Financial analysts' forecasts of earnings: A better surrogate for market expectations

The specification of the market expectation of accounting numbers is a common feature of many empirical studies in accounting and finance. Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) found that financial analysts' forecasts have information content. This study evaluates the quality of analysts' forecasts as surrogates for the market expectation of earnings and compares it with that of prediction models commonly used in research. Results indicate that prediction errors of analysts are more closely associated with security price movements, suggesting that analysts' forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts generated by time-series models. The study also identifies factors that might contribute to the performance of the financial analysts'forecasts. The broadness of the information set employed by analysts and, to a lesser extent, their reliance on information released after the end of the fiscal year appear to be important contributors to their performance.     

Investors’ reactions to retractions and corrections of management earnings forecasts

Timely voluntary disclosure of information by companies sometimes results in erroneous disclosure that must be later retracted (i.e., withdrawn) and/or corrected (i.e., replaced with a corrected disclosure). Although such retractions and corrections appear to be relatively easy and costless ways to fix the erroneous disclosure, our results generally show that both actions have unexpected effects on investor judgment. The results of four experiments, which are consistent with affect theory from psychology, indicate when a company provides a retraction of a previous erroneous voluntary disclosure, investors’ judgments continue to reflect the implications of the initial erroneous information. That is, investors under-adjust. In contrast, when a company provides a correction (alone or with a prior retraction) with an opposite earnings implication, investors tend to over-adjust. Our results also show that if investors do not form a strong initial affective reaction to the initial erroneous forecast, they are less prone to over-adjustment when the correction is later received. Implications for regulators and standard setters are provided.     

IFRS adoption and analysts’ earnings forecasts: Australian evidence

We study 145 large listed Australian firms to explore the impact of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) adoption on the properties of analysts’ forecasts and the role of firm disclosure about IFRS impact. We find that analyst forecast accuracy improves, and there is no significant change in dispersion in the adoption year, suggesting that analysts coped effectively with transition to IFRS. However, we do not observe the expected relationship between firms’ IFRS impact disclosures in their financial statements issued at the end of the transition year with forecast error and dispersion in the adoption year. The results question the timeliness and usefulness of financial statement disclosure, even in a setting where disclosure was mandated by accounting standards (AASB 1047 and AASB 1) and firms had strong incentives to provide information to analysts.     

Corporate risk-taking,firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.     

Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and credit rating

This paper shows that the puzzling negative cross-sectional relation between dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and future stock returns may be explained by financial distress, as proxied by credit rating downgrades. Focusing on a sample of firms rated by Standard & Poor's (S&P), we show that the profitability of dispersion-based trading strategies concentrates in a small number of the worst-rated firms and is significant only during periods of deteriorating credit conditions. In such periods, the negative dispersion–return relation emerges as low-rated firms experience substantial price drop along with considerable increase in forecast dispersion. Moreover, even for this small universe of worst-rated firms, the dispersion–return relation is non-existent when either the dispersion measure or return is adjusted by credit risk. The results are robust to previously proposed explanations for the dispersion effect such as short-sale constraints and leverage.     

Management earnings forecasts and analyst forecasts:Evidence from mandatory disclosure system

Distinct from the literature on the effects that management earnings forecasts(MEFs) properties, such as point, range and qualitative estimations, have on analy...     

Sources of earnings variability and their effect on earnings forecasts

Previous research shows that analysts’ forecasts of earnings do not fully incorporate information contained in reported earnings variability. This study investigates whether the inefficient forecast is because of a failure to incorporate observable information on two components of earnings variability: variability in operating performance and income smoothing. Our results show that analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate information contained in earnings variability for firms with high income smoothing and for firms with low operating variability. A smaller serial correlation of forecast errors is observed for firms with low operating variability, which suggests that analysts recognize the permanence in earnings for such firms.     

Intangible assets,IFRS and analysts’ earnings forecasts

We investigate whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 by Australian firms has been associated with a loss of potentially useful information about intangible assets. We find that the negative association between the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and aggregate reported intangibles previously documented by Matolcsy and Wyatt (2006 ) becomes stronger subsequent to IFRS adoption, primarily for firms with high levels of underlying intangible assets. Our result is largely attributable to reported goodwill, rather than other intangible assets, suggesting that the impairment approach to goodwill valuation required by IFRS conveys more useful information than does the former straight‐line amortization approach. When we investigate a sub‐sample of firms that report lower intangibles under IFRS than under the prior Australian GAAP, we do find some evidence consistent with a loss of useful information relating to intangibles.     

Analysts' forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings: additional evidence

This article examines analysts' forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings during Japan's economic burst period in the 1990s. Using the evidence of analyst earnings forecasts in the United States as a benchmark, the article documents the following three findings. First, whereas the forecast accuracy of U.S. analysts following U.S. firms improves over time, the forecast accuracy of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms does not. Second, whereas decreases in forecast errors of U.S. analysts following U.S. firms are best explained by decreases in forecast bias of the analysts, increases in forecast errors of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms are best explained by increases in the frequency of losses experienced by Japanese firms. Third, Japanese analysts forecast earnings less accurately than do U.S. analysts. These findings reflect the difficulty of producing accurate earnings forecasts during economic downturns. They also suggest that Japanese analysts are more bound than their U.S. counterparts by cultural ties that impede forecast accuracy.     

Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts' forecasts

This study examines whether management uses discretionary accounting accruals to move earnings upward toward analysts' earnings forecasts when it appears that earnings before discretionary accruals will fall short of the forecast. An earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts could lead management to fear lower compensation and an increase in the likelihood of job termination. The article finds that firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are below analysts' forecasts use income-increasing discretionary accruals and do so to a greater extent than do firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are above analysts' forecasts.     

Evaluating the information content of earnings forecasts

This study develops a framework to compare the ability of alternative earnings forecast approaches to capture the market expectation of future earnings. Given prior evidence of analysts’ systematic optimistic bias, we decompose earnings surprises into analysts’ earnings surprises and adjustments based on alternative forecasting models. An equal market response to these two components indicates that the associated earnings forecast is a sufficient estimate of the market expectation of future earnings. To apply our framework, we examine four recent regression-based earnings forecasting models, alongside a simple earnings-based random walk model and analysts’ forecasts. Using the earnings forecasts of the model that satisfies our sufficiency condition, we identify a set of stocks for which the market is unduly pessimistic about future earnings. The investment strategy of buying and holding these stocks generates statistically signi?cant abnormal returns. We offer an explanation as to why this and similar strategies might be successful.     

Signaling firm value to active investors

Active investors provide risk-sharing and value-adding effort in form of advising, networking, monitoring, etc. This paper demonstrates a conflict between two key objectives for high-quality entrepreneurs: to elicit such investor effort and to signal the firm’s type by retaining shares. This conflict may give rise to stable (and economically meaningful) pooling equilibria for startup firms. More established firms, with access to multiple signals, can always realize both of these objectives but may still decide to forego investor effort if eliciting it would require them to deviate substantially from the cost-minimizing signal mix. In comparison with otherwise identical pure-exchange settings (with passive investors), we find that the potential for investors to be active always increases the signaling cost in case of noncontractible investor effort, whereas the effect is ambiguous if investor effort is contractible. At the same time, we identify conditions under which signaling is welfare-enhancing as it helps guide investors’ effort towards more promising ventures.     

Contemporaneous verification of language: evidence from management earnings forecasts

Research documents that linguistic tone is incrementally informative about stock returns. What remains a puzzle is the mechanism by which investors can assess its credibility. We examine whether contemporaneous information in management earnings forecasts serves as a timely alternative to ex post verification. We document that ex post verifiable quantitative news in unbundled forecasts, and characteristics of the linguistic tone itself, affect investors’ pricing of tone. Consistent with higher quality signals enhancing the credibility of contemporaneous lower quality signals, we find that quantitative news verifies the associated linguistic tone; when the two signals have the same sign, the price effect of tone is stronger. Furthermore, the pricing attenuation of tone is increasing in the imprecision of the quantitative forecast, suggesting that lower forecast quality compromises the quantitative signal’s credibility enhancement. Managerial incentives to inflate tone lead to the verification effect being greater for optimistic language, while management’s use of hyperbole results in attenuation of the tone’s pricing.     

Product market pricing power, industry concentration and analysts’ earnings forecasts

This is the first study to establish a link between product market power and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and bias. Relating two different dimensions of market power to earnings forecastability, we document that (a) a firm’s relative pricing power and (b) its industry concentration are strong positive determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. We find that forecasting earnings of higher market power firms is less complex due to their ability to withstand cost shocks as well as greater informational-efficiency enjoyed by such firms. Further, forecast optimism increases with weakening product market pricing power and with lower industry concentration. The knowledge derived from this study will hopefully improve the accuracy of equity valuation, and thereby engender better buy-side (stock selections) and sell-side recommendations by analysts. Our analysis also suggests that brokerage firms compensating analysts based on forecast accuracy need to adjust for the differential in the information complexity of different industries.     

Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts

In this paper, managers differ from each other in terms of the probability that they are ??forthcoming?? (and disclose all the earnings forecasts they receive) or ??strategic?? (and disclose the earnings forecasts they receive only when it is in their self-interest to do so). Strategic managers choose whether to disclose their forecasts based on both the disclosure??s effects on their firms?? stock price and on their reputation among investors for being forthcoming. Our findings include: strategic managers can build a reputation for being forthcoming by disclosing unfavorable forecasts; managers?? incentive to build a reputation for being forthcoming may be so strong that they disclose even the most negative forecasts; as managers become more concerned about their reputation: (a) the current price of the firm in the event the manager makes no forecast increases; (b) managers who have a high probability of behaving strategically (as forthcoming) in the future issue forecasts more (less) often in the present.     

Herding in analyst earnings forecasts: evidence from the United Kingdom

We present an empirical analysis of herding behavior in analyst forecasts of earnings-per-share. Herding is defined as 'excessive agreement' among analyst predictions, i.e., a surprising degree of consensus relative to the predictability of corporate earnings. The data are for U.K. companies between 1986 and 1997. We examine the effects of forecast horizon and analyst coverage on forecast accuracy and dispersion. The evidence supports overoptimism, overreaction, and herding in analyst forecasts.
G1, G14     

Management earnings forecasts and IPO performance: evidence of a regime change

Companies undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs) in Greece were obliged to include next-year profit forecast in their prospectuses, until the regulation changed in 2001 to voluntary forecasting. Drawing evidence from IPOs issued in the period 1993–2015, this is the first study to investigate the effect of disclosure regime on management earnings forecasts and IPO long-term performance. The findings show mainly positive forecast errors (forecasts are lower than actual earnings) and higher long-term returns during the mandatory period, suggesting that the mandatory disclosure requirement causes issuers to systematically bias profit forecasts downwards as they opt for the safety of accounting conservatism. The mandatory disclosure requirement artificially improves IPO share performance. Overall, our results show that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts can impede capital market efficiency once it goes beyond historical financial information to involve compulsory projections of future performance.     

Value relevance of analyst earnings forecasts in emerging markets

Even though research in accounting and finance has extensively examined the role of financial analysts in developed economies, this issue has not been thoroughly examined in an emerging market setting. In this paper, I examine whether, following a market opening, analyst forecast accuracy and the market's reliance on analyst forecasts increase with time. Accuracy is expected to increase over time as analysts exert more effort and gain valuable forecasting experience. Results indicate that time is positively related to analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for a number of other firm and country characteristics. Second, I posit that time should also be related to the market's propensity to use analyst forecasts to form earnings expectations. As markets open and investors become more sophisticated, the reliance on analyst forecasts should also increase. Results are consistent with this expectation. In particular, I find that in the first sub-period earnings expectations based on random walk exhibit greater relative information content than earnings expectations based on analyst forecasts. This pattern is reversed in the third sub-period where analyst forecast errors better explain returns. Incremental information content tests produce similar results. Future research should further investigate the relation between financial analysts and other important market characteristics in emerging economies.     

Using earnings forecasts to simultaneously estimate firm-specific cost of equity and long-term growth

A growing body of literature in accounting and finance relies on implied cost of equity (COE) measures. Such measures are sensitive to assumptions about terminal earnings growth rates. In this paper we develop a new COE measure that is more accurate than existing measures because it incorporates endogenously estimated long-term growth in earnings. Our method extends Easton et al. (J Account Res, 40, 657–676, 2002) method of simultaneously estimating sample average COE and growth. Our method delivers COE (growth) estimates that are significantly positively associated with future realized stock returns (future realized earnings growth). Moreover, the predictive ability of our COE measure subsumes that of other commonly used COE measures and is incremental to commonly used risk characteristics. Our implied growth measure fills the void in the earnings forecasting literature by robustly predicting earnings growth beyond the five-year horizon.