Can Managers Forecast Aggregate Market Returns?

Previous studies have found that the proportion of equity in total new debt and equity issues is negatively correlated with future equity market returns. Researchers have interpreted this finding as evidence that corporate managers are able to predict the systematic component of their stock returns and to issue equity when the market is overvalued. In this article we show that the predictive power of the share of equity in total new issues stems from pseudo‐market timing and not from any abnormal ability of managers to time the equity markets.     

Stock option compensation and the likelihood of meeting analysts' quarterly earnings targets

One role of stock options in executive compensation packages is to counterbalance the inherently short-term orientation of base salary and annual bonuses. Managerial compensation plans frequently include stock options in order to better align the interests of managers and outside shareholders and reduce agency problems. However, since option values are sensitive to fluctuations in stock prices, and investors reward firms that meet or exceed earnings expectations, executives of firms with sizable option components in their compensation plans have increased incentives to report earnings that meet or exceed analysts' forecasts. We show that the propensity to meet or exceed analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts is positively related to the use of options in top executives' compensation plans. Further, firms that employ relatively more options in their compensation plans more frequently report earnings surprises that exceed analysts' forecast by small amounts (between 0 and 1 cent per share). These results suggest that the use of stock-based compensation intensifies top executives' focus on financial analysts' short-term earnings forecasts.     

Financialized accounts: Share buy-backs, mark to market and holding the financial line in the S&P 500

In recent years the US corporate sector has deployed more cash from operations to finance the repurchase of outstanding share capital for treasury stock. Shares repurchased for treasury stock can help flatter earnings per share, fund senior management share option compensation schemes and finance corporate acquisitions. In financialized accounts these are now significant transactions which, it is argued, serve the financial interests of managers and investors.The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is now demanding a “greater use of fair value measurements in financial statements” with the result that share options and corporate acquisitions will be “marked to market”. This will force a financialized ratchet because managers in the S&P 500 will need step up cash extraction if they are to hold the financial line.     

我国上市公司管理层收购财务绩效的实证研究

管理层收购(MBO)是优化公司治理结构、降低代理成本、充分发挥企业家才能,从而提高公司财务绩效的有效途径。本文以我国深、沪两市中具有代表性的24家上市公司为样本,采用合成数据(Panel Date)截面回归的计量模型,对我国上市公司MBO的财务绩效问题进行了实证研究,结果表明:(1)在比较低的管理层持股比例下,MBO并未提高我国上市公司的财务绩效,且管理层持股比例与公司财务绩效成反向关系;(2)管理层收购前后,公司每股净资产均呈向上的凸性;每股收益随着管理层持股比例的扩大而呈递减趋势。     

The outperformance of family firms: the role of variance in earnings per share and analyst forecast dispersion on the Swiss market

Recent studies provide empirical evidence that family firms are outperforming their non-family counterparts in terms of stock market performance. For the Swiss stock market we find that family firms indeed outperform their non-family counterparts after controlling for firm size and beta. In addition, our data shows that family firms display more stable earnings per share in contrast to their non-family counterparts. Furthermore we find that the variance of earnings per share positively affects analyst forecast dispersion. According to anomaly literature, lower analyst forecast dispersion has been found to induce higher excess return, which our data supports for the Swiss stock market. By linking variance of earnings per share, analyst forecast dispersion and stock performance we provide an insightful explanation for the excess stock market returns of family firms. In addition, our text extends the theory of dispersion effect with an additional empirical element, the variance of earnings per share.      

Valuation Effects of Greek Stock Dividend Distributions

This study analyses the price reaction to stock dividend distributions by firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange on both the announcement and the ex‐dividend day. It also analyses earnings per share, dividends per share and trading volume in the pre‐ and post‐announcement periods. The findings show statistically insignificant abnormal returns on both the announcement and the ex‐dividend day. The analysis does not reveal any significant change in earnings per share and dividends per share, but it does reveal a significant decline in the market‐adjusted trading volume in the post dividend period. The findings, based on a different institutional environment, expand the empirical evidence on the value effects of stock dividends.     

Environmental social controls and capital investments: Australian evidence

Environmental social controls (ESCs) such as mandatory disclosure, regulations, subsidies, and stakeholder opinion are intended to improve firm environmental performance. This paper reports ESC importance to Australian financial managers in making capital investment decisions. A decision‐making experiment showed managers to be most responsive to stakeholder opinion (42 per cent), followed by subsidization (26 per cent) and regulatory cost (22 per cent). Mandatory disclosure has very little influence (10 per cent). ESC interaction effects are limited so coordination of ESC policy is not a primary concern. High degrees of managerial self‐insight suggest policy changes would be enhanced by close consultations with the managers involved.     

The effect of affiliated analysts on stock recommendations: Evidence from share pledges in China

We use the share pledge context in China to examine how affiliated analysts whose securities companies are pledgees of share pledge firms issue stock recommendations on these listed firms. We find that their recommendations are more optimistic than those of non-affiliated analysts, and they are more likely to issue Buy and Add recommendations, suggesting that they issue optimistic rating reports for share pledge firms due to their conflicts of interest. We also find a dynamic adjustment in the stock recommendation behavior of these analysts, and their probability after issuing optimistic stock recommendations is significantly reduced before and after the years that the affiliation relationship between them and share pledge firms both began and ended. These affiliated analysts continue to issue optimistic stock recommendations after visiting the share pledge firms if they work in the same location as the firms, or if they are star analysts among New Fortune’s “top five analysts,” and when the information transparency of the share pledge firms is higher. In addition, the optimistic stock recommendation behavior of affiliated analysts is more significant in our sample of firms with high share pledge ratios and downward stock price pressure. The earnings forecast quality of affiliated analysts is also found to be lower, and they are less inclined to downgrade stock recommendations for these share pledge firms. Buy recommendations issued by both non-affiliated and affiliated analysts can bring cumulative excess returns in the short event window, but those issued by affiliated analysts are significantly negative in the long-term event window, and significantly lower than those issued by non-affiliated analysts. Overall, our study shows that affiliated analysts issue optimistic rating reports on share pledge firms due to conflicts of interest, which leads to decision-making bias in investors and thus decreases the stock price crash risk of the firms. Our findings further reveal the economic consequences of share pledging and extend our understanding of the behavior of analysts in a conflict of interest situation from the share pledge perspective.     

Are Financial Markets Overly Optimistic about the Prospects of Firms That Issue Equity? Evidence from Voluntary versus Involuntary Equity Issuances by Banks

This paper examines firm performance around announcements of common stock issues. We study the banking industry in which some stock issues are made voluntarily by managers, and other issues are involuntary. We find that banks that voluntarily issue common stock experience a significant drop in the matched adjusted operating performance following the issue, a significant drop in benchmark firms' adjusted stock prices following the issue, and systematically negative market reactions to post-issue quarterly earnings announcements. Banks that issue common stock involuntarily experience values for these measures that are not significantly different from those of the benchmark firm(s).     

Management compensation contracts and distribution policies in the US technology sector

This paper examines the impact of executive compensation practices on (a) the decision to distribute and (b) the distribution channel employed by companies from the US technology sector. We report that firms that compensate their managers using executive stock options (ESOs) tend to distribute less and firms that use stock awards make more distributions. When we simultaneously examine the distribution and the channel used, we find firms using ESOs restrict their dividend payments but their propensity for stock repurchases is unaffected. Firms using stock awards to compensate managers make greater distributions across all channels. We also provide strong evidence in favour of the agency and leverage explanations for distributions.     

Share Repurchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts

I show that share repurchases increase pay-performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Moreover, since employees are forced to bear more risk in firms that repurchase shares, they exercise their stock options earlier and receive higher compensation.     

Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

基于财务数据的农业股票投资价值研究

在农业板块股票市场中,采用灰色关联度法找出与股票价格相关联的财务指标,并分别建立了对数线性模型与截面数据回归模型检验了每股净资产对股票价格的基础作用。研究结果表明：股票价格与业绩关联性显著,公司财务因素对于股价有着极强的解释能力,每股净资产是股票价格的价值基础。     

中国上市公司股权激励实施效果研究

股权激励制度设计的初衷是为了减弱代理问题,因此考察股权激励的实施效果应该首先直接考察它能否缓解经理人的代理问题,然后才是对公司绩效的影响.利用2006-2014年我国沪深两市A股上市公司面板数据,从代理成本和公司绩效两个层面研究我国股权激励实施效果,结果表明:上市公司实施股权激励可抑制投资不足行为,却加剧了经理人的过度投资行为;股权激励计划并不能显著降低经理人的在职消费,由此而带来的以ROA衡量的公司绩效改善也并不显著,这从两个层面说明我国股权激励计划的激励效果并不明显.     

Institutional trading and share returns

Using a unique database of daily transactions from Australian equity managers, we investigate the relation between institutional trading and share returns. The 34 institutional investors included in our sample exhibit a statistically and economically significant ability to predict large capitalization share returns for the ten days following their trades. Detailed analysis indicates that investment manager style is important in understanding the link between institutional trading and stock returns. The contemporaneous relation between institutional trading and returns depends on trade size, broker use, and investment style. We find growth-oriented managers are momentum traders, while style-neutral and value managers are contrarian.     

Do managers time the market? Evidence from open-market share repurchases

A contentious debate exists over whether executives possess market timing skills when announcing certain corporate transactions. Pseudo-market timing, however, has recently emerged as an important alternative hypothesis as to why the appearance of timing might be evident when, in fact, none exists. We reconsider this debate in the context of share repurchases. Consistent with prior studies, we also report evidence of abnormal stock performance following buyback announcements. Pseudo-market timing, however, does not appear to be a viable explanation. Our results are more consistent with the notion that managers possess timing ability, at least in the context of share repurchases.     

Accounting behavior of German firms after an ADR issuance

This paper presents preliminary evidence on whether German corporations that issue American depositary receipts (ADR) experience a change in the level of garbling in earnings as expressed under German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In a shareholder regime, a manager's objective is to maximize the company's stock price. Past literature suggests that this will lead managers to follow a policy of more disclosure. In stakeholder regimes, managers have an ill-defined objective function and their compensation is not typically sensitive to the price of the stock. This literature suggests that managers in stakeholder regimes will manipulate earnings to satisfy the various constituents of the firm. By issuing an ADR, a company changes its regime: shareholders become relatively more important to the manager. To maximize the stock price, managers should minimize the overall noise in accounting numbers even under local GAAP. The empirical results are generally consistent with this hypothesis, but a small sample size prevents drawing definitive conclusions.     

Why do stock repurchases change over time?

Recent studies have shown the time trends of firm stock repurchase behavior. We examine these time changes for stock repurchase through the lens of real activities earnings management. Managers appear more likely to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Furthermore, suspect firms that just missed analyst earnings per share forecasts have higher incentives to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases. The results are not driven by changes in corporate governance associated with the passage of SOX. Overall, our results suggest earnings management can be a significant determinant of the dynamics of stock repurchases.     

A Temporal Analysis of Earnings Surprises: Profits versus Losses

I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about -33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are "a little bit of good news," and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an "extreme amount of bad news." My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider—namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report "a little bit of good news" in every year.     

Split Share Structure Reform,corporate governance,and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.