Variation in Output Shares and Endogenous Matching in Land Rental Contracts: Evidence from Ethiopia

We investigate the extent of variation in output sharing in land rental contracts and alternative hypotheses to explain this variation. Close to half of the rental contracts in our study in northern Ethiopia have output shares that deviate from the dominant 50–50 equal sharing. Variation in land quality, the relative bargaining power of landlords and tenants, production risks and shocks are hypothesised to influence output shares. Matched data of landlords and tenants are used. The importance of endogenous matching of landlords and tenants is investigated by assessing how endogenous tenant characteristics are correlated with landlord characteristics. We find evidence of negative assortative matching for key resource characteristics. A control function approach is used to control for endogenous matching in the output share models. The results reveal that production risks, as well as relative bargaining power, affect output shares in the reverse tenancy setting where tenants are relatively wealthier and more influential than landlords.     

What kind of labour regime is contract farming? Contracting and sharecropping in Java compared

This article compares contract farming with share tenancy, another labour regime in which smallholder farmers are bound by contract to deliver produce to another, usually more powerful party. Based on research in the Javanese village of Kaliloro, we explore contracting and sharecropping as labour regimes, each with their own specific mechanisms of surplus transfer from producers to non-producers. The cases compared are sharecropping of irrigated rice, contract farming of watermelon, and contract farming of poultry. There are important differences in how labour inputs are organized, how decisions are made, how costs are divided between landowner/contractor and farmer, and in the mechanisms of surplus transfer between the contracting parties. Exploring these differences allows us to understand and compare the role of the two labour regimes in the penetration of capital into the rural economy. Neither contract farming nor share tenancy are in themselves “win-win” or “win-lose” relationships, good or bad for small-scale cultivators. The actual balance of burdens and benefits—often contravening the provisions of written contracts or state regulation—is determined by power relations between the contracting parties.     

EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN SHARE CONTRACTS: LAND QUALITY,POPULATION PRESSURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Substantial variations in landowner's share under sharecropping arrangements are documented. Partial relationships between landowner's share and land quality and between landowner's share and physiological population density are explained by extensions of the competitive theory of share tenancy. It is shown that high landowner's share can be expected to be associated with high land quality and or high physiological density. The tendency for increases in population to be associated with increases in landlords' shares can be ameliorated by land-saving technological change.     

Experiments in farmers' collectives in Eastern India and Nepal: Process,benefits, and challenges

Do farmers' collectives, which pool land, labour, capital, and skills to create medium‐sized production units, offer a more viable model of farming for resource‐constrained smallholders than individual family farms? A participatory action research project in Eastern India and Nepal provides notable answers. Groups of marginal and tenant farmers, catalysed by the project, evolved into four different collective models with varying levels of cooperation, gender composition, and land ownership/tenancy status. Based on 3 years of action research, this paper examines how the models evolved and their differential outcomes. All groups have gained from cultivating contiguous plots in their efficiency of labour and machine use for land preparation and irrigation, and from economies in input purchase. Several collectives of tenant farmers have also enhanced their bargaining power vis‐a‐vis an entrenched landlord class and thus been able to negotiate lower rents and refuse long‐standing feudal obligations. However, the models differ in their extent of economic gain and their ability to handle gender inequalities and conflicts over labour sharing. The paper explores the historical, regional, and cultural factors that could explain such differences across the models. It thus offers unique insights into the processes, benefits, and challenges of farmers' collectives and provides pointers for replication and further research.     

Land rental market legal restrictions in Northern Ethiopia

This study assesses the de jure and de facto land market legal restrictions in the Tigray region in Ethiopia and the extent of implementation of the new land rental restrictions that were introduced in 2006 that state that not more than 50% of a farm can be rented out. The knowledge, perceptions and attitudes regarding the law among local Land Administration Committee (LAC) members, local conflict mediators and a sample of rural households are investigated. We find that the rented area restriction is commonly violated and not enforced. The law is circumvented by framing sharecropping as something other than land rental, although sharecropping is the dominant land rental contract in the region. When it is made clear that the law may hurt weak and vulnerable (often female-headed) households that are unable to farm their land themselves and therefore rent it out, the large majority of LAC members, conflict mediators and rural households are against the law.     

THE ANALYSIS OF NET FARM INCOME: AN EXAMINATION OF FARM MANAGEMENT SURVEY DATA

The practical significance of the conventional “net farm income” is elusive. It would be useful to have an accepted method of dividing “management and investment income” into its recognised Components—managerial salary and return on tenant's capital. One is a residual if the other can be calculated, and both alternatives are considered. An empirical formula is suggested for estimating the managerial salary which may be imputed to the farmer, taking account of his total turnover, his labour bill and his net farm income. This formula is then applied to Farm Management Survey data, for individual farms and for groups of average, high and low performance (output per £ input). The method may permit closer analysis of relative profitability.     

SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation?

In this article, we investigate whether the Brazilian notifications to the TBT and SPS agreements are characterized as retaliation or as cooperation in international agricultural trade in the period 1996–2008. A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model is used to estimate game models of bilateral trade between Brazil and its major partners (United States, European Union, and Japan). From the viewpoint of strategic games, the results suggest that the Brazilian notifications are forms of retaliation against the United States, and, regarding the European Union, the best result for Brazil was conciliation. On the other hand, if the results are interpreted as equilibria of bargaining games, they suggest that Brazil has great bargaining power in trade with the United States and that cooperation characterized agricultural trade between Brazil and the European Union in the period analyzed. In the case of agricultural trade between Brazil and Japan, only Japan has characteristics of a country with significant bargaining power.     

Landlords and farmers: implications of disparities in bargaining power for tenancy in agriculture

The equilibrium allocation of owner operated and rental land in the agricultural sector is examined given risk averse agents, risky returns and asset price risk. The model is extended to account for disparities in bargaining power among landlords and farmers. In the absence of disparities, the competitive equilibrium allocation satisfies the general conditions for optimal risk sharing with an adjustment factor similar to the optimal hedge ratio. Differences in bargaining power result in deviations from the optimal risk sharing conditions. Numerical simulations of tenancy structure are conducted for a developed agricultural economy exposed to various forms of risk. Estimates of parameter values representing the riskiness of returns and asset prices in this study are based on vector auto regressive techniques. The simulations show that a substantial reduction of the rental ratio is obtained in a situation where farmers are equally or more risk averse than landlords. Consequently, the results indicate that the importance of the tenancy institution as a risk sharing mechanism is severely mitigated in the presence of asset price risk, risky returns, relatively risk averse farmers and disparities in bargaining power.     

Passive farming and land development: A real options approach

The EU's farmers are no longer required to produce commodities to receive direct payments as long as they keep their land in good condition. Some believe this is bad for development because it encourages passive farming. We evaluate, using a real options approach, the implications of decoupled payments for the desirability and optimal timing of agricultural land development when considering sunk investment costs and uncertain future returns. We find that decoupled payments accelerate development while passive farming increases, by adding managerial flexibility, the value associated with land. We then use the Nash bargaining solution to identify the rental share to be paid for leasing land. We show that a deal for the lease of land can always be reached, but that the facility to use passive farming as an outside option allows landowners to extract policy rents, thereby undermining the potential for the Basic Payment Scheme to support tenant farmers’ incomes.     

The Forms of Monopoly Land Rent and Agrarian Organization

The incidence of diverse forms of surplus – fixed rents, share rents, profits from direct cultivation and labour rents – remains a conundrum in the study of agrarian organization. The article presents a theoretical account of the form of rent when a dominant landowner faces landowning peasants. From a purely economic standpoint, the surplus-maximizing choice among forms is shown to be contingent not only on their incentive and labour-process characteristics but also on land inequality and labour productivity. By incorporating the difficulty of extracting effort from hired labour as a fixed parameter, political and ideological factors are accommodated as independent additional determinants of the form of agrarian organization. When there is also a class of landless labourers, sharecropping or labour-tying may prove superior to wage-leadership as a form of tacit collusion among dominant and subordinate landowners. Some of these forms of rent extraction are also shown to restrict the monopolist's incentive to adopt technical improvements.     

Welfare impacts of technological change on women in southern Mali

It has often been hypothesized that new agricultural technologies could have an adverse impact on women because additional labor required of them reduces the time spent and therefore income earned from private-field activities. This study shows that the expansion of cotton cultivation on the household communal fields in southern Mali associated with the introduction of new technologies results in increased payments to women for their increased labor on the cotton fields. Unfortunately, these payments are small compared to the loss of revenue from private-plot production. Thus, the net effect of the expansion of household cotton cultivation is a reduction in incomes of women who cultivate private plots. Short-run policy implications of this study are that improving women's income requires concern with their private - plot earnings. For example, profitability of the private-field crops could be increased with higher input use. In the long run, as land becomes even more constrained, emphasis needs to be placed on institutional changes to increase women's bargaining power so that they obtain larger shares of the new income streams resulting from technological change on the communal field. Institutional changes already occurring in the region, with the apparent objective of increasing women's (and non-household head men's) bargaining power, include organized work teams and the movement toward smaller, nuclear families.     

Transactional framework of sharecropping: empirical evidence

Chew [Chew. Tek-Ann 1991 Share contracts in Malaysian rubber smallholdings. Land Econ., 67: 85–98; Chew, Tek-Ann, 1993. The Transactional framework of sharecropping: further implications. Can. J. Agric. Econ., 41: 209–221.] proposed a transactional framework of sharecropping that accommodates both the Marshallian and the Cheungian equilibria. An important conclusion arising thereof is the hypothesis that Cheung's sharecropping equilibrium is the rarity while the Marshallian equilibrium is the norm. In this paper, we collated some recent evidences to verify this hypothesis. The evidences support the Marshallian equilibrium, thereby providing indirect support for the transactional framework of sharecropping.     

Women’s Labour Contribution to Productivity and Efficiency in Agriculture: Empirical Evidence From Bangladesh

This article examines the contribution of women’s labour input to productivity and efficiency in crop farming using a large survey dataset of 1,839 households from 16 villages in two agro‐ecological regions of Bangladesh. Results reveal that female labour accounts for a substantial 28% of total labour use (mainly supplied from the family) and contributes significantly to productivity as well as technical efficiency. Contrary to expectation, the cost share of female labour input is significantly higher than the male share, and has a substitution relationship with all other inputs, including male labour. The estimated mean level of technical efficiency is 0.90, implying that crop output might be increased by 10% by eliminating technical inefficiency. Both male and female education have a significant impact on improving technical efficiency. Other significant technical efficiency shifters are farming experience, family size and crop diversification. Owner operators are found to be technically inefficient relative to the tenants. Policy implications include creation of a hired labour market for female labour so that more women can be involved in the production process, and can contribute to towards improving productivity and efficiency. In addition, investment in education for both men and women, strategies to promote crop diversification and effective regulation/modification of the tenancy market will significantly improve technical efficiency in this case.     

Self-enforcing contracts in agriculture

This article examines a self-enforcing contract between a risk-neutralprincipal and a risk-averse agent who is able to hold up valuesex post. It shows that risk aversion and variance can only partlyexplain the contract's incentive intensity. Ex post bargainingpower and outside options will also determine contract choice.If the agent's ex post bargaining position is weak, the principalcannot commit to high-powered incentives, whereas if the agent'sex post bargaining position is good, the agent cannot committo low-powered incentives. The model may thus explain some puzzlesin agricultural contracts, in particular why risk-averse agentssometimes accept to be governed by high-powered incentive contractsthat are quite similar to fixed rental contracts, and why risk-neutralagents are sometimes offered share contracts with lower-poweredincentives.     

Economic Development,Inequality and Poverty: An Analysis of Urban Violence in Colombia

This paper analyses some determinants of urban violence in seven major Colombian cities. The empirical research is intended to explore variations in violence across these Colombian cities and the influence of these variations on Colombia's economic development. In this study, several econometric data panel models and various estimate types are applied to control heterogeneity across the cities and to address endogeneity problems among the explanatory variables. The results show that education, poverty, inequality and the labour market are strong predictors of homicide rates in the seven Colombian cities. The results also demonstrate that city-level homicide rates depend on the city's level of development and the tendency of urban violence to persist over time. The findings thus demonstrate that factors such as inequality, poverty, education and the labour market influence urban violence, thereby generating negative effects on Colombia's economic and social development.     

Compensated optimal response under uncertainty in agricultural household models

This study derives the qualitative properties of a household's optimal consumption, family labour, hired labour and non-labour input choices under price and/or output risk through a Slutsky-type compensation without imposing any restriction on risk preference structure or production technology. These compensated responses provide the underpinning for welfare analysis in agricultural household models under risk. The framework for the evaluation of welfare effects of product and factor price interventions in a setting of output and price risk is developed. The paper also outlines an empirical model for estimation of the compensated demand and supply responses and for validation of the paper's analytical results.     

The roles of risk preferences,selection, and uncertain returns on land contracts

Using panel data on a statistically representative sample of Iowa farmland parcels from 1997 to 2017, we analyze the factors determining whether land is farmed by the owner or rented out under a cash rent or crop share contract. The landowner's decision to rent or operate the land depends on the distribution of expected net returns to the land, and so estimates of the factors affecting rental terms will be biased if the sample only includes rental contracts and excludes the owner-operator. Land with higher mean and/or lower variance of expected net returns is most likely to be rented out. Participants in the rental market will include the most risk-averse landowners and the least risk-averse tenants, while the least risk-averse landowners operate their own land. Our empirical results suggest that the rising use of cash rent contracts and declining incidence of owner-operation and crop-share rental contracts is consistent with falling coefficient of variation in expected net returns per acre.     

Do rural public works influence agricultural wages? The case of the employment guarantee scheme in India

Abstract

Since growth alone will not make a significant difference to agricultural wages in an oligopsonistic labour market, a case is made out for special employment programmes along the lines of the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in the Indian state of Maharashtra. The EGS has a substantial effect on agricultural wages—especially long‐term. Diminution of income supplementation through this scheme, following a sharp reduction in the share of poor participants, was thus partly offset by higher agricultural wages. To the extent that this income diminution reflected exclusion of the poor from the EGS because of deficiencies in its design and implementation, prompt remedial action would enhance significantly their bargaining power vis‐a‐vis that of large landholders.     

MGNREGA in Tamil Nadu: A Story of Success and Transformation?

Social protection has emerged as a key driver of development policy at the beginning of the twenty‐first century. It is widely considered a ‘good thing’ that has the potential not only to alleviate poverty and vulnerability, but also to generate more transformative outcomes in terms of empowerment and social justice. Based on an ethnographic study of the implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), India's flagship social protection policy, this paper takes a critical look at what this policy's ‘success’ consists of. The study was carried out in Tamil Nadu, a state widely presented as a ‘success’ in terms of MGNREGA's implementation, and describes who participates in the scheme and how success is understood and expressed at different social and bureaucratic levels. In terms of MGNREGA's outcomes, we conclude that the scheme is benefitting the poorest households – and Dalits and women in particular – especially in terms of providing a safety net and as a tool for poverty alleviation. But the scheme does more than that. It has also produced significant transformative outcomes for rural labourers, such as pushing up rural wage levels, enhancing low‐caste workers' bargaining power in the labour market and reducing their dependency on high‐caste employers. These benefits are not only substantial but also transformative in that they affect rural relations of production and contribute to the empowerment of the rural labouring poor. However, in terms of creating durable assets and promoting grassroots democracy, the scheme's outcomes are much less encouraging.     

FARMERS‘ WIVES - THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE FARM BUSINESS

The contribution which farmers' wives make to the farm business is typically overlooked and under-valued, yet the farm could not function without it. The paper describes the nature of the work done by wives on farms in the UK and Ireland as revealed by two recent postal surveys. Using data from the Farm Business Survey for England and Wales, it attempts to quantify some aspects of the work. It is suggested that farm wives may contribute 5 per cent of the manual hours worked by the regular labour force and 9–10 per cent of the total regular labour input on main holdings. Further, as hired and family labour is shed and farmers seek additional employment, the wife's labour contribution is likely to become more significant. Continued neglect of women's involvement may jeopardise the future of the family farm. The paper suggests how data collection procedures might be improved to give a more realistic picture of the wife's contribution.