The effects of antifraud rules and ex post verifiability on managerial disclosures*

Abstract. Both theoretical and experimental research has shown that full disclosure of private information will be observed when disclosures are credible. Disclosures are generally considered to be credible when they either are subject to an antifraud rule, are ex post verifiable, or are both. However, little consideration has been given to the individual and interactive effects of these conditions. This paper presents arguments concerning the effects of antifraud rules and ex post verifiability on disclosures of private information and the reaction to those disclosures. It predicts an equilibrium of full disclosure only when an antifraud rule is in effect, independent of the presence or absence of ex post verification. Further, one adverse selection problem is posited to disappear after repeated observations, regardless of antifraud rules or ex post verifiability. These assertions are tested by 20 laboratory experiments, which, in addition, provide insight into the effect of a legal system on disclosures. The results generally support the analytical assertions. Résumé. Les recherches théoriques aussi bien qu'expérimentales ont démontré que la présentation intégrale de l'information à caractère privé est observée lorsque les renseignements fournis sont crédibles. Ces renseignements sont généralement jugés crédibles lorsqu'ils sont assujettis à une règle anti-fraude, lorsqu'ils peuvent être verifiés ex post ou lorsqu'ils présentent ces deux caractéristiques. Jusqu'à maintenant, cependant, on s'est peu intéressé aux conséquences particulières et interactives de ces caractéristiques. Les auteurs présentent ici leur argumentation au sujet des conséquences des règles anti-fraude et de la vérifiabilité ex post sur la présentation d'information privée et sur la réaction à la présentation de cette information. Selon eux, l'équilibre de présentation intégrale de l'information n'est atteint que dans le cas où s'applique une règle anti-fraude, indédependamment de l'existence d'une vérification ex post. Plus encore, ils concluent à la disparition d'un problème de sélection préjudiciable après des observations répétées, peu importe les règles anti-fraude ou la vérifiabilité ex post. La véracité de ces affirmations est mise à l'épreuve dans le cadre de 20 expériences en laboratoire qui livrent en outre certaines indications relatives à l'incidence d'un système juridique sur la présentation d'information. Les résultats viennent généralement appuyer les hypothèses d'analyse.     

Risikoadjustierte Wertbeitr?ge zur ex ante Entscheidungsunterstützung: Ein axiomatischer Ansatz

Die Umsetzung eines integrierten Ertrags- und Risikomanagements im Rahmen einer wertorientierten Unternehmenssteuerung erfordert den Einsatz zweckspezifischer Kennzahlen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird ein Ansatz zur axiomatischen Fundierung von risikoadjustierten Wertbeitr?gen für den Zweck der ex ante Entscheidungsunterstützung entwickelt. Dabei wird insbesondere die Situation eines Investors betrachtet, für den als Alleineigentümer unsystematische Risiken des Unternehmensportfolios eine erhebliche Bewertungsrelevanz aufweisen. Ein Schwerpunkt des Beitrags liegt deshalb auf der ad?quaten Berücksichtigung stochastischer Abh?ngigkeiten zwischen Investitionsalternativen und dem bestehenden Unternehmensportfolio und somit auf der Risikokomponente des risikoadjustierten Wertbeitrags. Es zeigt sich, dass in der Literatur h?ufig diskutierte Verfahren zur verursachungsgerechten Risikoallokation im Unternehmensportfolio zur ex ante Entscheidungsunterstützung in der Regel nicht geeignet sind.     

Are smokers too optimistic about their health status: Ex ante perception versus ex post observation

As the world has moved toward the era of non-communicable diseases, whether the individuals are in a capable position to accurately evaluate their own health status has an important implication on disease prevention in particularly and population health outcome in general. In this paper, we address four important questions surrounding the accuracy of health perception: (1) to what extent that individuals can make an accurate evaluation on their own health status; (2) what are the major factors influencing health misperception if any; (3) what are the causal directions between health behavior and health perception; and (4) whether individuals can learn and update their self-evaluation on health status over time and whether such learning is productive in that it mitigates the health misperception. Specifically, we use a longitudinal data set obtained from Taiwan that covers six waves of survey over about twenty-year period to compare the ex ante subjective perception on health and the ex post mortality hazards. Our results suggest that over one third of the survey respondents are not performing well in the evaluation of their own health status. We also find that smokers are more likely to have an optimistic bias on their own health assessment as compared to nonsmokers. After controlling for the simultaneous causality problem, we find a causal effect of individuals' misperceptions on continuing smoking, but not vice versa. In addition, our results show that individuals update their subjective perception on health over time through the learning from personal health shocks and the provision of public information on smoking hazards. Although the learning process tends to be overshooting among smokers, it is beneficial to mitigate the optimistic bias. We also find the evidence that personal health shock has a stronger impact on updating behavior than public information, indicating that personal experience is a more effective channel through which to correct the bias in health perception, compared to the provision of public information, such as anti-smoking campaign.     

Finnish and Swedish business cycles in a global context

This paper evaluates the decisions made by the Finnish government to join EMU and the Swedish government not to join EMU in the early 1990s. Focusing on the characteristics of business cycles during the postwar period, we find that output fluctuations in Sweden and Finland are correlated to two measures of the international business cycle, a European and a non-European cycle. The Finnish cycle has become more synchronized to the European cycle but less synchronized to the non-EU cycle after 1999. For Sweden we find the opposite result. The decision by the Finnish government to join EMU on schedule is justified ex post but was not justified ex ante. Similarly, the decision by the Swedish government not to join EMU in 1999 seems to be justified ex post but was not justified ex ante. Our empirical evidence suggests that economic decisions based on historical data may not be optimal ex ante but they may be defensible ex post.     

Ex Post Settling Up in Cash Compensation: New Evidence

This paper provides new evidence on whether and how boards solve costly ex post settling up to recover CEO cash compensation for unrealized gains that fail to materialize. Our analyses are motivated by the likely expanding role for ex post settling up as the risk of compensating executives for unrealized gains that may never materialize increases in a more intangibles‐based economy, as well as by the conflicting evidence of prior research. We provide evidence consistent with ex post settling up by (i) using alternative truncation methods to derive observations most likely to fall within the theoretically motivated incentive zone; (ii) replicating and reconciling the conflicting results of prior research that supports (Leone et al. 2006) and fails to support (Shaw and Zhang 2010) ex post settling up; (iii) using Incentive Lab data with contract‐specific information, allowing strong identification of observations in the incentive zone; and (iv) documenting predictable cross‐sectional variation, with ex post settling up being more pronounced for firms with stronger corporate governance, less conservative accounting earnings, and a larger proportion of total pay in the form of cash compensation. Overall, we conclude that evidence is strong in support of the ex post settling up hypothesis.     

Government budget deficits,nominal andex ante real long-term interest rates in the U.K., 1960:1–1990:2

This paper explores the impact of government budget deficits on the U.K. nominal and ex ante real long-term interest rates over the period from 1960:1 to 1990:2 utilizing an open and closed economy IS-LM model. An open economy IS-LM model indicates that nominal and ex ante real long-term interest rates are affected by the expected rate of inflation, the real money stock, the real government budget deficit, the real government spending, and the real balance of trade.The evidence presented suggests that increases in the U.K. budget deficits do contribute significantly to increases in nominal and ex ante real long-term interest rates. This implies that rising nominal and ex ante real long-term interest rates, as a result of high government budget deficits, would crowd out private investment and deter capital formation and long-term economic growth.     

Uncertainty and Compensation Design in Strategic Interfirm Contracts

In strategic outsourcing contracts, a substantial portion of implementation occurs at the client's premises and requires integration of effort between the vendor and the client. Compensation design in such contracts involves trade-offs between the higher (lower) incentive properties of fixed-price (cost-plus) contracts and their higher (lower) ex ante contracting and ex post adaptation costs. Uncertainty influences these trade-offs and affects compensation design. We explore the compensation implications of two types of uncertainty—volatility and ambiguity—which are reflected in the client's accounting measures. Volatility reflects the unpredictability of changes in the future environment, which makes it difficult to contractually specify future contingencies. Ambiguity reflects lack of consensus about the nature, drivers, and value effects of uncertainty, which makes it difficult to contractually specify responses to contingencies if and when they occur. Volatility increases the likelihood of ex post adaptation costs, while ambiguity increases ex ante contracting costs; therefore, volatility and ambiguity decrease the attractiveness of fixed-price contracts. We use accounting and market measures to calibrate volatility and ambiguity and examine their implications for compensation design and ex post renegotiation. Analysis of archival data for 455 strategic outsourcing contracts valued over $15 million indicates that volatility and ambiguity influence contract compensation design and renegotiation likelihood. These results hold even after controlling for asset specificity, task complexity, and relational factors. We conclude that accounting measures can provide signals of volatility and ambiguity and thereby influence compensation design in strategic interfirm contracts.     

Technical progress,factor substitutability,and models of production: I

Summary This paper is the first of a two-part series which reviews and elaborates a number of rudiments central to production theory. The present installment focuses on technical progress and factor substitutability; specifically, it examines three dimensions of progress and four configurations of ex ante and ex post substitutability. The series is intended principally for the beginner in graduate economics.     

Capital structure and short-term decisions

Share price pressure can lead to managerial myopia as managersface incentives to make short-run decisions. We show how long-rundebt can negate myopic behavior by serving as an incentive tohave high future earnings in order to avoid the risk of bankruptcy.We show how increases in leverage could have been a signal inresponse to growing share price pressure in the 1980s. We obtaina theory of capital structure whose predictions are in linewith recent empirically observed patterns. We demonstrate thebenefits of high bankruptcy penalties in inducing efficientdecision making, and show how debt may, ex post, lead to inefficientdecisions being taken in an effort to pay it off. This ex postconsequence of debt can potentially undermine its ex ante incentivebenefits.     

Balance Sheet Conservatism and Debt Contracting

We study the role of borrowers’ balance sheet conservatism (i.e., conservatism in asset values) in debt contract design. We find that borrowing costs are decreasing in the degree of balance sheet conservatism, and this effect is stronger for firms with lower credit quality. This is consistent with balance sheet conservatism reducing lenders’ uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, thus facilitating the ex ante screening of borrowers. We predict that better ex ante screening also reduces the need for ex post monitoring, and find that balance sheet conservatism is associated with less restrictive covenant terms. Further, we find that asymmetric timeliness in earnings is associated with lower borrowing costs only when balance sheet conservatism is not high. This result suggests that lenders appear to recognize the constraining effect of high balance sheet conservatism on future conservatism in earnings.     

Control of sampling risks in auditing*

Abstract. This paper systematically analyzes the factors that affect sampling risks of the two major classes of statistical estimators in auditing. It develops three approaches for identifying when a particular estimator is preferred ex ante. It also provides a simulation analysis of ex ante-ex post sampling risk differences. The paper concludes that dollar-unit sampling may be more widely used than previous research has indicated. Résumé. Cet article analyse de façon systématique les facteurs d'influence du risque échantillonnal attaché aux deux grandes catégories d'estimateurs statistiques en vérification. Trois approches sont développées afin d'identifier les circonstances où un estimateur particulier s'avère préférable ex ante. Une analyse de simulation portant sur les différences de risque échantillonnai ex ante et ex post est également présentée. Cet article conclut que la méthode d'échantillonnage en unités monétaires semble plus utilisée que ce que la recherche antérieure laisse entendre.     

Empirical vintage models for the Netherlands: A review in outline

Summary The abundant literature on empirical vintage modelling for the Netherlands is not easily accessible. This article provides a discussion of the main issues covered by that research. Attention is given to (theoretical) model specifications, empirically inspired adjustments and empirical results. The empirical evidence for vintage models appears to be convincing, but it does not seem conclusive with respect to a preference for eitherex ante complementarity orex ante substitutability. Comprehensive modelling for the economy of the Netherlands up to now mainly usesex ante complementarity to describe the production technology. Apart from this, policy implications of such models show a degree of nuance which exceeds but also includes the purely demand oriented approach.     

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN INDIA: THE ROLE OF RETURN,RISK, AND INFLATION

The present study examines the determinants of foreign institutional investments (FII) in India, which by January 2003 almost exceeded U.S. $12 billion. Given the huge volume of these flows and their impact on the other domestic financial markets, understanding the behavior of the flows becomes very important, especially at a time of liberalizing the capital account. By using monthly data, we found that FII inflow depends on stock market returns, inflation rates (both domestic and foreign), and ex‐ante risk. In terms of magnitude, the impact of stock market returns and the ex‐ante risk turned out to be the major determinants of FII inflow. Unlike some of the other investigations of this topic, our study has not found any causative link running from FII inflow to stock returns. Stabilizing stock market volatility and minimizing the ex‐ante risk would help to attract more FII, an inflow of which has a positive impact on the real economy.     

Optimal economic institutions under rational overconfidence,with applications to the choice of exchange rate regime

We study the optimal choice of exchange rate regime when agents have beliefs that are mutually inconsistent. A general framework for identifying optimal policies in such situations is proposed and then used to compare fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. Agents are assumed to have diverse rational beliefs (rather than rational expectations), implying the prevalence of (rational) overconfidence. We argue that in such a situation, in comparing economic institutions, one should employ the concept of ex‐post optimality rather than that of Pareto optimality. Fixing the exchange rate is ex‐post optimal because it eliminates mistaken actions (based on mistaken beliefs).     

Performance-Based Conditionality: A European Perspective

The critique of conditionality has led to the recent emphasis on “ownership” by the recipient government. To promote ownership it has been suggested that traditional ex ante conditionality based on (promises) of policy changes be replaced by ex post conditionality in which aid is based on performance in terms of ultimate objectives. In this spirit, the European Commission has reformed its adjustment aid. This article reviews early experience with the EU initiative in four countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar and Uganda. We find a shift toward intermediate indicators, which are too distant from the final impact of the policies.     

A multivariate analysis of DISC election decision

Conclusion This study found that the decision by management to establish a DISC unit may not be satisfactorily identified by the examination of the financial data on either anex ante orex post basis. However, examination of the responses to the questionnaires indicate differences in the perceptions of the management of the two groups are significantly different on a multivariate basis.A possible implication of this research effort is that the use of published financial data alone cannot adequately explain decisions made by management. Indeed, unless management's expectations are realized, use of published data alone may result in unwarranted conclusions.     

A note on the time inconsistency of strategic trade policy

In a simple three-stage model of an international Cournot duopoly, optimal strategic trade policy is shown to be time inconsistent. If the domestic government first announces a production subsidy, firms then irrevocably commit resources to R&D, and finally play their output game, there is an incentive for the government to revise its ex ante optimal policy once R&D decisions have been made. If private agents anticipate this revision and if the government does not have the power to commit itself to the ex ante optimal policy, a credibility constraint has to be imposed.     

Redesigning the Aid Contract: Donors’ Use of Performance Indicators in Uganda

The perceived failure of traditional (ex ante) conditionality has led to proposals for using performance indicators as a basis for aid allocations (ex post conditionality). In this article we assess the role of performance indicators and their impact on the aid contract between donors and the government of Uganda. In Uganda the use of performance indicators has radically changed donor–recipient relations, by improving both program monitoring and donor coordination. It has, however, not yet fundamentally changed the incentive structure in the aid “contract.” To improve the incentive structure we propose a distinction between indicators used for monitoring and those designed to guide aid allocations.     

Information asymmetries and craft guilds in pre‐modern markets: evidence from Italian proto‐industry

This article analyses the relationship between guilds and information asymmetries using a large database of quality disputes from early modern Italy. It finds that a high‐quality urban textile industry was able to solve externalities using a range of ex ante and ex post monitoring mechanisms based on private market relationships and fair sanctions which effectively reduced adverse selection and information asymmetries. Instead, when guilds did use their quality regulations, the effect of the guild on information asymmetries and the industry as a whole was generally negative, by providing mechanisms that could be manipulated by entrenched interest groups for rent‐seeking purposes.     

Impact of the Information Asymmetry Between Managers and Owners Under Oligopoly

We show, using a Hotelling (1929) model with Laffont and Tirole (1986) firms, that under duopoly, the information asymmetry caused by the separation of ownership and control has two effects on owners’ incentives to induce effort. Information asymmetry raises the marginal cost of inducing effort, which decreases efforts and increases prices. Since all firms’ prices increase, this leads to a change in the expected demand of each firm, and thus in the marginal benefit of inducing effort, which may amplify or mitigate the initial impact. As a consequence, information asymmetry may induce some firms to increase efforts and lower prices. More surprisingly, it may increase both ex post and ex ante social welfare.