他回忆说,选择继任者的工作不仅是我职业生涯中最为重要的一件事,而且是我面临的     

The human resource department's role and conditions that affect its development: Explanations from Austrian CEOs

Using a qualitative approach, this study fills a void in the literature on strategic HRM by analyzing Austrian CEOs' perceptions of the role of the HR department in their organizations, and the conditions that affect the development of a strategic role. The results suggest that even if CEOs have an overall positive evaluation of their HR departments and are willing to delegate responsibility for higher‐level decision‐making, to develop the HR department's role, CEOs must also feel they have the scope to do so. A framework for future research and practical implications for opportunities and constraints confronting HR managers are discussed. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Keeping Their Cards Close to Their Chests: How Non‐Delegating CEOs Avoid Forced Career Ends

It is a common belief that CEOs must delegate to be successful. We hesitate to support this generalization and investigate how the distribution of responsibility within top management teams (TMTs) can influence the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Consistent with an agency theory perspective, our results indicate that CEOs may choose not to delegate their responsibilities to other executive TMT members, so as to benefit from an increased information asymmetry vis‐à‐vis the board of directors. Taking the resource‐based view as a complementary theoretical perspective, we find that non‐delegating CEOs benefit from their greater firm‐specific knowledge, which the board of directors considers as a valuable resource that should be retained. Our work also demonstrates that a more intense CEO–TMT interaction weakens the relation between non‐delegation and the likelihood of CEO dismissal. In sum, our research shows that the CEO’s delegation decision does not necessarily lead to a competence distribution that is in the firm's best interest; rather, it reflects a complex interplay between the potentially opportunistic career interests of the CEO, the involvement of other TMT members and the board of directors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Pay Comparability Across and Within UK Boards: An Empirical Analysis of the Cash Pay Awards to CEOs and Other Board Members

Drawing on the literature on social comparison and equity theories, this paper analyses the determinants of, and the relationships between, the cash pay awards of CEOs and other board members for a sample of large UK companies over the period 1992–95. Our results suggest that external labour market and internal (i.e., within board) pay comparisons are important in explaining both CEO and other directors' pay awards. In the case of CEOs, however, there is evidence of an asymmetric adjustment to prior period pay anomalies, whereby the pay of the relatively underpaid executives displays significantly greater sensitivity to external market comparison pay levels. This asymmetric adjustment process results in a 'bidding-up' of average CEO pay relative to other board members over the four year period investigated.     

Powerful CEOs and employee relations: evidence from corporate social responsibility indicators

In this paper, we investigate whether powerful CEOs who dominate the top management team exhibit positive or negative behavior towards their employees. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that CEO power as evidenced by high pay disparity between the CEO and top management, results in positive Employee Relations as measured by the KLD Statistics. We also find that CEO power affects the individual categories of Employee Involvement as well as Employee Health and Safety, indicating that pay disparity positively effects Employee Relations on a number of measures. However, the strong positive relationship is not found when the CEO holds the dual role of Chairman. In addition, neither measure tests positive for union relations, although high profitability, as measured by industry adjusted Return on Assets, appears to permit firms to have positive relations with employees on a number of different measures.     

How CEOs and TMTs Build Adaptive Capacity in Small Entrepreneurial Firms

Research suggests that a CEO may have more influence in the context of small entrepreneurial firms, but it is still unclear how a company's chief executive facilitates strategic decision‐making. Little is known about the ways in which these individuals build strategic capabilities, such as the capacity to adapt to changing environments. This study addresses these issues and develops a model indicating that transformational leadership facilitates behavioural integration and comprehensiveness in the decision process among members of the top management team (TMT), which in turn enhances organizational capacity to adapt to environmental changes. Survey results shed light on the complex way in which CEOs facilitate processes within the TMT and enhance small entrepreneurial firms’ capacity to adapt, thereby increasing their viability. This study contributes to the literatures on Upper Echelon Theory, strategic decision‐making, and dynamic capabilities by shedding light on the ways in which transformational leaders influence behavioural and decision‐making processes.     

When do Non‐Family CEOs Outperform in Family Firms? Agency and Behavioural Agency Perspectives

Family firms represent a globally dominant form of organization, yet they confront a steep challenge of finding and managing competent leaders. Sometimes, these leaders cannot be found within the owning family. To date we know little about the governance contexts under which non‐family leaders thrive or founder. Guided by concepts from agency theory and behavioural agency theory, we examine the conditions of ownership and leadership that promote superior performance among non‐family CEOs of family firms. Our analysis of 893 Italian family firms demonstrates that these leaders outperform when they are monitored by multiple major family owners as opposed to a single owner; they also outperform when they are not required to share power with co‐CEOs who are family members, and who may be motivated by parochial family socioemotional priorities.     

The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.     

Dominant CEO,Deviant Strategy,and Extreme Performance: The Moderating Role of a Powerful Board

This study examines the effect of dominant CEOs – defined as CEOs who are very powerful relative to other executives in their top management teams – on firm strategy and performance. Based on a sample of 51 publicly traded, single‐business firms from the US computer industry for the period 1997–2003, our results suggest that firms with dominant CEOs tend to have a strategy deviant from the industry central tendency and thus extreme performance – either big wins or big losses. Further, powerful boards weaken the tendency of dominant CEOs towards extremeness and, more important, improve the likelihood of dominant CEOs having big wins versus big losses. This study reconciles the pessimistic and heroic views regarding dominant CEOs, and suggests that the notion of power balance should be considered in a broader context.     

Ethnicity and homophily effects in US M&As

We show that ethnic diversity of CEOs of merging firms has been increasing and report evidence of ethnic homophily effect in M&As transactions. Specifically, M&As perform better when the CEOs of the merging firms share a common ethnic background. In a sample of 444 US mergers completed between 2000 and 2018, we find that ethnic homophily improves the probability of deal completion. Furthermore, we report mild variation of performance across ethnic groups. White CEOs exhibit better postmerger performance while Asian CEOs instigate a better market reaction (announcement return). Subsequent analyses show that White CEOs tend to have longer tenure and longer experience while Asian CEOs tend to be more transparent. We discuss our findings in light of a few extant theories and show that our findings are robust to several additional tests including instrumental variables, Heckman's selection bias correction, and several variations in the model specifications and definitions of key variables.     

To get the best new CEO,must the old CEO go? Power distribution in external CEO successions

When chief executive officers (CEOs) are replaced by external successors, they frequently retain high levels of power. We found that outgoing CEOs' announced post‐succession involvement is negatively related to their successors' power. Additionally, we found that the magnitude of the stock market reaction to succession announcements is greater when the outgoing CEOs are allowed to continue to retain significant influence, and diminished when the new CEOs are awarded significant position power when they become CEO. These results suggest that to improve long‐term performance, companies should keep outgoing CEOs around and not grant new CEOs too much power. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

亲缘关系与双元创新——来自中国家族上市公司的经验证据

本文以2011—2015年中国上市家族公司为样本,根据组织双元理论和社会情感财富理论探讨家族企业中的CEO亲缘关系对双元创新的影响,并研究冗余资源对亲缘关系与双元创新之间关系的调节效应,在此基础上进一步探讨亲缘关系的远近对双元创新的影响。结果显示：（1）亲缘关系与探索式创新呈显著正相关关系,亲缘关系与开发式创新呈显著负相关关系;（2）冗余资源对亲缘关系与探索式创新之间的正相关关系没有显著影响,但冗余资源强化了亲缘关系与开发式创新之间的负相关关系;（3）对于选择家族成员担任CEO的家族企业来说,亲缘关系越近,家族企业开展探索式创新活动的力度越弱,而亲缘关系的远近对于开发式创新没有显著影响。     

Does CEO gender matter for bank risk?

This paper addresses the relation between CEO gender and bank risk. We exploit a unique dataset of 365 Polish cooperative banks, 42% of which are run by female CEOs. We find that banks headed by female CEOs are less risky: they report higher capital adequacy and equity to assets ratios. Credit risk in female-led banks is not different from male-led banks, and therefore higher capital adequacy does not stem from lower asset quality and is likely to be linked to higher risk aversion of female CEOs. Our evidence supports the view that women are more risk averse bank CEOs than men. Our findings suggest that gender quotas in bank boards can contribute to reduce risk-taking behavior.