Stabilizing Endogenous Instability: Proposals for An Institutionalist Reform of Financial Regulation

A major and persistent question behind economic theories and related policies is whether the market can self-regulate without any restrictive exogenous intervention or whether regular and binding public regulation is necessary for ensuring the reproduction of the economic system in a sustainable way over time. This article considers this question with regard to the working of financial markets in a liberalized environment. Drawing upon an institutionalist stance, the article shows why the operation of a financialized capitalist economy usually leads to systemic imbalances and crises. The article then suggests an alternative framework for a consistent financial regulation that could prevent market actors from developing short-sighted strategies and gambling on macro stability.     

An Institutionalist Framework for a Consistent Financial Regulation

Abstract:

In the light of recurrent systemic crises that financialized market economies have been experiencing since the 1980s, this article seeks to determine the conditions required for a regulatory framework apt to ensure financial stability. Drawing upon an Institutionalist Minskyian endogenous financial instability approach, the article studies the fragilities of liberalized finance and points to some policy alternatives able to lead to an alternative financial regulatory model that is consistent with macroeconomic stability. It argues that in a weak regulatory environment financial markets naturally generate instabilities that could turn into systemic crises. The analysis maintains that in order to deal with such crises, a tight supervision should be framed under the aegis of public authorities and suggests some rules to develop a relevant regulatory system through an open and democratic decision process. Two points then deserve particular attention: a macro-prudential approach that regards instability as a systemic (non-individual) issue, and a preventive approach that aims at preventing systemic-risk generating activities from taking control over the markets.     

Financialization and Vested Interests: Self-Regulation vs. Financial Stability as a Public Good

I propose an institutionalist analysis of financialization through the lens of Thorstein Veblen, built on some peculiar characteristics of money and related financial instruments in a market-based capitalist economy. Following the case of the overcapitalization of farmlands, studied by Veblen (1919), I argue that modern capitalism is a financialized society dominated by vested interests that rely on financial liberalization-led speculative overcapitalization, often leading to a perverse accumulation process and resulting in systemic catastrophes. Consequently, one of the major constituent institutions of liberal finance, market-dependent selfregulation, proves unable to deal with society-level issues like financial stability. This latter issue must be handled at a systemic level, as a public good. Therefore, specific public regulation and action mechanisms must be designed to maintain society (and dominant vested-interests) within some viability limits to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy.     

The Institutionalist Roots of Macroprudential Ideas: Veblen and Galbraith on Regulation,Policy Success and Overconfidence

One consequence of the global financial crisis has been to prompt debate over macroprudential regulation – meant to limit private risk-taking that threatens systemic stability. In this paper, we stress the roots of macroprudential ideas in the Institutionalist economics of Veblen and Galbraith in a way that highlights both unrecognised policy possibilities and underappreciated impediments to policy effectiveness, arguing in particular that regulatory success can breed overconfidence. First, we argue that while Veblen's views anticipated macroprudential arguments, they also obscured tensions between the technocratic acumen of policy ‘engineers’ and popular legitimacy. Second, we argue that while Galbraith's views similarly shaped the postwar Keynesian policy mix, they also echoed Veblen in underrating the potential for populist resentment of an intellectual ‘technostructure’. We conclude that while this analysis can be seen as highlighting an overlooked century of macroprudential debate, it also demonstrates the potential for technocratic overconfidence – which can eventually undermine policy legitimacy and effectiveness.     

Public Knowledge and Financial Regulation: Two Post Crisis Periods

Abstract:

Since at least the days of Adam Smith there has been the recognition of essentially two forms of capitalism: in their theoretical extremes, one in which private companies determine the conditions of the social provisioning of credit and money, and one in which the State representing the general interest does. As we argue, the zeitgeist of the 1930s was a high water mark in the popular understanding of money and banking and its relationship with society. In contrast, today the general population is woefully ignorant on these points. As we argue, the relationship between financial governance and those governed hinges on the knowledge of the latter. Today’s public discourse reveals a widespread ignorance over financial matters that must accompany a likewise extreme moment of private control over nations’ money and credit. As we argue, the first steps towards a capitalism at the service of humanity and under public control, the first priority is publicly diffused knowledge.     

The Next Great Depression II: The Impending Financial Collapse

I seek to put social provisioning into perspective with regard to the financial instability issue in capitalism. My analysis rests on an institutionalist-Minskyian endogenous instability assumption and maintains that monetary/financial stability is a peculiar public good or specific commons since it concerns all of society and its viability in time, not individuals involved in private financial relations. Consequently, the provision of financial stability becomes essentially a matter of public policy and requires the intervention of public power in order to prevent finance from becoming a public “bad.” This result relies on the distinction between private “normal” goods and ambivalent/transversal money (and related financial relations). I point to the necessity of a public organization and tight regulation of finance and financial markets, when standard equilibrium models assume that social optimum and stability can be provided by private self-adjustment and market prices mechanisms.     

分业经营向混业经营转变条件下的金融监管

面对国外混业经营金融机构的大举进入及国内的竞争压力,国内金融机构纷纷进行金融创新,不断突破原有的业务界限,逐渐走上了金融混业经营之路。但与此同时我们也发现,我国原有的适应分业经营的监管体制不能适应这一挑战,出现了很多问题。以分业经营向混业经营转变条件下的金融监管机制为研究对象,阐述了金融监管的理论基础,论述了不同时期的金融监管理论,及金融监管的发展变化趋势。     

关于我国财政政策导向调整的研究

近年来我国实施的积极财政政策确实在很大程度上促进了经济和社会的发展。但是随着经济市场化程度的不断提高和经济环境的变化，这种积极财政政策也表现出诸多的不适应性。因此应适时调整财政政策导向以适应经济和社会发展的新要求。拟从我国近年来实施的积极财政政策的成效分析出发，阐述了当前调整财政政策导向的必然性，并提出了今后我国财政政策的调整方向。     

低碳经济下的金融发展与金融创新

面临低碳经济快速发展的趋势,传统金融理论和实践已无法应对低碳经济时代的要求,有必要进行金融创新以适应和促进低碳经济的发展。在低碳经济发展背景下,金融发展和金融创新具有新的特征,面临新的机遇和挑战,我国应积极发展碳金融以促进低碳经济的发展。     

全球金融危机反思与我国金融体制改革深化

肇始于美国次贷危机的本次全球金融危机,在使得主要国家金融体系遭受重创的同时,也揭示出发迭国家金融体制的某些缺陷和未来改革趋向.在反思全球金融危机的成因以及各国采取的应对金融危机措施的基础上,我们认为,我国的金融体制改革应致力于:进一步提高中央银行的独立性:继续推进金融综合化经营制度的实施;不断深化国有化金融机构改革;适应金融全球化要求,加快金融基础建设;加大金融创新力度,提升金融监管水平;继续加快资本市场发展;不断完善公司治理与薪酬激励;进一步优化外汇储备的投资结构.     

环境规制、金融资源配置与绿色发展效率

环境规制强度的提高,是否提高了地区绿色发展效率是我国发展环境友好型经济过程中面临的重要问题。采用Super-SBM模型估计了2000—2015年中国省级行政区绿色发展效率,考察了环境规制对地区绿色发展效率的影响及作用机制。研究结果表明:我国绿色发展效率总体呈现先降后升再平稳的趋势,且东部地区绿色发展效率明显高于中部、西部地区;环境规制强度提高显著降低了地区绿色发展效率,且这一影响随着时间的推移逐渐减弱;影响机制检验表明,环境规制的加强通过促使金融资源向第二产业配置从而降低了绿色发展效率。     

论金融制度与金融体制及经济制度的关系

目前,中国有部分学者在谈到金融制度时,将其与金融体制混为一谈,还有的学者甚至把金融制度与经济制度割裂开来进行分析,这些观点的存在,都是由于没有准确地界定和理解金融制度的含义。金融制度是指有关金融交易的规则、惯例和组织安排,它与金融体制既有联系又有区别,而与经济制度更是紧密相连。     

美国金融危机下金融监管模式的缺陷及对我国的启示

随着经济全球化的发展,国际金融的运行格局发生了巨大的变化,国际金融监管也出现了新的发展趋势。特别是2007年3月以来,美国的次贷危机引起了国际金融市场的大动荡,诱发了百年不遇的全球性金融危机。国际金融环境趋于恶劣,我国不可避免地受到了来自国际金融危机的影响,我国银行业能否抵抗这次金融危机的冲击,需要更深层次的慎思和积极应对。因此,我国需要从中吸取教训,防范金融风险,加强金融监管,弥补监管"缝隙",维护金融稳定。     

双重委托-代理视角下的金融中介、金融加速器与经济波动的研究

本文在BGG模型基础上,建立了包含企业、金融中介、投资者的双重委托一代理模型,将金融中介纳入信贷市场摩擦的分析框架内。分析了金融中介自身受信贷约束时,其资产净值变化对经济产生的金融加速器效应。得出在双重委托代理的信用契约下,企业外部融资溢价不但受自身资产净值的影响,还受金融中介资产净值的影响。各种外部冲击通过信贷市场中金融中介的传导对经济波动造成进一步放大的效应,经济波动的金融加速器效应在考虑金融中介资产净值的影响后得到了增强。     

多元化金融集团监管的模式研究

多元化金融集团复杂的内部结构和持股关系 ,以及其特殊的风险特征使得传统的分业监管体制面临挑战。从集团的层次上对金融集团进行合并监管是近年来各国监管当局及国际金融组织不断探索的监管模式 ,这一趋势的发展为我国对多元化金融集团的监管提供了重要的参考依据。     

推动民营经济发展的财税政策

民营经济在国民经济发展中起到了重要作用,是中国社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分。民营经济的发展受着外部环境的制约,仍然存在很多需要克服的障碍。国家应采取适当的财税政策,推进民营经济的健康持续发展。     

优化农村金融生态环境,建设社会主义新农村

良好的农村金融生态环境,是建设我国社会主义新农村、发展农村经济、增加农民收入的重要条件。本文从农村金融生态环境的基本涵义出发,论述了优化农村金融生态环境的重要意义及优化原则,并结合当前我国农村金融生态环境存在的缺陷,提出了优化农村金融生态环境、促进农村经济和谐发展的建议及措施。     

金融危机对资本充足率监管与银行风险承担激励的影响：基于我国上市银行的实证比较

运用局部调整模型和三阶最小二乘法（3SLS）,分析了金融危机如何影响资本充足率监管与商业银行的风险承担激励之间的关系,并首次分析了金融危机发生前后我国上市银行在面临资本监管压力下资本水平与风险水平的调整。结果表明,金融危机强化了银行的资本充足率监管效果,但也增强了银行的风险承担激励,这与监管当局试图通过资本充足率监管达到维持银行系统稳定性的初衷相违背。此外,金融危机的发生没有显著影响银行资本调整与风险调整之间的关系。     

农村金融体系改革与地方经济增长

金融体系的运作状况和发达程度及其效率高低决定着储蓄向投资转化的数量和质量,从而决定着经济发展的速度.我国农村现存的金融体系的缺陷已成为制约解决三农问题的瓶颈,阻碍了金融与经济的良性循环,已无法适应农业和农村经济发展的需要.所以,要从促进农村经济发展的目的出发改革农村金融体系.     

金融资本的历史与现实

马克思、希法亭和列宁分析了金融资本的产生和发展。他们的研究结果表明,从前资本主义时代的高利贷等生息资本,再到货币资本的独立运营,最后到垄断性的金融资本,资本形态在不断地发展、变动着。商业资本—产业资本—金融资本,是资本历史形态的更迭,其动因既是生产力的提高和信用的扩展,同时也是资本积累的必然结果。金融资本代表着资本发展的最抽象和最高级的形态,它的崛起将资本主义生产社会化推到了更高的层次,反映了当代资本主义从实物经济向虚拟经济过渡的基本趋势。