Der Einfluss von Cat Bonds-Emissionen auf das ökonomische Zielkapital von Schaden-/Unfallversicherungsunternehmen

One of the major problems in the market development of cat bonds is their impact on the economical capital requirement, while non-indemnity-triggers are used. In this article, an example portfolio is constructed which is heavily exposed to hurricane risks in Florida. A cat bond with a parametric trigger, a reinsurance without collateral and two other reference covers are used on this portfolio and their capital relief effect are calculated by means of monte carlo simulation. Amongst others, it shows that not only basis risk, but also default risk and cost disadvantage lead to the decline of a risk transfer instrument's capital relief effect. In the next step, the simulation is extended to the value based management with the capital requirement being a constraint and the maximization of the company's value being the objective function. In this context, the basis risk shows a much lower influence compared with the cost factors.     

WHERE'S THE CAT GOING? SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CATASTROPHE BONDS

This article provides an assessment of the current state of the market for catastrophe (or "Cat") bonds. Given the changes in insurance markets since September 11th, the demand for Cat bonds is likely to increase. For issuers, Cat bonds have the effect of transferring risks to the capital markets that would normally be underwritten by insurance or reinsurance companies. And as a substitute for insurance, Cat bonds have the potential to help issuers address problems such as lack of capacity and real risk transfer, cyclicality, and credit risk that are commonly associated with insurance and reinsurance markets. Investors value Cat bonds in part because of their low correlations with stocks and conventional bonds. Notable trends in the structuring of the products involve higher levels of risk transfer, longer-term contracts, and linkage to a portfolio of catastrophic risks.     

Trading and liquidity in the catastrophe bond market

We provide first insights into secondary market trading, liquidity determinants, and the liquidity premium of catastrophe bonds. Based on transaction data from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine), we find that cat bonds are traded less frequently during the hurricane season and more often close to maturity. Trading activity indicates that the market is dominated by brokers without a proprietary inventory. Liquidity is high in periods of high trading activity in the overall market and for bonds with low default risk or close to maturity, which results from lower order processing costs. Finally, using realized bid–ask spreads as a liquidity measure, we find that on average, 21% of the observable yield spread on the cat bond market is attributable to the liquidity premium, with a magnitude of up to 141 bps for high-risk bonds.     

Katastrophenanleihen als Risikotransfer-Instrument für Industrieunternehmen

All over the world an increase in natural catastrophes and resulting damages can be observed for entire economies as well as for individual industrial enterprises. This trend leads to extraordinary expensive traditional natural catastrophe insurance or even a lack of insurance capacities. Due to the increased threat resulting from natural catastrophes and the inefficiencies of traditional insurance solutions, it will be analyzed in the following whether catastrophe bonds (cat bonds), as an alternative risk transfer instrument, should play a role in the risk management portfolio of industrial companies. It will be discussed whether catastrophe bonds are possible risk transfer instruments for industrial companies and whether certain basic prerequisites for a confirmation of the suitability are recognizable. In a further step, the design possibilities for cat bonds will be presented and the most suitable design alternatives for industrial companies as issuers of cat bonds will be elaborated. In addition, a critical comparison between the usage of traditional insurance solutions and cat bonds by industrial companies in order to protect themselves against natural catastrophes will be conducted. The result is a first orientation and a general guideline for dealing with catastrophe bonds as part of the operational risk management for industrial companies.     

Accuracy of Premium Calculation Models for CAT Bonds—An Empirical Analysis

CAT bonds are of significant importance in the field of alternative risk transfer. Because the market of CAT bonds is not complete, the application of an appropriate pricing model is of high relevance. We apply different premium calculation models to compare them with regard to their predictive power. Without taking the financial crisis into account, a version of the Wang transformation model and the linear model are the most accurate ones. In contrast, under consideration of the financial crisis, all analyzed models are approximately equivalent. Furthermore, we find that CAT bond specific information does not improve out‐of‐sample results.     

The risk implications of insurance securitization: The case of catastrophe bonds

Catastrophe (Cat) bonds are insurance securitization vehicles which are supposed to transfer catastrophe-related underwriting risk from issuers to capital markets. This paper addresses key, unanswered questions concerning Cat bonds and offers the following results. First, our findings show firms that issue Cat bonds exhibit less risky underwriting portfolios with less exposure to catastrophe risks and overall less need to hedge catastrophe risk. These results show that the access to the market for insurance securitization is easiest for firms with less risky portfolios. Second, firms that issue Cat bonds are found to experience a reduction in their default risk relative to non-issuing firms and our results, therefore, demonstrate that Cat bonds provide effective catastrophe hedging for issuing firms. Third, firms with less catastrophe exposure, increase their catastrophe exposure following an issue. Therefore, our paper cautions that the ability to hedge catastrophe risk causes some firms to seek additional catastrophe risk.     

CAT Bonds and Other Risk-Linked Securities: State of the Market and Recent Developments

This article reviews the current status of the market for catastrophic risk (CAT) bonds and other risk-linked securities. CAT bonds and other risk-linked securities are innovative financial vehicles that have an important role to play in financing mega-catastrophes and other types of losses. The vehicles are especially important because they access capital markets directly, exponentially expanding risk-bearing capacity beyond the limited capital held by insurers and reinsurers. The CAT bond market has been growing steadily, with record amounts of risk capital raised in 2005, 2006, and 2007. CAT bond premia relative to expected losses covered by the bonds have declined by more than one-third since 2001. CAT bonds now appear to be priced competitively with conventional catastrophe reinsurance and comparably rated corporate bonds. CAT bonds have grown to the extent that they now play a major role in completing the market for catastrophic-risk finance and are spreading to other lines such as automobile insurance, life insurance, and annuities. CAT bonds are not expected to replace reinsurance but to complement the reinsurance market by providing additional risk-bearing capacity. Other innovative financing mechanisms such as risk swaps, industry loss warranties, and sidecars also are expected to continue to play an important role in financing catastrophic risk.     

The announcement impact of seasoned equity offerings on bondholder wealth

Previous studies document a negative return to equity on the announcement of an SEO. However, the effects of SEO announcements on bonds have received little attention. We find that bondholders experience a significant positive return on the announcement of an SEO and this effect is more pronounced for bonds with lower ratings. We examine alternate explanations for bond market reactions to SEO announcements including the leverage risk reduction, wealth transfer, and information signaling hypotheses. Overall, our results are most consistent with the leverage risk reduction hypothesis.     

Catastrophe Bonds—Regulating a Growing Asset Class

As the severity of natural catastrophes continues to intensify, disaster risk management is becoming increasingly important. In order to expand the capacity of the insurance markets, insurers and reinsurers have utilized alternative risk financing mechanisms such as catastrophe (CAT) bonds. Although the CAT bond market has increased recently, past CAT bond defaults have demonstrated that there are still concerns relating to contract documentation and the collateral structure of the bonds. This article argues that additional regulation that addresses these contracting problems and financial risks would facilitate greater use of CAT bonds. Regulatory change should also include industry‐wide accounting and tax reforms that will further support risk management objectives and the growth of the market. If the CAT bond market continues to experience the growth that was witnessed in the past year and additional regulation is implemented, insurers, reinsurers and governments can benefit from the cost‐effective protection that the instruments may provide in the event of a mega‐catastrophe.     

Determinants of the cat bond spread at issuance

The contribution at hand is a short summary of a working paper presented by Alexander Braun at the annual meeting of the German Insurance Science Association (DVfVW) in Hannover in March 2012. This working paper contains empirical evidence from the primary market for cat bonds, which provides new insights concerning the prevailing pricing practice of these instruments. For this purpose, transactional information from a multitude of sources has been collected and cross-checked in order to compile a data set comprising virtually all cat bond tranches that were issued between 1997 and 2011. In order to identify the main determinants of the cat bond spread at issuance, a series of OLS regressions with robust standard errors is run. The respective results indicate that, apart from the expected loss, the covered territory, the sponsor, the reinsurance cycle, and the spreads on comparably rated corporate bonds exhibit a significant impact. Based on these findings, a multifactor pricing model for cat bonds in the primary market is then proposed. This model is applicable across all considered territories and perils, exhibits a stable fit with regard to different subsamples used for calibration, and achieves a higher in-sample and out-of-sample accuracy than several competing specifications that have been introduced in earlier work.     

Catastrophe Bonds,Reinsurance, and the Optimal Collateralization of Risk Transfer

Catastrophe bonds feature full collateralization of the underlying risk transfer and thus abandon the reinsurance principle of economizing on collateral through diversification of risk transfer. Our analysis demonstrates that this feature places limits on catastrophe bond penetration, even if the structure possesses frictional cost advantages over reinsurance. However, we also show that catastrophe bonds have important uses when buyers and reinsurers cannot contract over the division of assets in the event of insolvency and, more generally, cannot write contracts with a full menu of state‐contingent payments. In this environment, segregation of collateral—in the form of multiple reinsurance companies, as well as catastrophe bond vehicles—can ameliorate inefficiencies due to reinsurance contracting constraints by improving welfare for those exposed to default risk. Numerical simulation illustrates how catastrophe bonds improve efficiency in market niches with correlated risks, or with uneven exposure of buyers to reinsurer default.     

The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post-FDICIA Period

In this article we examine whether the federal safety net is viewed by the market as being extended beyond de jure deposits to other bank debt and even the debt of bank holding companies (BHCs). We extend previous research by focusing on the post‐FDICIA period and by examining the risk‐return relation of bonds issued directly by banks, not BHCs. Our results provide evidence that both bank and BHC bonds are priced by the secondary market in relation to their underlying credit risk, particularly for less capitalized issuers, suggesting that proposals requiring banks to issue subordinated debt may enhance market monitoring and discipline and be useful in supplementing regulatory discipline.     

Seniority Differentials in High Yield Bonds: Evolution,Valuation, and Ratings

Almost 20 years ago, one of the coauthors of this article published a study that reported finding systematically wider yield spreads on senior corporate bonds than on subordinated bonds with the same credit rating, but issued by different companies. The study also showed that this difference in spreads did not represent a market “anomaly” or failure to price risk correctly, but instead reflected differences in the actual, and hence the expected, loss rates of the securities. And such differences were in turn shown to stem from the practice of the rating agencies—which was abandoned about ten years ago—of rating a given issuer's subordinated debt two “notches” below that of its senior debt. Partly in response to this finding, all of the major agencies modified their use of this “two‐notch” convention by initiating in‐depth fundamental analysis of subordinated issuers on a case‐by‐case basis. In the meantime, the near disappearance of subordinated debt in the high yield market since the global financial crisis and its partial replacement by secured debt has furnished the authors of this article with a seemingly related “anomaly” to explore—namely, the tendency of secured bonds to have higher yields than samerated senior unsecured bonds. As in the earlier study of the senior‐subordinated puzzle, the authors' analysis confirms that the market has been properly pricing the relative risks of the different securities by showing that the actual loss rates of the secured issues have been systematically higher than those of like‐rated senior unsecured issues. The clear suggestion of these findings, as in the case of the earlier study, is that those investors who have chosen to incur the costs of analyzing expected loss rates instead of relying solely on the ratings have been rewarded for their efforts. And if the past is a guide to the future, this article may also succeed in spurring the rating agencies to make further refinements to their methods.     

Risk sharing in a financial market with endogenous option prices

This article investigates a financial market in which investors may trade in risk-free bonds, stock and put options written on the stock. In each period, stock and option prices are simultaneously determined by market clearing. While the introduction of put options will decrease the systematic risk in the financial market, it will increase the price of risk. Investors with mean-variance preferences will generally hold portfolios containing the primary asset and the put option and may use the option to increase the risk in their wealth position in exchange for higher returns. Aggregate wealth is unaffected by an option market when there are no spillover effects on stock prices, and it is shown that short selling of options will increase the volatility of individual wealth positions. Investors with erroneous beliefs may on average be better off not trading in put options.     

The Evolving Market for Catastrophic Event Risk

ABSTRACT: In the last two years, the market for catastrophic event risk has witnessed important change. The first large and truly successful catastrophe ("CAT") bonds have been issued. New exchanges have opened, traded contracts have been created, and indexes of CAT losses have been introduced. The array of products confronting issuers and investors has widened substantially.
This article provides a brief overview of these changes. It also takes a functional approach to diagnosing the problems in the market for CAT event risk in order to understand how future change is likely to occur. Finally, it provides information to companies looking to assess whether these new markets are useful for solving their problems.     

Collateral affects return risk: evidence from the euro bond market

Covered bonds and senior bonds are prominent securities in the euro bond market. Senior bonds are unsecured, while covered bonds are secured—backed by collateral. Our results show that the presence of collateral reduces the total risk in individual bonds by more than 70%. Compared to diversified portfolios of senior bonds, diversified portfolios of covered bonds have a significantly lower level of systematic risk. However, the fraction of systematic risk to total risk is higher for covered bonds. By decomposing the variance of bond returns, we find that around 33% of the risk in senior bonds is systematic, versus 53% in covered bonds. Both types of bonds contain instrument-specific risk.

     

Sharing Longevity Risk: Why Governments Should Issue Longevity Bonds

Government-issued longevity bonds would allow longevity risk to be shared efficiently and fairly between generations. In exchange for paying a longevity risk premium, the current generation of retirees can look to future generations to hedge their systematic longevity risk. Longevity bonds will lead to a more secure pension savings market, together with a more efficient annuity market. By issuing longevity bonds, governments can aid the establishment of reliable longevity indices and key price points on the longevity risk term structure and help the emerging capital market in longevity-linked instruments to build on this term structure with liquid longevity derivatives.     

A continuous-time model for reinvestment risk in bond markets

When comparing standard bond market models with practice we observe that, whereas the literature places no restrictions on the time to maturity of traded bonds, this is actually the case in practice. Hence, standard models ignore the reinvestment risk present in practice when considering contacts with longer time to maturity than the longest bond traded in the market. In this paper we propose a model including this reinvestment risk. We place a restriction on the bonds traded in the market by limiting the time to maturity of traded bonds. At fixed times, new bonds are issued in the market, thus extending the time of maturity of traded bonds. The initial prices of the new bonds issued in the market depend on the information generated by the market and a stochastic variable independent thereof describing the reinvestment risk. In order to quantify and control the reinvestment risk we apply the criterion of risk-minimization.     

Hard markets,hard times: On the inefficiency of the CAT bond market

This study explores the existence of inefficiencies in catastrophe (CAT) bond secondary markets by investigating the impact of sponsor characteristics on the CAT bond premium. We show that the CAT bond market does not satisfy the demand for catastrophe risk transfer efficiently by revealing a significant effect of sponsor-related factors on the CAT bond premium. This inefficiency is particularly surprising given that a CAT bond isolates the insured risk from other sponsor-related risks through a special purpose vehicle. Remarkably, this inefficiency is even present among non-indemnity CAT bonds, which determine the payout through a mechanism that is exogenous to the sponsor. Our findings also reveal that sponsor-related pricing inefficiencies vary over time and are more relevant during hard and neutral phases compared to soft market phases. Among the sponsor-related determinants of the CAT bond premium are the sponsor's tenure, market coverage, rating, credit default swap spread, and his ability to issue innovative “on the run” CAT bonds.     

债务抵押凭证（CDO）的风险与信用评级研究

债务抵押凭证（CDO）是金融市场重要的风险转移工具,具有信用级别高、收益水平高的特征,其市场规模扩展迅速。但这种金融创新产品因较复杂的基础资产和分层结构,产生出异于传统公司债券的风险特征。很多投资者没有真正了解其潜在风险,且信用评级质量不佳,致使CDO投资者在次贷危机中遭受严重损失甚至破产。因此有必要深入了解CDO所具有的风险特征和CDO产品信用评级的一般方法,纠正现有评级方法的不足,分析其对次贷危机的影响。