Formation of symmetric free-trade blocs,optimal tariff structure,and world welfare

We present a new tariff-game rule and a new numéraire rule in Krugman's celebrated model to form symmetric trading blocs. We hold that to maintain logical consistency in a world of symmetric trading blocs, an individual bloc should act on the actions of other individual external blocs in a one-to-one fashion, rather than to the actions of the rest of the world as a whole as assumed by Krugman, and show that Krugman's seemingly innocuous choice of the world price of a given good as the numéraire will produce asymmetry in the optimum Nash equilibrium tariff. We prove that the optimal tariff schedule is monotonically decreasing in our relative bloc size, and that the world welfare increases with our new relative bloc size as the latter grows beyond the lowest-welfare pessimal number, which is rather small by our simulations. Though confined to symmetric trading blocs, this paper fortifies the analytical foundation of Krugman's model. In some sense, it reinforces Kemp–Wan–Shimomura's and Ohyama–Panagariya–Krishna's results with the provisos that countries are symmetric and interact mutually in a symmetric fashion without a compensation scheme. It strengthens the case of regionalism as a stepping stone (building bloc) toward a complete world economic integration.     

Savings,pension rights and taxation

Summary The voluntary saving rate has declined in The Netherlands over the last thirty years. In this paper the increasing share of transfer income in total income, with a high propensity to consume, and the increase in collective pension schemes are simultaneously used to explain this development. Furthermore, the influence of taxes is modelled. The planning horizon of the representative consumer is treated as a parameter to be estimated. The planning horizon obtained (about 4.5 years) appears to be short compared to expected residual lifetime, implying rather small interest elasticities. The estimation results indicate that, in case the obligatory pension schemes are diminished, the representative consumer offsets the loss in pension benefits for 75 per cent by voluntary, additional accumulation of nonhuman wealth in the long run. The working of the model is illustrated by simulation experiments.I wish to thank two anonymous referees, Prof. J. Pen, G.M.M. Gelauff, J.J. Graafland, W. Vossers and other colleagues of the CPB for their helpful comments.     

Comparing the welfare effects of income and excise taxes in the presence of the other taxation paradox

This paper implements numerically a general equilibrium model in which all private producers are price makers and the government utilizes tax revenues to provide a public good. After deriving the partial equilibrium condition for an excise tax to increase price by more than the tax (for a monopoly firm), numerical examples are given, demonstrating this phenomenon for both partial and general equilibrium. In the general equilibrium context, optimal excise taxation and optimal flat-rate income taxation are compared. In the excise tax regime, prices increase by more than the taxes. In the income tax regime, prices actually decline relative to the no-tax regime. In all of the examples given, flat-rate income taxation is superior to excise taxation in terms of welfare. The author has benefitted from exceptionally helpful comments received from J. Ronnie Davis, John D. Wilson, Ralph W. Pfouts, and Amy Crews. He has also benefitted from conversations with Franz Gehrels, David E. Wildasin, Herbert J. Kiesling, and Harold York. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Consumption externalities,market imperfections and optimal taxation

In a dynamic model with a keeping‐up‐with‐the Joneses preference and market imperfections, we attempt to investigate under what circumstances and for what reason the optimal tax should be state‐varying. We extend the Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) proposition to include preferences that exhibit non‐homotheticity. We show that a keeping‐up‐with‐the‐Joneses preference (a non‐intertemporally‐dependent preference) can lead the social planner to commit to a state‐contingent tax on labor income. Moreover, the optimal labor income tax can be either procyclical or countercyclical with respect to economic fluctuations, this crucially depending on whether the level of contemporaneous consumption increases or decreases the wedge between the intertemporal substitution elasticity of households and of the social planner.     

Imitation, patent protection, and welfare

Newly developed technologies run the risk of being imitatedwhen patents are long and imitation cost is low. This papershows that the innovator has the incentive to postpone technologyadoption when imitation is a credible threat but imitation costis not below a certain threshold. The possibility of licensingeliminates or at least reduces the incentive for delayed technologyadoption. Further, this paper explains the advantages of a forwardlicensing contract versus a simple licensing contract in termsof profits and social welfare.     

Fragmentation,welfare, and imperfect competition

In this paper, we explore the effect of fragmentation of production processes on social welfare in the imperfectly competitive market. We consider a situation in which firms located in a country strategically decide whether they produce at home or move their production overseas. We show that, in such a situation, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all of the firms move production overseas although domestic production is socially desirable. This implies that “reverse imports” do not necessarily benefit the country. We also discuss the effectiveness of a subsidy for domestic production in improving the social welfare of the country. J. Japanese Int. Economies 21 (3) (2007) 365–378.     

Environmental taxation and employment

Summary This paper explores how environmental taxes affect employment. It argues that the case for environmental taxes should rest on environmental grounds rather than possibly favorable employment effects. Using pollution taxes to shift the tax burden away from labor is likely to be difficult for economic, social, and political reasons. Moreover, these taxes are likely to raise the overall tax burden-even if the revenues are recycled as lower distortionary taxes. To stimulate employment, governments should rely on alternative instruments targeted at the labor market.     

对称市场结构、产业研发效率与政府的研发政策

本文在Spencer和Brander(1983)提出的第三国市场模型基础上,分析对称市场结构下,行业的研发效率对一国最优研发政策的影响。研究结果表明,无论他国政府干预其国内企业研发与否,仅当行业研发效率较高(低)时,本国政府的最优研发政策为补贴(征税)。因此,Leahy和Neary(2001)关于研发补贴政策的稳健性同样不适用于一国为寡头市场结构的情形。     

Quantitative restrictions,unempolyment and welfare

This paper explores the effects of import quotas and voluntary export restraints (VER) on employment and welfare of an economy plagued by generalized unemployment due to wage rigidity. The welfare effects of quotas and VER in the presence of unemployment are compared with those derived in the traditional full employment model. We show that a tightening of quotas or VER may improve welfare.     

Nonlinear taxation and punishment

The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n  ≥ 3 differing individuals. It is demonstrated that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self-selection can only be identified by maximizing a welfare function of the above form if (at least) one of the individuals in the economy is assigned a negative weight.     

Mining enclaves and taxation

This paper examines certain macroeconomic effects of major mining projects in developing countries, paying special attention to the case of Papua New Guinea. It goes on to assess the contribution that such projects can make to economic development indirectly through their contributions to government revenue. This paper reviews existing evidence on the linkage effects of foreign investment in mining projects in developing countries and presents as new evidence the results of a study on the macroeconomic effects of major mining projects in Papua New Guinea. Considerable support is found for the proposition that such projects tend to perform as enclaves, having only weak direct links with host national economies. This paper stresses the importance of applying fiscal arrangements which can be expected to appropriate a large share of the mineral rent from intra-marginal mining projects while preserving the incentive to invest. Fiscal arrangements of this type are being applied in Papua New Guinea and are indeed able to capture very large benefits for the country. In Papua New Guinea the enclave nature of large-scale mining projects is consistent with their making large contributions to progress towards national objectives, and this paper argues that given the application of appropriate fiscal arrangements, this conclusion can be extended to other developing countries.     

Generational incidence of savings taxation versus capital-income taxation

This paper examines the incidence of capital taxation in a model in which the taxation of capital is clearly justifiable and using analytical techniques from the tax reform literature. The taxation of capital has long been a controversial issue, with much of the literature concluding that savings/capital-income should not be taxed. Recently, however, Blackorby and Brett have shown in a model with several desirable features that it can be optimal to tax capital, and they provide a simple yet compelling argument in favor of both savings taxation and capital-income taxation. We use the Blackorby–Brett model (i.e. a model in which the taxation of capital can be justified) to revisit the question of the incidence of capital taxation. We focus on the generational incidence of capital taxation; that is, the incidence on a young generation and an old generation. However, an interpretation in terms of the incidence on "capital" versus "labor" (as is traditional in the tax incidence literature) is also provided.     

Distribution,taxation and employment in an open economy

Summary If taxes on labour income are passed on in wages the balanced budget multiplier may be negative. The present paper analyses this problem from a theoretical point of view applying a linearized version of a model for the small open economy. The model is dynamic, because account is taken of capital accumulation. Short-run and long-run solutions are expressed in terms of fiscal policy variables, a wage push variable, the price level abroad and world demand. Numerical examples are supplemented to illustrate the analytical results. Acknowledgement is due for his helpful comment to S.K. Kuipers