The Dynamics of Gasoline Prices: Evidence from Daily French Micro Data

Using millions of individual gasoline prices collected at a daily frequency, we examine the speed at which market prices of refined oil are transmitted to retail gasoline prices in France. For that, we estimate a reduced‐form model of state‐dependent pricing where thresholds triggering price changes are allowed to vary over time and depend on the duration since the last price change. We find that the degree of pass‐through of wholesale prices to retail gasoline prices is on average 0.77 for diesel and 0.67 for petrol and depend on local market characteristics. The duration for a shock to be fully transmitted into prices is about 10 days. There is no significant asymmetry in the transmission of wholesale price to retail prices. Finally, the duration since the last price change has a significant effect on thresholds triggering price changes but a large variance of idiosyncratic shocks on thresholds is also crucial to replicate the size distribution of price changes.     

Nonlinear Pricing and the Market for Settling Payments

Fedwire Funds is a real‐time gross settlement system that uses a decreasing block pricing scheme to attract nonurgent payments. A bank's optimal response to Fedwire's pricing depends on its perceived benefits to settling nonurgent payments quickly. If the urgency for immediate settlement is great enough, a bank responds to marginal price; otherwise, it responds to average price. We find banks respond to average price, suggesting that Fedwire's advantage over competing services of being able to provide immediate settlement is small. Moreover, attempts to increase demand for Fedwire services by lowering the cost of banks' final block of payments may be ineffective if there is not a corresponding decrease in average cost.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

Competition For Order Flow, Market Quality, And Price Discovery In The Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock

We investigate competition for order flow, market quality, and price discovery in the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ). The QQQ, an AMEX‐listed, exchange‐traded fund, is the most actively traded security in the U.S. equities market. On July 31, 2001, the NYSE began trading the QQQ, marking the first time it traded securities of companies it does not list. The greatest volume of trading takes place on electronic communication networks (ECNs), following by trading on the AMEX and the NYSE. Most of the block trades are executed on the AMEX, where the bid‐ask spreads are narrower. We find that ECNs contribute the most to the price‐discovery process. The spreads on all trading platforms have decreased and market quality and price discovery have improved since QQQ shares have traded on the NYSE.     

THE LIQUIDITY ROUTE TO A LOWER COST OF CAPITAL

The managements of many public companies do not pay much attention to the liquidity of their securities. Many if not most CEOs and CFOs feel powerless to affect what goes on in financial markets, and a common attitude among top executives is that maintaining liquidity is the concern of the securities exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission. This approach may work for those companies whose stocks are already highly liquid—a group made up mainly of large‐cap companies, as well as a number of smaller high‐flying, high‐tech firms. But, for the vast majority of public companies—especially smaller and mid‐sized firms—this is likely to be the wrong policy. As the authors of this article demonstrated in their pioneering study (published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 1986), liquidity appears to be a major determinant of a company's cost of capital. As their theory suggests and their empirical tests confirmed, the more liquid a company's securities, the lower its cost of capital and the higher its stock price. And, as discussed in this article, academic research since then has produced a large and impressive body of evidence linking greater liquidity to higher stock prices. Although recent technological innovations such as Internet‐based trading have increased liquidity generally, not all companies appear to have benefited equally. The authors offer a number of suggestions for companies intent on increasing the liquidity of their stock. Specifically, they propose that managers do the following: (1) consider measures, such as stock splits, designed to increase their investor base by attracting small investors; (2) seek trading venues for their securities that promise to increase liquidity; and (3) take advantage of the new Internet technology to provide more and better information to investors. Moreover, for smaller companies with little or no analyst coverage, the authors offer the radical suggestion that such companies actually pay analysts to cover their stock, much as companies pay Moody's or Standard & Poors to rate their bonds. This, in the authors' view, would be a more efficient alternative to the current practice of using stock splits to encourage intermediaries to make markets in the firm's shares.     

What Cost of Capital Should You Use? The Market Has an Answer

The most widely used means of estimating a company's cost of equity capital is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). But as a growing number of academics and practitioners have suggested, use of the CAPM produces estimates that often fail to reflect the risks of the companies as perceived by current and potential investors. The authors' work, together with other research, also suggests that the cost of equity produced by the CAPM is often too high. To the extent this is so, companies are discounting investment projects at rates of return that may be leading them to pass up value‐adding opportunities. The authors advocate the use of a simple and practical alternative to the CAPM that does not use either an assumed market risk premium or a beta. It uses instead an equity premium that is implied by the current market price of a company's stock and, as such, is implicitly derived from investors' assessments of the firm's risk that are reflected in that price. More specifically, the alternative approach solves for the internal rate of return that equates the present value of expected future cash flows to the current market price. In support of this approach, studies have shown that such market‐implied measures are better predictors than CAPM‐based estimates of future stock returns, both at the individual‐firm and aggregate market levels.     

Toward Real‐Time Financial Reporting: How to Reduce Investors' Information Gap and the Cost of Capital

Public companies are struggling to provide detailed and accurate guidance in a turbulent world. Many have dropped guidance altogether, or substantially reduced the precision of their guidance. However, they pay a price for the resulting increase in investor uncertainty in the form of a higher cost of capital and reduced equity valuations. This article provides evidence that improving investors' information can help to reduce the cost of capital of public companies. A look at market data for the years 2007 through 2009 for German DAX 30 companies suggests that investor uncertainty stemming from current financial reporting practices appears to be amplifying the expected association between increases in the beta coefficient and the volatility of fundamentals such as revenues and income, which in turn could be increasing the cost of equity capital. The article explores ways for both individual companies and financial regulators to improve investor information and reduce the cost of capital. For individual companies, the proposed solution is more frequent and voluntary provision of information about actual performance in lieu of more extensive financial guidance. A look at market data for the years 2007 through 2009 for German DAX 30 companies suggests that investor uncertainty stemming from current financial reporting practices appears to be amplifying the expected association between increases in the beta coefficient and the volatility of fundamentals such as revenues and income, which in turn could be increasing the cost of equity capital. Quarterly reporting is a matter of tradition while today's information technology could easily provide investors with real‐time, or close to real‐time, financial information. Internal financial controls, the quality of financial reporting, and the cost of capital might all be improved by mandating faster reporting cycles.     

Optimal regulation of network expansion

We model the regulation of irreversible capacity expansion by a firm with private information about capacity costs, where investments are financed from the firm's cash flows and demand is stochastic. The optimal mechanism is implemented by a revenue tax that increases with the price cap. If the asymmetric information has large support, then the optimal mechanism consists of a laissez‐faire regime for low‐cost firms. That is, the firm's price cap corresponds to that of an unregulated monopolist, and it is not taxed. This “maximal distortion at the top” is necessary to provide information rents, as direct subsidies are not feasible.     

University of Texas Roundtable on The Role of Private Equity in the Financing and Restructuring of Oil and Gas Companies

In this second of two University of Texas roundtables, four highly successful veterans of the U.S. energy industry, with considerable experience running both public and private companies, discuss recent developments in this rapidly evolving industry. Among the most remarkable—and a major focus of this discussion—is the dramatic expansion of the output and productivity of the Permian Basin of West Texas, and the role of private equity in accomplishing it. Although the Permian has been a major source of oil and gas since 1920, the combination of massive horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has contributed to a tripling of production volumes from about 800,000 barrels per day to 2.5 million during the past ten years. In fact, the productivity gains are said to be so great that, even with the huge run‐up in the cost of acquiring acreage (to as high as $40,000 per acre), today's producers are projecting annual operating returns of 20% even if oil prices fail to rise above their current level of about $50 a barrel. What's more, there appears to have been a fairly clear division of labor between private and public companies in this recent development of the Permian. With most of the high‐priced acreage now being acquired by larger public companies, the primary role of private equity has been to identify and make good on opportunities to increase the productivity and value of smaller operations that can then be sold to public companies—companies that have the size and access to capital to benefit from the economies of scale produced by combining them with their other operations. Thanks to their earlier position in the value chain, investments by private equity groups have generally not only produced higher payoffs, on average, but involved larger operating and financial risks. And this difference in risk profile is reflected in a notable difference in hedging practices between public and private equity‐controlled companies. This difference was summed up as follows by a private equity partner who has also run several public oil and gas companies: To a much greater extent in private equity than in public companies, we think of our projects and companies as delivering value that is largely independent of changes in oil prices. Hedging is our way of saying we don't want to take oil price risk if we don't have to. We do not count on price increases to make our required returns. The returns come from operating the company successfully without the help of commodity prices.     

限售股个人所得税新政与企业所得税特别纳税调整分析——以"紫金富豪避税门"为例

紫金富豪避税门事件显示,上市公司限售股股东避税的灰色通道在于将法人股以成本价转让给关联自然人后再在二级市场套现.国税总局规定,自2010年起对个人转让限售股的所得应征收个人所得税.该规定部分堵塞了原有的避税漏洞,但无法追溯既往的限售股转让行为,对以限售股申购ETF行为是否纳税也未予以明确,且可能导致税收套利.税务机关应根据企业所得税法特别纳税调整的一般反避税条款,对无合理商业目的低价转让法人股权的关联企业进行纳税调整,达到反避税目的.     

Managing Pension Risks: A Corporate Finance Perspective

Defined benefit (DB) pension plans of both U.S. and European companies are significantly underfunded because of the low interest rate environment and prior decisions to invest heavily in equities. Additional contributions and the recovery of stock markets since the end of the crisis have helped a bit but pension underfunding remains significant. Pension underfunding has substantial corporate finance implications. The authors show that companies with large pension deficits have historically delivered weaker share price performance than their peers and also trade at lower valuation multiples. Large deficits also reduce financial flexibility, increase financial risk, particularly in downside economic scenarios, and contribute to greater stock price volatility and a higher cost of capital. The authors argue that the optimal approach to managing DB pension risks relates to the risk tolerance of specific companies and their short and long‐term strategic and financial priorities. Financial executives should consider the follow pension strategies:

• Voluntary Pension Contributions: Funding the pension gap by issuing new debt or equity can provide valuation and capital structure benefits—and in many cases is both NPV‐positive and EPS‐accretive. The authors show that investors have reacted favorably to both debt‐ and equity‐financed contributions.
• Plan de‐risking: Shifting the pension plan's assets from equity to fixed income has become an increasingly popular approach. The primary purpose of pension assets is to fund pension liabilities while limiting risk to the operating company. The pension plan should not be viewed or run as a profit center.
• Plan Restructuring: Companies should also consider alternatives such as terminating and freezing plans, paying lump sums, and changing accounting reporting.

     

Value‐Added Per Share (VAPS): A Value‐Relevant Corporate Performance Metric

The authors introduce Value Added Per Share (VAPS) as a value‐relevant metric that is intended to complement earnings per share (EPS) in helping corporate managers and analysts understand and overcome the limitations of GAAP‐based reporting. VAPS discounts a firm's past and projected cash flows at its “cost of capital,” allowing companies to avoid the subjective accounting accrual process and other practices that often make EPS misleading. A company's VAPS is calculated in three main steps: (1) estimate the change in the capitalized value of after‐tax operating cash flow by taking the net change (plus or minus) of the firm's operating cash flow after taxes and dividing that number by the firm's cost of capital; (2) subtract total investment expenditures; and (3) divide by the number of shares outstanding. By capitalizing the change in after‐tax operating cash flow, one finds the net change in a firm's current operations value. By subtracting investment expenditures from that change in current operations value, the analyst gets a clearer picture of the benefit to shareholders net of the funds used to create that benefit. Consistent with basic theory, VAPS is positive when a company earns a return at least equal to its cost of capital and negative otherwise. Because of their fundamental differences, EPS and VAPS are likely to send different signals, and VAPS is expected to provide greater insight into stock price changes. The authors provide the findings of statistical tests showing the superior explanatory power of VAPS and recommend that companies publish statements of VAPS along with standard GAAP results, especially since the former can be readily calculated using the available income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement data.     

The effect of large audit firm mergers on audit pricing in the UK

This paper examines the effects on UK audit market concentration and pricing of mergers between the large audit firms and the demise of Andersen. Based on data over the period 1985–2002, it appears that mergers contributed to a rise in concentration ratios to levels that suggest concern about the potential for monopoly pricing. The high concentration ratios have not improved the level of price competition in the UK audit market. Our pooled models suggest that concentration ratios are associated with higher audit fees. The evidence suggests that the effects of mergers between big firms on brand name fee premium and on price competition vary depending on the particular circumstances. The brand name premium is strongest for the largest quartile of companies prior to the mergers. After the Big Six mergers, the premium increases for average‐sized companies but falls for the smallest and largest companies. Following the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, the premium increases for below median‐sized clients but decreases for above‐median sized clients. For the Deloitte‐Andersen transaction, the premium falls for the smallest and largest companies but increases for those in the second quartile. Our results provide evidence that auditees are likely to pay higher fees if their auditor merges with a larger counterpart. We attribute merger‐related fee hikes to product differentiation, rather than anti‐competitive pricing.     

Microdata Evidence on the Empirical Importance of Selection Effects in Menu‐Cost Models

We use microdata on product prices linked to information on the producing firms that set them to study to what extent the timing of price changes reacts to changes in marginal cost. This self‐selection of price changes is a key feature in the canonical Menu‐Cost model a la Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007), which may generate near monetary neutrality (Golosov and Lucas Jr. 2007, Karadi and Reiff 2016), but is absent in the Calvo (1983) model. We find that the microdata strongly favors the Calvo (1983) model. Thus, upstream in the supply chain, price setting is best characterized by a very low degree of self‐selection into price changes.     

实施整合报告能否提高信息的价值相关性——来自第一个强制实施整合报告的国家南非的经验证据

本文以世界上第一个强制实施整合报告的国家(南非)的上市公司为样本,研究了2010年其强制实施后的市场反应结果。通过对整合报告实施前后信息价值相关性变化的考察,来检验整合报告的实施是否对企业价值产生影响。结果发现,在整合报告制度实施前,由于存在自愿性且不规范的披露,投资者对财务信息的决策依赖程度已有所下降,而当正式实施整合报告后,财务信息价值相关性下降的趋势有所减缓,从而使整合信息发挥更强的决策有用性。这说明整合报告的实施,非财务信息对股价的解释力度提升,可以弥补财务信息价值相关性下降的趋势,从而间接支持了国际社会倡导实施整合报告的目的,使得股价更能全面反映企业价值创造及可持续发展能力。     

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity‐based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives–particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market–appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep‐underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity‐based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long‐run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to “time” the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near‐term earnings at the expense of longer‐term cash flow. Besides requiring “more permanent” holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular “fixed value” plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of “fixed number” plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at‐the‐money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the “opportunity cost” of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well‐diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow‐vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options:

• ? they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders);
• ? they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and
• ? the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press.

     

信息披露考核降低了股价崩盘风险吗？

深交所自2001年起对于上市公司的信息披露工作进行考核。本文从信息透明度的 角度,利用深交所上市公司信息披露考核数据,考察信息披露质量对股价崩盘风险的影响。研 究发现：（1）深圳证券交易所的信息披露考核对于股价崩盘风险有显著影响,整体来看上市 公司的信息披露质量与股价崩盘风险存在显著的负向关系;（2）对于经营业绩较差的公司而 言,信息披露质量与股价崩盘风险的负向关系更加显著;（3）相对于非主板公司而言,信息披 露质量对主板公司的股价崩盘风险的抑制作用更加显著。     

Fine‐Tuning a Corporate Hedging Portfolio: The Case of an Airline

Industrial companies typically face a multitude of risks that could cause significant fluctuations in their cash flow. This is a case study of the hedging strategy adopted by an international air carrier to manage its jet‐fuel price exposure. The airline's hedging approach uses “strips” of monthly collars constructed with Asian options whose payoffs are based on average of “within‐prompt‐month” oil prices. Using the carrier's own implicit objective function based on an annual granularity, the authors show how the air carrier could fine‐tune its current hedge portfolio by adding tailored exotic options. The article describes annual average‐price options, provides an explicit valuation of them, and considers how such instruments may affect corporate liquidity. Consistent with its annual objective function, the airline made this exotic derivative the central tool to hedge across all potential realized values of annual jet‐fuel spot prices. The authors believe this modified portfolio is better suited to address the firm's hedging cost and its overall exposure to jet‐fuel price fluctuations.     

An Empirical Model of Optimal Capital Structure1

The authors provide a reasonably user‐friendly and intuitive model for arriving at a company's optimal, or value‐maximizing, leverage ratio that is based on the estimation of company‐specific cost and benefit functions for debt financing. The benefit functions are downward‐sloping, reflecting the drop in the incremental value of debt with increases in the amount used. The cost functions are upward‐sloping, reflecting the increase in costs associated with increases in leverage. The cost functions vary among companies in ways that reflect differences in corporate characteristics such as size, profitability, dividend policy, book‐to‐market ratio, and asset collateral and redeployability. The authors use these cost and benefit functions to produce an estimate of a company's optimal amount of debt. Just as equilibrium in economics textbooks occurs where supply equals demand, optimal capital structure occurs at the point where the marginal benefit of debt equals the marginal cost. The article illustrates optimal debt choices for companies such as Barnes & Noble, Coca‐Cola, Six Flags, and Performance Food Group. The authors also estimate the net benefit of debt usage (in terms of the increase in firm or enterprise value) for companies that are optimally levered, as well as the net cost of being underleveraged for companies with too little debt, and the cost of overleveraging for companies with too much. One critical insight of the model is that the costs associated with overleveraging appear to be significantly higher, at least for some companies, than the costs of being underleveraged.     

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS ROUNDTABLE ON ENERGY DERIVATIVES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE ENERGY SECTOR

In this roundtable, a successful oil entrepreneur and a group of ex‐bankers whose careers have taken them into the energy business discuss the deregulation of energy markets and the emergence of energy derivatives, and how these two developments have affected both the way companies do business with each other, and how the companies themselves are organized internally. The first part of this two‐part discussion explores how derivatives and corporate risk management have produced a strikingly new business model for a number of once traditional energy companies, including Enron Corp. and Mirant Corporation (until recently, Southern Energy). In addition to its ability to change corporate strategy, the panelists also consider how the hedging of price risks can affect a company's financing strategy and cost of capital. A notable feature of the new business model is a corporate structure that differs greatly from that of conventional large energy companies. And in the second half of the discussion, the focus shifts from risk management and strategy to issues of corporate structure, such as: How do companies divide themselves into business centers for reporting and accountability; how much decision‐making authority is entrusted to the managers of those divisions; and how many layers of corporate management are necessary to coordinate and control the activities of the business units? Also discussed at great length are questions of performance evaluation and incentive compensation: How do companies evaluate their own performance on a year‐to‐year basis? And what basis do they use for rewarding their managers?