Individual characteristics and the arousal of mixed emotions: consequences for the effectiveness of charity fundraising advertisements

• Charities that deal with emotionally upsetting issues (severe physical disfigurement, cruelty to animals, etc.) frequently include in their fundraising materials images and messages with the potential to cause substantial psychological distress to some members of the public. Often, the materials presented arouse mixed positive and negative emotions within viewers. This study examined the influences of a number of potential antecedents of the stimulation of mixed emotions among individuals confronted with highly emotional charity fundraising advertisements. The research sought to identify the type of person most likely to experience mixed emotions when observing an emotional charity advertisement, the specific kinds of emotion felt most deeply by individuals with various characteristics, and the consequences of mixed emotions for a person's attitude towards the advertisement and for the individual's behavioural intention vis‐à‐vis future donations. Three made‐up charity advertisements were presented to a sample of 771 respondents. A model was constructed to predict the participants' emotional reactions to the advertisements and was estimated, the results suggesting that mixed emotions represented an important determinant of both attitude towards the advertisement and the sample members' behavioural intention.

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effect of emotional victim images in prosocial advertising: The moderating role of helping mode

Charities and marketers routinely incorporate images of recipients, for example victims of a flood or famine, in their prosocial advertising; however, previous literature suggests mixed results regarding the effectiveness of relying on sad versus happy images of victims. Recently, due to reactance to excessively traumatic marketing campaigns, happy victim images have been found to be more effective in eliciting prosocial behaviors. To extend this line of research, an experiment found that consumers are more willing to help when viewing advertisements featuring happy children over sad children. Moreover, helping mode moderates the relationship between victim image and helping intentions. The effect of a happy victim image is attenuated when consumers are asked to buy cause-related products rather than donate to charities. According to emotion regulation consumption theory, consumers mitigate the feeling of negative emotions by increasing their intention to buy cause-related products. Practically, the findings provide guidance on integrating victim images in prosocial advertising.     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global upswing delayed

• This month sees our global GDP growth forecast for 2015 revised down to 2.7%, implying no improvement from 2014. At the start of the year, we expected world growth for 2015 at 2.9%.
• A key factor behind the slippage in our global forecast has been a softening of activity in the US. The balance of economic surprises (actual data versus expected) has deteriorated sharply in recent months. As a result, we now expect US growth at 2.7% this year, compared to 3.3% at the start of 2015.
• We are wary of reading too much into the most recent data, as the US and other advanced economies also went through ‘soft patches’ at the starts of both 2013 and 2014, but recovered. Also, the balance of economic surprises for the G10 is only moderately negative – and is strongly positive for the Eurozone.
• One area of concern is sluggish US consumption recently – despite lower oil prices. But with labour market conditions favourable and disposable income growing solidly, we expect this to prove a blip. And the evidence from advanced economies as a whole suggests lower oil prices have boosted consumers.
• There are nevertheless genuine drags on global growth. The strong dollar appears to be weighing on US exports and investment, and curbing profits. It is also damaging growth in some emerging markets through its negative impact on commodity prices and capital flows and via balance sheet effects (raising the burden of dollar‐denominated debt).
• Meanwhile, this month also sees a fresh downgrade to our forecast for China – GDP is now expected to rise 6.6% this year versus 6.8% a month ago. This reflects weakness in a number of key indicators and also the likely impact of a squeeze on local government finances from the property sector slump.
• With the US and China representing a third of global GDP, slower growth there will also tend to retard world trade growth. We continue to expect world GDP growth to reach 3% in 2016, but 2015 now looks like being another year of sub‐par global growth.

     

The influence of branding on adolescent smoking behaviour: exploring the mediating role of image and attitudes

• This study investigates the continuing effects of tobacco marketing communications in a post advertising era, focusing on the constructs of brand awareness, brand image, attitude formation and intention to smoke by adolescents.
• A conceptual model is presented, based on 926 respondents from a UK wide study, to assess brand‐related interrelationships and influences of peers on adolescents' attitudes toward smoking and intention to smoke.
• Results show the strong influence of branding on both attitude and intention, and have implications for government anti‐smoking policies specifically in regard to generic packaging and point of sale displays.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of credibility in shaping attitudes toward nonprofit websites

• The study examines the factors that impact the perceptions of consumers when visiting a nonprofit website. Measures of online communications effectiveness in the for‐profit environment are applied to the nonprofit world.
• Consumer reactions to two major nonprofit websites provide insight into the relationship between website credibility and attitude toward the site.
• The study points to the importance of several credibility measures (particularly those related to site design) that are significantly related to attitude toward the site.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Will Brexit speed a seismic shift in UK trade patterns?

• The UK's trade pattern has shifted significantly away from the EU since the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that this shift will continue in the decades to come, with the EU share in UK goods exports potentially slipping to around 35% by 2035. Shifts in relative prices from moves in tariff and especially non‐tariff barriers could lower the share further.
• Over 60% of UK goods exports went to the EU in the late 1990s but this has fallen to around 45%. Slow EU growth is partly to blame, with UK exports to the EU barely expanding since 2007. But our analysis also shows that a 1% rise in EU GDP leads to only around half the rise in UK exports to the EU that a 1% rise in GDP in the rest of the world induces in UK exports to non‐EU countries.
• Based on our findings and OE forecasts of long‐term growth in the EU and the world, the EU share of UK goods exports could fall to 37% by 2035 and around 30% by 2050 – back to its 1960 level. The share of services exports to the EU has held up better but is lower than for goods, at around 40%.
• Weakening growth of UK exports to the EU has taken place despite the development of the EU single market since the early 1990s. Indeed, based on our projections UK goods exports to the single market could drop below 5% of UK GDP by 2050. These projections make no allowance for Brexit effects, but the declining importance of exports to the EU single market could colour prospective Brexit negotiations.
• Simple income‐based projections of potential country shares in future UK exports suggest a further swing towards emerging countries (EM) in the decades ahead, especially China and India. Exports to EM could approach 40% of the total by 2035. A shift in the pattern of trade preferences and restrictions faced by the UK post‐Brexit could spark even larger shifts in the structure of UK exports.

     

Sensation seekers and civic participation: exploring the influence of sensation seeking and gender on intention to lead and volunteer

• Approximately 1100 extreme sports participants were surveyed to identify the relationship between sensation seeking and gender on current civic participation, motivation for volunteer involvement, intention to participate in the future, and a preference for leadership.
• Sensation seeking was not helpful in identifying current civic involvement. However, sensation seekers reported a significant desire to work with activist and reform‐oriented organizations.
• Females reported a significantly higher level of motivation for civic participation than males as well as a greater intention to volunteer in the future.
• Both male and female sensation seekers reported a preference for a leadership role.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of nonprofit brand equity on individual giving intention: mediating by the self‐concept of individual donor

• Currently nonprofit organizations have to rely more on individual donors and less on the government for funding. Therefore, understanding the individual donor from the perspective of nonprofit has been of increasing interest to nonprofit marketers. In this research, the effects of nonprofit organizational brand equity and individual self‐concept on individual giving intention were studied by using survey to selected 393 valid respondents in China. The empirical results indicated that, (1) the three dimensions brand personality, brand image, and brand awareness of the nonprofit organization has positive direct impact on individual giving intention; (2) brand personality and brand awareness of the nonprofit organization has positive direct impact on the self‐concept of individual donor; (3) the self‐concept of individual donor has positive direct impact on individual giving intention; and (4) the self‐concept of individual donor mediates significantly the relationships between brand personality, brand awareness, and individual giving intention, while not significantly between brand image and individual giving intention.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Secular stagnation ‐ are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• Stunningly low global long‐term bond yields provide some credence to a secular stagnation view of the world. We present an analytical framework – culminating in a simple scorecard – for assessing the extent to which purported drivers and manifestations of secular stagnation match global economic and financial developments and we compare with a complementary narrative focusing on balance sheet boom and bust. We find some support for each, but think global rates will not stay as low for as long as markets price in.
• Larry Summers has used the term to refer to a situation where demand and supply for savings deliver very low equilibrium real interest rates. The bulge in middle‐aged savers, falling prices of investment goods, and flows of savings ‘uphill’ from emerging markets may have all led to real rates trending much lower in recent decades.
• Another version of the story is that slow technical progress depresses demand for borrowing, and pushes down on real rates. This is less compelling, and based more on anecdote than anything else. There are as many reasons to be optimistic, as pessimistic, about the supply side.
• There are holes in the secular stagnation narrative. Until very recently, G7 savings rates have trended down rather than up, partly because of another decades‐long trend of financial innovation. Furthermore, few economists, nor the Fed or the BoE, expect policy rates in the US or UK to stay low for as long as is priced in to markets.
• A complementary narrative would stress the role of the credit‐fuelled mega‐boom and subsequent balance sheet blow out and Great Recession, and then the long road to financial repair. This is more consistent with the path of savings rates over recent decades, and the policy response – including QE – can explain much of the rest.
• We see the two explanations as complementary and reinforcing. In global terms, they appear no better or worse than each other. Comparing across countries, Japan comes closest to resembling secular stagnation, followed by EZ, US and UK, according to our scorecard.
• We think ultra‐low long rates will not be borne out by the future path of short rates, but acknowledge a significant risk they might, for example, if monetary policy remains too tight on average because of zero bound effects on interest rates and limited scope for fiscal accommodation.

     

China‐commodity nexus at the heart of global upturn

• ? The China‐commodity nexus has been at the heart of the global upturn in trade and industry. It could directly and indirectly account for as much as 70% of the recovery since mid‐2016, based on our analysis. We think this nexus will continue to support world growth in the near term, but the global upturn is vulnerable to moderating Chinese growth and slippage in commodity prices.
• ? China has directly accounted for around a third of the upturn in world trade, similar to the contribution of G7 countries. But adding in indirect effects, China's influence is likely to have been much more significant. Stronger Chinese demand has contributed to an improvement in the trade performance of its Asian trading partners, commodity exporters and other advanced economies.
• ? Using a model simulation that introduces positive shocks to imports in “greater China” and to commodity prices (based on the scale we have seen since mid‐2016), our top‐end estimate for China's contribution to the upturn in world trade is around 70%.
• ? The simulation points to especially strong improvements in output and exports for economies such as South Korea, Japan, Malaysia and some commodity exporters. This broadly matches the pattern of performance seen over recent months, though commodity exporters' performance has been quite mixed.
• ? G7 investment growth is likely to have played only a modest role in the recent global upturn. But Japan is an exception, while upgrades to investment forecasts for South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have also been large.
• ? A 1% rise in commodity prices could raise commodity exporters' investment by 0.3–0.6%, based on our analysis. As a result, there could be additional improvement in commodity exporters' investment this year, supporting world growth. However, with our forecasts suggesting that commodity prices are set to slip further over the coming quarters, this boost could prove short‐lived.

     

Brexit — velvet divorce or messy breakup?

• We use a ‘scenario tree’ approach to look at the possible outcomes of the negotiations around the UK's exit from the EU. Given how little common ground there is between the two sides, we find that a relatively loose relationship is the most likely outcome, with the UK set to leave the EU in early‐ 2019.
• The negotiating positions of the UK and EU are diametrically opposed. The UK wants to end the free movement of labour, cease making contributions to the EU budget and regain ‘sovereignty’ from Brussels, while retaining as much access to the single market as possible. But the EU's starting position is that single market access is dependent upon agreeing to the four freedoms and that this is non‐negotiable.
• So far all signs are that the UK will prioritise the ability to control immigration over single market access. Thus remaining a member of the EEA is very unlikely to be viable over the longer‐term – our scenario tree analysis gives it a probability of just 6% – although it may be adopted as an interim step. Remaining part of the customs union is also unlikely (18%) as it will preclude the UK from making FTA with third countries.
• If the EU takes a mercantilist approach, it will have little incentive to come to an agreement with the UK over single market access for services, given the UK's large trade surplus with the EU for these activities, implying that UK firms may face growing non‐tariff barriers after the UK has left the EU. The UK's large deficit on goods trade with the EU gives a better chance of agreeing a FTA for goods, though with any FTA requiring agreement from all 27 EU members, the UK would have to be prepared for lengthy negotiations and make extensive concessions. Therefore, we think that a reversion to WTO rules (37%) is slightly more likely than agreeing a FTA (36%).

     

Housing slump could cut world growth to decade‐low

• ? A combined slump in house prices and housing investment in the major economies could cut world growth to a 10‐year low of 2.2% by 2020 – and to below 2% if it also triggered a tightening in global credit conditions.
• ? In such a scenario, inflation would remain well below target in the main economies, and US Fed rates would be up to 100 basis points lower than in our baseline by 2021.
• ? Signs of a global house price downturn are already visible, with around a third of our sample of economies seeing falling prices and world residential investment starting to decline. High house price valuations add to the risk that this downturn will deepen in the coming quarters, hitting consumer spending.
• ? Using the Oxford Global Economic Model, we find that a 10% fall in house prices and an 8% fall in housing investment both cut growth by around 0.3%‐0.4% across regions. Adding a sharp Chinese downturn, such as that seen in 2015, has a large additional impact on growth in Asia .

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: A weaker dollar and slightly faster growth

• ? We have raised our world GDP growth forecasts this month, to 2.7% for 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 (from 2.6% and 2.9% previously). Similarly, we have lifted our inflation forecast for this year to 3.1%.
• ? Surveys continue to suggest buoyant global activity, driven by manufacturing in several countries. This, in turn, is helping pull world trade from its 2016 lows. However, this partially reflects factors such as stimulus measures in China, which is boosting construction and manufacturing and bolstering trade in the region, and also benefitting major capital goods exporters such as Germany and Japan.
• ? But there are reasons for caution given there are still underlying factors holding back demand and the likelihood that the fiscal stimulus promised by President Trump will not be as big as expected.
• ? The most important forecast change this month is that we see a weaker US dollar ahead as monetary policy tightening in the US has already been largely priced in. This means our EURUSD and GBPUSD forecasts are now $1.10 and $1.32 by year‐end, while the short‐term outlook for many EM currencies against the US$ has also firmed.
• ? We still expect the Fed to raise rates on another two occasions this year, followed by three hikes in 2018. However, we have brought forward by one quarter to Q4 2017 our forecast of when the Fed will begin to taper reinvestment of its portfolio holdings.
• ? Meanwhile, we think the ECB is still a long way from policy normalisation. We expect QE to be tapered from January until June 2018. Then, the ECB will consider lifting the deposit rate from its negative levels in the final part of 2018, and only in 2020 will it start raising the main refinancing rate.
• ? Emerging markets' prospects have improved amid a strong batch of high frequency indicators and a pick‐up in trade. Given low valuations, we see positive momentum for EM currencies and think that they may have entered a long cycle of strength.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Forecasts steady but near‐term signals mixed

• Our world growth forecasts are steady this month, at 2.3% for 2016 and 2.7% for 2017.
• One factor behind the more stable outlook is the rally in financial markets since mid‐February. This rally appears to have been the result of a number of factors including a more dovish Fed and an improvement in some near‐term economic indicators.
• The implied 12‐month ahead Fed funds rate dropped around 0.5% from its January peak to mid-February and remains around 0.35% lower now. So the Fed still apparently has the capacity to boost markets with changes in communication policy.
• The Citigroup economic surprise indicators have also improved over recent weeks, especially for emerging markets where the indicator is back in positive territory. The G10 index nevertheless remains clearly negative.
• Other economic signals are mixed. The latest reading of OE's world trade indicator (based on survey evidence for March) suggests a modest improvement, although again the indicator continues to signal weak world trade growth.
• Meanwhile, there have been some warnings of potentially softer labour market conditions. Though payrolls gains have remained solid, a weighted sum of the employment subindices of the US ISM surveys has dropped sharply over recent months. A similar index for the Eurozone is more positive, although it has also softened from its late‐2015 peaks.
• These mixed signals suggest limited likelihood of near‐term upgrades to the world growth outlook and overall we maintain our view from last month that risks look skewed to the downside – so that further monetary policy stimulus remains a possibility.
• This assessment appears to be shared, to some extent at least, by global bond markets. US 10‐year yields have dropped back to only 1.7% since mid‐March (only 0.1% above their February lows), with German yields at just 0.1% and Japanese yields at ‐ 0.1%. So the ‘great squeeze’ on G7 bond yields is still continuing.

     

Determinants of charitable donation intentions: a structural equation model

• Currently charities have to depend more on individual donors and less on the government for funding. Hence, understanding the individual donor and what motivates them to contribute to charities is something, which has been of increasing interest to nonprofit marketers. In this article, a path model for the charitable donation process of a religious individual is developed and tested. The variables that are used in the model are religiosity, attitude towards helping others (AHO), attitude towards charitable organizations (ACO), attitude towards the advertisement (Attad) and behavioral intentions (BI). The results suggest that AHO by itself does not cause BI. Altruistic people need to be targeted with an appropriate advertisement message. Since religiosity is an important causal variable for AHO, segmenting and targeting individuals who are religious would be pertinent. Attempts to build favorable ACO would also be worthwhile.
• Religiosity
• Charitable donation intentions
• Charity advertisements.
• Path model for predicting intentions to donate.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

World trade recovering but still reasons for caution

• ? World trade has picked up in recent months, expanding at the fastest pace in six years in the first quarter, with the rise fairly evenly split between advanced and emerging markets. Stronger activity in China and a broader upturn in global investment have been key factors. But there are still reasons for caution. Although the ‘cyclical’ element in world trade is improving, the ‘trend’ element is not thanks to changes in supply chains and a lack of trade liberalisation.
• ? World trade growth looks set to reach about a 4% annual rate in Q1 2017, the fastest pace since 2011. Alternative freight‐based indicators confirm the upturn. This suggests some modest near‐term upside risk to our world growth forecasts.
• ? Recent growth has been evenly split between advanced countries and emerging markets (EM). In EM, the end of deep recessions in Russia and Brazil and an upturn in China have been key factors. China directly added 0.5 percentage points to annual world trade growth over recent months and firmer growth there has also pushed up commodity prices and the spending power and imports of commodity exporters.
• ? Another important positive factor is an improvement in investment, which is a trade‐intensive element of world GDP. Rising capital goods imports across a range of countries suggest the drag on world trade from weak investment is fading.
• ? The decline in the ratio of world trade growth to world GDP growth over recent years has both cyclical and structural elements. But while the cyclical component now seems to be improving, there is little evidence that the structural part – responsible for between a half and two‐thirds of the recent decline – is doing likewise.
• ? Key factors behind the structural decline in world trade growth are changes in supply chains and a lack of trade liberalisation/protectionism. Both are likely to remain a drag over the coming years. Meanwhile, a levelling‐off of growth in China and drop back in commodity prices could curb the recent cyclical uptick.

     

Global growth to 2024: reversion to which mean?

• We expect global GDP growth to average 3.5% per year (at PPP exchange rates) over the next ten years. This is lower than the 3.8% recorded in 2000–14 though not dramatically so. There will be a modest recovery in advanced economy growth ‐ but not to pre‐crisis rates. Emerging market (EM) growth will slow but remain faster than growth in the advanced economies. And with EM's share in world GDP much increased from 10–15 years ago, EMs will continue to provide a large proportion of world growth.
• EM growth is expected to run at around 4.5% per year in 2015–24, well down on the 6% seen in 2000–14. This includes a slowdown from around 10% to 5–6% in China ‐ but China's share in world GDP has risen so much that China's contribution to world growth will remain very substantial.
• Advanced economies are forecast to grow by 1.9% per year in 2015–24, a big improvement from the 1% pace of 2007–14 (which was affected by the global financial crisis) but below the 1990–2014 average. Indeed, the gap between forecast G7 GDP and GDP extrapolated using pre‐crisis trends in potential output will remain large at 10–15% in 2015–24.
• Global growth will remain relatively strong compared to much longer‐term averages: growth from 1870–1950 was only around 2% per year. But a return to such low growth rates looks unlikely; China and India were a major drag on world growth until the 1980s but are now fast growing regions.
• Our forecast is relatively cautious about key growth factors; the contribution of productivity growth is expected to improve slightly, while those from capital accumulation and labour supply fall back. Demographics will be a more severe drag on growth from 2025–40. Overall, risks to our long‐term forecasts look to be skewed to the downside.

     

An investigation into blood donation intentions among non‐donors

• In broad terms, the donation of blood along with organ and bone marrow donation is considered to be the ultimate act of humanity involving a voluntary and anonymous exchange between two people of a life saving commodity. Yet motivating people to donate blood is a significantly difficult task. The aim of this paper is to use the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) to examine non‐donors on the basis of their likely intention to donate blood in the future and to identify barriers on these more favourable non‐donors. This exploratory research finds that subjective norm, perceived behavioural control and time related barriers are related to intent to donate by current non‐donors. Differences between higher and lower intention donors are also explored.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Weak world trade could spark competitive devaluations

• World trade growth has slowed sharply in 2015, with our forecast for growth just 1% for the year. High frequency indicators suggest a stagnant picture, with trade in key emerging markets (EM) especially weak. Import growth in the US and Eurozone remains positive and is holding up world trade, but there are downside risks here also. Very slow world trade growth risks incentivising competitive depreciations and depressing global bond yields.
• In August our OE export indicator fell to its lowest level since late‐2012 –; the point when the US announced ‘QE3’. Its weakness is corroborated by other indicators such as container trade and air freight.
• The main drag to world trade is from emerging markets, especially the BRIC‐4 whose import volumes contracted sharply in H1 2015, cutting more than 1 percentage point from annual growth in goods trade.
• US and European import growth looks stronger and should be supported in 2016 by firming GDP growth. This is an important support for world trade, but the latest data suggest some downside risks here also.
• The weaker world demand growth is then the more that trade will appear like a zero‐sum game where a country can benefit only at the expense of its competitors. This has potentially important implications for asset prices: in particular, countries may turn to competitive depreciation, adding further to global deflationary pressures and holding down global bond yields.

     

‘The City of Our Dream’: Owambe Urbanism and Low‐income Women's Resistance in Ibadan,Nigeria

Ibadan, Nigeria, has been an outlier in the ranking of world‐class cities. But in the past seven years, amidst the circulating Africa Rising narrative, Ibadan has embarked on what I call an Afropolitan Imagineering project of owambe urbanism. Afropolitan Imagineering refers to the production of new images/narratives of Africa and Africans as world‐class and cosmopolitan. Owambe urbanism is a spatio‐temporal neoliberal project concerning destination, arrival and place‐making, which promises a shared and happy future for all urban dwellers. I argue that this promise of happiness is challenged by low‐income women who are cognizant that a shared and happy future is impossible when little effort is made to address social inequality in the present. They thus refuse to be ‘good’ citizens and invoke an alternative urban futurity through their embodied and imagined resistance.