THE ENDOGENEITY OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND CORPORATE FINANCING DECISIONS

Firms endogenize the extent of information asymmetry by choosing the optimal level and channels of direct communication with the capital markets. Firms choose more communication when they have a greater potential demand for external financing (characterized by higher growth, less cash, and higher leverage). We demonstrate that a higher level of communication is associated with a higher probability of equity issuance. We further document that the previously observed negative market reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements is attributed only to low‐communication firms; high‐communication SEO firms experience no significant adverse market reaction.     

OVER-THE-COUNTER FIRMS,ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION,AND FINANCING PREFERENCES

A puzzling empirical finding is that firms often seem to follow a pecking-order hierarchy of financing. Asymmetric information has been hypothesized as one possible explanation for the pecking-order hierarchy. A survey of Fortune 500 firms found strong support for the pecking-order model. This study surveys over-the-counter firms which seem more likely to experience asymmetric information than the Fortune 500. The findings of this study provide empirical support for the asymmetric information hypothesis by demonstrating that managers of firms with greater asymmetric information are more likely to believe their stock is mispriced leading them to follow the pecking-order model of financing.     

CONTINGENT CAPITAL: INTEGRATING CORPORATE FINANCING AND RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

Financial executives of companies that face a sharp increase in business or financial risks have two basic ways of protecting the solvency and strategic viability of their organizations: they can transfer those risks using insurance or derivatives; or they can raise additional capital, typically by issuing equity, to cushion the firm against the higher expected volatility. But CFOs now also have a third means of managing risk, known as "contingent capital," that effectively combines capital raising and risk management.
A contingent capital facility gives a company the right to raise capital after the realization of a loss arising from one or more specified risks, thus ensuring access to capital in potentially difficult times. For example, Swiss Re recently granted Michelin a five-year right to issue ten-year subordinated debt at a fixed spread over LIBOR, though only under conditions in which the tire maker expects its own earnings to be down. To the extent that it eliminates the need to keep more capital on the balance sheet, the use of such contingent capital has the potential to increase shareholder value by reducing a company's overall cost of capital. This article provides an introduction to some recent innovations in contingent capital, along with discussion of their role in integrating corporate finance and risk management.     

SHAREHOLDER RETURNS TO USA ACQUIRED FIRMS IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ACQUISITIONS

This research employs the residual methodology to examine whether gains to shareholders exist through international diversification. Under the assump tion that bid premiums (abnormal returns) are a proxy for expected gains in a merger, the magnitude of abnormal returns to acquired f m s in foreign and domestic mergers is determined using the market model. Any significant difference is imputed to expected gains from international diversification. Results indicate that although differences appear to exist, these differences are insignificant when method of payment and merger type are considered.     

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRMS’ OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND FINANCING DECISIONS

We investigate the impact that the political connections of publicly traded firms have on their performance and financing decisions. Using a long‐term event study covering a sample of 234 politically connected firms headquartered in 12 developed and 11 developing countries from 1989 to 2003, we find that firms increase their performance and indebtedness after the establishment of a political connection. We also find that the political connection is more strongly associated with changes in leverage and operating performance for firms with closer ties to political power. Overall, our study confirms that politically connected firms gain easier access to credit and reap benefits in terms of performance from their ties with politicians.     

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSALITY AMONG FIRMS' DIVIDEND,INVESTMENT, AND FINANCING DECISIONS

In this paper we posit that information asymmetries and the resultant signaling implications make a firm's investment decision dependent on its dividend and financing decisions. By applying the vector autoregressive modeling technique to 100 firms randomly selected from ten four-digit SIC industries, we find evidence of interdependencies among the three decisions. The success of the model in predicting each of the three decision variables also suggests that these decisions should be analyzed in a simultaneous equation framework.     

SECURITIZATION: A FINANCING STRATEGY FOR EMERGING MARKETS FIRMS

With emerging markets now in crisis, companies in developing countries are finding it difficult to obtain financing. Securitization, a transaction structure in which the securities sold to investors are backed by a company's receivables, is one of the few vehicles with at least the potential to provide financing at economic rates in the current environment of uncertainty.
Unlike U.S. securitization issues, emerging markets transactions often use a structure known as future flows securitization, in which the securities are backed by receivables that are not expected to be generated until after issuance. This article begins by describing how the process of future flows securitization carves out securities with levels of political risk acceptable to foreign capital market investors. Then it traces the history of emerging markets securitization from its origins in Latin America to its more recent uses during the Asian crisis. Securitization helped bring foreign investors back to Latin America after its debt crisis of the early 1980s. And while the Asian crisis has sharply reduced new issuance for all kinds of emerging market financings, the volume of securitization issues appears to have declined less precipitously than other types of transactions geared to foreign investors. Moreover, investment bankers are now hard at work planning new securitization issues for companies in both Latin America and Asia.
In exploring the longer-term effects of securitization on both domestic issuers and their economies, the author suggests that securitization could play a pivotal role in restoring emerging markets companies' access to global financial markets. Indeed, with a few exceptions such as Malaysia, most emerging markets are now responding to the crisis by taking measures to protect investors, such as requiring greater financial transparency and dispelling legal uncertainties that have discouraged securitization in particular and overseas investment more generally.     

THE DIVIDEND PAYOUTS OF PRIVATE FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM TAX COURT DECISIONS

To study the dividend payouts of private firms we extend the agency cost/external financing cost trade-off model of dividend payouts to include the accumulated earnings tax (AET). The firm's optimal dividend policy trades off the benefits from lower agency costs against external financing costs and the AET. Information from tax court records reveals that private firms' payouts are influenced by both agency costs and the AET.     

TESTING PRICE TAKING IN LOAN AND DEPOSIT MARKETS BY FINANCIAL FIRMS

This paper tests for the failure of price taking in the markets for financial and nonfinancial services. A firm that can purchase or sell an unlimited quantity at the prevailing price is a price taker. This hypothesis is tested using historical data on a sample of eighteen banks, considering financial services, demand deposits, time deposits, labor, cash, materials, and capital. The empirical results indicate little flexibility in the financial technology, whether price taking is imposed on all markets or only on the labor market.