关于流通渠道中生产商与零售商关系的博弈分析

本文以流通渠道中的生产商和零售商为研究对象,基于完美信息的连续策略博弈,建立了双方的纳什均衡模型。研究结果表明,直接渠道对于生产商最为有利,其次为生产商主导的混合渠道、零售商主导的混合渠道和间接渠道;而对于零售商恰好相反。文章最后对研究结论进行了验证,并对中国流通业的发展现状进行了反思。     

零售商渠道控制的价值链创新绩效分析

大型零售商利用其拥有的资源优势,获得渠道控制力量,通过有效报酬激励与供应商共同创造供应链利润,产生显著的价值链创新绩效.这种零售商主导的价值链创新模式需要完善的渠道法律环境,鉴于现阶段我国零售渠道结构法制存在缺陷,我国应深化零售业改革,这需要政府运用合理的规制措施规范零售商的主导行为,以更好发挥零售商主导的价值链创新绩效.     

论零售商主导型供应链联盟

现代商业中的竞争已经从企业之间的竞争转变为供应链联盟之间的竞争.零售商主导下的供应链联盟是分工深化和信患化条件下以大型零售商为主导的流通渠道成员通过信息共享并按契约分享利益的一种中间性组织.创新流通渠道组织、建立零售商主导下的供应链联盟本质上反映了客观经济规律的要求,同时能够有效地协调工商关系.本文基于合作竞争视角深入讨论了其组织性质、形成原因和竞争优势,并结合现阶段市场竞争国际化的背景探讨了我国零售企业的发展对策.     

日本家电行业的流通渠道系列化

流通渠道系列化是日本制造企业渠道运作与管理的独特模式．家电业是日本流通系列化的代表性行业之一。研究和探讨日本家电行业流通渠道系列化的独特经验．对我国家电企业的渠道创新有积极的借鉴意义。     

日本家电行业的流通渠道系列化

流通渠道系列化是日本制造企业渠道运作与管理的独特模式,家电业是日本流通系列化的代表性行业之一.研究和探讨日本家电行业流通渠道系列化的独特经验,对我国家电企业的渠道创新有积极的借鉴意义.     

我国空调销售渠道的基本模式分析

为了使空调能够更好地普及,聪明而智慧的厂家们开始新一轮的技术革新,空调朝着更节能、更舒适发展了。空调如今已经拥有数亿消费群,成为普通百姓生活的必需品。而在市场经济的激烈竞争中,企业也经历着生存与发展的洗礼,企业除了本身产品质量有保证外,销售渠道对其发展也十分重要。为了分析美的公司的空调销售渠道,本文着重分析我国空调销售渠道的状况。中国空调企业营销渠道模式主要分为批发商带动零售商模式、零售商为主导的营销渠道系统、厂商股份合作制合作模式和区域总代理制。其中、零售商为主导的营销渠道系统、厂商股份合作制合作模式和区域总代理制又分别成为海尔模式、格力模式和志高模式。     

日本化妆品行业的流通渠道系列化

流通渠道系列化是日本制造企业渠道运作与管理的独特模式,化妆品行业是日本流通系列化的代表性行业之一。研究和探讨日本化妆品行业渠道系列化的独特经验,对我国化妆品企业的渠道创新有积极的借鉴意义。一、日本化妆品行业流通渠道系列化的产生日本化妆品的销售渠道是比较独特的,第二次世界大战后,日本的化妆品形成了三种不同的渠道模式,分别是专销商品制造商模式:通过制造商的销售公司和系列零售店销售商品;一般商品制造商模式:通过批发商和一般零售店销售商品;访问销售商品制造商模式:通过访问和组织去销售商品。而专销商品制造商是化妆品…     

日本化妆品行业的流通渠道系列化

流通渠道系列化是日本制造企业渠道运作与管理的独特模式,化妆品行业是日本流通系列化的代表性行业之一.研究和探讨日本化妆品行业渠道系列化的独特经验,对我国化妆品企业的渠道创新有积极的借鉴意义.     

从国外融资主导模式看我国融资模式和渠道选择

资金是企业生存、发展的基础，是企业的血液。如何合理地为企业融取资金，是每一位企业经理人员都必须认真对待的课题，也是一个难题。笔者试从国外主导融资模式的比较分析中，探讨一下我国企业应如何选择合适的融资模式和渠道。一、国外融资主导模式比较分析国外融资主导模式主要分为两类，一类是以日本、韩国为主要代表的银行贷款融资模式；另一类是以美国、英国为主要代表的证券融资模式。日本以银行贷款为主要融资模式，约占其企业外源融资额８０％以上。其模式与日本企业的法人治理结构、企业股权结构等密切相关。在日本企业中，产权制…     

超级零售商渠道权利的外部性研究

目前,国内营销类文献对零售商主导市场问题的讨论主要集中在零售商和供应商的渠道冲突上.本文旨在透过零售商渠道权力增强的现象,全面分析零售商渠道权力的运用对整个市场及生产商、其他分销商和消费者产生的积极和消极影响,提出如何规制零售商渠道行为从而减少其渠道权力的负外部性、促进正外部性的相关对策和建议,以期为提高营销渠道效率和渠道整体利益、规范市场交易秩序提供理论指导.     

Retailer voluntary investment against a threat of manufacturer encroachment

To elucidate supply chain cooperation between a manufacturer and a retailer, this study examines a model in which the retailer makes voluntary investments to reduce the marginal production cost of the manufacturer. The manufacturer is allowed to introduce a direct selling channel in addition to the indirect channel through the retailer (i.e., manufacturer encroachment), which however dampens the retailers’ investment incentives. The retailer can leverage its voluntary investments as a means of deterring manufacturer encroachment. We demonstrate that manufacturer encroachment is strategically deterred when the retailer’s cost-reduction technology is sufficiently effective. This strategic encroachment deterrence encourages the retailer to invest more, but it narrows the variety of channels from which consumers can select. When the latter effect dominates the former effect, consumer surplus declines with strategic encroachment deterrence.

     

How does the added new online channel impact the supporting advertising expenditure?

This research addresses the strategic effect of a newly added online channel on a manufacturer’s supportive advertising expenditure once a manufacturer opts to open an online channel to compete with its retailer. We first study the manufacturer–traditional retailer supply chain and consider three different scenarios: (1) product is less compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (2) product is more compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (3) product has the same compatibility with the online channel as with the traditional channel. Our results show that the added online channel significantly impacts the manufacturer’s investment in supportive advertising. Depending on the different product categories, the impact of the newly added online channel on the supportive advertising expenditure also will be different. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the manufacturer–online retailer supply chain and investigate the effect of that added online channel on the manufacturer’s supportive advertising to the online retailer. Based on our results, the manufacturer can utilize our findings to improve its decision-making when it plans to open an online channel to improve its product distribution.     

Retail services and firm profit in a dual-channel market

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays use online technology to engage in direct sales. The mix of retailing with a direct channel adds a new dimension of competition and complementarity to a product's distribution channels. Our model focuses on the strategic role played by the retail services in a dual-channel competitive market. The manufacturer uses a direct channel as an effective tool to motivate the retailer to improve its retail services and profits from it. While operated by the manufacturer to motivate retailer to perform more effectively from the manufacturer's perspective, the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because the retailer can obtain a lower wholesale price from the manufacturer and a higher sales volume from the improved retail services. In our research, our results suggest that the improved retail services effectively alleviate the channel competition and conflict and improve the supply chain performance in a competitive market.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing

This research examines a retailer’s incentive to share information with its supplier when the supplier can also undertake initiatives to increase retail demand. It is well known that a retailer is averse to sharing market information with a manufacturer due to concern for a manufacturer’s strategic use of such information. This research shows that despite such strategic exploitation of market information, a retailer may want to establish information sharing channels with its supplier. Information sharing essentially shifts power upstream which, in turn, enhances the manufacturer’s incentive to bear costs to boost retail demand: the manufacturer is induced to invest merely by knowing that information is on its way. Hence, the retailer benefits from information sharing ex ante despite the costly ex post exploitation by the manufacturer. This finding is a stark contrast to the most of previous results which consistently point out how bad it is for the manufacturer to have the retailer’s demand information before setting prices. In fact, due to the investment effect, information sharing can lead to gains for the retailer, manufacturer, and consumers alike.     

Strategic alliances in international distribution channels

Given the differing dynamics of managing a distribution channel system, can the extant research on international strategic alliances, which largely focuses on the manufacturer–supplier interface, be extended to the manufacturer–distribution channels context? Owing to the paucity of research on strategic alliances in international distribution channels, this investigation seeks to verify empirically the effects of learning orientation, relationship longevity, and relationship closeness as determinants of cooperation, which, in turn, is an antecedent of performance, and relationship satisfaction.The research hypotheses were tested empirically on data drawn from a sample of manufacturing firms located in the United States (U.S.), Finland, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), and Poland. Although some similarities for fostering cooperation in international distribution alliances were detected on a cross-national basis, disparate emphases on alliance management practices were observed as well.     

Strategic Role of Retailer Bundling in a Distribution Channel

We study retailer bundling in a distribution channel when the manufacturer for one bundled product can strategically set the wholesale price. We show that the retailer can use a bundling option as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the manufacturer in form of a lower wholesale price. This finding contributes a novel rationale for retailer bundling to the bundling literature. Whenever the bundling option causes this concession-extraction effect, the retailer always benefits from the lower wholesale price. The manufacturer, nevertheless, does not necessarily suffer because bundling can lead to a higher consumer demand. We also show that the manufacturer's marginal production cost plays a critical role in driving the retailer's bundling decision, concession extraction behavior and consequently the total channel profit.     

Distribution Channel Decentralization and Strategic Durability Choice

In a simple two‐period setting we examine a decentralized distribution (marketing) channel consisting of an up‐stream durable‐goods manufacturer and down‐stream retailer. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the product’s durability while the retailer selects an output level. We show that in this setting, the profit‐maximizing manufacturer unambiguously selects a higher durability than the socially efficient (cost‐minimizing) level in both uncommitted sales and rental markets. We show this ‘reversed planned obsolescence’ result is due to the strategic benefit of durability in this double‐marginalization (double monopoly mark‐up) setting. This is in stark contrast to the usual integrated channel result where the profit‐maximizing manufacturer will select an efficient level of durability in rental markets and an inefficiently low durability in uncommitted sales markets (due to the selling firm’s commitment problem with potential buyers). Intuitively, with a decentralized distribution channel, the manufacturer faces potential commitment problems with both current buyers and its down‐stream retailer. We show, only in cases where both sources of commitment issues are removed (i.e. the manufacturer can credibly commit to both potential buyers and its retailer), will the profit‐maximizing durability choice be socially efficient.     

Attack and defend: the role of targeting in a distribution channel

This paper studies the role of targeting in a distribution channel composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. In channel interactions, the manufacturer can deploy targeted advertising while the retailer can initiate targeted pricing. Using a game-theoretic framework, we find the following results: (1) Targeted advertising increases the manufacturers profit at the expense of the retailer; (2) The retailer may be worse off using targeted pricing; (3) Targeted pricing discourages the manufacturer from launching targeted advertising which is a more severe threat to the retailer. Therefore, the retailer may optimally use targeted pricing, even when it hurts profit, to defend against the attack of targeted advertising by the manufacturer.     

Efficient replenishment in the distribution channel

Efficient replenishment (ER), a business process that involves the reduction of order cost to facilitate deliveries of goods from the manufacturer to the retailer, is becoming increasingly important in distribution channel management. While a well-executed ER program is expected to lower total channel costs and increase channel profit, very little is known about how this incremental channel profit is distributed between the manufacturer and the retailer and how it varies across the two common channel relationship structures, retailer price leadership and manufacturer price leadership.In this paper, we develop the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer gain more or less from the adoption of ER based on a game theoretic channel model of bilateral monopoly under the two channel relationship structures. We develop analytic results on the impact of ER on purchase quantity, price and the distribution of profits in three cases, namely, (1) when only the retailer adopts ER, (2) when both the manufacturer and the retailer adopt ER, and (3) when the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically integrated in the distribution channel, which adopts ER.The results, which can be generalized for all demand functions, show that the manufacturer benefits from the retailer's adoption of ER only when the manufacturer's holding cost relative to the retailer's is sufficiently large, relative to its order cost relative to the retailer's. By adopting ER, the retailer gains more than what the manufacturer gains even if the manufacturer is the price leader. Both the parties are likely to gain more if they both adopt ER than if only the retailer adopts ER. The incremental channel profit due to the retailer's ER adoption is highest in a vertically integrated distribution channel and is greater in a retailer-led channel relationship than in a manufacturer-led relationship.