Market failure vs. system failure as a rationale for economic policy? A critique from an evolutionary perspective

This paper reconsiders the explanation of economic policy from an evolutionary economics perspective. It contrasts the neoclassical equilibrium notions of market and government failure with the dominant evolutionary neo-Schumpeterian and Austrian-Hayekian perceptions. Based on this comparison, the paper criticizes the fact that neoclassical reasoning still prevails in non-equilibrium evolutionary economics when economic policy issues are examined. This is more than surprising, since proponents of evolutionary economics usually view their approach as incompatible with its neoclassical counterpart. In addition, it is shown that this “fallacy of failure thinking” even finds its continuation in the alternative concept of “system failure” with which some evolutionary economists try to explain and legitimate policy interventions in local, regional or national innovation systems. The paper argues that in order to prevent the otherwise fruitful and more realistic evolutionary approach from undermining its own criticism of neoclassical economics and to create a consistent as well as objective evolutionary policy framework, it is necessary to eliminate the equilibrium spirit. Finally, the paper delivers an alternative evolutionary explanation of economic policy which is able to overcome the theory-immanent contradiction of the hitherto evolutionary view on this subject.     

Why Need is “A Word We Cannot Do Without” in Economics

Economists in the neoclassical tradition do their best to avoid using the word “need.” Social economists have traditionally been more open to discussions of need. Philosophic discussions of need are also scarce but nevertheless helpful. This essay will argue that need is “a word we cannot do without” in economics, and not only in social economics. Need is objective, satiable, and absolute, by contrast with want or preference as it is defined in neoclassical economics. With this clarification, 1) it is reasonable that public policy should consider need as well as want and aim to satisfy some needs, and 2) for some purposes, such as the economics of health care, conventional demand cannot be understood without the concept of need. Thus, even the narrower purposes of neoclassical economics cannot be achieved without clarifying and using the concept of need, in addition to the more usual motivational assumptions of neoclassical economics.     

Japanese Consumption,External Disequilibrium and their Statistical Measurement

Georgescu-Roegen's work is usually divided into two categories, his earlier work on consumer and production theory and his later concern with entropy and bioeconomics beginning with his 1966 introductory essay to his collected theoretical papers published in the volume Analytical Economics. Most economists usually praise his earlier work on pure theory and ignore his later work which is highly critical of neoclassical economics. Those economists sympathetic to his later work usually take the position that he “saw the light” and gave up neoclassical theory some time in the 1960s to turn his attention to the issues of resource scarcity and social institutions. It is argued here that there is an unbroken path running from Georgescu's work in pure theory in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, through his writings on peasant economies in the 1960s, leading to his preoccupation with entropy and bioeconomics in the last 25 years of his life. That common thread is his preoccupation with “valuation.” The choices our species makes about resource use and the distribution of economic output depends upon our valuation framework. Georgescu-Roegen's work begins in the 1930s with a critical examination of the difficulties with the hedonistic valuation framework of neoclassical economics, moves in the 1960s to the conflict between social and hedonistic valuation, and culminates in the 1970s and 1980s with his examination of the conflict between individual, social, and environmental values. This paper traces the evolution of Georgescu-Roegen's thought about valuation and the environmental and social policy recommendations which arise out of his bioeconomic framework.     

Is Gerard Debreu a Deductivist? Commentary on Tony Lawson's Economics and Reality

Tony Lawson has argued that the methodology of neoclassical economics is deductivist: in constructing their formal models, economists hope to be able to provide explanations based on laws, as described by the deductive-nomological model of explanation. This article argues in contrast that neoclassical economics cannot be understood as following just one methodology. It is argued that neoclassicism exhibits two methodologies, one “official” and one tacit. The former is empiricist, and corresponds to the practice that has been described by Lawson. The latter, which can be called “hypothetico-deductive rationalism”, amounts to the position that knowledge of the world can be obtained without any empirical verification of one's assumptions, simply by exploring the implications of the assumptions one makes.     

From Judicial Sovereignty to Collective Democracy: The Development of J.R. Commons’ Perspective on Progressive Institutional Change

Abstract:

This article clarifies the significance of “collective democracy” in the works of John R. Commons by comparing it with “judicial sovereignty” in terms of its contribution to “progress.” We can thus answer two issues that Paul D. Bush does not clearly address: (i) what setup for policy formation contributes to progress and (ii) what is the role of economists within a collective democracy? Based on the comparison, the answer to the first question is collective democracy, and regarding the second question, the roles of economists as both economists and “institutional” economists are extrapolated.     

The Incoherent Emperor: A Heterodox Critique of Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory

It is somewhat common for heterodox economists to come to the defense of neoclassical microeconomic theory. This is due to many reasons, but perhaps the commonest one is ignorance. It seems that most heterodox economists are not aware of the many critiques or that as a collective they completely undermine neoclassical theory. The objective of the article is to dispel ignorance by using the existing criticisms to delineate a systematic critique of the core components of neoclassical microeconomic theory: the supply and demand explanation of the price mechanism and its application to competitive markets. The critique starts by examining the choices, preferences, utility functions, and demand curves, followed by examining production, costs, factor input demand functions and partial equilibrium, and ending with perfect competition and the supply curve. In the conclusion, the implications of the results will be extended to the firm and imperfectly competitive markets, and then the question whether general equilibrium theory or game theory can save neoclassical microeconomic theory.     

The Social Economics of Work Time: Introduction

How do social economists conceptualize and analyze time, particularly time spent in paid employment? In this symposium regarding this quite “timely”" issue, it is evident that social economics views work time as something more than its presentation in neoclassical economics. For neoclassical economists, time is a scarce resource that, when commodified as labor, serves as a factor of production and means to the end of consumption for optimizing firms, individuals, and families. It is also more than the radical political economics understanding of time as the yardstick measuring the value created by labor. Instead, time spent on the job is all at once a source of income, personal identity, and relative status within society, the workplace and household, and a constraint on individuals' ability to pursue self-directed activities and social reproduction. Work time is determined within a complex web of evolving culture and social relations, as well as traditionally conceived market, technological, and macroeconomic forces and institutions such as collective bargaining and government policy.     

Cornelius Castoriadis on the Scope and Content of Neoclassical and Marxian Economics

The paper presents the thought of the political philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis on economic methodology and the neoclassical and Marxian traditions. Castoriadis suggested that the scope of economic theory includes the identification of “local” regularities and not the search for invariant “laws.” He criticized the use of equilibrium and the utilitarian framework in the neoclassical tradition and proposed to approach human agency based on the Aristotelian concept of the “social individual.” In addition, he criticized the deterministic nature of the Marxian “laws.” According to Castoriadis, the use of concepts such as the “production function” and “capital” presents a number of caveats.     

Social Provisioning as a Starting Point for Feminist Economics

The past decade has seen a proliferation of writing by feminist economists. Feminist economists are not identified with one particular economic paradigm, yet some common methodological points seem to be emerging. I propose making these starting points more explicit so that they can be examined, critiqued, and built upon. I use the term “social provisioning” to describe this emerging methodology. Its five main components are: incorporation of caring and unpaid labor as fundamental economic activities; use of well-being as a measure of economic success; analysis of economic, political, and social processes and power relations; inclusion of ethical goals and values as an intrinsic part of the analysis; and interrogation of differences by class, race-ethnicity, and other factors. The paper then provides brief illustrations of the use of this methodology in analyses of US welfare reform, gender and development, and feminist ecological economics.     

Resurrecting the ghostly entrepreneur

The longstanding debate on the exact theoretical role and nature of the entrepreneur has traditionally featured the works of three great economists, Joseph Schumpeter, Frank Knight and Israel Kirzner. Each had a somewhat different take on this question, but each of them shared the common assumption that the entrepreneurial function exists as an independent and objective input into the productive order. However, this assumption was vigorously called into question in a little noticed but very important piece by Harold Demsetz in 1983. Demsetz may be said to have “unbundled” the other writers entrepreneurial packages and could find substantially nothing therein that was not already accounted for in the standard neoclassical market model, with investors being rewarded for taking risk under conditions of uncertainty. He comes very close to denying that there even exists a separate entrepreneurial function in the production process. This paper then proceeds to argue that Demsetz has overstated his case and that there is a distinctive aspect to entrepreneurship that has not heretofore been noted in the literature. That is the idea of “the idea”, the original cognitive formulation of a plan, a new business, an invention, a reorganization or any other new concept. The problem in understanding the role of the entrepreneur is one of intellectual property, since, at the moment of idea formulation, there is no practical way to give property right protection to an abstract idea. A comparison to the patent and the copyright system elucidates this point. The only practicable method of protecting the inherent value of a new non patentable or non-copyrightable idea is by joining it with another input which can receive property right protection, such as any of the traditional production inputs. This explains the common confounding between entrepreneurship and starting a new firm. Because of the team production nature of the venture, it is impossible to measure the marginal contribution of each of the constituent elements, thus explaining why a lot of entrepreneurial ventures are “one-man” firms. The matter of compensating for entrepreneurial services in publicly held corporations is also considered.     

Neoclassical vs evolutionary theories of financial constraints: Critique and prospectus

Empirical models based on neoclassical theory predict that if investment is sensitive to current financial performance, this is a sign that something is ‘wrong’ and is to be regarded as a problem worthy of a policy intervention. Evolutionary theory, however, refers to the principle of ‘growth of the fitter’ to interpret investment-cash flow sensitivities as the workings of a healthy economy. In particular, I attack the neoclassical assumption of rational profit-maximizing firms. Such an assumption is not a helpful starting point for empirical studies into firm growth. One caricature of neoclassical theory could be “Assume firms are perfectly efficient. Why aren’t they getting enough funding?”, whereas evolutionary theory considers that firms are heterogeneous and that not all firms should grow. This essay highlights how interpretations and policy interventions can be framed by the initial modelling assumptions, even though these latter are often chosen with analytical tractability in mind rather than realism.     

Vested Interests and the Common Man as Seen Through Monetary and Fiscal Policy: Flooding Wall Street or Main Street?

There are many angles through which a critical observer can analyze the divergent class interests in most aspects of macroeconomic management. We examine the insistence of financial authorities of all major economies on reviving economic activity through monetary — and not fiscal — policy as a particularly clear example of favoring vested interests over the interests of the common man. Nearly a century after Thorstein Veblen wrote on the subject, one can find many parallel elements to the political landscape of the times. Today, the common man is often expressed by the “99%,” and many accept that the dominant vested interest is that of global banks. Unlike in Veblen’s times, economists today have many historical experiments in economic management that they can consult. By employing logic, historical experience, and an understanding of our current global finance-led capitalism, we offer a preliminary institutionalist analysis of the mechanisms of current monetary policy that “flood” Wall Street, while leaving employment, production, and investment — Main Street — all but forgotten. We then explain how vested interests have abandoned fiscal policy and left a deflationary macroeconomic environment.     

The Arrow-Debreu model: How math can hide a fatal conceptual error

I argue that math, like love, can cover a multitude of sins, and I use the neoclassical object of adoration, the Arrow-Debreu model, as the case in point. It is commonplace that the Arrow-Debreu (AD) model of general equilibrium does not describe the real world, but it is equally commonplace to accept it as representing the pure logic of the competitive capitalist economy in an idealized world free of transactions costs. I show that the AD model fails even as an idealized model; it actually mistakes the logic of pure capitalism. Unlike McKenzie’s model of idealized general equilibrium under constant returns to scale, Arrow and Debreu claim to have shown the existence of competitive equilibrium under decreasing returns to scale and positive pure profits. The AD model (again unlike the McKinzie model) needs to assign the profits to individuals and this is done using the notion of “ownership of the production set.” But this notion suffers from a fatal ambiguity. If Arrow and Debreu interpret it to mean “ownership of a corporation” then a simple argument in the form “labor can hire capital or capital can hire labor” defeats the alleged necessity of assigning residual claimancy to the corporation. A given corporation may or may not end up exploiting a set of production opportunities (represented by a production set) depending on whether it hires in labor and undertakes production or hires out its capital to others (all by assumption at the parametrically given prices). In the latter case, residual claimancy is elsewhere. There is no such property right as “ownership of a production set” in a private property market economy. The legal party which purchases or already owns all the inputs used up in production has the defensible legal claim on the outputs: there is no need to also “purchase the production set.” At any set of prices that allow positive pure profits, anyone in the idealized AD model could bid up the price of the inputs and thus try to reap a smaller but still positive profit. Therefore,pace Arrow and Debreu, there could be no equilibrium with positive pure profits. In the Appendix, the property rights fallacy that afflicts the AD model is shown to also afflict orthodox capital theory and corporate finance theory.     

What economic agents do: How cognition and interaction lead to emergence and complexity

Kohn (The Cato Journal, 24(3):303–339, 2004) has argued that the neoclassical conception of economics—what he terms the “value paradigm”—has experienced diminishing marginal returns for some time. He suggests a new perspective is emerging—one that gives more import to economic processes and less to end states, one that bases behavior less on axioms and more on laboratory experiments. He calls this the “exchange paradigm”. He further asserts that it is the mathematization of economics that is partially at fault for leading the profession down a methodological path that has become something of a dead end. Here I suggest that the nascent research program Kohn has rightly spotted is better understood as distinct from its precursors because it is intrinsically dynamic, permits agent actions out of equilibrium, and treats such actions as occurring within networks. Analyzing economic processes having these characteristics is mathematically very difficult and I concur with Kohn’s appeal to computational approaches. However, I claim it is so-called multi-agent systems and agent-based models that are the way forward within the “exchange paradigm,” and not the cellular automata (Wolfram, A new kind of science, 2002) that Kohn seems to promote. Agent systems are generalizations of cellular automata and support the natural abstraction of individual economic agents as software agents.     

Behavioral political economy: A survey

In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research.     

Why we need a commitment approach to environmental policy

The principal reason why economists have advocated environmental policies based on incentives is that their conception of business behavior derives from the neoclassical model of the firm. Businesses certainly do respond to profit incentives, but firms' behavior is also greatly influenced by socio-political considerations and their organizational capabilities. In recent years, a significant group of businesses that are highly innovative, competitive and socially responsible has emerged. These are not the firms that policy makers envisioned when they formulated command and control and market incentive environmental policies, i.e., control-oriented policies. Because of this, there is a need for new types of environmental policies. Thus, the first purpose of this paper is to propose a new class of environmental policies. The second purpose is to explain why the neoclassical model is deficient as a basis for environmental policy and to explicate the nature of a more appropriate model.Control-oriented policies were designed for firms that behave like neoclassical firms. For high performance organizations (HPOs), what is needed is the opposite of control-oriented policy. What is needed is an environmental policy that takes advantage of HPOs commitment, responsibility, and trustworthiness. The appropriate policy should take into account that overall environmental performance is a product not just of firm behavior but of the whole environmental system of which firms are a part. What is needed is a commitment approach to environmental policy.A commitment approach (CA) to environmental policy is first of all not a control-oriented policy. A CA is a nonregulatory approach in which firms are self-regulated. The CA is only for firms that are able to 1) make a commitment to high environmental performance and 2) develop the capabilities to meet these commitments. The environmental protection (EP) agency that administers the CA would be charged with selecting the particular “high commitment” (HC) firms that would be subject to the policy. Low and intermediate commitment firms would presumably continue to be regulated under the usual control-oriented environmental policies. The selected HC firms would be eligible for government technical assistance and information. In addition, the EP agency could aid the functioning of the environmental systems (ES) in which HC firms are embedded by, for example, providing education and information to these businesses' stakeholders. Finally, it would be necessary for the EP agency to accomplish periodic assessments of how ESs performance departs from the ideal and how these systems' operations require rectification.     

Political and Social Economics: Beyond Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy

Economists face at least two problems when they try to go interdisciplinary. One is how to adapt their theory where the original set of assumptions may fail to apply. This is a particular problem for economists who carry the “default” neoclassical model around in their heads. This paper outlines a map for keeping track of assumptions when doing interdisciplinary work. A second problem is how to take a theory designed for one discipline and turn it into something intelligible to practitioners of another. One needs a common language, and it is argued that general systems theory might help, even though it is not a complete language. The map proposed here provides a unified way to compare and contrast the approaches of different orthodox and heterodox traditions and better see what problems they are most suited to addressing.     

Firms and industries in evolutionary economics: lessons from Marshall, Young, Steindl and Penrose

Evolutionary economists have tended to assess firms and industries separately, neglecting the role of their interaction in the process of economic growth and development. We trace the separation of firms and industries to the introduction of population thinking in the discipline of industrial economics, including some broadly evolutionary analyses. If researchers conflate a population of firms with an industry, they introduce “thin” means of relating firms to one another and to industries. Despite his device of the ‘representative firm’, Marshall develops “thick” means of relating firms to industries by means of their internal and external organizations. Penrose avoids the notion of industry by focussing on heterogeneous and potentially mobile firms. Young and Steindl develop mundane explanations of firms’ relations within groups and locate the impetus for economic growth in a poorly understood environment. We conclude that evolutionary economists should revisit firms’ boundaries, not in the sense of explaining the existence of firms but in a relating and communicating sense in which boundaries signify the selective means of firms’ relationships.     

An unpleasant dilemma for contemporary general equilibrium theory

By examining the contributions of two prominent contemporary neoclassical economists, i.e. Lucas and Hahn, the article attempts to shed light on the problematic relationship between neoclassical theory and observation. It is argued that this approach must face the unpleasant dilemma of having to choose between endowing general equilibrium theory with an explanatory role that is marred by its illegitimate notion of capital as a single factor of variable form (Lucas); or alternatively, to consistently treat each capital good as a distinct factor of production, with the bitter implication that the theory must simply renounce to have a correspondence with observation (Hahn).