Rethinking Climate Change,Conflict and Security

This special issue of Geopolitics presents a series of critical interventions on the links between global anthropogenic climate change, conflict and security. In this introduction, we situate the special issue by providing an assessment of the state of debate on climate security, and then by summarising the eight articles that follow. We observe, to start with, that contemporary climate security discourse is dominated by a problematic ensemble of policy-led framings and assumptions. And we submit that the contributions to this issue help rethink this dominant discourse in two distinct ways, offering both a series of powerful critiques, plus new interpretations of climate-conflict linkages which extend beyond Malthusian orthodoxy.     

The Austrian theory of relational goods

In modern rich societies, the traditional positive correlation between income and happiness seems to have disappeared: even though their income keeps rising, people do not declare themselves to be happier. This problem, which is known in literature as the “paradox of happiness”, has been thoroughly studied. One of the possible explanations is based on the observation that an income increase can sometimes entail the destruction of those relational goods on which happiness largely relies: relationships of family, friendship, love and fellowship. This research aims to show how, in the age of Marginalism, the most important attempt at establishing if and in which sense relational goods are economic goods is carried out by the very Austrian economists who led Robbins to write the epistemological statute of modern economic science.     

Introduction: Is the European Union Capable of Integrating Diverse Models of Capitalism?

ABSTRACT

The causes and consequences of the Euro crisis have led comparative political economy scholars to question whether European integration can accommodate diverse models of capitalism. This special issue addresses two important questions about the compatibility of diverse growth models within the European Union (EU): Are some growth regimes better suited to European integration than others? and does the EU favour a particular constellation of domestic institutions? Contributions within this special issue provide a qualified yes to these questions, concluding that the EU favours export-led growth models whilst it penalises and discourages domestic consumption-oriented growth paths, particularly those that are financed by debt accumulation. While recent comparative capitalism literature highlights that European monetary integration has favoured export-led growth regimes, contributions in this special issue outline that the EU’s prioritisation of export-led growth over domestic demand-led growth is present in other facets of integration, including EU accession, financial integration, the free movement of people, fiscal governance and the Europe 2020 growth strategy. Findings here provide important insights for both the European integration and comparative capitalism literature, highlighting that the unique economic ties being forged within the European project may be problematic for those countries outside northwestern Europe and for workers in low-wage domestic sectors.     

Game-theoretic definitions of fairness and the contractualistic foundations of justice

We discuss game-theoretic interpretations of Rawls's theory of justice with special reference to the choice of the most appropriate solution concept. We show that Core-like solution concepts, as the one proposed by Laden (1991,Philosophy and Public Affairs,20, 189–222), have undesirable implications in this context. The “Bargaining Set” has more satisfactory properties for any contractualistic approach.     

Walras and pareto on the meaning of the solution concept in general equilibrium theory

The notion of solution plays a crucial role in the conceptual system of Léon Walras, the founder of the General Equilibrium Theory (GET). In this paper, after introducing the two solution concepts employed by Walras in the development of his version of GET, respectively called the “theoretical” and the “practical” solution, we discuss the problems such peculiar conception gives rise to, as well as the attempts Walras makes to dodge them. Then we explain why and to what extent Pareto, Walras’ immediate successor and co-founder of GET, departs from Walras’ original conception, progressively developing an independent viewpoint on the issue of equilibrium computability in GET. (JEL:B13, B21, B31, B41, C62, C68, D50)     

Introduction to field experiments in economics with applications to the economics of charity

This special issue highlights an empirical approach that has increasingly grown in prominence in the last decade—field experiments. While field experiments can be used quite generally in economics—to test theories’ predictions, to measure key parameters, and to provide insights into the generalizability of empirical results—this special issue focuses on using field experiments to explore questions within the economics of charity. The issue contains six distinct field experimental studies that investigate various aspects associated with the economics of charitable giving. The issue also includes a fitting tribute to one of the earliest experimenters to depart from traditional lab methods, Peter Bohm, who curiously has not received deep credit or broad acclaim. Hopefully this issue will begin to rectify this oversight.      

Innovation,growth and financial markets

We review some of the literature at the intersection of innovation, financial markets, and economic growth. We explore two key questions: (i) How financial markets interact with innovation; (ii) what type of quality transformations are brought about by innovation. A special emphasis is given to questions that stem from the 2008 economic and financial crisis, and to subjects further developed in the articles collected in this issue.     

Matching markets with price bargaining

The extant microeconomic literature on matching markets assumes ordinal preferences for matches, while bargaining within matches is mostly excluded. Central for this paper, however, is bargaining over joint profits from potential matches. We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, a seemingly simple allocation task in a 2×2 market with repeated negotiations. When inefficiency is possible, about 1/3 of the complete matches are inefficient and, overall, more than 3/4 of the experimental allocations are unstable. These results strongly contradict existing bargaining theories requiring efficient matches. Even with regard to efficient matches, the tested theories perform poorly. Standard bargaining and behavioral concepts, such as Selten’s (1972) Equal Division Core, are outperformed by the simplistic ε-Equal Split, i.e., an equal split of the joint profit plus/minus ε.     

Cost of capital,discounting and relational contracting: endogenous optimal return and duration for joint investment projects

Concession, project financing and public–private partnership schemes are investment projects that are generally submitted to valuation criteria based on discounted cash flow analysis. The theoretical basis of these valuation criteria are now at issue. Pursuant to recent advances in relational contracting economics and behavioural finance, joint investment projects can be considered as special relational environments where the project's returns improve on alternative replacement opportunities. This article seeks to bridge the gap between new theories and widely used valuation techniques by providing a generalized approach to investment valuation. This article suggests reasonable valuation criteria that fit these new theoretical developments, including an endogenous optimal duration function that may be integrated into the project's contractual agreement.     

China's indigenous innovation approach: the emergence of Chinese innovation theory?

Theory-driven and theory-based studies on innovation in China are relatively scarce. Most innovation studies about Chinese business are based on Chinese policy and government programmes and their results. This special issue of Technology Analysis and Strategic Management explores China's indigenous innovation strategy and suggests a research agenda that focuses on Chinese innovation theory building that incorporates China's efforts to move towards an innovation-based economy. Currently, China is developing its indigenous innovation capabilities (The Chinese term is 自主创新, pronounced zizhu chuangxin). We suggest that innovation studies of Chinese business could focus on these indigenous innovation ambitions. In addition to this, it could adopt, and be embedded in a Chinese theory of innovation instead of a traditional Western-centric theory of innovation. Our proposition is that to better understand Chinese indigenous innovation, a new paradigm of Chinese innovation should be developed. We therefore present a research agenda that can be a starting point for the development of such a theory, and present seven papers in this special issue that give content to this idea. Obviously no theory will have a monopoly on exploring Chinese innovation phenomena, but it is interesting to add a Chinese-centric view into the Western-centric scholarly view. We hope that will be one of the contributions of this special issue on innovation in China.     

Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers

Summary This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games withoutspillovers. We find thatpopulation monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, when the payoff of a player changes monotonically when the size of the group of players choosing the same strategy increases, are crucial to obtain the equivalence of these two solution concepts. We identify the classes of games, satisfying population monotonicity properties, which yield the equivalence of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the set of strong Nash equilibria. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equivalence result even when the population monotonicity assumptions are relaxed.We wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko, Akihiko Matsui, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Benyamin Shitoviz, Tayfun Sonmez, William Thomson, the participants of the Southeastern Economic Theory Meeting in Charlottesville and the seminars at CORE and University of Tsukuba for useful discussions and comments. Our special thanks due anonymous referee for the suggestion to add a section addressing the issue of existence of a strong Nash equilibrium.     

On the dynamics of inequality

The dynamics of inequality are studied in a model of human capital accumulation with credit constraints. This model admits a multiplicity of steady state skill ratios that exhibit varying degrees of inequality across households. The main result studies equilibrium paths. It is shown that an equilibrium sequence of skill ratios must converge monotonically to the smallest steady state that exceeds the initial ratio for that sequence. Convergence is “gradual" in that the steady state is not achieved in finite time. On the other hand, if the initial skill ratio exceeds the largest steady state, convergence to a steady state is immediate.This paper is based on unpublished notes from 1990; see http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/DevEcon/Notes/incdist.pdf. Two considerations suggest that these results may be worth reporting in print. First, the existence of a sizeable recent literature indicates that these relatively early notes may have value outside a filing cabinet or a private webpage. Second, Mukul Majumdar’s own research on economic growth with a nonconvex technology is an even earlier precursor to some of this literature, so the current outlet – a special issue in his honor – seems appropriate. Conversations with Glenn Loury simplified the proof of the main result. I thank Dilip Mookherjee for many useful discussions, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Funding from the National Science Foundation under grant number 0241070 is acknowledged. This paper is dedicated with much affection and warm admiration to Mukul Majumdar – or to Mukulda, as I always think of him – on the occasion of his 60th birthday.     

Benefits Transfer: Current Practice and Prospects

This paper introduces a special issue devoted to the benefits transfer methods used as part of benefit costs analysis for policy analysis. Benefits transfer methods, as they are applied for environmental policy analyses, use economic concepts together with existing empirical estimates to predict the incremental benefits from a change in some feature of an environmental resource. After giving two examples of the decisions that analysts confront in performing these analyses, I discuss the interconnections between the papers in this issue and the research challenges that emerged from discussions of them.     

The directions of FDI and the self-intensifying expectations of the exchange rate and the effectiveness of sterilized intervention

In this paper, we develop the Renminbi’s dynamic model to analyze the relationship between the flow directions of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the exchange rate’s expectations on the basis of distinguishing the real interest rate from the desired interest rate. We find that the exchange rate expectation has a self-intensifying mechanism, which could have a reverse effect on the country’s macroeconomic stabilization. We discuss the issue on how expectation impacts the macro economy and then analyze the conditions of successful intervention, which is helpful for policy management. __________ Translated from the The Journal of World Economy (世界经济), 2005, (7) (in Chinese)     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">Acting</Emphasis> Person: Social Capital and Sustainable Development

Ron Stanfield has had a long and distinguished career as a social economist and commentator on the social economy. Of special concern to us in this article are Stanfield’s interests in social capital, sustainable development, and nurturance which we refer to as caring. We also take up several other virtues including sympathy, benevolence, and generosity that have been part of the economics literature from the time of Smith’s Moral Sentiments along with the associated vices of heartlessness, insensitivity, meanness, greediness, and others. This article attempts to show that (1) adding social capital to the machine-like individual of mainstream economics results in the acting person of personalist economics who becomes more fully a human person through social interactions that foster the development of several virtues or less fully a human person through other interactions that instill certain vices; and that (2) in matters relating to sustainability, becoming more fully a human person calls especially for the practice of the virtues of justice and moderation. In addition we have suggested a framework for thinking about sustainable development in terms of actuating and limiting principles and for developing critical values or performance standards for sustainable development that are person-centered.     

The Ethics of Intergenerational Distribution: Reply and Response to John E. Roemer

Recent concerns among economists over global climate change have given rise to an uneven literature on intergenerational welfare economics. Environmental & Resource Economics in its March 2011 issue published a paper by the political philosopher John E. Roemer that contains not only errors of interpretation of what others have written, but also misunderstandings of settled matters. I respond and reply to Roemer by re-exploring the foundations of intergenerational welfare economics. I show that ethical pluralism gives rise to a very different framework for thinking about the subject than the one Roemer presents in his paper. Moreover, his dismissal of much of what welfare economists write on such concepts as social discount rates has as its source an utterly narrow view of the contexts in which economic evaluation is undertaken in the contemporary world.     

On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms

Here, we establish a relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms. Both concepts have been used to relate the types in one structure to types in a second “larger” structure. In general, the two concepts may differ, in the sense that a hierarchy morphism need not be a type morphism. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the two concepts coincide. We go on to provide situations under which this condition must be satisfied.     

Fiscal Competition: An Introduction

The papers in this special issue contribute to a rapidly growing literature that departs from traditional public economics by emphasizing that governments (including subnational governments, but also, increasingly, national governments) operate in an environment where labor and capital flow across jurisdictional boundaries. These open–economy considerations raise a host of issues for the analysis of public policy, ranging from practical problems of business taxation in a multi–jurisdictional setting to fundamental conceptual questions about the organizaton of the public sector and the evolution of the institutional structure of governance. The papers in this special issue advance many facets of this broad research program.     

ON EQUILIBRIUM FOR OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS ORGANIZATIONS*

Necessary conditions for equilibrium are that beliefs about the behavior of other agents are rational and individuals maximize. We argue that in stationary OLG environments this implies that any future generation in the same situation as the initial generation must do as well as the initial generation did in that situation. We conclude that the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature do not satisfy this condition. We then propose an alternative equilibrium concept, organizational equilibrium that satisfies this condition. We show that equilibrium exists, it is unique, and it improves over autarky without achieving optimality. Moreover, the equilibrium can be readily found by solving a maximization program.     

Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation

It has been suggested that players often produce simplified and/or misspecified mental models of strategic decisions [Kreps, D., 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford]. We submit that the relational structure of players' preferences in a game is a source of cognitive complexity, and may be an important driver of such simplifications. We provide a classification of order structures in two-person games based on the properties of monotonicity and projectivity, and present experiments in which subjects construct representations of games of different relational complexity and subsequently play the games according to these representations. Experimental results suggest that relational complexity matters. More complex games are harder to represent, and this difficulty seems correlated with short term memory capacity. In addition, most erroneous representations are simpler than the correct ones. Finally, subjects who misrepresent the games behave consistently with such representations, suggesting that in many strategic settings individuals may act optimally on the ground of simplified and mistaken premises.